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


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**Things divine and supernatural conceived**



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# THINGS

## DIVINE and SUPERNATURAL

Conceived by

# ANALOGY

With Things

NATURAL and HUMAN.

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βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπληρα ἐν αἰνίγματι.

1 Cor. xiii. 12.

*Quod ad Myſteriorum Explicationem attinet, videmus non dedignari Deum ad Infirmiſſimam Captivitatē noſtræ ſe demittere; Myſteria ſua ita explicando, ut a nobis optime ea poſſint percipi: Atque Revelationes ſuas in Rationis noſtræ Syllepſes et Notiones veluti INOCULANDO; atque Inſpirationes ad Intellectum noſtrum aperiendum ſic accommodando, quemadmodum Figura Clavis aptatur Figuræ Seræ. Baco.*

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*By the Author of*

The Procedure, Extent and Limits of Human Underſtanding.

---

L O N D O N:

Printed for WILLIAM INNYS and RICHARD MANBY  
at the Weſt-End of St. Paul's.

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## ERRATA.

Pag. 267. line 24. for it read this *Internal Disposition*. Pag. 277.  
line 18. after or insert *exhausted* by.

OF

# Divine Analogy.

## C H A P. I.

*The Difference between Metaphor and Analogy in general; and of divine Analogy in particular.*

HAVING in the first Book of the former Tract treated of the *Ideas of Sensation*, as the only *Original Materials* for the Mind of Man to work upon, and the *First Foundation* on which the whole Superstructure of all our Knowledge both human and divine is raised; having also in the Second treated of the *Pure Intellect*, and its various *Operations* upon those Ideas and the *Conceptions* and *Complex Notions* formed partly out of them: I am now to discourse more fully and particularly of that *Divine Analogy* to which we owe the greatest Enlargement of human Understanding; and without which the Nature and Properties of God and supernatural Beings, and the Objects of another World, would be as utterly inconceivable to us as if they had no Existence.

Nothing, as I have formerly observed, is  
B of

of greater Consequence in order to set out rightly the Bounds and Limits of human Understanding; to the stating the true Use of Reason in Religion; and to give us a right Notion of our Christian Myſteries, than the apprehending with ſome exactneſs the Nature of *Metaphor* and *Analogy*: Which have been commonly miſtaken one for the other, and treated of indiſtinctly and confuſedly under one and the ſame Conſideration; whereas there is a great and material Difference between them, which tho' I have already touched on, I ſhall now deſcribe more at large.

METAPHOR in general, is a *Subſtitution* of the *Idea* or *Conception* of one Thing, with the Term belonging to it, to *Stand for* another Thing, on Account of an *Appearing* Similitude only, *Without any real Reſemblance, and true correſpondency between the Things compared*; as when the Pſalmiſt deſcribes the *Verdure* and *Fruitfulneſs* of Vallies by *Laughing* and *Singing*. ANALOGY in general, is the *Subſtituting* the *Idea* or *Conception* of one Thing to *Stand for* and *Repreſent* another, on Account of a *True Reſemblance, and Correſpondent Reality in the very Nature of the Things compared*. It is defined by *Ariſtotle*, ἰσότης τοῦ λόγου, an *Equality* or *Parity* of *Reason*; tho' in *Strictneſs* and *Truth* the *Parity of Reasoning* is rather *Built* on the *Similitude* and *Analogy* and conſequent to them, than the ſame Thing with them.

1. THEY both agree in this, That they are equally a *Substitution* of the Idea or Conception of one Thing to stand for another; and that by them a Word is *Transferred* from its *First* and *Proper* Signification, to express some other Thing in a more remote and *Secondary* Meaning.

2. THEY agree also in this, That the *Substituted* Ideas or Conceptions cannot, either in Analogy or Metaphor, *Represent* to our Mind any thing of the *Real true Nature* of the Objects they stand for, *As they are in themselves*. They only furnish us at best with *Similitudes*; or *Representative* and *Mediate* Conceptions of those Objects.

BUT they differ in this. First, That the *Ground* and *Foundation* of Metaphor consists only in an *Appearing* or *Imaginary* Resemblance and Correspondency; as when God is said to have *Hands*, and *Eyes*, and *Ears*. But the Foundation of Analogy is an *Actual Similitude* and a *Real Correspondency* in the very *Nature* of Things; which lays a Foundation for a *Parity of Reason* even between Things different in *Nature* and *Kind*: As when God is said to have *Knowledge*, *Power*, and *Goodness*.

2. THEY differ in this. Metaphor is altogether *Arbitrary*, and the Result merely of the *Imagination*; it is rather a *Figure of Speech*, than a *Real Similitude* and *Comparison of Things*;

and therefore is properly of Consideration in Rhetoric and Poetry. But Analogy being built on the very Nature of Things themselves, is a *Necessary* and *Useful* Method of *Conception* and *Reasoning*; and therefore of Consideration in Physics and Metaphysics. It is the Result of Reason viewing the *True Nature* of Beings. The Comparison here contains something not only Actual and Real, but *Correspondent* and *Similar*; and the Parity of Reasoning upon it is just and true. For Instance, when God is called a *Father* in respect of Christ, being derived from his very Nature and Essence; both the Word and Conception are transfered to him by *Analogy*, founded on the very *Nature* of God and of Man, thus: What a Father is to his Son begotten in the way of Nature, *That* God the Father is to Christ who was derived from him by a supernatural Generation. The Application of the same Conception and Word *Son* to both is not *Arbitrary*; but founded on a real Correspondency *Antecedent* to any Operation of our Mind upon it.

As all Language abounds with Metaphor and that Analogy which is between worldly Things, insomuch that by Reason of the constant Use of such Phrases we do not often distinguish the *Propriety* from the *Secondary* Meaning: So the Scriptures are full of this *Divine Analogy*; as I have intitled it in the first of these Tracts, to distinguish it from that which is *Human*, and founded on the Resemblance  
and



and Correspondency we observe between the Things of this World, which are equally the *Immediate* Objects of our Senses and our Reason : But more particularly when they speak of the Myſteries of Chriſtianity, as in the Words *Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Mediator, Redemption, Interceſſion*, and ſuch like. So that we run into them inſenſibly, and they become ſo familiar to us that we do not diſtinguiſh the *Analogy* in thoſe Terms, from the ſtrict *Propriety* of them as they were originally applyed to the common and immediate Objects of our Faculties.

THIS *Divine* Analogy differs from that which is *Human*, Firſt, In that the *Particular* Similitude and Correspondency which is the Foundation of human Analogy, either is or may be in ſome Degree *Known*. It is between Things which are, or may be, equally the *Direct* and *Immediate* Objects of our Faculties *In ſome Meaſure* ; as the Operations of *Reason* in Man, and of *Natural Inſtinct* in Brutes. But the *Particular* Similitude, and *Preciſe* Correspondency which is the *Ground* of that divine Analogy by which we transfer our Conceptions and Words from Earth to Heaven, and from Man to God ; is not only actually *Unknown*, but as *Inconceivable* to us as thoſe divine Things themſelves which it ſerves to repreſent. The Compariſon and Parity of Reason here is drawn between Things well known and familiar ; and what is immaterial, ſupernatural, and inconceivable to us *As it is in its ſelf*, and far removed out of the

*Direct* Reach of all our Capacities. And accordingly in this divine Analogy there is always *One Term* at least, expressive of something not to be known or comprehended *As it is in its own Nature*. For Instance, What *Wisdom* is in an human Creature, That some *Similar* and *Correspondent*, but *Incomprehensible* Perfection is in God. We have but *One* Conception for both these Things; we express them by the *Same* Word *Wisdom*; and we Analogically transfer both the Word and the Conception from that *Wisdom* and *Thought* we are immediately Conscious of, to that imperceptible and ineffable Perfection in the Divinity, to the *True* and *Real Nature* of which we are intirely blind: Which Perfection is in the utmost *Propriety* of Speech we are capable of, called *Wisdom*; and not by a mere *Figure* only which is purely *Voluntary*, and which has no *Foundation* in the *Nature* of Things.

J U S T thus are all the Mysteries of the Gospel conceived and expressed. The Term *Mediator* for Instance is thus transfered to Christ. In its *Strictly proper* Acceptation it signifies what is common and familiar; namely a Person who interposes between Men at Variance, and by his good Offices on both Sides works an intire Reconciliation and Friendship. This plain vulgar Word and Conception are in the Gospel *Substituted* to express and *Represent* to us Christ's *Mediation* between God and Man; the *True Kind* and *Manner* of which as it is in it self,

self, is to us inconceivable and ineffable. However, tho' the *Real Nature* of it is thus above all our Capacities, yet thus much we learn from the Term *Clearly* and *Fully* and *Certainly*: That as an human Person by his Mediation perfectly reconciles others at Enmity among themselves; so are we brought into favour with God, by that incomprehensible Performance of Christ, which we can no otherwise conceive than under the Analogy of a worldly Mediation. So that it is a *Real* and *Similar* and *Correspondent* Performance of Christ; tho' not a *Literal* Mediation, or any Operation the same in Kind with what is merely natural and human.

Now tho' this divine Analogy is certainly founded on an *Actual Similitude* and *Real Correspondency* between worldly and human, and supernatural and divine Objects: Yet it is very sure the things of this Life can bear no such Resemblance or Correspondency to heavenly Things, as they do to each other. And this is more especially true of those Conceptions and Words by which we express the Attributes of God: For it is utterly impossible to conceive, what *Particular Degree* or *Proportion* of Similitude and Correspondency the Properties of a *Finite Creature* bear to the Perfections of an *Infinite Creator*. And therefore we must and ought to depend on the Veracity and Goodness of God, who has made this Analogy *Necessary* to us in our Conceptions of himself; for such a *True* and *Real*, tho' *Incomprehensible* Similitude and

Correspondency between them, as may be a safe and sufficient Foundation for all our *Moral Reasonings* and *Religious Sentiments*. So that tho' we have the greatest *Reason*, and are under an absolute *Necessity* to use divine Analogy in all our Conceptions and Discourses of God, and Things heavenly and immaterial; yet *That Part* of the *Ground* of it which exists in the *Divine Things* themselves, is utterly imperceptible to us. Tho' we are sure there must be a *Real Ground* for it there, yet we cannot tell *Particularly* what it is, or comprehend *Wherein exactly* it consists.

FROM what has been said we may discern how the Words *Door*, *Vine*, *Way*, and *Light* when applyed to Christ, and many other such like Terms with which the Scripture abounds, are pure *Figure* and *Metaphor*: Because they contain no other than an *Imaginary Resemblance*; and the Comparison is between Things equally the *Direct Objects* of our Understanding *At present*. So Christ figuratively calls himself a *Door*, as by him we are *Admitted* into his Church on *Earth*, and by that Means into Heaven hereafter. He says of himself *I am the true Vine*, because all good Christians are Branches *Grafted* upon him by being admitted *Members* of his Church, and so become Partakers *Here* of all the happy Means of Salvation which nourish the Soul. He says again *I am the Way*, as his Doctrine *Directs* us here in our Way to Heaven. And thus he is styled the *Light* of the World,

as

as his Instructions and Example disperse the *Clouds* of Error, *Inform* our Understandings, and *Direct* our moral Actions. The Comparison in these Instances is between a *Door*, and Admission into the *Visible* Church of Christ; between a *Vine*, and the *Members* of his Church *Here*; between a *Way*, and his *Doctrine*; between *Light*, and his *Instructions* and *Example*. So that there is nothing of that *Divine Analogy* in them by which a Word is transferred from the proper and immediate Objects of our Senses and Reason, to import something *Divine* and *Supernatural*; nor are they made Use of to stand for and *Represent* any *Similar* and *Correspondent* Reality in the Nature or Operations of *Heavenly* Beings; as it is in the words *Father*, *Son*, *Holy Spirit*, *Redemption*, *Intercession*, and such like, under which Terms the *Mysteries* of Christianity are revealed to us. Besides that the first Sort of Words are used without an *Absolute Necessity*, and may all of them be expressed without a Figure and in proper Terms: But the latter are absolutely *Necessary* in our present State; because we can have no *Proper* Words or Ideas, nor any *Direct* Conceptions of Things divine and purely immaterial. To which I shall add, that we can make *Good Sense* of all that former Sort of Words and Expressions relating to God, and to Christ, and to Heaven (which are pure Figure) *Without* transferring them to any Thing *Really Like* and *Correspondent* in immaterial Beings. But we can find no Sense or Meaning in the *Latter* Sort, unless we suppose



suppose them to signify something actually *True* and *Similar* and *Answerable* in the *Very Nature* of God and of Christ.

2. FROM these Instances it appears they differ in this likewise. That *Human* Analogy is in great Measure *Voluntary*; because whatever is thereby intended, is capable of being known by *Direct* Ideas or Conceptions, and expressed by a proper Word, tho' perhaps not with the same Emphasis and Elegance; thus the subtle *Knowlege* of a *Fox* may be expressed by *Natural Instinct*, which is more proper. But the Use of divine Analogy is from absolute *Necessity*, because we have neither *Proper* Ideas or Words, nor *Direct* Conceptions of Things divine and immaterial; and must therefore not think nor speak of them at all, unless we perform it by a Similitude and Correspondency with Things human and immediately known. God's *Knowlege* for Instance could never have been *Justly* and *Usefully* conceived by us at all; if we did not form a Conception of it by Analogy with that Knowlege and Thinking which we experience in an human Mind. And Christ's prevailing in Heaven with God the Father for our Pardon and Reconciliation, could no way so justly be revealed to us, as by Analogy with a *Man's* being an *Advocate* and *Interceding* successfully with a temporal Prince for the Life of another who is a Criminal; and thus it is in all the other Mysteries of Christianity, and Attributes of God.

3. A THIRD Difference is this. That *Human* Analogy as well as all Metaphor, may consist in a Substitution of mere *Ideas of Sensation only*. But the true *Divine* Analogy, consists in a Substitution of our *Conceptions* and *Complex Notions*, to represent supernatural and heavenly Things. The Reason of this is apparent; because Objects of mere Sense can bear no *Real Resemblance* to purely spiritual Beings; they cannot *Represent* any *Similar* and *Correspondent Reality* in divine Things. But the *Faculties* and *Properties* and *Operations* of our own Minds, and the *Conscious Conceptions* we have of them; together with some of the *Complex Notions* we form out of *Them* considered in *Conjunction* with *Ideas of Sense*; furnish us with such a *Real Resemblance* and *True Correspondency* between the *Properties* and *Actions* of human Creatures, and the *Attributes* and *Operations* of divine and supernatural Beings, as serve all the noble Ends of *Morality* and *Religion* in this Life. And we form an unanswerable Argument to prove that such Analogical Conceptions are *Just* and *True*; not only from our being created after the *Image* of God; But also from the absolute *Necessity* of this Analogy to our *Thinking* and *Speaking* at all of the divine Being and the Objects of another Life; as well as from the *Example* of God himself in his *Revelation* to Mankind.

It may be objected against this last Distinction,

tion, That in all our most abstracted Conceptions and most sublime Complex Notions, there is a mixture of Ideas of *Sensation*; which render them very *Improper and Unworthy* Representations of *Purely Spiritual* Perfections; and that for this Reason there can be no *True and Just* Analogy between them.

I ANSWER, that without doubt there is a mixture of Ideas of Sense in our most elevated Notions and Conceptions. We cannot be conscious of any Faculty of our own Minds without considering it, either as operating on some Ideas of Sense, or without taking them in *Some Measure* into the Account: While our Spirit continues to act in a necessary Conjunction with Matter, this must be the Case. But all that can be truly infered from hence is, That therefore such substituted Objects and Analogous Conceptions do not furnish us with any Knowledge of divine and supernatural Things as they are *In themselves*, but with *Similitudes only* of them; That they are not *Exact* Images of them in *Every Respect*; That they do not convey to us any Idea of the *Real Nature* of those Beings; That there is not such a *Perfect, Complete and Adequate* Resemblance between *Them* and their supernatural *Correspondent Realities*, as if we were all Spirit, and could form Conceptions of these without any mixture of such Ideas: All which I readily grant. But still there is such a *Real tho' Distant* Resemblance and Analogy between them, and the Objects they are substituted to represent;

sent ; as lays a solid Foundation whereon to build a *Just* Parity of Reasoning between them. Tho' the Knowledge we have after this Manner of divine and heavenly Objects be *Analogous only*, yet it is not *Delusive* ; it is *Just*, and *Real*, and *True*, and *Clear*, as far as it goes ; and therefore no *Improper* Representation as the Objection supposes ; unless by *Improper* be meant *Analogical*, as opposed to *Proper* Ideas or *Direct* Conceptions. The Faculties and Properties and Operations of our own Spirit, tho' in Conjunction with Matter, and notwithstanding the inevitable Mixture of sensitive Ideas in our Conceptions ; will always afford us a *True* tho' *Remote* Analogy whereby to conceive the Attributes and Operations of God himself, after whose Image it was created. Besides that whatsoever is bound down upon us by an absolute Necessity of our Nature, and is the very *Best* Method of proceeding we have ; cannot be justly called *Improper* or *Unworthy*. We might as well argue that we can form no Notions at all *Worthy* of God, because our Soul acts necessarily in Conjunction with Matter. Whereas were the brightest *Angel* in Heaven to form an *Analogous* Conception of God from its own Perfections, even this would be but a distant *Similitude only* or *Representation* of them in a *Finite* Creature ; tho' perhaps it might thus be made up *Without* any Ideas of Sense intermixed ; and yet we cannot say it would be *Improper* or *Unworthy*. Now all the Difference between such an *Angel's* Conception of God, and our's,

would

would be this ; That as he is created in a nearer Resemblance of the Divinity, so his Analogy would be vastly more *Perfect*, and *Exact*, and *Lively* than our's ; tho' at the same time our's may be equally *Just*, and *True*, and *Clear*, and *Worthy*, as far as it goes. And therefore,

4. A FOURTH Difference is this. That in this divine Analogy we cannot justly say the same Word or Conception is attributed to one Thing *Properly*, and to another *Improperly* ; as it is in Metaphor, and in many Instances of human Analogy : Because we can have no Words *Strictly proper* for those heavenly Things ; and therefore they cannot be said to be *Improperly* expressed or represented by the only Terms and Conceptions we can *Possibly* use for them, and which accordingly are the most proper Terms and Notions we are capable of. But we can truly say, that in divine Analogy the same Word and Conception is affixed to one Thing *Properly* or *Literally*, and to another *Analogically* ; that is, after the most proper Manner we are *Capable* of conceiving and expressing it. The Word and Conception is *Strictly proper* to one, and *Necessarily transferred* to the other. Thus the Word *Intercession* with the Notion annexed to it, is properly and literally used for one Man's Application to another for the Pardon of a third Person ; and yet it does not express and represent the divine and incomprehensible Intercession of *Christ* with the *Father* for the Pardon of Sinners *Improperly*, but *Analogically* : Be-  
cause



cause these are the only Word and Conception we have for it; and these are *Necessarily* used to convey to us the Knowledge of a Thing, for the *Real Nature* and *True Manner* of which we can have neither a *Proper Term* nor any *Direct Idea* or Notion.

## C H A P. II.

*The various Methods of Men's accounting for the manner of our Knowledge of Things Divine and Immaterial.*

**T**HIS *Divine Analogy* of which I have been discoursing, is that by which the Mind of Man is render'd capable of raising itself above all things Material and Human; by which only it can acquire any acquaintance with the World of Spirits, or the great Creator; with those heavenly Objects which are yet behind the Veil, and will not open to a more *Direct* and *Immediate View*, till we enter into the *Holy of Holies*, where we are to behold *Face to Face*.

CONCERNING this Analogy I shall make the following Observations.

I. WE are to lay it down as a sure and undeniable Truth which holds universally, That we have not the least *Perception* or *Idea* of things *Immaterial*, of purely spiritual Beings, or of  
God

God in particular, as they are in their *Own Nature*; nor doth the least spark or glympse of the Light of Heaven, or Glory of God dart itself *Directly* into an human Mind. We have no Faculties of Body or Soul for any such *Direct* Idea or Perception of them in this Life.

MEN have several ways endeavoured to account for the *Manner* of our Knowlege or Conceptions of things *Immaterial*. Some say the *Ideas* which they suppose we have of them, are derived from their original Ideas in the divine Mind, *Tanquam ab æterno exemplari*; as from the *Archetypes* according to which all things were formed: For they suppose that God hath in himself the Ideas of all things created by him, and that we derive them *Immediately* from thence; thus a Modern Philosopher explains it farther, *By the Power of which Ideas they were created*; *Æterna veritas exterius nos admonet per imagines a rebus desumptas*; *sed forte interius per illam Similitudinem qua rem ipsam producit*.

ANOTHER way of accounting for our Knowlege and Conceptions of God and heavenly things is, by imagining our Ideas of them to be as some sparks of divine Light, struck out of the Mind by a strong impression from above. The Ideas of this sort are described to be *Quædam Intellectionis scintillatio, et est momentanea*; they are called *Repentina Lumina*, such as happen but seldom, and do not remain upon the Mind; and we have, say they, no Idea of  
God

God in this Life but *Per subitas et intercisas Coruſtationes*: Other Philoſophers on the contrary ſay that material Objects are perceived by *Ideas*, but that immaterial Objects are *Self Intelligible*; they could find no *Ideas* of them in the Mind, and from thence concluded that things Immaterial muſt be perceived without any *Mediation* of *Ideas*:

OTHERS again tell us this is performed by *Purely Spiritual* Symbols or Representations of thoſe immaterial Beings *Inſenſibly conveyed* into the Mind; accordingly they ſay *Genus videndi Deum eſt Symbolicum; ſunt enim ſpiritualia ſymbola quibus Deus eminens conſpicitur*; by help of which we have very imperfect and diſtant *Views* of him:

OTHERS, becauſe they could not rightly diſtinguiſh the different manner of our Knowledge of things purely Spiritual, and Material; put them all upon a Level and held, *That we ſee all things in God*: For he having the *Ideas* of all things in him, and being ever preſent to our Minds, we can ſee thoſe *Ideas* no otherwiſe than they are in that divine Mind which is preſent to ours; and purſuant to, this Notion they ſtyle God the *Intelligible World* or *Place* of Spirits, as this World is the *Place* of things Material.

OTHERS again have found themſelves ſo intirely at a loſs, that they have reſolved the manner of our Conceiving the divine Nature and

Perfections into some secret and altogether unaccountable *Immediate Consciousness* of the Mind, which they imagine for that very purpose to be nearly allied, and as it were adapted to the Divinity. *Cui [Deo]* as a Modern Philosopher expresses it, *Ut rei cognatæ mens coaptatur, quem magis præsentit quam intelligit; eique arcano quodam contactu copulatur. Est enim in ipso mentis Apice quidam sensus, et velut tactus, quo tangimus potius, quam intelligamus Quid Deus sit.*

THE way of accounting for this sort of Knowledge *Metaphysically* is, that it is performed by a kind of Ideas *Purely Intellectual*, by abstraction from all things Sensible and Material; *Intellectus*, says a Metaphysician, *e speciebus corporeis alias omnino spirituales et intelligibiles, velut per distillationem quandam, extrahit.*

LASTLY, the usual way of accounting for this Knowledge of things purely spiritual with some Divines, is by attributing it to an *Irradiation* from the Fountain of Light, or a Ray from God let into our Souls; which gives us clearer or less distinct perceptions of the Divine Nature and things of another World, according to the increase of Grace and permanent Operations of the Holy Spirit within us. This the *Mystical* Divines carry on to such an intimate *Union* and Conversation with God and all things Spiritual, as is not to be performed but by a suspension of all the Operations of Sense and Reason. This a very elevated Genius of that strain describes  
by

by such a *Simple Intuition* of the *Abyss* of the Deity, as is performed *Absque Imaginatione, aut immixtione Rationis*—*cum Oculis Rationis et Intellectionis retunditur et obscuratur; simplex vero animæ Oculis apertus manet; et hæc est pura, uniformis, et ultra captum elevata meditatio.* This again your *Enthusiasts* of a lower Rank, with more Ignorance and Confidence, and much less mixture of sincerity and true Religion, do carry on yet farther; And arrogate to themselves a *Direct* and familiar intercourse with the very *Nature* of God and spiritual Things; and such an *Immediate View* of them by an *Inward Light* from Heaven in the Mind, as renders the Use of all Sensation and Reasoning vain and unnecessary. But the *Gnosticks* of old carryed this yet one step higher; to such an intimate Knowledge of the *Real Nature* and *Essence* of all things Spiritual, and even to such an internal Sense and *Feeling* of them by Supernatural Illumination, as was sufficient to sanctify the vilest and most exorbitant Sallies of their Lusts and Passions.

By these and other such Methods, whereof we can form no clear and distinct Conception, and expressed in dark Phrases to which we can affix no determinate Sense or Meaning, have Men gone about to account for the manner of our conceiving the Things of another World: And they all proceed upon this gross Mistake, That our manner of conceiving things Immaterial is by some sort of *Ideas* of them, as we do sensible and material Objects. But; as I ob-

served, we must lay this down for a certain Truth, that we have no Capacities for any *Idea* of the *Real Nature* of them in the least degree; no more than a Man born blind hath for any *Idea* of the Sun or of Light. Such a Man, of no more than four Senses, could not be said to have only an *Imperfect, Glimmering, uncertain View* of Things; but *No View* at all: Light would be to him in this respect as thick Darkness; the Sun and Moon and Stars, the Firmament and all the Heavenly Bodies would be to him as imperceptible by any *Idea* of them as if they had no Being; The Word *Light* would be to this Man a Term to which he could affix no direct *Idea* or Conception.

LET us suppose then that all Men were in the same Condition without the Sense of *Seeing*, and that God were to reveal to us there was such a thing as *Light*. We having neither a Name nor an *Idea* for it, nor any Capacity of conceiving the *True Nature* of it as it is in it self; it is plain this could not be revealed to us by the Name *Light*, a Word wholly unknown to us, and for which we had no *Idea* or Conception. Nor would it be revealed by any *Direct* and *Immediate* Impression of the Object *Itself* striking upon us; there being no Organ of Sensation for the Perception of it. Nor would this be performed by any Supernatural Operation causing some little, obscure, and *Confused Glimmerings* of Light to break in upon the *Pure Intellect*; for tho' we should suppose the pure Intellect capable

capable of this, yet still it would be impossible for one Man to *Communicate* this Revelation to another as blind as himself; and it would require the same Almighty Power after the same Manner to enlighten the Mind of every individual Man, or he could have no sort of Idea of it.

IF therefore it were to be revealed to such blind Mortals that there was such a thing as Light, this would be performed by the *Substitution* or *Mediation* of some Words and Ideas or Conceptions already well known and familiar to us. And accordingly when we were told, that it was something which derived its being from the very Substance of a Glorious Body called the Sun, whereof we could now have no other *Direct* Knowledge but that of its Name and its *Existence*; that it was *Coeval* with that Sun, tho' it is as truly *Derived* from it as a Child from his Father who begat him; that they were truly and really *Distinct* from each other, and yet so much one and the same as to be still *Inseparable*. When we were informed, that this was what *Warms* and Cherisheth and *Invigorates* us after an insensible Manner; and that it is from thence we continue to have *Life*, and Motion and Subsistence; That it can diffuse itself in an Instant thro' a Vast and Immense Expansion; That when our Eyes were opened it would help to enlarge our Understanding, and marvellously recreate and delight us, by enabling us to distinguish things much more accurately,

and after quite another Manner than ever we did before; by discovering to us Myriads of new and surprizing Objects, with their different Arrangements and Proportions; and at such distances from us and each other, as could not now enter into our Hearts to imagine. After all this, we should remain as utterly void of any *Direct* Idea of Light and its *Real Nature* as we did before; and the very best Conception we could form of it from all this Revelation, would amount to no more than an *Indirect*, and *Substituted*, and *Complex* Knowledge, collected from those Ideas we were already stocked with by our four Senses, and the Mind's various Operations upon them; instead of that *Simple Idea* we should have of it, had we a proper Sense for its perception.

THIS serves in some measure to illustrate the Case of us Mortals in this Condition of Imperfection and Infirmary we are now in. We are *Born Blind* in respect of the *True Nature* of things Immaterial and their *Real Properties*; of God in particular, and of all the Things of another World, as they are in *Themselves*. So that we may tire our selves out with the most exquisite Labour of Abstraction; and range all our Ideas either among themselves alone, or combined and complicated with the conscious Knowledge of the Mind's Operations, into Millions of different Figures and Notions, without arriving to one direct Idea or Conception of Heavenly Objects. The very utmost our greatest Efforts  
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can ever arrive to, will prove no other than *Analogical* Conceptions and *Substituted Representations* of Things, whose real Nature and Attributes are at present intirely out of the *Direct* reach of our most sublime Capacities. And therefore I am to observe,

2dly, THAT we have no *Ideas*, properly speaking, even of the *Mind* of Man, or any of its Faculties and Operations. We cannot with our utmost Intention of Thought and greatest Energy of Abstraction form to our selves any *Original* and *Purely Intellectual* Ideas of the Nature and workings of our own Mind. And the Reason of this is, because the most abstracted and exalted Operations of the Human Mind are Actions of both Matter and Spirit in *Essential Union*, and not peculiar to either *Alone*: We have indeed an immediate *Consciousness* of the Operations *Themselves*, without the Intervention of any Idea of them; but no Perception of them by such *Abstract* or separate *Idea* of any sort.

THINKING, *Willing*, *Intellect*, *Memory*, *Hope*, *Joy*, *Fear*, *Love*, *Grief*, and other Terms which are commonly mistaken to be expressive of such *Simple Ideas*; are not really Words affixed to any immediate and *Purely Spiritual Ideas* which we have of those Operations and Passions, exclusive of Matter and Sensation, as some imagine: But they are expressive of so many *Complex Conceptions* which we form to our

selves from that immediate internal Consciousness we have of the Mind's different manner of *Acting* or *Operating*, first on Ideas of Sense, and then upon Notions made up partly of such Ideas; as also from the manner of both Body and Mind being *Affected Passively* by such Objects and Operations; as any Man who consults his own Nature attentively and impartially will readily allow.

Nothing can be more absurd than for a Being composed of Spirit and Body in strict and intimate Union, to imagine it can frame either *Merely Sensitive* or *Merely Spiritual Ideas* of its thinking Faculty or its Acts: And if it has not Ideas of either sort *Separately*, consequently it can have no *Direct* and immediate *Knowledge* of its own Mind but by *Complex Conceptions*, formed from a *Consciousness* of the Operations themselves, and Ideas of Sense taken together; and as necessarily intermixed and blended in order to this Knowledge of its self, as its own Essence is in fact compounded of Matter and Spirit. Nay the State and Condition of an human Mind would, in this respect, be apparently the same I now describe it; tho' we should suppose our Spirit to act not in essential Union *With* the Body; but only *In* it as a mere *Instrument* necessary to the exerting its Operations. For in such a Case, our forming *Merely Spiritual* or purely intellectual Ideas of the Mind, which should be totally independent of Sense; would prove contrary to the very Supposition of Mat-  
ter

ter being an Instrument *Necessary* to its Operations: And supposes our Spirit to act in a *Necessary Dependence* on material Organs, and yet *Independently* of them at the same Time; or which amounts to the same thing, That the material Instrument is *Necessary* to the Operations of the pure Intellect, and *Not necessary* at the same Time.

FOR these Reasons it is, that whenever we *Attempt* to frame any *Ideas*, properly speaking, of the Mind's Operations or the *Manner* of them, they prove no more than *Indirect Metaphorical Images* borrowed from Sense and Imagination; and no *Direct Representations* or *Original Ideas* of any thing transacted in the Mind it self. What a large Stock of Ideas and Words for that purpose doth the Eye with its Objects furnish to Speech? This being the noblest and most extensive Organ of Sensation, and its Objects most plain and delightful, we choose the Words belonging to it, to express most of the Operations of the Eye of the Mind; and when these fail, we have recourse to the rest of our Senses. *Perception* is a Word and Idea transfered from the View and Sight we take of *Material Objects*, to a quality of the pure Intellect. *Discerning* is supposed to be something in the Mind like a Power the *Eye* hath of distinguishing its different Objects. So *Comparing* Ideas takes its rise from a nice and particular View of two or more *Visible Objects* at the same Time; and the very word *Simple Idea* is taken from those  
Objects

Objects of *Sense* in which we perceive the greatest Uniformity, and which have the least visible distinction of Parts. *Abstraction* is an Idea formed from the separating one part of Matter from another, in order to a more distinct and particular View. *Capacity* of Mind is a Word transfered from a large or bulky *Space* or *Measure* which can contain many things together; or more immediately from a spacious Prospect of the Eye at once. Thus again *Comprehension* is the Mind's *Grasping* an Idea on all its Sides at once. *Invention* is the finding out such things, by looking for them, as do not lye directly before us in our way. *Intention* is the bending or straining of the Mind; so we say it is *Unbent*, or *Relaxed*. Nay the only Idea we have of *Thinking* in general, which seems to be farthest removed from Sense, is that of a certain *Motion* of the Mind employed about its Objects: And we conceive it as the *Working* of some busy active Principle we feel within us, taking a *View* of those Ideas it finds transmitted from the Senses to the Imagination; *Diminishing* or *Enlarging*; *Separating* or *Compounding* them at pleasure; *Comparing* them among themselves, *Measuring* them by one another, and joyning them into Notions with its own conscious Operations; so as to be able to pronounce upon all their Differences and Agreements. Pursuant to this figurative Language we say, that a Notion is *Hard* or *Obvious*, *Clear* or *Confused*; That the Intellect hath a *Taste* or *Relish* of a thing; that it hath a great *Reach*; that it is *Quick* or *Slow*, or  
*Deep*

*Deep* or *Shallow* ; that it *Concludes* or *Shuts* up its Reasonings ; that it *Infuses* its Sentiments into others, or receives a *Tincture* from them. It is said to be *Dull* or to have an *Edge* ; to take the *Stress* of a thing ; to *Urge* and *Press* its Arguments ; and to have a peculiar *Vein* of thinking.

THIS same Method which we have observed as to the Intellect, runs thro' all the Operations of our *Will*, and thro' all the *Passions* and *Affections* of the Soul. *Passion* itself is *Imagin'd* as no more than something like the Suffering of one *Body* from another ; and we *Imagine* all the different *Passions* of Love and Hatred, and Anger and Hope, and Fear, but as so many different ways of *Suffering* both of Body and Mind from various Objects or Ideas ; and the *Rising*, and *Falling* and *Commotion* of those Passions are Words of mere Sensation. We have no *Idea* of *Willing* but that of a *Motion* or *Propension* of the Soul towards certain Objects ; and we express it by *Inclination* or the *Bending* of the Mind that way. So we suppose Hatred to be an *Aversion* or *Turning* the Mind away from any thing ; *Temper* of Mind is a Word derived from the mixture or Crasis of *Bodies* ; accordingly we say a Temper is *Sweet*, *Even* ; *Harsh* or *Bitter*, *Smooth* or *Rugged* ; *Firm*, *Unshaken*, *Wavering*, *Unmanagable* ; *Positive* or not easily removed from its present Posture and Scituation ; *Obstinate* or withstanding all Force and Opposition. And according as the Tempers of  
Men

Men are *Strung* and *Tuned* to one another, we say there is an *Harmony* or *Discord* of Souls.

JUST thus it is with the Memory likewise. We have no other *Idea* of it, but that of the *Laying up* of Notions and Ideas in the Imagination, as in a Store-house; or else that of *Stamping* or *Painting* out the Images of things there as in a Picture, for the View or Observation of the Intellect, and the exercise of all our Passions and Affections upon them. *Recollection* is the *Gathering* together any neglected or dispersed Notions or Ideas; we speak of retaining them *Fresh* in our Memory; of *Stirring* up such as lay Dormant; *Reviving* such as are Obliterated; and we describe the Memory to be *Strong* or *Weak*, *Frail* or *Tenacious*.

FROM what I have said under this Head, we may again observe how great and fundamental an Error it is in our Modern Logicians, and how pernicious to human Understanding, to lay down *Indifferently* Ideas of Sensation and Reflection for the *Primary* Materials of all our Knowledge; and that too, as if they were *Equal*, *Original* and *Simple* and *Direct*. The only Cause I can think of for Men's running into this Error is, because the Mind does so very *Insensibly* mix and combine the Original Ideas of Sense with its own complicated Operations upon them; and by that means raises up to its self many complex Conceptions and Notions with such *Quickness* and *Activity*, that it overlooks this *Gradual* Process;

Process; and is apt to consider some of these complex Conceptions, especially those relating to its own Workings, as *Simple* and *Original*: So as from thence too hastily and proudly to conclude, that it has a native Faculty for a *Direct* View and *Immediate Idea* of its own immaterial Principle and its Operations, independent of *Matter* and all Sensation. Whereas upon a more wary and attentive Tryal in any one particular Instance which seems most abstracted; it will find that in all its Reasonings, Ideas of Sensation must not only be *Presupposed* as the sole *Groundwork*: But that all its Knowledge has an immediate intimate *Mixture* of them, and a necessary *Connection* with them; as I have often observed in the first of those Tracts. And therefore it is that, whenever we substitute the *Faculties* and Perfections of our Mind, or the commendable *Affections* of the Soul, to represent Analogically *Correspondent* Qualities of Immaterial Beings; it is properly speaking no substitution of *Ideas*, but of the *Conscious Conceptions* we have of the Faculties and Operations of our Mind; tho' it be impossible in our present State totally to exclude *All* Mixture of sensitive Ideas from such Conceptions.

3. SINCE then the Case is thus with the *Mind* of Man, whereof we have a nearer, and more immediate Knowledge; insomuch that we are not capable of one *Simple* or *Direct Idea* either of its Nature and Essence or Operations, which is intirely independent of Sensation: We

may the less wonder that we have no such direct or immediate Ideas of things *Purely Spiritual*, which are so much farther removed out of the reach of all our Capacities; and that we are under a necessity of thinking and speaking of them by Substitution and Analogy. The most direct Knowledge we have of such Spiritual Objects is that of their *Existence*; and yet even this we *Conceive* and *Infer* from the Existence of things worldly and human. *The invisible things of God, saith St. Paul, Are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.* And so sayeth the Angelic Doctor, *Est autem naturale homini, ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia veniat; quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu initium habet.* And again, *Convenit—ut spiritualia sub similitudinibus corporalium proponantur.* And accordingly the Spirit of God hath made use both of Metaphor and of Analogy, in all his Revelations of the things of another World to Mankind; in merciful Condescension to the narrowness and frailty of human Understanding.

THERE are but two ways imaginable of God's making any discoveries of himself, and the things of another World to us. One is by *Raising* our Minds *Up* to them; the other by bringing them *Down* to the level of our Understandings.

I. As to the first, that of *Raising* the Mind up to them, and enabling it to take some *Direct* and *Immediate* View of them, this could not be



done without altering and enlarging our *Natural* Capacities of Apprehension and Knowledge to a *Supernatural* Degree : And perhaps not without giving us Faculties intirely *New*, and turning us into quite other Creatures from what we now are ; and in short not without such an intire Alteration in the whole frame and contexture of human Nature, as would anticipate our great Change at the last Day. How far God by his Almighty Power *Can* dispose the pure Intellect, even in its natural state of Infirmary, to receive an *Immediate* impressiion of heavenly Objects, or supply it with Ideas of them equally *Direct* with those we have from Sense ; and by that Means enable us to discern something of them as they are in their *Own Nature*, this I say is not for us to determine. But these two things we may be positive in.

1. FIRST, that if the Mind were any way supplied with such *Purely spiritual* Ideas, we should be as *Conscious* to ourselves of the Perception of them ; as we are now of the Perception of material Objects ; we should discern that Light which gave us such a Direct and immediate prospect of Heavenly Objects, as *Clearly* as we do that of the Sun.

2. SECONDLY, That if a Man did himself receive any such immediate Impressions, it would be such a Light within him as could never be seen by others ; he could have no way of *Communicating* them to any one else. And this appears

pears from the Case of *St. Paul*, who when he was *Caught up into the third Heavens*, his Visions and Revelations were such that he could give other People no Notion of them; the Words he heard were *Unspeakable*, and which *ὅντιν ἐξόν* it was *Not possible* for a Man to utter: The Reason of which he himself assigns; because he was in a Trance; or the Revelations were to his *Spirit* only in actual separation from the *Body*; and whether it was the one or the other, they could not be communicated to any but such as were in the same supernatural State and Condition he then was.

II. THE other way of God's making discoveries of himself and the things of another World to us is, by bringing them *Down* to the level of our Understanding and Imagination; by adapting things supernatural to our natural capacities of Sense and Reason; and by making some *Representation* of them to those faculties of Perception and Knowledge with which we are already endowed.

Now this method of proceeding being what Men were necessarily led into by the mere light of *Reason*, in order to conceive and express any Thing of God and the Objects of another World; and thus becoming altogether the Language of *Natural Religion*; it is carryed on and wonderfully improved by *Revelation*. Thus it is that God in Scripture speaks to us of himself in the same Style and Language we do of  
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One another, sometimes *Figuratively* under the mere Symbols of an human Body, and Ideas of Sense; and sometimes by way of Analogy with the Perfections and Operations of an human Mind, that is Faculties of Matter and Spirit acting in essential Union. By this means he delivers himself to us with great plainness and familiarity; by this we have an intercourse with Heaven; and we think and speak of God with as much ease, and clearness, and certainty as we do of our fellow Creatures, and of the other visible Parts of the Creation.

THIS might have passed without a particular Notice; and we should have no occasion to distinguish the Nature of this divine Metaphor and Analogy with so much exactness and nicety, if the perverseness and subtilty of Heretics and Infidels, and all the Enemies of Mystery and revealed Religion had not made it necessary: In order to an effectual confutation of their Objections and Arguments, which are most of them founded either upon a gross supposition of our conceiving things Human and Divine after the *Same* manner; or upon a mistake of this Analogy for a *Purely figurative* and *Metaphorical* manner of Conception.

By this Analogical method especially it is, that we come to a competent and sufficient Knowledge of the most exalted Mysteries of Christianity: Which are not discovered to us in a Language adapted to the *Real*, divine, and heavenly

venly *Nature* of them ; nor are there any *New Terms* invented, to exprefs any new Ideas or direct Conceptions of things before imperceptible and ineffable. No, the Language of the Gospel was all our own before ; and we have not any one *Direct Conception* or *Simple Idea* more now than the Mind of Man was furnished with before it was written. It makes no Alteration in these, but takes them as it finds them already in our Mind : And the Revelation consists in shewing us how to exalt and as it were *Spiritualize* our natural *Sentiments* and *Words* ; by transferring them Analogically from things of this World to things Divine ; and by rendering things obvious and familiar, a kind of Representations of those Objects for which we have not as yet either *Proper Words* and Ideas, or *Direct Conceptions*. Thus is the Word *Father* used in the Gospel, in respect of Christ ; so it is with the Words *Son*, *Spirit*, *Begotten*, *Proceeding*, *Purchase*, *Ransom*, *Mediator*, *Intercession*, *Propitiation*, *Redemption*, and all such like Words and Expressions which are Analogically applied to another World. In the very same manner we use the Word *Trinity*, *Satisfaction*, *Incarnation*, *Person*.

LET the Reader single out any one of those Words, and look into his own Mind, and examine what *Immediate* Notion it suggests to him, and he will find it to be of something in Nature ; something intirely within our ordinary Sphere of Knowledge, and nothing more than  
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a common Object of our faculties of Reason and Perception. For Instance, the word *Father* immediately suggests to us a relation founded in natural human Generation; the word *Son* suggests a Man so begotten of another; and the word *Spirit* is directly expressive of an *Human* Spirit acting in essential conjunction with Matter. And if his Mind rests and terminates here in the first and strict propriety of those Words, this will be a degree of Knowledge which will answer all the purposes of this Life: But they must be carryed on and transferred from thence by Analogy, to express things ineffable and imperceptible as they are in their own Nature, in order to answer the Ends of Religion and the purposes of another World.

LET him therefore think of these Words over again, and attend to what they signify in a Gospel and mysterious Sence; and he will find, that they do not exhibit to the Mind any *New Idea* or *Direct* Conception of the *Real Nature* of God, or any of his Operations: But of something in the Divine Nature, the *Correspondent Reality* and *Truth* of which the Scripture leaves us under a necessity of infering by an Analogy and parity of Reason, after this manner. What a Father in the way of *Nature* is to his Son begotten of him, That God is to Christ *Supernaturally*; What a Son by natural Generation is to the Person who begat him, that Christ is to God the Father by a super-

natural Generation ; The Holy Spirit is to the Father and the Son, what we can most exactly represent to ourselves by the *Spirit of a Man* which is in him. And so in all the rest ; What a *Purchase* or *Ransom* is among Men ; That the *Blood* of Christ is in respect of God. Thus he will find his way of apprehending the import of these and all other Words by which we speak of the things of another World, is not by any *Immediate Ideas* and *Direct* Intuition or Conception of them : But by the *Substitution* and Mediation of such Words and Notions as are obvious and familiar to us ; *Instead* of such *Direct* Impressions as those divine things would make upon our Minds if we had Capacities for it.

To all this, which is plain and evident, I shall add what is matter of *Conjecture* only, but as highly probable as any thing of which we have no certainty. That even in our most perfect state of Glory in another Life ; our Conceptions of God and his Attributes or Perfections, will not be so *Direct* and *Immediate* as to exclude all degrees of this *Analogy*. It is true even to a Maxim, that no *Finite* understanding can directly and adequately *Comprehend* Infinity : And therefore whether we suppose all our faculties in another World intirely *New* ; or those we have, *Improved* to the utmost pitch they are capable of ; yet we shall even then be as incapable of *Comprehending* an infinite Nature, as we are now.

IF it is said that we may then *Apprehend* God *Directly*, tho' not *Comprehend* him; that we may have a *Direct* and immediate Knowledge *Partly*, and in some *Degree*; and tho' not of his *Essence*, yet of the *Perfections* flowing from it. I answer, That all the Attributes and Perfections of God are in their real Nature as infinite, as his very *Essence*; so that there can be no such thing as having a direct View of him in *Part*; for whatever is in God is *Equally* Infinite: If God is to be apprehended at all by any *Direct* and immediate *Idea*, he must be apprehended *As Infinite*, and in that very act of the Mind he would be *Comprehended*; and there is no medium between *Apprehending* an infinite Being *Directly* and *Analogically*,

FROM hence it may be conjectured, that the meaning of the Apostle's opposing our seeing *Face to Face*, to our seeing now *Thro' a Glass darkly*, is to point out to us the great disparity in the *Degrees* of our *Analogical* Knowledge here, and hereafter; which will be *As great* as that between the sight of an Image in the Glass here, and the original Face. Here the Analogy by which we form Conceptions of the divine Nature and Perfections, is comparatively speaking very *Remote* and faint; in proportion only to the present frail and imperfect state of our Humanity, who can form Conceptions of God no otherwise than from those Perfections we find in our selves: But when all our Capa-

cities are improved and enlarged, then the Contemplation of our own Nature will raise up to us more *Lively* and *Emphatical* Semblances and Representations of him, who is the source and standard of all Perfection; and consequently the more transporting will that *Happiness* be, which must arise from such an immense increase of Knowledge.

THAT which may give some Countenance to this Opinion is, the Answer of God to Moses when he desired to see his Glory, *Thou canst not see my Face, for there shall no Man see me and live*; which one would be inclined to believe in some degree applicable even to another World: Especially since the Apostle doth, in general and without any exception or limitation of the saying to this Life, describe God as a Being *Whom no Man hath seen at any Time*, and as *Dwelling in the Light which no Man can approach unto*; *whom no Man hath seen or can see*. So that those expressions of seeing *Face to Face*, seeing him *As he is*, *Beholding his Glory*, and such like, are not improbably to be referred to that present and immediate Vision we shall have of Christ's *Human* Nature in his state of Glorification; which will render the Divine Nature as it were visible to us, *In and Thro' him*. Accordingly it must be a comfortable and pleasing thought to a pious Mind, that it might have been one Instance of infinite wisdom and goodness in Christ's taking our Nature upon him; to render us capable of a more *Direct* and im-  
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mediate Intuition of the Divine Nature in him : And to exalt our Humanity to a nearer and more direct Contemplation of the Essence and Perfections of the Godhead which shine forth *In* him ; and that by this means we might be admitted even to an intimate and familiar Interview and Communication with him, so as to see him *As he is* ; to converse *Face to Face* ; and to behold his Glory, *The Glory as of the only begotten of the Father*. In short to converse with him, as we do with one of our own Nature, or with our fellow Saints ; a Privilege perhaps so peculiar to Mankind, that it might have raised the Malice and Envy of the fallen Angels.

THE short of what I mean by the foregoing Paragraphs is this ; that what just and sufficient Knowledge we have of God now in this Life, is obtained by *Analogy*, or *Similitude* with those Perfections we find in our selves. That when we become more perfect by our great change at the last Day, our Knowledge of the divine Nature and infinite Perfections will be proportionably increased ; and our Contemplation of them be to an inconceivable degree more clear and perspicuous : And that the greater Perfections any created Nature is endowed with, the more unspeakably *Clear* and *Extensive* must his Knowledge of God be, to whom he thereby makes *Nearer Approaches* ; and the Contemplation of His Perfections still more exalted and *Ravishing*. But that no *Finite* and created Being can have *Direct* and *Immediate* Views of that

Essence or those Perfections which are *Infinite*; because it could not *Thus* conceive or apprehend them otherwise than *As Infinite*, and that would be supposing a finite Creature to *Comprehend Infinity*. And therefore that even the highest Order of Angels, Cherubim or Seraphim, must probably have a method of forming Conceptions of God and his Perfections, which do not come up to direct and immediate Perceptions; such as they have of one another and of all Heavenly Objects, and such as *We* now have of things Human and Material. Their manner of conceiving the divine Perfections, and of communing about them with one another; must probably be thro' the lively Transcript of them in their own Nature from their great Archetype and Creator. So that they think and Communicate or Discourse about them, if I may so speak, as we do; but from inconceivably more *Elevated* and *Exact* Representations of them which they find in themselves; Which is but a kind of *Analogy* still, tho' such as hath a much nearer foundation or Proportion of Similitude than ours. And tho' it is a strain of divine Knowledge in them vastly transcending the farthest reach of all our present Capacities, and may for ever successively receive a gradual Increase and Improvement; yet probably will never come up to a *Direct* and *Immediate Intuition* of the divine Nature *As it is in it self*.

· C H A P, III.

*That there is a true and sure Foundation  
for this Divine Analogy in the Nature  
of Things.*

I SHALL now shew that our Knowledge of God and the things of another World is *True*, and *Solid*, and *Real*, and *Just*; and founded in the very *Nature* of Things, tho' obtained by *Analogy* only: And that the *Terms* and *Language* we use in speaking them, are then as *Just* and *Expressive*, as when they are taken in their strict and *Literal* Propriety,

IN order to this I must premise, that we have three ways of thinking and speaking concerning God and his Attributes, as well as all other Beings purely Spiritual and Immaterial. By the Parts and Members of an human *Body*, or other things *Merely Material*; by the *Passions* and *Affections* of an human Soul; and by the *Operations* and *Perfections* of the *Mind* or *Intellect*.

i. As to the first of these, it is certain there can neither be any bodily Parts, or Members, or Appetites in Beings Immaterial; much less in the divine Being, who is of a Nature infinitely above that of any created Spirit: Nor can there be any such *Real Similitude* and *Re-  
semblance*

*semblance* between mere Matter and pure Spirit; as that the Nature and Properties of one should, of themselves, furnish our *Understanding* with any *Just* and *Useful* Conceptions of those belonging to the other. So that neither the Words or Ideas of that sort can with any such aptness and *Correspondency* be transfered to the Divine Being, as the Operations and Perfections of our *Minds* are. Therefore when we attribute to him any bodily Members, such as *Eyes*, and *Ears*, and *Hands*, and *Feet*; or bodily Actions, such as *Searching*, or *Seeing*, or *Walking*; the Words are purely *Figurative* and *Metaphorical*. These and such like Terms are used to express the *Wisdom*, or *Knowledge*, or *Mercy*, or *Power* of God; or some other *Attributes* and *Perfections* for which we are not without Words more Proper, Just, Significant, and Expressive.

BESIDES, the transferring our bodily Members or other things merely material to God or the divine Nature of Christ, is purely *Voluntary*: And not of absolute *Necessity*, as it is in those other Words *Power*, and *Knowledge*, and *Wisdom*, and *Holiness*; which are by a true *Analogy* transfered to the divine Being; and without which we could neither think nor speak either of him or his Attributes. To which I may add, that if the Reader will look inward and think with some Intenseness, He will find that in attributing to God our *Bodily Members* or *Movements*, or any other things  
merely

merely *Material*, he transfers the bare *Words* only, and abhors the transferring of the *Idea*; which shews that all such Expressions are purely Figurative and Metaphorical: But in attributing the Operations and Perfections of the Mind or Intellect, he jointly transfers both the *Word* and the *Conception* without Scruple, which is a Confirmation of their being truly Analogical.

Now, tho' this first kind of Words and Expressions are purely Figurative and Metaphorical; yet they are not mere *Empty Sounds*, or so many *Letters* put together without any *Real Import* or Signification. Even in *Common Metaphor*, where a borrowed Word is used to express something less properly but to more Advantage, the *Thing* thereby expressed is nevertheless *Real* because the Word is Figurative. As when it is said an Orator *Thunders* and *Lightens* in his Discourse; it means some *Real Action* or Performance in him, and some real effect, some warmth or Commotion or Passion raised in the Minds of his Auditors. So when we speak of God as having bodily Members, and performing bodily Actions, we always intend to express something (tho' *Not Correspondent* and *Similar*, yet) *True* and *Real*; of which we had *Before* obtained the most exact Knowledge we are capable of by the help of *Analogy*.

2. THE Second way we have of expressing God's Attributes is, by the *Affections* and *Passions*

sions of an human Soul. Men have ran into two Extremes concerning this way of speaking of God. Some contend earnestly for *Real Passions* in God, and of the *Same Kind* they are in us but more excellent in *Degree*; as the Socinians: Others, in the contrary extreme, allow neither *Any Passions* in God, nor any divine Perfections *Similar* and *Answerable* to them; to be a *Foundation* for Truth and Reality in all our Discourses concerning God where we use the Language of human Passions.

THAT there are *Literally speaking* no Passions in God, nor indeed any Perfections of the *Same Kind* with what these are in Man even when duly regulated, is most true; for all our Passions and Affections, as well as our Thinking, and Knowledge, and Will, are the *Joint Operations* or *Properties* of Matter and pure Spirit in *Essential Union*: And therefore when they are under even the strictest Government and most exact Regulation, cannot be of the *Same Kind* with the Excellencies or Perfections of pure Spirits; who have not only a quite different way of *Knowing* from us, intirely *Separate* from all Matter and independent of it; but also of *Loving* and *Hating*, of *Inclination* and *Aversion*. And certainly this must be more eminently true with respect to the infinite Perfections of the *Divine Nature*, which differ vastly more *In Kind* from those of all finite *Created* Spirits; than theirs do from the most exalted *Human Perfections*,

As the Passions and Affections therefore are attended with *Natural Commotion* and *Disturbance* in us, and are more apt to be seduced by material Impressions than the pure Intellect and Will; consequently they cannot be attributed to God so *Fully* and *Exactly* as the Operations of these last: But are however transfered with a *Lower* and *Less perfect* degree of *Analogy*, after we have removed all the *Natural* and *Moral* Irregularities of them as carefully as we can. And accordingly we may observe that whenever we attribute even our *Commendable* Passions and Affections to God, we do it with some degree of Scruple and Reluctance at the best; whereas when we transfer *Knowledge*, *Wisdom*, *Power* and *Will* to Him, we do it familiarly and without Scruple.

FROM hence we may observe that tho' our Passions are not transfered to the Divine Nature as *Fully* as the Operations of the Intellect and Will; yet God is not so grossly represented by them, as by our bodily Parts; nor is the Language of our Passions then purely *Figurative* and *Metaphorical*, but carries in it a good degree of *Analogy*. For tho' there are literally speaking no such Passions in God as Love or Hatred, Joy or Anger, or Pity; yet there may be *Inconceivable Perfections* in him some way *Answerable* to what those Passions are in us, under a due Regulation and Subjection to Reason.

IT is sure that in God those Perfections are not attended with any degree of *Natural* Disturbance or *Moral* Irregularity, as the Passions are in us. Nay *Fear* and *Hope*, which imply something *Future* for their Objects, may have nothing *Answerable* to them in the divine Nature to which every thing is *Present*. But since our reasonable Affections are *Real Dispositions* of the *Soul* which is composed of *Spirit* as well as *Matter*; we must conclude something in God *Analagous* to *Them*, as well as to our *Knowledge* or *Power*. For it cannot be a Thought *Unworthy* of being transfered to him, that he really *Loves* a virtuous and *Hates* a vitious Agent; that he is *Angry* at Sinners; *Pities* their moral Infirmities; is pleased with their *Innocence* or *Repentance*, and *Displeased* with their Transgressions: Tho' all these Perfections are in him accompanied with the utmost *Serenity* and never-failing *Tranquility*.

THUS much is certain; that they all exhibit and represent to us *Something* as *Real* on the Part of the *Divine* Nature, as in common Use they express in the *Human*. Something so Solid and *Answerable*, as renders all our Reasonings and Discourses concerning God in the Language of our *Commendable Passions*, as Just and *True* as when we speak them of one another: Some *Ineffable Perfections* which move and *Incline* him to act in all his Dispensations towards Mankind and other intelligent Beings,



as our Passions properly regulated dispose us to demean ourselves to other Men; and which are nevertheless *Real* because they are *Infinite*, and consequently of *Another Kind* than they are in us.

3. THE last way we have of conceiving and expressing the divine Nature and Attributes is by the *Operations* and *Perfections* of our *Intellect* and *Will*; which being more refined and farthest removed from Matter, and but accidentally liable to *Moral* Corruption (that is by voluntarily yielding to the vitious Appetites of the Body, and the irregular Passions of the inferior Soul) are the best and most *Lively* Representations we have of the Divinity: Such as *Wisdom*, and *Knowledge*, and *Thinking*, and *Reason*, and *Will*, with all the various *Modifications* of them; and accordingly in these we familiarly transfer both the *Word* and the *Conception* annexed to it, to express the divine Perfections. But because even these in *Us*, as well as our Passions, are the *Joint* Operations of finite *Matter and Spirit* in essential Union, and are *Necessarily* transacted by the concurrence of Body; therefore they are likewise but *Analogy* when applied to the Divinity. Now tho' they are so; and as I have observed, tho' we are utterly Ignorant of *Part* of the *Real Ground* of that Analogy which runs thro' *These*, as well as thro' all those moral Virtues and Evangelical Graces proceeding from the due Direction and Regulation of our *Passions*: Yet that there is a sure and solid *Foundation* for this Analogy in

in the *Nature* both of *God* and *Man* is evident; if we consider

1. THAT we were originally and in our Kind formed to some *Resemblance* and Similitude of the divine Nature. The words of God himself are thus, *Let us make Man in our Image, after our Likeness*; and the Relation of Moses by Inspiration is thus, *So God created Man in his own Image; in the Image of God created he him*. How far the Expression may have a respect even to that *Bodily* likeness of *Christ*, who in the eternal purpose of God was at the fulness of Time to take our human Nature into the Divinity; and to that *Resemblance* of him in the Body of a Saint; when at his appearing it shall be *Fashioned like unto his glorious Body*, we know not: Tho' the Expression being in the *Plural* Number, and spoken to his *Council* as some learned Jews expound it (which Council could be no other than that *Divine Person* who was to take that Nature upon him, and the *Holy Spirit* of God) would incline one to think that a *Likeness* even in *This* Instance was not totally excluded. Nor can we say how far any *Resemblance* or Correspondency may be intended between that *Living Soul* in Man, which resulted from the Union of the pure Spirit with the Body, when God *Breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life*; and the ineffable *Procession* of the *Holy Spirit* from the Father and the Son. But without all doubt the solemn manner of expressing this *Likeness*  
by

by such an immediate *Repetition* of the same thing over again; and the Reduplication of the words *Image* and *Likeness*, do plainly shew that something is intended very remarkable; something so *Real* and *Solid* in the very *Nature* of things, that it is not to be evaded by any Supposition of its being only a *Figurative* and *Imaginary* Likeness: Nay something of no less consequence must be intended at the Bottom, than by those sayings to lay a firm and immovable *Foundation* for *Truth*, in all those Sentiments, and Words, and Expressions which thro' all Generations were *Necessarily* to be *Transferred* from the human Nature to the Divine.

HOWEVER this may, or may not strike us with Conviction, yet all agree in this; that those Texts do chiefly import a Likeness to the Divine Nature in that *Part* of our Frame especialy which in Scripture is distinguished by the word Πνεῦμα or *Spirit*. In our first Creation this had a *Nearer* Resemblance of the Divinity in a Superior *Knowledge* and *Wisdom*; in a much more perfect Rectitude of *Will*; and in untainted Innocency and Holiness: And as all the Passions and Affections were more completely biassed and inclined to Goodness in our first Parents, before they had the actual experience of any Vice; so this original Perfection of their Nature and Morals rendered them more lively Representations of the Divinity, to whom the correspondent supernatural Per-

fections were all *Essential* and necessary. In their state of Innocency, they were hereby enabled to think more *Clearly* and *Fully* of the Divine Being; and it rendered all their Discourse and Language concerning him more *Apt*, and *Proper*, and *Significant*: But by the Fall both our *Conceptions* of all things Divine, and the *Language* in which we express them are grievously impaired. And because in our present state we are not perfect even in our *Kind*, we are now at the additional trouble of removing (as far as we are able I mean) not only all *Natural* Imperfection, but also all *Moral* Corruption especially, which have invaded our Understanding and Will, as well as our Affections and Passions since the Fall; before we can with *Justness* and Safety *Substitute* them, even *Analogically*, to represent the absolute and inconceivable Perfections of the Divine Nature.

Now, tho' this *Rectitude* of our Will, Affections, and Passions; and this original Perfection and Clearness of our Understanding are lost: Yet the Spirit of a Man that is in him still retains *Much* of that natural *Image* and *Likeness* of the great Antitype, according to which it was originally and in its *Kind* moulded and fashioned; in that it is *Immaterial*, *Immortal*, and endued with *Reason* and *Freedom* of choice. And in what degrees soever our bodily Appetites are reasonably subdued and restrained; our Passions mastered and rectified; and our Understanding cleared of all Prejudice  
and

and Prepossessions; so far we *Repair* a darkened, decayed, and corrupted Nature, and recover *More* of that primitive Image and Likeness of God which was unhappily defaced and almost obliterated: And the Consequence of this is, that both our *Analogical* Sentiments and Speech concerning that *Standard* of all Perfection do by this means ever receive proportionable *Improvement*. Since therefore all Perfections in *Us*, which are distinguished into *Moral* and *Natural*, are necessary and essential Attributes in God, of an intirely different *Kind*; we may well conclude that tho' we see not *Wherein* it consists, yet there is a sure *Foundation* in the *Nature* of both for such a Similitude and Parity of Reason, in our whole manner of *Thinking* and *Discoursing* of the Divine Being from those Moral and Intellectual Perfections we find in our selves, as renders it all *Just* and *True*; and the Terms we use in all such Reasonings and Discourses are as expressive and *Significant*, as when they are spoken in their most *Literal* and strict Propriety.

2. BUT this will appear more fully if we consider Secondly, that all the *Perfections* of Intelligent Beings must be greater or less, as they make *Nearer* or more *Distant* Approaches in their *Kind* to a Resemblance of him who is the only *Source* and Fountain of all Perfection. There can be *No Perfection* in the Creature but what is *Derived* from thence, and what is originally of a more *Transcendent Kind* in him; and

his very *Creation* of such Beings especially, was no other than a formation of them after the *Original Archetypal Idea* of them in the Divine Mind: So that if they are good and perfect in *Their Kind*, this must consist in having all the *Resemblance* of the Creator their respective Natures are *Capable* of. As Angels are an Order of Beings much superior to Man, this must be because they are in their *Kind* framed to a *Greater Likeness* and Resemblance of God: And consequently their *Knowlege* of him, and their *Conceptions* of all his Attributes and Perfections must vastly exceed any thing of which we are capable. Nor is it an improbable Conjecture that their whole Knowlege of him, and intire manner of communicating that Knowlege to one another, takes its rise from those Perfections they observe in themselves, and which they transfer after the method of our *Analogy* from their own to the Divine Nature.

BUT however this may be in respect of *Angels*; yet all the Perfections of our *Reasonable Human* Nature must have something *Correspondent* and *Similar* to them in the Divine, tho' infinitely more excellent and transcendent in Kind. Hence it is that our whole manner of thinking and speaking of God, is from what we find in ourselves, and more especially from the Operations of the Mind: And this we naturally fall into, as if they were exactly of the *Same Kind* in him that they are in us, tho' upon Recollection we know it is impossible they

they should be so. All our Thoughts and Words concerning spiritual Beings and God in particular do proceed, tho' insensibly, upon this Presumption; that there is something in the *Real Nature* of such Beings *Correspondent* and *Similar* to those Attributes we substitute for them, and which we conceive to be most excellent and perfect in human Nature. And this is a Presumption so well *Grounded* upon that *Image* and Likeness of God after which we were created; that there is a *Natural Aptitude* in all the Operations of the Mind, and even in our commendable Passions and Affections, to *Represent* to us the Perfections of the Divine Nature: Insomuch that our Conceptions and Expressions of those Perfections, tho' in their first and *Strictly proper* Acceptation they be merely Human, are all yet *Apt* and *Necessary* when spoken of God; and there is nothing the less of *Truth* and *Reality* in this Analogy, because we are not able to discern any *Exact Degree* and Proportion, or that *Particular sort* of Similitude which is the Ground and *Foundation* of it. Tho' we do not apprehend it now; yet there is a Reason in the *Very Nature* of things Divine, why they should be conceived and expressed after *That Manner* they now are, rather than after any other; insomuch that we then think *Justly*, and express our Thoughts of them in the greatest *Aptness* and *Propriety* of Speech our present Condition of Infirmary will admit.

3. LASTLY we are to consider, that if there were not a sure Foundation for this Divine Analogy in the very *Nature* of things; we should be under a grand *Delusion* in all our Sentiments of *Natural* as well as *Revealed* Religion. For since the Attributes of God differ from ours in *Kind*; all the Knowledge we have of them and the things of another World, even by the mere *Light of Reason*, must be founded upon Analogy. For the proof of which, besides what I have urged already, I shall only desire any Person under the strongest prejudice against this Doctrine, to single out any one of the Divine Attributes which he thinks most easy and obvious, and try whether he can form any *Direct* Idea of it; or any *Conception* or *Idea* which shall be *Purely Spiritual*, and intirely exclusive and *Independent* of Ideas of *Sensation* and the conscious *Operations* of his own Mind, as Parts of the Ingredients of it. So that either our Creator has rendered human Ages utterly void of *Any useful Knowledge* of him and his Attributes; or else there must be a *Real Ground* for this *Analogical* Conception of them in his *Nature* and our own. We are intirely incapable of any *Direct* Knowledge or Idea of them; and therefore must *Necessarily* conclude there is a *Sure Foundation* for this Method of proceeding; Or that we labour under an *Invincible* mistake in all our Thoughts of Divine Objects, and can never arrive to more than a merely *Metaphorical* and *Precarious* Notion of them.



SINCE then it is thus in our natural Notions of God from unenlightened *Reason*; we may the less wonder that all *Revelation* concerning God and the Myſterious things of another World, is made to us by the *Substitution* and Mediation of ſuch Conceptions and Expreſſions as are moſt common and familiar among Men. And if there were not a ſure *Foundation* of Similitude for a Parity of Reason in the very nature of things both Human and Divine, which are thus conceived and expreſſed by the very ſame Notions and Words in the Scriptures; it would be impoſſible to reconcile any Divine *Revelation* to our natural Notions of the *Veracity* of God; or to any exact Teſt or Standard of Truth.

AND therefore as to the *Scripture* Analogy, the *Goodneſs* as well as the *Veracity* of God is more *Immediately* concerned in the *Juſtneſs* of it. For if ſuch Scripture Words and Conceptions contained in them *No Analogy* at all, i. e. referred to nothing *Like* and *Correſpondent* in divine Things: It would follow that our Creator has expoſed us to the Danger of *Unavoidable Error* and Darkneſs, even in the plain Uſe of our Reason when we interpret ſuch Parts of Scripture; by revealing to us his Myſteries in ſuch Terms as unavoidably *Lead* us into this Notion. For Inſtance, it is revealed to us that *Chriſt is the only begotten Son of God*. No Man living can be ſo abſurd as to imagine this Ex-

pression means *Literaly* such a *Kind* of Son or *Manner* of Generation as we every Day observe. And yet if there be any thing of solid *Truth* at all in this Proposition, it must mean that Christ is a *Real* and *True* supernatural Son of a supernatural Father, by a Generation essentially different from any Kind of *External Efficiency* or *Creation*; and consequently his Son after such an *Inconceivable Manner* as we have no way of apprehending but by *Analogy* with an human Son. The Mind of Man can find out no other *Just* and *Rational* method of proceeding in all such Scripture Instances as this; without either directly impeaching the Goodness and Veracity of God in his Revelations, which surely were not designed to puzzle but to inform Mankind: Or which amounts to the same, without turning the main Parts of them into *Mere Figure* only and *Allusion*.

I HAVE before observed that no discovery of things Divine can be made to us but by one of these two Ways.

1. FIRST, by giving us some *Direct* and *Immediate* and *Proper* Ideas of them; and then indeed all our Conceptions and Expressions would exactly Quadrate with the *True* and *Real Nature* of those things, as much and in the same *Strict Propriety* as we now think and speak of the most familiar Objects of Life. But we have not the least capacity for any such Revelation in this World. If we had intellectual  
Faculties

Faculties for the *Direct Perception* of things Immaterial, this would be obtained from an actual *Shewing* of them, and exhibiting them to the *Immediate View* of the Mind ; and the Effect of it would be indeed some degree of *Direct Knowledge* of them ; but it would leave no room for *Belief* or *Faith* which is *The Evidence of things not seen* : We should then assent to nothing but what was seen *Directly* and *Immediately* by the Eye of the Mind.

So that tho' all the Revelations of God are *True*, as coming from him who is *Truth* it self ; yet the *Truth* and *Substance* of them doth not consist in this, That they give us any *New* Set of Ideas, and express them in a Language altogether unknown before : Or that both the Conceptions and Terms are so immediately and properly adapted to the *True and Real Nature* of the things revealed, that they could not without great *Impropriety* and even *Profaness* be ever applyed to the things of this World. But the *Truth* of them consists in this ; That whereas the *Terms* and *Conceptions* made use of in those Revelations are *Strictly proper* to things worldly and obvious : They are from thence *Transferred Analogically* to the Correspondent Objects of another World with as much *Truth* and *Reality*, as when they are made use of in their first and most *Literal* Propriety ; and this is a solid *Foundation* both for a *Clear* and *Certain Knowledge*, and for a *Firm* and well grounded *Faith*.

2. AND therefore Secondly, The other way of *Revealing* and Discovering things Divine to us, must be by the *Intervention* and *Mediation* of such Ideas or Conceptions as the Mind was supplied with *Antecedently* to any such Revelation; and by such Words and Expressions as were before grown into familiar and common Use among Men. And then we are to depend upon our natural Notions of the Wisdom and Veracity of God (obtained already thro' Analogy, by mere Reason) that these earthly Representations, under which those invisible things are revealed in Scripture, do bear the *Greatest Similitude* and *Correspondency* to them that any thing *Can* do within our present scanty Sphere of Knowledge. Nor is there any thing less of *Truth* and *Certainty* in this way of Revelation, than there could be supposed in the former. For tho' divine Revelation doth not exhibit to us any *Direct View* or Knowledge of the real *True nature* of things Divine: Yet it lays before us such *Lively Semblances* of them, that from thence we *Necessarily infer* the Existence of their Substance and *Correspondent Realities*; and that these become the Subject of our *Faith* and our *Hope*. This is *Seeing* them, as the Apostle speaks, *Thro' a Glass darkly*. As by the help of a Looking-Glass we see the Resemblance only or *Similitude* of a Man, but nothing of the *Substance* or *Reality* of human Nature; so God in his Revelations gives us a view of himself, and of all other divine things which

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have any Relation to us, in the *Mirrou* of *This World*: Which tho' it can afford us no *Direct* or *Immediate Idea* of the *Real true Nature* and Substance of those divine Objects as they are *In themselves*; yet exhibits to us such a *Semblance* and *Representation* of them as serves all the Ends of *Morality* and *Religion* in *This Life*. These *Images* are what we now can *Directly discern* and give our *Assent* to; they are the *Immediate Objects* of our Knowledge, and of that *Faith* which is built upon it.

THE *Substance* and *True Nature* of what we thus Conceive and Believe is now the Object of our *Hope* and Expectation in *Another World*; which is nevertheless *Real* because we see the Similitudes only, and some Resemblances of it in a Glass. If they were Types and Symbols *Alone*, or nothing more than bare *Appearances* without any *Correspondent Realities*, then would all divine Revelation be one grand *Delusion*; our whole *Faith* of the Gospel would be no other than blind *Credulity*; and our *Hope*, a *Vain Expectation* of things without any *Being*. That we see the *Semblances* only and *Images* of them, is not from any failure in the *Objects*; but from the weakness of our *Sight*: Which can neither directly discern the *Substance* or *Properties* of things Immaterial; nor what *Particular Proportion* of *Similitude* they bear to those things by which they are represented. But *Whatever* the Proportion of Similitude really is; the Nature and Kind of it is certainly  
such,

such, that they could not have been so *Truly* and *Aptly* revealed to us by any *Other* Words or Conceptions as these already given us: Nor would any *Other* Simblances than those which are made use of in Scripture have been so consistent with the *Wisdom*, and *Goodness*, and *Veracity* of God; or with our present *Capacities* and *Means* of Knowledge.

#### C H A P. IV.

*Authorities for Divine Analogy. And the mistaken Notions of it.*

THE Necessity of Analogy in order to our Thinking and Speaking of things Supernatural and Divine hath, one would think, appeared sufficiently evident from the whole Course of those Observations which have been already made: And it might reasonably be supposed that I had nothing farther to do here than to leave every Man to make the Application of it to his own Mind, and to consider well these two things.

FIRST, When he endeavours to apprehend the *Substance* of God by a *Simple Idea* in his Mind, whether he doth not fix upon something Natural; such as the most refined particles of Matter, the Parts and Members of an human Body, or Light, or the very Globe of the Sun, or a Fountain, or some other visible and worldly Object :

Object: And then transfer that sensitive Idea with the Term which denotes it, by pure Figure and *Metaphor* to represent the imperceptible *Substance* of God?

AND Secondly, When he would think or speak of the *Intellectual* and *Moral* Perfections of the Divinity; whether he doth not proceed after this manner, by first observing what are the Faculties and Operations and Excellencies of his own Mind: And then transferring them likewise to the divine Being, by substituting them as so many Images or Representations of those infinite Perfections in him; whereof we are as incapable of any *Direct*, *Immediate*, and *Simple* Apprehension in the Mind, or of any Idea *purely Spiritual*; as we are of any sensitive Perception of his *real true Substance* or *Essence*? And whether those Faculties and Operations of our own Mind so transferred to the *Mind* of God, are not styled *Attributes* for this very Reason chiefly; because we only *Attribute* them to God, to *Supply* the want of any *Direct* and *Immediate* Apprehension or Conception of his own *Real* intrinsic Operations and Perfections?

I SAY I need to have proceeded no farther for the Establishment of this Truth, than an *Appeal* to every Man's own Consciousness of what he finds within himself, upon a deliberate and impartial Tryal. But the strong Prejudices and Prepossessions of the generality of Men

Men from wrong Principles of Knowledge, greedily imbibed in their younger Years and at the Beginning of their Studies; the great Progress of a new Religion framed out of Arianism and Socinianism blended together, and founded upon either the merely *Metaphorical* or strictly *Literal* Acceptation of Scripture Terms, as it best serves the Turn of an Hypothesis; together with the Pious tho' mistaken Zeal of modern Defenders of Truth and Orthodoxy, made it necessary to come to a more close Engagement upon this Point (I am sorry I have it to say) not only with the well known Corrupters and Subverters of our Christian Faith: But with those very learned and worthy Persons who have defended it with the greatest Courage and Skill they could possibly shew upon the received *Metaphysical*, *Abstracted*, and in some Instances even *Unscriptural* Principles of the Schools.

IN order therefore to a more express and positive Proof of this Divine Analogy, I shall first shew it hath been the constant received Opinion of all Men, that we can have no *Direct* and *Immediate* Knowledge of God or his Attributes in any Degree *As they are in themselves*: And that our only way of conceiving them is, by the Intervention of those Ideas and Conceptions we have of things Natural and Human. And Secondly, That there are very good *Reasons* for their being of that Opinion.



As to the first then, I shall produce my Authorities in this Method.

1. ALL Men have ever asserted that God is not only altogether *Imperceptible* by any of our *Senses*, so as to be *Ἀναφής Intactilis*, *ἄορατος Invisibilis*; but that even in respect of the *Mind* of Man he is *Incomprehensible*; and in the style of the Fathers *Ἀπερινόητος*, *Ἀπερίληπτος*, *ἀκατάληπτος*. The meaning of which Terms is not, that we have no *Adequate* or *Complete* and *Full* Knowledge of God and his Attributes; for no finite and limited Understanding can have such a Knowledge of him, not the most exalted of all created Beings: In this Sence therefore none can be said to *Know* the Father but the Son; and the Holy Ghost, who is said to know the *Mind* of God. Nor do Men mean by those Terms that we have no *Clear* and *Distinct* Knowledge of God and his Attributes; For as far as the Knowledge we have of God in our Mind reaches, it is as clear and distinct as any other Knowledge we have, which is founded upon *Moral* Evidence and Certainty. As for a *Sensitive* Knowledge of him we have none; and with respect to a Perception of any thing in the divine Nature by *Spiritual Ideas*, or a *Direct Intuition*, or by any *Supernatural* Notions and Conceptions infused directly from above, the Eye of the Mind is altogether as blind as that of the Body: And Thus we cannot be said to have *Indistinct*, *Confused*, and *Imperfect* Appre-

Apprehensions of the *true Nature* of God and of his *Real Attributes*; but *None at all* in any Degree. However as we conceive them by *Analogy*, our Conceptions of them are all as clear and distinct, as those we have of the *Faculties* and *Operations* of our own Mind: So that we can conceive God to be *Powerful*, and *Wise*, and *Good*, and *Just*, and *Holy*, with the same *Distinctness* and *Perspicuity* we know and conceive a Man to be so. The true meaning therefore of the Word *Incomprehensible* is, that we have no *Idea* at all of the *Real true Nature* of God; nor any *Direct* or *Immediate* Perceptions in the Mind, of his *Attributes* and *Perfections* in any Measure: And that we are utterly incapable of any *Direct* and *Immediate* Knowledge of him, by the utmost Efforts of *Sense*, or *Reason*, or *Imagination*.

THIS is the meaning of the Word *Incomprehensible* among all the *Antients*; that we have no direct Knowledge at all of God in any Degree. Chrysostom, describes God ὑπερβαίνοντα διανοίας θνητῆς κατάληψιν, *Transcending all Apprehension of human Knowledge*: Nay, ἀθέατον τοῖς σεραφίμ, *Invisible to the Seraphim, Undiscernible to the highest Order of Angels who are all Spirit and Mind*. ἀκατανόητον τοῖς χερουβίμ, *Not to be known or perceived even by the Cherubim*; by which he could mean no other than a *Direct* and *Immediate* Perception of the divine Essence and Attributes. For 'tis plain that both they and we have a *Solid* and *Real* Knowledge

lege of God, in proportion to the Excellency of our Nature, and of those Attributes and Properties which supply us with distant *Representations* of the infinite incomprehensible Perfections of that Fountain of all Perfection: And as the highest Order of Angels are without doubt in all their Faculties formed to a greater Similitude and Resemblance of God; their Knowledge of him must be still more bright and clear; more direct and immediate and comprehensive. Gregory Nyssen says that God is πάσης ἀντιλήψεως τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν ὑψηλότερος, *Vastly above all Apprehension or Perception even of the Mind*; and he assigns this Reason for it, because he transcends all Knowledge; that is surely all *Direct* and *Immediate* Knowledge and Perception only. Nazianzen says of God that he is μόνος ἄγνωτος *Alone or only unknown*; that is by any *Direct* Knowledge or Perception of him, as he is in himself. Pseudo-Dionysius asserts him absolutely to be ὑπὲρ γνῶσιν *Above Knowledge*.

THIS is the Style of all the Fathers who mean by these and such like Expressions which are frequent in them; not that we cannot *Fully* comprehend the true Nature of God and his Attributes; but that we are not capable of any *Direct* or *Immediate* Apprehension or Perception of them: And accordingly they assert him to be so transcendently above all things Natural and Human; that no Ideas or Conceptions in the Mind of Man (all which take their Rise

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from the things of this World) can exhibit to us any thing of the Truth and Reality of his Nature and Attributes. Agreeably to this their common Epithets for God are that he is Ὑπεράγνωστος *More than unknown*, or transcendently above all Apprehension or Knowledge. Ἀνύπαρκτος *Without Existence*, Ἀνούσιος *Without Substance*; and Dionysius asserts that the Term Ὀυσια or *Substance* cannot Properly be applied to God, who is Ὑπερόσιος *Above all Substance*. Ἄναυς *Without Mind* or Soul. Ἄζως *Without Life*. Ὑπέροφθι *above all Wisdom*. Ὑπέρζως *above all Life*. Nay to this Purpose he uses such hyperbolical Expressions as these concerning the Divinity; that God is Ὑπέρφωτος γνόφος *Darkness above all Light and Splendor*; Ἡ ὑπερούσιος ὑπαρξις *A supersubstantial Existence*, Ἡ ὑπέρθεος θεότης *A superdivine Divinity*, Ἡ ὑπεργάαθος ἀγαθότης *A Goodness above all Goodness*. And what is more remarkable, some of the Antients rejected even the word *Perfection* as very improperly attributed to God; for this Reason, because they apprehended that he was Ὑπερτέλης *beyond all Bounds of Perfection*; even to such a Degree that, as Dionysius speaks, πᾶσαν ἀπειρίαν ὀρίζεις, *He even terminates all Infinity*.

THEIR meaning in all this is plain and obvious; that there is not in the Mind of Man the least *Sensitive Idea*, or the most *Minute imperfect Intellectual Perception* of the *Real Nature and Attributes* of the divine Being as they are in themselves; insomuch that all our  
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best Conceptions of him in the utmost Elevation and Abstraction of the Mind, and highest flights of the Imagination, can never attain to any degree of a *Direct* and *Immediate* Knowledge of him: The most apt and accurate Ideas or Conceptions we can frame even of *Divinity* or *Perfection* it self, fall vastly short of giving us any such direct Knowledge. This being rightly understood from those Epithets and Expressions already quoted; it will be easy to reconcile these Authors to themselves, in respect of those contrary Epithets and Expressions which so frequently occur in them. As that God is *ἑαυτοτελής* *Perfect in himself*, *ἄειτελής* *Eternally Perfect*; *παντελής* *Absolutely Perfect*, *ἄοριςτος* *Without Bounds*, *ἄπεράτῳτος* *Incommensurable*, *τὸ καταληπτὸν* *That which can be most of all apprehended*. And again their styling him *οὐσιότης* *Substance it self*, *θειότης* *Divinity it self*, *ἀλήθεια* *Truth it self*, *συμμετρία* *Harmony, Symmetry or Proportion it self*, *τὰγαθὸν* *The one and only Good*: And in short their asserting him to be *Life*, and *Wisdom*, and *Power*, and *Holiness*, and *Infinity*, and *Perfection* it self. As at other times they deny all or any of these to be in God; so here they run quite into the other extreme, asserting them all to be in him even in the *Abstract*: And they affirm *Both* for the same Reason, because we can have no *Direct* or *Immediate* Perception or Notion of the real Nature and Perfections of God; these being altogether *Incomprehensible*. And therefore they either rejected all our best Notions and Con-

ceptions, as exhibiting to the Mind nothing at all of the *Truth* and *Reality* of any thing in him: Or on the other Hand they attributed to him the most exalted Perfections the Mind is capable of apprehending, in the *Abstract* only; to express such Perfections of the divine Nature as are in themselves utterly *Inconceivable*. They perceived that those Titles and Characters could not with any Aptitude and Significancy be *Directly* and *Literally* applied to God in the *Concrete*; and that this would be altogether unworthy of him: Unless we observed the true Medium, and attributed the best Notions and most exalted Perfections the Mind of Man can conceive, to the divine Being by *Representation* only and *Analogy*.

2. SECONDLY, As the true meaning of the word *Incomprehensible* in the Opinion of all Men is, that we have no *Direct* Perception, Apprehension, Intuition or Idea in the Mind, of the *real* Nature and Attributes of God, in any Degree; so all Men have concurred in asserting them to be accordingly *Ineffable*, in a Sense agreeable to their being thus incomprehensible: That is, we have not Terms in human Language to express any thing in the real Nature of God, as he is *In himself*; or with the same *Literal Propriety* they express things natural and human. It is in this Sense that God is so frequently styled by the Antients 'Ανόνημος, 'Ακλήϊστος, 'Αρρήτος. *Without a Name*, or *Appellation*, *Inexpressible*; nay 'Υπεράρρητος *More than Inexpressible*.

*pressible, or Infinitely above all Expression. And that they so often pronounce it with great positiveness* Ἀδύνατον φράσαι, λέγειν, ἐκφονεῖν, ὀνομάζειν, *A thing utterly impossible to find out any Name or Denomination which can express the divine Nature; that is with any Literal Signification or Propriety. Accordingly Dionysius asserts God to be* Ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὄνομα καὶ πάντα λόγον, *Above any Name or Speech. Says Nazianzen, he is* Μοῦνος ἄφρατος *Alone Unspeakable. Says Plotinus* οὐτε ὄνομα αὐτῷ *Nor is there a Name for Him, ὅτι μεδὲν κατ' αὐτῷ Because we can think and speak nothing concerning Him. Justin Martyr observes That there is no Name for God; and that* Θεός, Πατήρ, Κτίσης, Κύριος, Δεσπότης *Are not properly Names, but Προσηγήσεις Appellations only for the supreme Being, taken from his Operations, and the Benefits we receive from Him; it is only* Προσαγόρευμα *A Denomination for what is in it self ineffable. But Philo, in a strain beyond them all, expressly asserts that God cannot have* ὄνομα κύριον *A proper Name; and that it was for this Reason that God styled himself I am to Moses, Because his Nature was to exist only, not to be named or spoken. And in another Place he says, It is impossible to speak of God in proper Words, so as to express any degree of true and immediate Knowledge of Him: Nay so impossible.* οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σύμπας ἔρανος ἐναρξθεὶς φωνὴ γεγόμενος *That if the universal Heaven became an articulate Voice, it could not express him with any Aptness and Propriety. The Ground upon which they all proceed for the support of this Opinion,*

that there can be no *Proper Name* for God is because he is utterly *Inconceivable* as he is in himself; and that what is so, can never be expressed in proper Words. And from them Aquinas determines, That as we have no direct or immediate Knowledge of God; so we can have no Name expressive of his Nature or Substance, in the same Propriety that the Term *Man* is applyed to one of ourselves; *Deus est supra Nominationem, quia Essentia ejus est supra id, quod de eo intelligimus & voce significamus.* And for the same Reason many of the Antients have very justly argued, that we have no Words to express the Nature and Attributes even of Angels with any such *Propriety* of Speech, as that they shall not be at the same time applicable to other things in a more *Literal* and *Immediate* meaning.

Now the Inference to be made here upon the Principles of our modern clandestine Arians is this; Why then, if we have no proper Name for God, how can we worship him? Can we worship we know not what? How can we pray, *Hallowed be thy Name*; or say with the Psalmist, *Holy and Reverend is his Name*? The Answer is obvious; that tho' we have neither a proper Name nor Word for any thing in the *True Nature* of God as he is in himself; yet there are many Names and Words which *We apply* to him, to express both his Nature and Attributes: Which tho' they have no *Literal* and *Strict Propriety* in them



them when spoken of the divine Being; do however express both him and his Attributes in the utmost Propriety whereof our human Language is capable. Accordingly those very Persons who have so positively determined that God is *Ἀνώνυμος Without a Name*; have at the same time asserted that he is *Πολυώνυμος*, that we have *Many Names*, and Appellations, and Words for God and his Attributes. So that tho' the Name *God* attributed to the divine Being, hath none of the *Literal Propriety* in it, which the word *Man* hath when applyed to our Humanity; and tho' every Notion included in that Term is borrowed from things worldly and human, and more *Strictly* applicable to them: Yet in respect of *Us*, who have voluntarily appropriated that Name to express the inconceivable Substance and Essence and Perfections of the Divinity, it hath the greatest Propriety that human Language is *Capable* of. Thus therefore we can pray with Understanding and Faith, *Hallowed be thy Name*; and we can say with the utmost Reverence and Devotion of Soul, *Holy and Reverend is his Name*: And we can after the same Manner adore and magnify him in all those Terms, which denote his Attributes Natural and Moral, and which in respect of the *Real Perfections* of the *Divine Being* have no more *Literal Propriety* in them than the Name *God*; and yet in respect of *Us* and our *Manner of Thinking and Speaking*, have the utmost Propriety which any Words can have when applyed to things Divine and Supernatural.

3. As the Antients held the *Nature* and *Essence* of God to be thus *Incomprehensible*, and *Ineffable* by us ; so they were of the same Opinion with respect to all his *Attributes* in *General*. They not only held God to be altogether another *Kind* of Being from Man ; but to differ more in *Kind* from every Rank of all created Beings, than any one of them do from another. In this Sence it is that they so often use that Expression of his being *Above all things* ; not in *Degrees* of Perfection, but as being in his whole *Nature* of another *Kind*. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων says Damascene, *For God is nothing of those things which exist*. So likewise Plotinus, Οὐτε τί τῶν πάντων *Nor is he any thing of all things*. Nazianzen describing God poetically says, that he is καὶ πάντα, καὶ οὐδεὶς, *All things, and yet no one*. Οὐχ ἓν ἑαὺν, καὶ πάντα, *Being neither one, nor all*. And it is a well known saying of the Platonists, that the Divinity is τὸ ἓν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, *That which only exists, and that which alone hath no Existence*, in that literal Propriety of the Term wherein it is spoken of any other Being. It is hardly possible for Men to express that God is of a different *Kind* from any Being or Rank of Beings in the Universe with a higher Signification, and greater Emphasis.

As the Antients I say thus held God to be of a *Kind* infinitely different from all other Beings, with regard to his real *Essence* or *Substance* :

So they were very exprefs in declaring themselves of the same Opinion, in respect of all the *Attributes* and Properties which *Flow* from that Essence, or are included in it. And indeed if they had thought otherwise, they would have been irreconcilably inconsistent with themselves; as well as with the common Sense and Reason of Men, into whose Heads it could never enter (otherwise than to serve a vile Hypothesis) that the *Essence* or *Substance* of any thing should differ in *Kind* from that of another; and yet that the *Attributes* and *Properties*, inseparable from that Essence, should be of the *Same Kind* in both. This is more remarkably false with respect to the *Divine Attributes* or Properties, which all Men allow to be distinguishable from the divine Essence as well as from one another, not as they *really are in themselves*: But as they are in the Mind of Man, and in respect of *Our Understanding* only; in order to our thinking and speaking of God in a way proportioned to the weakness of human Nature. That is, as we infer the Existence of an inconceivable divine Nature or *Essence*, from the Works of the visible Creation: So we conceive the otherwise inconceivable *Attributes* and *Properties* of that Essence, by the Faculties and Operations of our own Mind; and distinguish them both from that divine Essence, and from one another, after the very same manner we do our own. It was for this Reason that in the style of the Fathers all the Perfections we attribute to God are ἑννοιαί,

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Νοήσεις, Ἐπίνοιαι, Ἐπειθυμήσεις, Ἐπιλόγισμοι, all of them Terms expressive of *Natural Notions* only, and *Apprehensions*, and *Conceptions*, and *Reasonings* in the Mind of Man: Which from thence are Anologically transfered to the Divinity, to represent and express those Attributes which are in themselves altogether Supernatural, and Inconceivable to us as they are in themselves, those true and real Perfections which Fulgentius asserts, *Cannot be expressed with the Tongues either of Men or Angels.*

BECAUSE the *Real* Attributes of God are all of them equally inconceivable and ineffable; it was the universal Opinion of all the Antients that there could be no Communication or Intercourse between God and Man, but by the Intervention and Mediation of such Notions and Conceptions as are natural and familiar to us. Accordingly Tertullian asserts, *Deum non potuisse humanos Congressus inire, nisi humanos & Sensus & Affectus suscepisset. That God could have no Intercourse with Mankind, otherwise than by taking on himself the Dialect of our Senses and Affections.* And that the Case is the same on our Side is thus expressed in short by a learned and more modern Author; *Ex iis quæ usu quotidiano, & sensibus atque Intelligentia capimus; qualem possumus, adumbramus Dei Notitiam.* From those things which are obvious and familiar to us, the common Objects of our Sensation and Intellect; we frame to our  
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*selves such a Knowledge of God as we are capable of by Shadow and Representation. So says Maimonides, The Law speaketh in the Language of the Sons of Men; and I add also in those natural Conceptions and Sentiments which are expressed by that human Language in its first and literal Propriety; and then transfered by Analogy to the incomprehensible Nature and Substance, and Properties of the divine Being. This is a thought so natural that some of our modern English Writers of the best Note have of late run into it in the Gross; We cannot, says one, think or speak of the first Being, but by making use of such natural Notions and Words as we have: This is self-evident, since none can think or speak with Thoughts or Words which he hath not.*

*It is demonstrable says the same Metaphysical Author, That no Notion, nor consequently Word we have, can be univocally spoken of God, as he is in himself; and of the Creatures. No, not so as to express any thing of the same Kind in God, and in the highest Angel of the Creation; much less in respect of God and Man: And for the Reason he gives, Because no Notion can be common to God and Creatures; no, it is even Frenzy to imagine it. All the Notions, says he, we have for God, and the Words we use when we speak of him are Metaphorical; for no Word spoken of God and Creatures are univocal, or spoken in the same Sense; they must then be spoken of him and them in different Sences:*  
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*Wherefore since, when spoken of Creatures, they express those natural Notions which we had from the Creatures themselves, and are therefore proper; it follows that the Sense they are taken in, when they are transferred thence to God, is in some sort Improper and Metaphorical. This Author did plainly discern, that no Words of ours, not even those which express the Moral Attributes of God, could be spoken of him with any Literal Propriety; and therefore he runs into the other as dangerous Extreme and crudely asserts, that All our Language of God is Metaphorical: And accordingly says, that The Names of our best Virtues are Metaphorically said of God; his Reason is, Because we had the Notion of those Virtues first from ourselves, and therefore the Names of them are applied to Man in their first Propriety, and afterwards transferred to God; not in pure Metaphor as he asserts, but by a True Analogy.*

SAYS another, who is reckoned among the polite Authors of the Age, *If we consider the Idea which wise Men, by the Light of Reason, have framed of the divine Being, it amounts to this; That he hath in him all the Perfection of a spiritual Nature: and since we have no Notion of any KIND of spiritual Perfection but what we discover in our own Souls — What is a Faculty in an human Soul, becomes an Attribute in God. Each of these human Faculties indeed (misled by the great modern Ignis Fatuus of Human Understanding) he supposes enlarged by*

by the Notion of *Infinity*. Enlarged by a Negation! So then it is plain that, according to him, we can have no Notion or Conception or Knowledge of God but what is purely *Negative*. If it is answered, that our Knowledge of God is *Positive* before we begin to enlarge; and even till we *Stop* in the Course of our Enlarging by a general Negation of any Limits. So say I; it is both positive and useful, if we keep within our bounds of Enlargement which are very finite and limited; and which cannot with any Reality or Sense or Meaning be extended beyond that of Representation and Analogy: And surely if we could suppose that Knowledge *Positive* which is by *Negation* only; yet an *Infinite human Affection* or *Faculty* is a monstrous Notion, and one of the last things I would attribute to God. The adding Infinity to any Idea or Conception necessarily Finite, makes up no other than a curious Contradiction for a divine Attribute. Add Infinity to the most remote and imperceptible Fibres of the Brain, and to the animal Spirits operating in essential Unity with pure Spirit in the Act of Thinking; and then you make up an Attribute of Knowledge or Wisdom *Infinitely Finite*: Which is as Chimerical and Gigantick an Idea, as an infinite human Body; and which you may apply after any other manner you please, rather than as a Representation of the Divinity.

ANOTHER hath this saying to the same Purpose.

Purpose. By *studying attentively the Book of Creatures, and reflecting heedfully on those natural Notions which are most sublime and most defecated from Matter; we transcend Nature it self, and all the lower Orbs of finite Beings; and soar up to their great Creator, and divine Original.* Thus far right, but Alas! it follows; *Nay we gain some distant Glimmerings of his Essence it self, and of all his glorious Attributes.* No, it is by gazing with the utmost stretch and Intenseness of the Mind at those *Imaginary sparklings, and Dawnings, and Glimmerings, and Twinklings* of celestial *Light*, that Men contract such a degree of *Blindness*; that they cannot rightly discern the only Representations of God and his Attributes which are within our Reach, and as perceivable as the Light of the Sun at Noon Day: Which otherwise they might have done, with the same Distinctness and Perspicuity they do the *Natural* Objects of human Understanding; or the Qualities, and Faculties, and Operations of their own Mind. In this consists the Emptiness and Vanity of all *Mystical Theology* (that dazzling *Appearance* only of Perfection in Religion) that it is all a fruitless and impracticable Attempt in Men, to think and speak of God in some Degree *As he is in himself*: In order to which they set themselves to abstract intirely in their own Minds from all Ideas, and Notions, and Conceptions of things Worldly or Human. They first describe God in the most emphatical and lofty Terms they are able to invent, as infinitely



finitely transcending all Perception or Apprehension of the Mind of Man; and as altogether ineffable by the Tongues of Men or Angels: And then, by a strange Inconsistency with themselves, their whole Aim and Ambition is, to attain some *Immediate* intellectual *Views*, and distant *Glimmerings* of that real Nature and Essence which they hold to be utterly Incomprehensible to us; and to find out Words to express with some *Propriety* of Speech what is thus inexpressible. This unavoidably runs their towering Piety and Devotion into *Enthusiasm*; for all that unnatural Working, and Struggle, and Labour of the Mind, by eager and impotent Efforts to soar above the Reach of human Understanding; do end at last in a supine Sloth and Weariness: It is all a Dream; with no other Effect and Tendency, but to impair and weaken the native Strength and Vigor of the Soul for the Functions of a truly Religious Life; and for the more active and commendable Discharge of all the Instances of a genuine Virtue and substantial Holiness.

4. As the real intrinsic Attributes of God in *General* were thus universal held to be above all our direct Apprehension, and Propriety of Expression; so were those we call his *Moral* Attributes in particular. The Distinction of the divine Attributes into *Natural* and *Moral*, hath no more Foundation in the *Real Nature* of God; than that of his *Attributes* in *General*,

General, from his *Essence*: Tho' both these Distinctions are necessary in respect of our human Understanding, who have no other way of thinking and speaking of him but by what we observe in our selves. Wherefore tho' they are not to be distinguished by the Mind of Man *As they are in God*; whose Nature and Essence and Attributes we conceive in the General as one Being in whom is all infinite Perfection in a *Manner* as inconceivable as his Essence: Yet it would be impious (as the Anomœans did of old) to argue that they *Ought* not to be distinguished at all in our Manner of conceiving them; since this would be to deprive Mankind of all that Knowledge of God whereof alone we are capable, and by direct Implication to subvert and destroy all Religion Natural and Revealed. Accordingly when the Antients were so express and emphatical in describing the divine Being as Incomprehensible and Ineffable, they meant it of his whole intire Nature; including both his real Essence and all his Attributes or real Perfections without Exception; and this made them the less express and particular in respect of his *Moral* Attributes. Yet even in respect of these their Epithet for him is that he is ὑπεράγαθος *Above all Goodness*; and Dionysius styles him ὑπερ-φανὴ καὶ ὑπεράνωμεν ἀγαθότητα *Goodness above all Splendor and above all Name*: And says again that he is ἡ τῆς ὑπεραγαθότητος ὑπαρξίς *An Existence of Goodness above all Goodness*; that is a Goodness infinitely out of the Reach of all

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*Direct* Conception, or Apprehension, or proper Expression of ours, in any degree. For which Reason God is with great Significancy said to be πάντων θείων, *Him of whom all things may be affirmed*; that is all moral as well as all natural Perfection imaginable: καὶ πάντων ἀφαίρεσιν, *And of whom all things may be denied*, even the greatest moral and natural Perfection directly conceivable by the Mind of Man. To the very same Purpose Dionysius describes him ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ θείων *Above all Negation or Affirmation*. Tho' the Parts in these two Sayings are seemingly opposite, yet they both mean the same thing; that none of either the affirmative or negative Attributes we have for God, do express any thing in his *Real Nature*, with any *Literal Propriety*: That we have neither a direct Idea or Conception, nor proper Word or Expression for the real Perfections of the Divinity; so that all we can do is by *Negative* Attributes to remove from him all Imperfection, and by those which are Affirmative to attribute to him Analogically all the Perfections which fall within our Sphere of Knowledge. 'Ουχ' ἔχει says St. Cyril γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρώπου φύσις μείζον τι τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὴν λέγειν ἐπὶ θεῷ. *For human Nature hath not any thing to say of God greater than those things that are within it self*: And it follows, *We think and speak of God, as they before us have done, in a Manner that is proper to our selves*, τὰ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς, μιζόνων ὑποδείγματα ποιεῖμεν *Making the things within our selves Symbols or Representations*

tions of those things that are superior to us; that is, substituting the Affections, and Properties, and Operations of our own Mind to represent the infinite Perfections of God. And agreeably to this Dionysius, speaking of the divine Attributes, hath this Saying; *In God alone there is no Mind, and yet there is* ὑπερέχουσα σοφία, *A transcendent Wisdom.* καὶ ὅσα ἐν τὰγαθῷ τῆς τῶν ἀνείδεων ἐστὶν ὑπεροχικῆς εἰδοποιίας. *And so it is with all other Instances of Expression for a super-excellent Form of things without Form or Idea, in that absolute Good; that is, the Mind of Man by such Forms and Ideas as it hath within it self, must conceive those divine Perfections of him who is Goodness it self, and for which it can have neither Proper Form nor Idea.*

THE meaning of these, and of such like sayings which frequently occur in the Fathers, is very obvious; that we cannot have the least Conception or Idea of what *Goodness* is in the *Real Nature* of God; nor of any of those moral Attributes into which we branch it, according to our Observation of the greatest moral Perfections whereof we find our human Nature to be capable: And that, as a learned Man remarks, whoever thinks or speaks of God, *Humana de eo vel Cogitatione fit, vel Oratione contentus, He must be contented with such Notions and Words as are properly Human.* It was for this Reason that, as another observes, St. Peter calls the divine moral Perfections τὰς ἀρετὰς *The Virtues* of God; because of that Similitude

militude our Virtues and Graces bear to the divine Perfections: And because we have no other way of expressing them but by the Virtues and Graces of our own Souls; and he hath this saying to that Purpose, *Analogiam cum ea [Sanctitate] habet aliquam Honestas ac Virtus humana.* And again speaking of the moral Attributes of God, *Ex natura Affectuum humanorum, a quibus ipse Dei Spiritus ob Analogiam ac Similitudinem Voces ad Deum transfert; aliqua Ratione æstimanda nobis erit Natura illorum divinæ Voluntatis Actuum.* From the Nature of human Affections, the Names of which are by the Spirit of God himself transfered to God by Analogy and Similitude; we can in some sort judge of the Nature of those Operations of the Divine Will. To which I shall add, that we have no other way of Reasoning upon those divine Virtues as St. Peter calls them, or Affections, or moral Attributes, or Perfections in God; but by Analogy with the Notions we have of the Virtues and Graces of our own Souls, and those Words by which we express them: And that those human Perfections which Men assert to be thus transfered by Similitude only and Analogy, can never be supposed of the same Kind with those divine Perfections of which they have a Similitude only and Resemblance. When we attribute our own Perfections to God, says one of our own Writers, *We abstract from the Manner how those Virtues are in him; in regard this being utterly unknown to us, it could not enter into our Intention or Notion when we*

*thus transferred them. And again, These Attributes are however truly spoken of God, tho' they have this Impropropriety in them; for tho' all Creatures are as nothing in Comparison of him—when we use those Words, we only mean to apply them to God, as far as they suit some Notion of ours, which by Analogy hath some Perfection resembling what is in him. To these Authorities I shall add that of Aquinas, who is very express and distinct in this Matter, and in respect those moral Attributes which are spoken of God even affirmatively, says, that they have no strict Propriety in them, for this Reason; *Intellectus noster eo modo apprehendit eas* [Perfections] *secundum quod sunt in Creaturis; & secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per Nomina.* He distinguisheth these two things in the Names of those moral Attributes; one is the *Real true Perfections* in the very Nature of God expressed by those Terms; which he says are altogether transcendent and inconceivable, but are however signified by those Terms in the greatest Propriety we are able to express them: The other is; our *Manner of signifying or denominating* those Attributes, in respect of which they cannot *Properly* be spoken of God; *Habent enim Modum significandi, qui Creaturis competit.**

5. As the *Real Nature* of God, of all his Attributes in general, and of his moral Attributes in particular were in the Opinion both of the Antients and Moderns held to be altogether

gether Incomprehensible and Ineffable ; that is above all our direct Apprehension, and literal Propriety of Expression : So such of them as have thought more closely of the true Nature and Manner of that Knowledge we have of things Supernatural and Divine ; have found themselves under a Necessity of acknowledging that we conceive and express them all by *Analogy*. Tho' it must be confessed that they have not yet proceeded farther than some general Expressions, and confused and very indistinct Assertions concerning this divine Analogy ; nor to any particular Application of it to the Confutation of those many Arguments and Objections of Heretics and Infidels, which proceed upon a grossly literal Acceptation of the Terms of the Gospel. And that many for want of a due and full Consideration of the true Nature of this divine Analogy, together with a clear and distinct Explication of its difference not only from that which is merely human, but from human and divine Metaphor, have unhappily confounded them ; and have thereby run into dangerous Mistakes, and into such Errors as are fundamentally destructive both of Natural and Revealed Religion.

THE first I shall mention is Hilary, in Opposition to the Arians ; who then argued, as they do at this Day, from our gross Ideas and Conceptions of worldly things, and the *Literal* Acceptation of the Terms in which we express them, to things Spiritual and Divine. He hath

this Saying among many others to the same Purpose. *Comparatio enim terrenorum ad Deum, nulla est; sed Infirmitas nostræ Intelligentiæ cogit species quasdam ex inferioribus, tanquam superiorum Indices quærere: Ut rerum familiarium Consuetudine admonente, ex Sensus nostri Conscientia, ad insoliti Sensus Opinionem educeremur. Perigimus itaque de Deo locuturi, Dei Verbis; sensum tamen nostrum rerum nostrarum specie imbuentes.* In which Words tho' he doth not name it, yet he gives us a very clear and distinct Description of Analogy; and the Inference he makes from this Doctrine of his which he so frequently urges is, *Ut cum aliquid ex humanis Comparationibus proferimus, non secundum naturas corporales de Deo sentire credamur; nec Passionibus nostris Spiritualia comparare: Sed potius rerum visibilium speciem ad Intelligentiam invisibilium protulisse.* That when we make any Comparison from things human, we may be understood not to think of God according to the Nature of things Corporeal; nor to compare Spiritual things to our Passions: But to have applyed the Species or Appearances of things Visible, to the Understanding or Apprehending things that are Invisible. And Clemens Alexandrinus long before the Arian Heresy appeared in the World observed *οἱ ὁ ἀπίστοι ἐξ ἑρανεῦ καὶ τῆ ἀοράτου, πάντα ἔλκουσιν εἰς γῆν.* But Infidels draw all things from Heaven, and from what is there Invisible, down to the Earth. That is, as he explains himself, They conceive the invisible incomprehensible things of another World, relating to God and the My-  
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teries of the Gospel, exactly by their gross Ideas and Conceptions of the visible things of this World, as if both were the *Same in Kind*: In-  
somuch that they think and speak of them as if *Ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας, καὶ δρυὶς περιλαμβάνοντες* *They were really or actually handling Stocks and Stones which they distinguish by the Touch.* What is here placed in so short and clear a Light, is the very ground of all the prevailing Heresy and Infidelity at this Day; and most of the Heresies in every Age of the Church have sprang from the same Cause. But the Arguments in defence of them, and the Objections against the Orthodox Faith drawn from this earthly Topic, have been of late not only revived; but so far improved, and disguised, and refined beyond the Artifice and Subtilty of the Antient Heretics: That there is now no other effectual way left for a clear and full Confutation of their Descendents, but by proceeding upon that excellent Observation of Clemens; till we come to a particular Application of the Doctrine of Analogy to every Article of our modern Heresies put into the strongest Terms, and carried on to the utmost Point of Decision.

To the same purpose Athanasius, with respect to our manner of thinking and speaking of things Divine and the Mysteries of the Gospel, with great Truth and Elegance expresseth himself thus, *Ταῦτα ἀνθρωποπαθῶς μὲν λέγονται, θεοπρεπῶς δὲ νοῶνται*, *These things are expressed indeed after the Manner of Men, or in*  
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*human Language; but they are conceived in a godlike or heavenly Manner.* This was levelled at the Arians, who founded their heretical Opinions, and the whole stress of their Reasoning in Defence of them, upon the strictly literal Acceptation and Meaning of the Terms wherein the Mysteries of the Gospel are revealed: Whereas we express those Mysteries in Words of human Language, which lose their strict Propriety when applied to things Supernatural and Divine, and are then to be understood Analogically,

AMONG the learned of later Times we meet with many Hints and short Descriptions of this divine Analogy; and in some of them a few feeble Efforts towards a fuller Discovery of something, which they found was plainly wanting to all divine Knowledge: But they were always driven back from any commendable Progress by a frightful Apparition, in the ghastly shape of airy *Figure* and *Metaphor*, ready with open Mouth to devour all Religion as well Natural as Revealed. Observe the Determination of a Philosopher of Name upon this Question of highest Importance to us, *Quomodo Deus a nobis cognoscatur?* There are two different ways, says he, which lead us to the Knowledge of God; One by *Negation*, or removing from him all Imperfection in the Creature; which we do by negative Attributes, such as *Infinite, Immense, Invisible*: by this means, *Obscuram et involutam, sed magis nostræ Infirmitati attemperatam, divinæ simplicitatis Imaginem Cogitatione*

*gitatione depingimus.* He should have remarked here, that in this *Negative* way of proceeding we are to remove from him not only all natural and moral *Imperfections incidental* to the Creatures; but the whole intire *Nature* and *Essence* and *Kind* of all and every one of them, together with all their *Essential Attributes* and *Properties*, as one grand Imperfection utterly unworthy the *Real Nature* and *Intrinsic Perfections* of the great Creator; and then, as far as it reaches, this negative Knowledge is not obscure and involved, but most clear, and distinct, and useful. But when Men attempt to add all or any of those negative Attributes, and Infinity in particular, to any created Being; or to any *Essential Property* or Faculty or Operation of that Being, taken in its *Literal Sence*, in order to make up an Attribute expressive of any Perfection superior in *Degree*, but of the same Kind in the Divinity; they do but confound our Thoughts, and pervert a plain and obvious Knowledge, most useful to Religion, into Absurdity and Contradiction.

THE other way to the Knowledge of God, he observes, is by Analogy. *Cum ex Analogia & Similitudine quadam Creaturarum Dotes Deo tribuimus; tum magis distinctam divinæ Majestatis Imaginem formare nobis videmur. Sic Deum ut Unum, per Analogiam vero; ut Bonum ipsum concipimus.* We Seem to form; and to our Selves; and a Sort of Similitude; and a More distinct Resemblance. What Occasion was there for  
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all this Caution in a plain Case? How tenderly he touches a safe and evident Truth, as if he were feeling for it in the Dark: Where it was to remain no longer concealed, than till new and unheard of Forms and Disguises of Heresy and Infidelity made it necessary for it to break into Light, and appear in Public. He might have spoke out and boldly affirmed, that we have no other way of forming to our selves any *Positive Conceptions* of things Supernatural and Divine, but by Semblance only and Representation of things Natural and Human: Inso-much that, as he remarks, we could not conceive even the *Unity* of God, but by our gross Idea or Conception of human Unity; nor his Goodness, but by the Virtues and Graces of our own Souls.

ANOTHER, more truly a Divine than a Philosopher, accounts much after the same Manner for our Knowledge of God. *Naturam Dei pro captu Viatorum declarat nobis sacra Scriptura, per certa Attributa essentialia partim negativa, partim affirmativa: Partim etiam, quoad rationem quandam formalem, analogice (si fas ita loqui) seu in Imagine quadam, & Similitudine.* *Pro captu Viatorum*, of Travellers, who are intire strangers to the *Real Nature* of the Place, as well as Company to which they are going; and whereof they can have no other Knowledge, than by Resemblance only or Similitude with what they have already seen and known. *Attributa essentialia Negativa*, was only a great  
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Slip of the Pen. But what is most material to observe is, that the Scripture declares to us Travellers, those essential Attributes; *Quoad Rationem formalem*, which is the Language of the Schools to express, *As they are in their own Nature* analogically; they being otherwise inconceivable and ineffable. Could that great and good Man hear me now from among the Blessed, I might venture to tell him, that the Doctrine of divine Analogy in its full Latitude is now become not only *Lawful*, but *Necessary*; both for the farther Defence of the orthodox Faith from its open and clandestine Enemies: And for a seasonable Reinforcement and Relief to our learned and worthy Defenders of it; who wanted nothing towards an intire Conquest, but the giving up the literal and strictly proper Acceptation of the several Terms in Dispute; which as it was a Point utterly indefensible by them, so the Concession must have proved fatal to their Adversaries.

ANOTHER very learned Man expresseth himself to the same Purpose after this Manner. *Igitur quæ a rebus creatis & corporeis transferuntur Nomina, & ad divinas explicandas accommodantur; a nativa illa originis suæ facie purganda sunt: Ut quicquid in his unde petita sunt rebus impurum & imperfectum cernitur; id a divinis istis & cælestibus, cogitatione separetur.* The Meaning of which is, that *The Words transferred from things created and corporeal to things Divine, are to be purged from the Dregs of their*  
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*original Acceptation; that nothing imperfect or impure imported in them, might be applyed to things Divine and Heavenly.* Why, every thing in the whole Nature of whatsoever is created or corporeal is imperfect, and even impure in respect of the Divinity; so that no word can be transfered from things natural and human to God, but by *Semblance* only and *Representation*: But scared with the Name, at his time of Day, when there was no more than a Dawn of Analogy; he however expressed the Thing. And again, in Opposition to those Heretics who founded their Arguments against the orthodox Faith upon the literal Acceptation of Terms, he most rightly observes; That the Fallacy of their Reasoning consisted in this, *Quod quæ Divinitati tribuuntur a nobis, humanis explicata Similitudinibus ac Vocabulis; iisdem quibus insunt nobis irretita Conditionibus ac Modis, transferri in Deum existimant.* That is, they fondly imagine that the Conceptions and Terms which we transfer to God, are to be then understood after the same Manner as when they were applyed to things Natural and Human. No says he, *De Deo aliter hæc intelligenda, quæ a creatis rebus assumuntur; quam de creatis ipsis unde sunt petita.* The Sabellians and Arians to whom these Sayings are applyed, he observes, understand the Terms of the Gospel in a gross and human, that is a literal Sence, and from thence make their Inferences quite contrary to each other: But we must take them as he says *Aliter*, when transfered to the Divinity; and from

from a full Explication as well as a right Application of that *Aliter*, or that very different Manner, will arise a final Determination of the great Points in Controversy.

BUT of all whom I have yet met with, the Angelic Doctor hath set this whole Matter in the truest Light, and with greatest Judgment and Exactness. Speaking of our Conception or Knowledge of God by Resemblance only and Similitude, he distinguisheth thus. In respect of the divine Being himself, there can be nothing in the Creature whereby to discern any thing of his real true Nature and Essence; no created Species or Form can exhibit to the Mind of Man any thing as it is in the Real Nature and Essence of God: But in respect of our Understanding, some Similitude or Representation of God and his Perfections he asserts to be however absolutely necessary, in order to render us capable of some Conception or Apprehension of Him. All the Perfections of the Creature, and of an human Mind in particular, he asserts to be in God not *Eminenter* in a higher Degree, as the vulgar Notion is; but *Supereminenter*, quite of another Kind, and infinitely above all Form or Species of created Beings; and therefore no created Perfection can be any more than a Similitude and Resemblance of the divine Perfections. And he concludes by shewing, that altho' nothing can give us a real and true Perception or Apprehension of any thing in the Nature of God, as he is in himself;

himself; yet we have a solid and substantial Knowledge of him by Similitude and Representation: And all this he clears up fully under that Conclusion of his with this Title, *Nomina de Deo & Creaturis dicta non Univoce, nec pure Equivoce; sed Analogice dicuntur, secundum Analogiam ad ipsum.*

AGAIN upon these three different Acceptations of Words he farther explains himself thus. Nothing can be affirmed of God and of the Creature *Univoce*, in the same Sence or as if they were of the same Kind. For Instance, says he, when we say a Man is *Wise*, this Term is taken in the Concrete, so as to include a directly known Being; and withal we know what it is for him to be *Wise* or *Foolish*: But when this is made an Attribute of God, *Relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, & excedentem Nominis Significationem.* Therefore when we say God is *Wise*, we can mean it only in the Abstract as he calls it; as an incomprehensible *Perfection* of an incomprehensible Substance or Essence, *Answerable* and *Similar* to Wisdom in human Nature. To which he adds, that Wisdom in Man is a *Property* only, distinguished from his Essence; but that in God it is not really distinguished from his very Substance and Essence; and from thence he makes this Inference, therefore *Wise* or *Wisdom* cannot be spoken of God and Man in the same Sence,

NOR are the Attributes of God says he,  
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and the *Moral* Attributes in particular, affirmed of him and of Man *Pure Equivoce*; that is in the other Extreme, in a Sence or Meaning without any *Real Correspondency*, or Similitude: For then we could have no useful Knowledge of God at all, *Sed semper incideret Fallacia Equivocationis*; but one continued *Æquivocation* and Fallacy would run thro' all our Conceptions and Reasonings upon God and his Attributes.

WHEREFORE his Conclusion is, that the divine Attributes are spoken of God and of Man, in a middle Way between the two former; that is *Analogice*: *Et iste modus Communitatis, medius est inter puram Æquivocationem, & simplicem Univocationem*; which Manner in his own Words is *Secundum Analogiam, id est, Proportionem*. This Analogy with great Accuracy he founds in the Relation of Man in particular to God the first Cause and Principle of all things: In whom all the Perfections of his Creatures (and I shall take leave to add by way of farther explication; and of Man in particular, who was made in the Likeness of God and after his Image) are *Supereminenter*; in a manner so transcendent, that our greatest Perfections bear only a faint and very distant Similitude and Correspondency to those which are Divine; which Similitude or Analogy he asserts to be so imperfect, that no Words or Attributes can be ascribed to God and Man, *Secundum idem genus, So as to mean any thing*  
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*of the same Kind.* I shall only observe here for the sake of those who are unacquainted with the Terms of the Schools, that a Word applyed *Univocally* to God and Man means, its being attributed to both in the same literal Sence and strict Propriety. By *Purely Equivocal* is meant, that the same Word is attributed to God and Man in a Sence so intirely different, that it implies no *Real Similitude*, or *Correspondency* of the one to the other. And a Word is attributed *Analogically*, when it is spoken of Man in its first and literal Propriety; and transfered to God on account of an inconceivable, but *Real and Correspondent Similitude* in the Nature of both Beings.

AFTER so clear and distinct an Account of *Divine Analogy* by a Person to whom, as Erasmus observes, no Divine even of his own more refined and learned Age was equal in a sound Judgment and solid Learning, it may well be thought strange that in the space of above four hundred and fifty Years no farther Improvement should be made of it: And that so important a Point should have been thus intirely overlooked among the many useless, and trifling, and some of them even mischievous Niceties of the Schools.

THE first of our English Writers in whom I have met with any mention of the Thing without the Name, is that great and good Man who will live and flourish in the Latin; when  
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Alas! all that he wrote in English must die. In one of his Sermons he hath this Saying. *Repentance is not ascribed to God properly; but as other human Passions and Affections are, as Grief, Sorrow, &c.* Ἀνθρωποπαθῶς, *To import some Actions of God eventually, and according to the Manner of our Understanding, like unto the Operations which those Passions produce in us; but have nothing at all of the Nature of those Passions in them.* Upon this I shall only observe, that the Distinction between taking Words Ἀνθρωποπαθῶς after the manner of Men, or in a literal Sence; and Θεοπειπῶς in a manner worthy of God, or in a divine Analogical Acceptation; hath prevailed more universally among learned Men from the Time of Athanasius, who made use of it against the Arian way of arguing from the literal Application of Terms in the Gospel both to God and Man indifferently. And again, that if all our Intellectual and Moral Attributes (which are spoken of the Divine Being Ἀνθρωποπαθῶς and Analogically, as well as our commendable Affections and Passions) import no more than the *Actions of God Eventually*; then there can be no *Real Correspondency* and *Similitude* between them and the divine Perfections which they represent and exhibit to the Mind of Man: And thus all Parity of Reason is quite taken away; we can have no solid and real Meaning at the Bottom when we speak of God in the Language of human Faculties; and any other Terms whatsoever would serve as well to ex-

press the Actions of God, as what we call his Attributes taken from the Perfections of our own Minds. But this was only an incautious way of wording a Doctrine which, had there been in his Time the same Occasion for Exactness there is now, that curious Logical Head could have placed in such a Light as perhaps no Man will be able to do after him.

I AM now come down to our own Times, wherein Arianism hath been not only revived; but wrought up together with all the Principles of Socinianism not inconsistent with it, into a new and formidable Herefy: Which from hiding its Head in clandestine Darkeness and Recess, and sculking from the Laws, without ever appearing in Public but under Cover of Diffimulation and a Color of Orthodoxy; begins now to stare the received, established, Orthodox Truth in the Face; not without an insulting disdain, and triumphant Pity of whatever has been said or written against it. The Prime Authors and Defenders of it have, without any Provocation, and merely thro' a Foresight of the impending Danger which threatened their Hypothesis from the Doctrine of divine *Analogy*, attacked it vigorously at every Turn; and with so much keenness and virulence, that they seem to have wasted all their Strength against it already, before this untryed Ground can be fairly laid out for the Engagement. On the Side of Orthodoxy we find no mention of *Analogy*, but where Men  
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are hard pressed with absurdity in the Application of Terms in their literal Propriety to things Divine and Supernatural: Nor have they yet proceeded any farther than to some general Expressions concerning it, and that often without even the Name; and sometimes perhaps to a few Remarks on it, dubiously if not erroneously worded; for the most Part with as much Caution as they would use in walking upon the Brink of a Precipice, from whence they observed others, by making a wrong step, to have fallen down headlong.

THE first I shall cite here is a Right Reverend Person, whom I have somewhere seen styled in print, and very deservedly, the *Finest Thinker* of the Age. *What Conceptions I have of the Nature and Perfections of God are according to my Apprehension so far clear; as to enable me truly and justly to determine which of those distinct Ideas I have in my Mind are applicable to him, and which are not: And such a Knowledge of the Divine Nature as this, is a sufficient Direction of my Faith in any Proposition concerning God; where I clearly understand all the Ideas attributed to him.* A fine Sentence, and fraught with Judgment; only it must be observed that he mingles *Ideas*, which it has been shewn we attribute to God by Metaphor only; with those Notions or Conceptions which we attribute to him by Analogy. Here no less than these several things are comprised. That the Knowledge I have of the Nature and Perfections

of God, is taken from the clear and distinct Ideas or Conceptions I have in my own Mind, which are from thence applyed and attributed to him. That these Ideas or Conceptions attributed to God are clearly understood; so that what we know of God, and all that we attribute to him is as clear and distinct when thus attributed to him, as when they are applyed to our selves. That the Mind of Man is capable of judging and distinguishing which of our Conceptions are fit to be attributed to God, and which are unworthy of him: That is, we attribute all the *Perfections* of human Kind to him; after having separated the Intermixture of Imperfection as far as we are able. Lastly, That this sort of Knowledge by the Intervention of such Ideas or Conceptions as are natural and human, is sufficient for the Direction of our Faith; I add, and of our Practice, and for all the Ends of Religion.

AGAIN says the same Author, *It seems to have been the Design of the Scriptures to represent God in a sensible Manner; tho' at the same time they take Care to assure us, that God is in his own Nature a Being of different Perfections not conceivable by human Understanding; and is thus represented only in condescension to our Weakness, for the Help and Assistance of our Devotion: So that all Expressions of this Kind, where God is the Subject, are to be understood in an higher and more spiritual Sence; but still with some Analogy to what they properly and usually signify.*  
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The whole Matter is here fully exprest, tho' with much Caution. In a *Sensible Manner*; he means in a natural, easy, and intelligible Manner, representing God by such Conceptions or Ideas as he before observed we had already in our *Minds*, from Sense and Reason: And accordingly the Language of Scripture concerning God and things supernatural runs altogether either upon divine Metaphor or Analogy. *Of different Perfections not conceivable by human Understanding*, that is as they are in themselves; which they would be in some Degree, if any of our natural or moral Excellencies were of the same Kind in God that they are in us. *In a higher and more spiritual Sence*; that is in a divine Sence analogous to what they express in their literal and proper Acceptation.

THE next I shall cite is a later Author, who unwarily runs into that Error of the Anomœans of old and partly of the Socinians, of resolving all the moral Attributes of God into the *Rectitude* of his Nature; and who finds great fault with Men's *Distinguishing and multiplying the moral Perfections of God beyond Measure, and without Grounds*. But if they did not distinguish and multiply the moral Attributes of God, they could have no way of thinking or speaking of them any farther, than that *His Nature is Right*; which is a confused, general, and undetermined Manner: And Men would thus proceed in direct Contradiction to the Scripture, which all along distinguishes and

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multiplies

multiplies the moral Perfections of God. This he himself immediately observes in direct Opposition to his own Principle, but solves it thus. This is done in the Scripture says he *By way of Accommodation to human Language and human Conception. It ascribes to him our Affections, our Passions, our Senses, and even Parts of our Bodies; but yet we do not suppose that any of these things are strictly applicable to the Deity; or any otherwise than in a figurative and foreign Sense. In like Manner human Virtues—seem applied to the Deity, if not in a Figurative, yet in a less proper Sense. I will not presume to affirm that it is even an Impropriety to ascribe the several forementioned Characters to the Deity; much less that they are to be considered in him merely as Analogical.* I must observe here that there are but three ways wherein our moral Perfections can be ascribed to God; either first in a *Literal and Proper* Sense, as they are spoken of Man; so as to be of the same Kind in both. Or Secondly, in a Sense purely *Figurative* or *Æquivocal*; so as to import nothing in the Deity which hath any *Correspondent Reality* with what they signify in us. Or lastly, so as to import real incomprehensible Perfections in the Divinity, which have a real *Correspondency* and Similitude to the moral Perfections of our own Souls; and this is conceiving them Analogically. Now read those few perplexed, obscure, inconsistent Periods over again; and observe how these three ways are jumbled together, so that you cannot tell which of them he means; or whether



whether all of them together ; or none of them, but some *Foreign Way* which he hath not explained; or whether he makes more or fewer ways than these, of ascribing our moral Perfections to God. *Human Virtues seem applied to the Deity in a less proper Sence*: And in the same Breath, he will *Not presume to affirm that it is even an Impropriety to ascribe them to God*; so that thus they are attributed to God neither with *Propriety*, nor *Impropriety*. Again the Scripture ascribes our bodily Parts to God, in a *Figurative* and *Foreign Sence*: And human Virtues *In like Manner*; but not with *Impropriety*. But above all observe the flat Contradiction between the Beginning and Ending of the whole. *The Scripture distinguisheth Justice, Righteousness, Truth, Faithfulness, Holiness, Goodness, Mercy, Long-suffering, and all other moral Characters, by way of Accommodation to human Language and human Conception*. Now if we transfer this human Language and these human Conceptions to God, then they become divine Attributes; and those divine Attributes must mean something *Real* in God, or they may as well be inarticulate Sounds; and they must mean besides, something *Similar* and *Correspondent* to what those moral Perfections are in us (otherwise they help us to no true and useful Knowledge of God) and this is *Analogy*. And yet in the close he intimates *That it is Presumption to affirm that they are to be considered as merely Analogical*. I did not produce this Citation, with design to lessen the Character

rafter of the ingenious and worthy Author; but to fhew how neceffary a clear and well digefted Knowlege of divine Metaphor and Analogy is, even to thofe of greateft Parts and Learning, in order to prevent all Confufion and Obscurity in their Difcourfes and Reasonings: Not only upon the moral as well as natural *Attributes* of God; but upon all thofe *Terms* of Revelation which in Scripture are fpoken, as he truly obferves, *By way of Accommodation to human Language and Conception.*

My next Citation is from another learned and ingenious Author who hath obliged the World with fome very valuable Reflections on Reason. He juftly lays down *Clear and diftinct Ideas of Senfation* as the original materials and ground-work of all our Knowlege, and then it follows; *Thefe and the reflex acts of the Mind whereby ſhe adjusts, compounds, and . . . compares thefe Ideas; and from their different Combinations draws Inferences, makes Deductions, and forms Concluſions; or from thence forms Analogical Conceptions of abſtracted and ſpiritual Truths; make up the whole and ſole Province of Reason. From theſe reflex acts of the Mind upon its own Powers and Operations in receiving, retaining, comparing, and compounding theſe Ideas, proceed a claſs of Notions and Conceptions of a more ſpiritual and refined Nature. By removing every ſhadow of Imperfection, and heightening to the utmoſt Extent of Thought every Perfection we perceive in our ſelves or created Nature, we arrive*

*rive at a certain Ideal Knowledge of God and divine things, which we apprehend and conceive only by Analogy, and express only by Metaphor. The Use I would make of this Passage is, to shew how the ingenious and learned Part of the World are coming into these great and important Truths therein contained. That Ideas of Sensation are the Only original Materials and Groundwork of all even our Rational Knowledge. That all Compositions of those Ideas, and much more all our complex Notions and Conceptions, are Falsely and improperly called Ideas. That the Mind forms Analogical Conceptions of spiritual Truths. That by the Knowledge Of every Perfection we perceive in our selves, we arrive at a certain Knowledge of God and divine Things. And that We apprehend and conceive God and divine Things by Analogy.*

THUS far all is exactly right, but for the sake of Truth I must not pass over those grievous Mistakes which are here mingled with it.

1. BY *Ideas* the Author says he means both those of *Sensation*, and the *Reflex Acts* of the Mind. Here he confounds even simple Ideas of Sensation, with our complex Notions and Conceptions: Nay and lays them down indifferently together as the Materials and Groundwork of all our Knowledge, expressly contrary to what he afterwards affirms; that *Simple Ideas are the Materials and Groundwork of all our Knowledge.*

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2. HE calls the Consciousness which the Mind hath of its own Operations upon those simple Ideas of Sensation, *Reflex Acts*. Whereas the internal View, the Mind hath of those Ideas, as well as the Consciousness of its own Operations, are as direct and immediate, as the Sight the Eye hath of a visible Object directly before it: If it were otherwise, all our Knowledge might well be compared to the confused, uncertain, imperfect Perception of that Organ of Sensation by a forced side Look; or rather by a Distortion and wresting of it inwardly upon it self. *Reflex* or *Reflection* applied to the Operations of the Mind, is a Term so utterly senseless, and without any Aptitude or Ground of Propriety in Nature; and which necessarily occasions so much Obscurity and Confusion thro' the whole Procedure of the Intellect, that its prevailing so much is unaccountable.

3. ANALOGICAL *Conceptions of abstracted Truths*. Abstraction is the separating in Thought one thing from another which is not separated from it in Nature, for a more distinct Consideration of the Mind. This hath been, by a profound Mistake, applied in Religion to express the manner of our Perception or Apprehension of things Divine and Spiritual; by the Mind's abstracting intirely from all Perception and Conception of things Natural and Human: For lay aside that obscure  
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affected Term *Abstraction*, and the Meaning is no more than this; let the Mind drop all Thought or Conception of worldly Things when it contemplates divine Objects, and then it will be capable of some Apprehension or Conception of these last. Whereas both are equally impracticable; for if a Man thinks at all, he cannot by the utmost intenseness of his Mind take it intirely off from things Material or Human, which are its proper and immediate Objects. He hath no way of abstracting intirely from these, but by shutting his Eyes both of Body and Mind, and becoming stone Blind. And if he could thus abstract from all worldly things, how would it enable him to obtain the least Perception of things Divine and Spiritual, which are the immediate and proper Objects only of another World; there being no distinct Faculty in human Nature now for the direct Perception of them? So that Analogy, which is a Substitution of the Conceptions we have of our own Perfections to represent those of God and things Spiritual, is quite contrary to all such Abstraction, and utterly inconsistent with it; and yet these two things hath this Author huddled together into one. If you abstract intirely from all our natural Ideas and Conceptions, by his own Concession you abstract from all the materials and ground-work of Knowledge, and then the Intellect hath nothing to operate upon. But if you preserve the Foundation, and only transfer the natural and worldly Knowledge

lege you have already built upon it, to things divine and spiritual by Analogy, *It is a Kind of Knowledge*, as the Author observes, *Which tho' Low and Inadequate*, (as he words it) *will however be found a firm and substantial Basis for all our Enquiries after Truth and Happiness.*

4. *I D E A L Knowledge of God and divine things.* Here again this Author hath grievously mistaken his own Doctrine of Analogy. For we can have no *Ideas* of things Divine and Spiritual; that is in other Words no *Ideal Knowledge* of them. No, all our Knowledge of them as he himself truly observes, is by *Analogical Conceptions formed from Inferences, Deductions and Conclusions*: That is in other Words, from the Operations of the Mind considered together with those simple Ideas which he justly calls the first Materials and Ground-work of all our Knowledge. *Ideal Knowledge of God*, are two things put together with the greatest Inconsistency imaginable.

5. *G O D and divine things we conceive only by Analogy, and express them only by Metaphor.* This is not a Trip, but a Stumble occasioned by too much Haste or Inadvertency; and he might as well have said that we conceive them only by *Hyperbole*, and express them by *Irony*. To think of them necessarily after one manner only, and yet to be able to express that same Thought after another, requires a new and unheard

heard of Figure of Rhetoric: And is no less absurd than affirming a Man cannot avoid conceiving a thing by a Figure, and yet can be capable of expressing that very Conception Properly; or of conceiving it in a Proper Manner only, and expressing that same Conception Figuratively. Surely never was there a more palpable Mistake ever contracted into so few Words.

THIS Doctrine of Analogy is elsewhere by the same Author expressed thus. *The highest that this feeble Faculty [Reason] can pretend to in these Matters [Spiritual Truths and Mysteries of Religion] is from the known, certain, and experienced Nature and Properties of material things—to apprehend a proper Analogy; and from the visible things of this lower World, which are low Images of the spiritual and invisible things of God; to frame imperfect Likenesses and Representations of those superior Objects; and that in short is all that Reason can do in these sublime Matters.* Very just and clearly expressed (except the words *Material* and *Visible*, which turns all into Metaphor) and it cannot be thought an unreasonable request that the Author would never recede from it; but employ all that Learning and Ingenuity he hath shewn himself Master of in its Defence against those who hold a quite contrary Doctrine. But, *That spiritual Truths and the Mysteries of Religion, are not to be apprehended by all the Powers of Reason. That For this there must be some supreme central Faculty, Power, or Capacity of*  
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*the Soul, superior to all its rational Powers. Some secret Principle of Truth independent of all corporeal Objects and Ideas whatsoever; tho', as he truly says, these are the only Materials or Ground-work of all our Knowledge. That We have vital spiritual Perceptions, and Tastes, and Views of God and invisible Things, by the help of inward spiritual Senses, capable of infinite Perception. That Articles of Faith cannot be apprehended by Reason, but by a divine essential Light manifested to the Spirit; or by a mysterious Communication of mysterious Light to the Soul: To use the Author's own Words but otherwise applied, this is all Cant and Enthusiasm, Jargon and Nonsense. I shall leave these extatic Notions to himself for a second Review and more mature Deliberation.*

ANOTHER Authority I shall produce from among our late Writers is in these Words of a very ingenious and useful Author. *If our Passions be, as certainly they are, real Motions and Affections of the rational Soul, there can be no doubt but that there is something in the Nature of God, considered as a perfectly rational Being, Analogous to these Affections in us; tho' infinitely removed from those Imperfections, with which they are attended in us: and we may as well refuse to ascribe the Faculty of Knowledge to God, because we know by Ratiocination; as deny all rational Affections to him, because they are excited in us by Passion.*

HERE it is very rightly asserted that there  
must



must be *Something in the Nature of God Analogous to human Passions and Affections*; that is in other Words, there must be something in the divine Nature that bears a Similitude only and Correspondency with the commendable Passions and Affections of an human Soul: For otherwise there could be no Analogy between them; and then those Perfections in the Nature of God which are signified by them, would be as truly the very same in Kind with your Passions and mine, as the Passions and Affections of any other Man. The Reason assigned here for this great Truth is likewise very Good; for if we ascribe *Knowledge to God which in us is performed by Ratiocination*; that is by Thinking, which requires the help of imperceptible Fibres in the Brain, and the Concurrence of the animal Spirits: We may as safely ascribe to him those *Passions and Affections* which are also the Operations of the rational Soul, composed of Matter and Spirit acting in essential Union. These indeed, as he truly observes, *Shew themselves more in the sensitive Part of the Body*, than Ratiocination or the Motions of the Will; that is, than the several Modes of Thinking and Willing; and *Are attended with a more extraordinary Commotion of Spirits*: But there is still a motion or Commotion of Bodily Parts and Spirits in both, which are often even wasted and impaired by Intensity and Vehemence of Thinking and Willing. And therefore all to be infered from thence is, that in this state of corrupt Nature, our Passions are ascribed to God in a lower degree of Analogy,

logy, than our intellectual Operations and moral Virtues; tho' in a state of Innocence they must have been all equally complete Representations of the divine Perfections.

INFINITELY removed from those Imperfections with which they are attended in us. Here I must obviate a Mistake common to this Author, with several others who in the Main allow this Doctrine of divine Analogy. He means as they do, That if you remove all the Motions and Commotions with which our Passions and Affections are attended, you may then attribute them to God in a *Literal* and proper Sence; as being then of the *Same Kind* in him that they are in us, tho' infinitely more transcendent in Degree. But if you remove all Motion and Commotion of bodily Parts from them, you in effect remove the Passions themselves; even as considered in a State of perfect Innocence, or as they may be in a State of Glory. For as they never were, so they never will be the sole Operations of pure Spirit; but of Spirit and Matter in essential Union: And now in this Life they include in their very Notion, Nature, and Essence, the Motion and Commotion of the imperceptible Fibres or Animal Spirits. So that if you remove all the Imperfections necessarily adhering to them in us, you remove all Conception of the real Nature and Kind of them; and leave nothing to substitute even as a Similitude and Resemblance of God's correspondent Perfections;

or

or for a sure and solid Foundation of Analogy, and a sound Parity of Reason in all that is spoken of him in the Language of our human Passions and Affections.

My next Citations are from a learned and worthy Author, who hath said more upon this Subject of Analogy than any I have yet seen among our English Writers. A Person of a soaring and elevated Genius; who could he have been contented with walking upon the Ground in the search of Truth, might have outgone all his Cotemporaries, and not have come behind even the Antients of his Profession: But his too lofty and frequent Flights of Imagination *Pennis non homini Datis*; and his being so often upon the Wing in abstracted *Supermechanical* Reasonings, as to Matters depending on Observation of Fact only, and Experiment; together with a Deduction of Consequences relating to the things of the invisible World, independent of all Ideas and Conceptions of things Worldly and Human; have retarded his Course, and given others those Advantages which Nature designed for him. Alas! This fond prevailing Ambition of thinking above Man; and this straining of the Mind till it seemingly exerts its Faculties and Operations beyond its self, is no other than throwing it into *Convulsions*, which tho' they carry an Appearance of Strength and Vigor beyond what is natural, yet never fail to end in extreme Fainting and Weakness.

I CANNOT omit here his unhappily running into the fashionable Affectation of the Age, by treating moral and divine Matters in a Mathematical Method; with *Axioms, Definitions, Propositions, Demonstrations, Corollaries, Scholiums, Lemmas*, and mutual References of these to each other, in order to draw out a continued *Chain* of Consequences; in which if there is a Failure of one Link, the whole is dissolved. Whereas every Moral Truth stands secure on its own Bottom, without this tedious Apparatus; and requires no such additional Support or Corroboration. There is indeed a perfect Agreement and Harmony between all the Truths both in Morality and Revelation; but no such *Necessary* Connexion as there is between things Material, which are to be estimated by their Quantity; nor will they be treated, like them, in *Number* and *Figure*: You may as well go about to measure the Dimensions of a Virtue by a *Square* or a *Triangle*, or to compute its Degrees of Perfection by the *Golden Rule*; which this Author asserts Analogy to be, not only in Philosophy, but also in natural and revealed Religion. This Manner of proceeding is taken up of late, with a mistaken Intention to add Weight and Prevalency to Men's Discourses upon the Truths of Morality and Revelation; but the Event is quite contrary: For those Truths are by that method only wrested into an unnatural Posture and Situation; in which their natural Easiness and

Force

Force and Beauty are scarcely visible ; the substance of them is quite lost in Form ; and they become so disguised with a starched ungainly Mein, that all due Regard and Veneration for them is dropped in the Reading. Had he been satisfied with any thing short of *Demonstration*, no Man was better able to have placed the utmost Degrees of *Moral Evidence* (of which alone the Truths of natural Religion and Revelation are capable) in a more shining Light : But the injudicious blending of these together, and cloathing this Evidence in a Mathematical Dress, is covering it with the disguise of a Slave ; and throwing the *Truths* of Religion into *Chains* and *Fetters* ; whereby all the Freedom, and Majesty, and commanding Air of Reason and Authority peculiar to them is worn off ; together with that universal and *Free Empire* they have an innate Right to exercise, not over the *Understandings* only, but over the *Wills* and *Consciences* of Men.

THERE are three material Points asserted by this Author.

FIRST, *That the Visible, Intellectual, and created Species of things are Pictures, Images, and Representations of the invisible Archetypal and uncreated Species of things in the Mind of the supreme Being*—*That they are Pictures, Images and Representations of the divine Attributes, more or less Perfect according to their Order in the Rank of Beings*—*That things Visible are*  
I 2
*Analogical*

*Analogical Types and Miniatures of the Invisible*  
 —It is absolutely impossible that infinite Power and Perfection should bring any thing [any free and intelligent Agent] into Being; which had not its own Signature, Stamp, or Image on it; for there could be nothing besides himself whose Images they should be; and it is absurd to imagine they should represent nothing at all—All these Faculties [of human Nature] seem to be originally designed for nothing but this material World, and the System of things about us; they help us to no Notion or Conception of any sort of Beings distinct from Matter, but in so far as Analogy will bear us out. And in another Place he observes, That from this Method of Analogy (the only Medium of human Knowledge) we are necessarily led to conclude the Attributes or Qualities of the supreme and absolute Infinite, are indeed Analogous to the Properties and Qualities of finite Beings. All this would have been very just and intelligible (tho' somewhat darkly worded) had he not included the Visible Species of Things among his Analogical Representations of God; whereas they are merely sensitive and metaphorical Images when transferred to the Divine Being; and contain no real Analogy.

SECUNDLY, That things Visible [*Human* he should have said] are no more than Pictures, and Types, and Representations; and have nothing in them of the same real Nature and Kind with those invisible and divine things, whereof

whereof they are Pictures and Representations. *Those Affections and Properties in Creatures, which in them are but Modes; when Analogically carried up to the like or similar Affections or Attributes in the divine Nature, are the utmost Realities, as being complicated with absolute Infinity; and thereby transformed and exalted into real Qualities and actual Subsistences.* Again, Power, Subsistence, Duration, Knowledge, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty, &c. which in intelligent Beings are Images of Omnipotence, Necessary Existence, Eternity, Omniscience, the divine Sophia, Benignity, Infinite Perfection, &c. in the divine Nature; and are but Modes of Being, and not essential Perfections in those; are in him infinite Realities, and living active Principles. Here I must confess he is almost out of Sight; but what is discernible of him is much to the Purpose; That all the Perfections of intelligent Creatures, and of Man in particular, are no more than bare Images and Representations of the correspondent Perfections in the Divinity. In Man they are only *Similar Affections and Attributes* as he words it; and so far from being of the same Kind with the divine Attributes or Perfections which they represent, that they are but very low and distant Similitudes. So very low, that some learned Men have ran into a very dangerous Extreme, and have peremptorily denied not only that there can be any Similitude; but even any Proportion or Correspondency between the intellectual or moral Perfections of an hu-

man Mind, and those which are divine. *Inter infinitum & finitum*, says one, *simplicissimum & compositum, dependens & independens, nulla Similitudo*. And again, *Licet igitur Deum prædicemus Sapientem, Sanctum, Bonum, Potentem; eademque Encomia Angelis & hominibus tribuamus; Non credendum propterea easdem, aut similes verbis illis significari Perfectiones—Deum igitur Optimum, Maximum, Regem, Æternum, Justum, Fortem prædicamus; propterea quod istiusmodi Titulis, eos qui magni a nobis æstimantur solemus cohonestare: Non vero quod in animo habeamus ipsum Deum vocibus illis describere; aut aliquam in ipso nostris similem Perfectionem designare—Immenso igitur distinguimur Intervallo, quo Proportio omnis excluditur*.

It might have been said with great Truth, that all *Conceivable* and *Known* Similitude and Correspondency is excluded; for the *true Ground* and *Degrees* of that Similitude which all intelligent Beings bear to their great Archetype, are as incomprehensible as the divine Nature: But to deny there can be *any* Similitude conceivable or inconceivable, is in effect to deny that Man is made *In the Likeness of God or after his own Image*; upon that Principle we can affix no intelligible Meaning to that Text; but we destroy it utterly by saying in short, *Inter finitum & infinitum nulla Similitudo*. That nothing Finite can be of the same Kind with that which is Infinite, is as plain as a first Principle; but to assert that



that there can be no Similitude, or Proportion, or Correspondency in one to the other, is to overturn the whole Foundation of all our divine Knowledge, which is only by Analogy: Infomuch that if there can be no Similitude between Finite and Infinite, there can be no solid Ground for a Parity of Reason in our whole Manner of thinking and speaking of things Supernatural and Divine. But as we have not only Reason, but the Word of God to support the Truth of that Similitude; so we are to depend upon his Goodness and Veracity in not suffering us to be liable to such an inevitable and universal Delusion, as we should labour under if it were Groundless.

BUT to return to our own English Author. His way of demonstrating the Visible and Intellectual Species of things to be Pictures only, and Images of the invisible Archetypal Species of things is, because the *Affections* and *Properties in Creatures are but Modes, and no essential Perfections*; but in God they are *Realities and living Principles*; which I am obliged to take Notice of here, because it overturns all that Doctrine of Analogy which he hath been demonstrating. For there can be no Real Similitude, or Proportion, or Analogy between Nothing and Something. If the Affections and Properties in Man are not Realities, as he seems to intimate; then in ascribing them to God we ascribe nothing real to him: So that thus all the divine Attributes by which we ad-

mire and praise and worship the divine Being, can have no more meaning than if they were inarticulate Sounds. They cannot mean any thing in God *Similar* and *Answerable* to what they are in us, because in us they are but *Modes*; that is according to him, so many *Nothings*, as opposed to infinite Realities; and how can mere *Nothings* import any Similitude or Proportion or Correspondency with Realities? It is no proper Answer to this to say, that tho' *Knowledge, and Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness* are no Realities in us; yet that they become such when *Analogically* carryed up to the divine Nature, as being then complicated with absolute Infinitude. Now what It is for *Modes* to be transformed into *Quantities*, and exalted into actual *Subsistences*; For *Nothing* to be realized into *Something*, without an Act of Creation; For *A finite Mode* to be complicated with absolute Infinitude, without a Contradiction; I take to be Propositions that ought to be understood, before they are demonstrated. If *Power, and Knowledge, and Goodness, and Justice, and Mercy*, and the rest of those Perfections which we ascribe to God for divine Attributes, are to be deemed no Realities or real Perfections in us, before we ascribe them to him: Whatever Realities they may be in respect of the divine Nature, they can have no real fixed Meaning in respect of our Understandings which transfer them; because we have no *Direct* Idea, Notion, or Conception of any divine Perfection; so that after his manner of arguing, all we say

of God in the Language of our own Perfections is still but so much inarticulate Breath. Whereas the very Reason why we attribute them to God is, because we first find they are *Real* Perfections actually in our Nature; and therefore we transfer them to God, to express some incomprehensible Realities in him: And if they were not real Affections and essential Properties in us, they could not denote or exhibit to our Mind any correspondent Realities in the divine Nature,

ANOTHER thing very material taken Notice of by this Author is, that there is no arguing justly from the real Nature of the Creatures, and of Man in particular; to the real intrinsic Nature of the Divinity: Or in other words, that there is no proceeding upon the strictly proper and literal Acceptation of Terms, as if any one essential Affection or Attribute were of the same *Kind* in God and Man. *He who would reason Analogically from the Nature of those [Knowledge, Wisdom, Goodness, Power, Beauty &c.] in created intelligent Beings, to the Nature of those [Perfections] in the divine Essence; without having the utmost Regard to absolute Infinitude—would be miserably mistaken.* Again, *He that from the Picture of a Man would reason Analogically about human Nature: and from the Blending and Position of some Colors on Canvas, would reason to Life and Knowledge: Or from the reflected Image of the Sun in the Water, would draw any Conclusions concerning the real intrinsic Nature.*

*Nature of Light and Heat, could not err more grossly. Once more, He who would judge, determine, and pursue practical Conclusions about the Nature and Properties of spiritual and divine things by his Reason; would act as incongruously and contrary to the Analogy of Nature; as he who would taste Colors, and look into Sounds. The highest that this faculty can justly pretend to in these Matters is, from the known, certain, and experienced Nature and Properties of material things (to which the rational Faculty is in some Measure adequate) by a proper Analogy (and from the Visible's being low Images of the Invisible and spiritual) to frame similar but imperfect Likenesses and Representations of these superior Objects.*

WITHOUT *having the utmost Regard to absolute Infinitude.* Here this Author falls in with that monstrous Notion of adding Infinity to the Powers, and Properties, and Affections of our own Minds, in order to work them up into divine Attributes; the Absurdity and Falseness of which I hope hath already been made sufficiently evident. I shall only take Notice how this Notion utterly destroys all that Analogy which this Author had been demonstrating. For it proceeds upon a Supposition that our Affections and Properties are attributed to God in Kind. How then can his Opinion, *That their being complicated with Infinity quite changes their Nature, and exalts them into a different Category or Kind,* be consistent with this? And how can this agree with our having no Apprehensions, or Ideas, or  
 4 Conceptions

Conceptions of things Invisible and Spiritual, otherwise than by *Similar* and *imperfect Likenesses and Representations of those superior Objects* ; since according to this Opinion we have the Things themselves in Kind ?

By *his Reason*. We have no way of judging and determining concerning divine things, but by the same Faculty by which we judge and determine concerning things Natural and Human ; and that is our Reason. But the Author's Meaning is however just ; That we have no way of apprehending or perceiving any thing of the *Real intrinsic* Nature of things divine and spiritual by our *Reason*, or by any other Power or Faculty in human Nature ; we have no way of conceiving or apprehending them, or of judging and reasoning upon them, otherwise than by Analogy with things Worldly and Human.

THE Author hath pursued this Doctrine of Analogy with great Learning and Ingenuity (but in the Demonstrative Way) thro' all the Works of Nature, and visible System of the Creation : And from thence carries it by a notional Gradation up to the very Nature of the invisible World ; taking the whole Universe, and even the Divinity it self into an *Infinite Cone*, whereof he supposeth God to be the *Base*. The *Body* of it is *The whole System of Creatures from the highest spiritual Intelligence ; descending in a perpetual Subordination and continual*

*tinual Scale down to brute Matter. As you thus Consider the Creator and the Creatures altogether in one View, but in an inverted Order from the Base downward; you are to imagine, that as All the Sections of a Cone parallel to the Base are similar to it, and to one another: So every Species and Rank of Creatures have a stronger Impression and more lively Similitude of the Origin of all Perfection, as they come nearer to their Base; from whence that Resemblance diminishes in Proportion to their Distance from it, till you come to the Vertex; where that Similitude is most Weak, and Faint, and Contracted.*

THIS comprehensive Scheme, and the whole Series of Demonstrations which follow upon it, may be entertaining enough to the Curious; But I meddle not with Analogy as the Ground of it may be either *Imagined* or *Demonstrated* in the very Natures of *All* things Visible, or Invisible, Human, or Divine; or as they bear a mutual and *Known* Similitude or Proportion in the Order of Beings. I confine my self to that *Divine Analogy* only, whereby things worldly and human do necessarily become Images and Representations of *Supernatural* and *Divine* Things, to the Mind of Man: Between which the Similitude or Correspondency, tho' true and real, is so far from admitting of any Demonstration, or even Illustration of its particular *Nature* and *Degrees*; that these are altogether as inconceivable and unknown

as the true intrinsic Nature of things Spiritual and Divine. Nor is this kind of Analogy Matter of mere Curiosity only and Speculation; but such as is of real Use and Necessity to be plainly understood, and well considered: As it leads us into the true Method and Manner of that Knowledge we have of the things of another World; and as it enables us in Religion to steer safely between the two dangerous Extremes of Enthusiasm and Infidelity.

I CANNOT however but observe here what a favourable Aspect that Hypothesis, tho' far from the Design of the worthy Author, bears towards Atheism. Had he left the divine Nature out of his Cone, it might better have fitted the rest of the Universe, and the whole System of created Beings: Among which it is not improbable that there should be many distinct Ranks and Species one above another; tho' not differing by such insensible Degrees only, as we imagine between the contiguous Sections of a Cone. For this carries in it an ugly Implication that they are all one common Mass, and hardly distinguishable Heap of the same universal, similar, uniform Substance; one mere Huddle of Beings thrown all close together by a Kind of Fate and Necessity, or by some Chance and accidental Disposition of the Parts of an eternal and infinite System of Matter in endless Motion: Rather than by the voluntary Contrivance of an infinitely Wise and powerful Agent, who created all purely  
spiritual

spiritual Intelligences totaly and essentialy different from each other; and at great distances from those composed of Spirit and Matter. This Notion hath a direct Tendency to render doubtful the truly essential and wide difference between Matter and Spirit; which all unbelievers are very fond of doing; being heartily disposed to wish that there were no such thing as pure Spirit in the Universe.

THIS might however have passed as a slight Inadvertency: But to take the divine Nature into one and the same universal System with the Creatures, is no less than running unwarily into the very Atheistical Hypothesis of *Spinoza*; who, as this Author himself observes; *Considered the universal System of things as a kind of a Huge-Brute-Animal.* But at the same time he held God to be Part of that System, as a vital Spirit at least or natural Virtue diffused thro' the Whole: Or in the Language of other Men of the like Principles, as the *Soul* of the Universe; some of them asserting this to be an intelligent, and others an unintelligent Principle. Now whether it be one or the other, it makes little Difference in respect of the evil Tendency of every Hypothesis which includes God and the Creatures into one common universal System; and it would have served *Spinoza's* Turn as well, if he had considered the whole System of things as an *Huge-Animated-Cone*, or as an *Huge-Monstrous-Anything else*. All such Hypotheses therefore are  
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to be utterly exploded, as altogether unworthy of God; and as leading Men directly into a Disbelief of his distinct Existence, real Creation, and Providence; as well as of that infinite Distance there is between him and his Creatures. The Author saw this Consequence, and therefore took care afterwards to place the *Supreme Infinite*, or Basis, at an *Absolutely infinite* Distance from the Body of the Cone. But this is so far from removing the Objection, and preventing the evil Aspect of the Hypothesis; that it is loading it with Absurdity and Contradiction: For how the Cone should be it self *Infinite*, and yet its Basis be at an *Absolutely infinite Distance* from it, requires a very exuberant Imagination to conceive, or a Faculty of Demonstrating even beyond Mathematical Certainty.

THIS wrong inconsistent Notion, together with that of *Complicating Infinity* with our human Perfections, in order to work them up into Realities for divine Attributes; it may be easily conjectured this Author sucked in with his Mother's Milk at the University; who was herself, with the rest of her Sisters, about that Time unhappily poysoned by an *Essay concerning Human Understanding*: Which appeared indeed in the Beauties of Style, and Wit, and Language; but all this was the Glittering of the Serpent, to palliate and disguise a long Series of false Principles of Knowledge, directly destructive of revealed Religion especially;

pecialy; and calculated with no small Labour and Artifice for leading youthful and half learned Minds into all that prevailing Ignorance and Infidelity, which sad Experience hath shewn to be the Consequences of them. The Author of that Essay hath laid the Foundation of this very Hypothesis. *Things*, says he, *as far as we can observe, lessen and augment as the Quantity doth in a regular Cone; where tho' there be a manifest odds betwixt the Bigness of the Diameter at remote Distances, yet where they touch one another the Difference is hardly discernible.*——Observing such gradual and gentle Descents downwards, in those Parts of the Creation that are beneath Man; the rule of Analogy may make it probable, that it is so also in things above us and our Observation; and that there are several Ranks of Intelligent Beings, excelling us in several Degrees of Perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite Perfection of the Creator; by gentle Steps and Differences that are every one at no great Distance from the next to it. — This sort of Probability, which is the best Conduct of rational Experiments, and the Rise of Hypothesis, hath also its Use and Influence. Yes, this Hypothesis, as laid down and applyed by him, hath two very evil Uses, and a most malignant Influence.

FIRST, The plain Design and Implication of it is, to shew that there is no essential Difference between Men and Brutes; these are supposed

posed to touch one another in the Gradation of his universal Cone, and their Diameters to be so nearly of the same Length, that they differ but in a Point. This is the express Use and Application made of this Conical Doctrine by the Author; *For, says he, it is a hard Matter to say where sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end. Again, If we compare the Abilities of some Men and some Brutes, we shall find so little Difference; that it will be hard to say that those of the Man are clearer or larger.* Thus a Fool of a Man and a cunning Fox (the very Instance by which he elsewhere illustrates this vile Notion whereof he is very fond) come as near together as any two Systems of Matter can do: So that *Rational and Irrational, Sensible and Insensible; Man, and Beast, and Vegetables;* are all one common uniform System, whose Parts are as closely linked together as the Sections of a Cone; and each of us differ from those species of Beings contiguous to us, no otherwise than as the insensible length of the adjoining Diameters in such a Figure. This is exactly of a Piece with many other insinuations of this Author; particularly that Men by decrepid old Age, and loss of Senses and Memory, may be in a Condition not above Cockles and Oysters; and that Matter may possibly have a property of Thinking super-added to it.

SECONDLY, As this Hypothesis includes  
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God and the Creature in one and the same System, it is liable to all the dangerous Consequences before mentioned; but without any Softening or Alleviation, or the pious Use made of it by the other Author. God was there the Basis, but he is here *Supposed* to be the Vertex of the Cone, and the Notion is left barefaced to do all the mischief it can; by a pernicious Insinuation that the Difference between the highest created Intelligence and the Creator himself, is as insensible as that between Man and Brute, and that there is the same close Connexion between them: Which Hypothesis at best gives no small Countenance to those Atheistical Opinions, which run upon supposing the whole Universe one uniform System of Matter; and in which God is supposed to be the vital Spirit, or a Natural Virtue and Energy diffused thro' the whole; or to be the Soul of the Universe; and which attribute he Differences between all Ranks of Beings to Motion, or Chance, or some continual Series of a fatal Necessity. This and all such notional Hypotheses which carry in them these Dangerous Implications, and from whence such evil Consequences are so easily deduceable; should be carefully avoided by all who have a sincere Regard to natural, as well as to revealed Religion: Of which this Author was so far aware, as not to say expressly that God was the Vertex of his universal Cone; this he knew would have been read with Abhorrence. But he leads you upward thro' the several, even contiguous Ranks  
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of intelligences, till he brings you *Towards* the Vertex; and then if you keep to his Hypothesis, he leaves you to stop short of including it if you can; from whence there is but one easy Step into Infidelity; and another as easy from thence into Atheism.

THIS is his way of proceeding quite thro' that Essay. He will not say in positive Terms that there is no spiritual or immaterial Substance in Man. But, since the granting such a Substance in us, totally distinct from Matter, would utterly confound and destroy that beloved Hypothesis of his; he leads you so far *Towards* this Opinion, as to maintain that God may superadd to Matter a Power of Thinking: From whence there is but a short Step into a Persuasion of the Materiality of the Soul; and from thence into a disbelief of all future Rewards and Punishments; and from thence again into all the Immoralities which may be practised with present Impunity, and with Safety to the Honour and Reputation of those who are to die like Beasts. And few People are able at first sight to discern that the Question can mean no more than, Whether God can make the same thing to be Matter and no Matter, Rational and Irrational at the same time? And therefore that *Superadding* here, is a Term as Senceless and Contradictory, as it is in asking this Question, Whether God can *Superadd* to pure Spirit *Impenetrability* and *Extension*, without making it *Matter*?

AGAIN, his asserting with great positiveness, that *We can have no Knowledge, where we have no Ideas*; is not flatly denying that we can have any Knowledge at all of things Supernatural and Divine: but it decoys Men so far *Towards* it, that by excluding all other means of Knowledge, he leaves them no rational Foundation for the Knowledge of the things of another World. And Men neither finding *Ideas* of those things in their Minds; nor being able on his Principles to account for a sure and solid Knowledge of them without such direct and immediate *Ideas*; they conclude it in vain to attempt any Knowledge at all of them: For few Heads are attentive enough to distinguish between *Ideas* of things Divine and Supernatural (which it is impossible for us to have) and those *Complex* Conceptions of them, which the Mind forms to its self from its own Operations taken in Conjunction with those *Ideas*, and then substituted to *Represent* such divine Objects.

AGAIN, He would not say in plain Words, that Natural Religion is preferable to revealed; but he advances so far *Towards* it as to argue that *Morality* is capable of Demonstration, which all the World knows Revelation cannot pretend to: And this hath a direct Tendency to lead Men *Towards* Infidelity and a Contempt not only of the Scriptures, but indeed of natural Religion it self. For after all,

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even this can never admit of Mathematical Certainty; as doth sufficiently appear from the vain Attempts of several, who from this Author's groundless Suggestions have been drawn in to treat moral Subjects in a demonstrative Method, and with Mathematical Terms. And it is well worth remarking that most of the Treatises written in that manner, have been evidently contrived with a former Purpose and Design to render all revealed Religion useless and contemptible.

ONCE more, He doth not say in express Words that there are no such things as Intelligent Beings which are purely Spiritual; but he draws you on insensibly *Towards* it, by asserting contrary to common Sense and Reason, that *You have as clear and distinct an Idea of the Substance of Spirit, as you have of bodily Substance*: The immediate Consequence from which is, that if you have not, upon Tryal, as clear and distinct an *Idea* of Spirit as you have of Matter (which is impossible) you have, upon his Ideal Principles, nothing to do with it, as what cannot be the direct Object either of your Understanding or Faith. And few People will see that he means quite otherwise than what he says, namely that *We have no Idea at all of either of them*; *You have*, says he, *an Idea of their Properties and Qualities, but none at all of the Substances themselves*. Why then, say I, if we have no *Idea* of the Properties and Qualities of *Pure Spirit*, we can have no

Knowlege at all of it. What Saving then hath he left for any Knowlege at all of God, or for all Religion Natural and Revealed? Why, you have an Idea of *Thinking*, which is the property of Spirit; and so all is safe again. But how is this a Saving; if, according to him, *God can superadd Thinking to Matter*? Or if Thinking, as it really is, should prove a Property not of pure Spirit, but of Spirit and Matter in essential Union; so as to be the joint Faculty or Operation of both? For if so, then it cannot be the Property of God or of pure Spirit; so that all is lost again, and here he leaves it; till in another Place, in flat and open Contradiction to himself, he lays it down as a certain Position, that the very *Existence of finite Spirit is not knowable*; nay tho', he says, you have clear and distinct Ideas of its Qualities or Properties; which is the only way he before allowed you of knowing the Existence of it, or of bodily Substance: And he tells you plainly in the same Paragraph, that you cannot certainly conclude its Existence from such Ideas, any more than the Reality of Fairies from the Ideas you form of them. The immediate Consequence from all which is, that you cannot possibly know there is any Immaterial Substance at all, no not even in the human Composition; and thus all Religion inevitably falls to the Ground.

THESE Instances which are to our present purpose, are but a few of those covertly pernicious



cious Principles I could point out to the Reader, thro' that unweildy Bulk of Ideal Ignorance and Error; which is disposed in every Part of it (when once you pass Ideas of Sensation) for overturning all Foundations of our Knowledge relating to things Divine and Supernatural. The laying down false Principles of Knowledge in the General; Giving the Reader the Premises only, and leaving him to make the Inferences; stating and asserting Propositions seemingly true, but full of false and evil Implications; the forming whole strings of Propositions in the Style and Language of Orthodoxy, but fraught with direct and immediate Consequences against the Fundamentals of Christianity; and framing Hypotheses to give a literal and worldly Turn to all the most important Terms of the Gospel; in order to set Revelation at Variance with Reason; and to insinuate as if it was altogether useless and unnecessary. These are the modern clandestine Methods of proceeding against the truly antient and orthodox Faith; whereby Men are carried on so far *Towards* Infidelity and even Atheism, that it is not easy for weak Minds overcome with Vanity and Licentiousness, to stop short of the utmost Extremes; and to return back again to a full Persuasion of the Excellency of a sincere Faith in Christ, and of that strict Virtue and Holiness which is truly Evangelical. As it is too evident that most of these Methods of proceeding took their first Rise from that Essay: So the Applause and Appro-

bation it even still meets with, from too many in whom it ought to have raised the greatest Indignation: shews the Power and Prevalency of Education in blinding the Understandings as well as the Consciences of Men, beyond any Instance whatsoever of Bigotry or Enthusiasm.

ANOTHER Authority for the Doctrine of Analogy shall be out of a late Writer, who in his *Delineation of the Religion of Nature* holds there is no Sin but what consists *In Speaking or Acting a Lie*; and therefore that he may be sure to avoid this, he hath linked together a long Chain of *Truisms*: By which, under color of deep Science and profound demonstrative Knowledge, he hath involved and perplexed the most common and obvious Principles of practical Religion; and wasted a great deal of Learning and Parts in an aukward Application of them to the proving what every one knows better without it, and what no body denies. However in hopes that what he says upon this Subject may have some Weight with those who admire him upon other Accounts much less to be regarded; take the Citations as they follow.

BUT as we have no adequate [no nor inadequate] Idea of an infinite and perfect Being; his Powers, and among them his Power of Knowing, must infinitely pass all our understanding: It must be something different from, and infinitely transcending all the Modes of apprehending

tending things, which we know any thing of. And for this he cites these two remarkable Sayings of Maimonides, *His Knowledge is not of the same Kind with our Knowledge. And again, It differs not only in much or little, but in the very Kind of its Existence.* Speaking not long after of our Manner of Knowing by Senses, Memory, Phansy, Report of others: it follows, *God has no Organs of Sensation, nor such mean Faculties as the best of ours are, and consequently cannot know things in the Way which we know them; if he doth not know them by some other Way, he cannot know them at all, even tho' they are present—They are and must be known to God by some other Way.* And he quotes another Saying of Maimonides to the same purpose, *To attempt to comprehend the Manner of God's knowing, is the same as for us to endeavour to be God himself.* For this Reason he argues in another Place, *That we must endeavour to think and speak of him—in the most proper Mannner we are able; keeping withall this general Conclusion——that tho' we do the best we can, he is still something above all our Conceptions: And desiring that our faint Expressions may be taken as aiming at an higher and more proportionable Meaning. To do otherwise implies not only, that his Mode of Existence and essential Attributes are comprehensible by us;——but that our Words and Phrases taken from among our selves, are adequate Expressions of them; contrary to Truth.* This he explains in the Instance of Mercy, *When we ascribe*  
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*Mercy to God — it must not be understood to be like that which is called Compassion in us—but that we mean Something, which tho' in our low way of speaking, and by way of Analogy, we call it by the same Name; is yet in the perfect Nature of God very different. And here he cites that common Saying of the Jews, We speak of God according to the Language of the Sons of Men: And that saying of Plotinus, For want of proper Expression —transferring such Words or Names [to God] as we are fond of among our selves. And he asserts expressly, that His Attributes of Mercy, and Justice, &c. cannot be as we conceive them.*

I SHALL now cite a few Concessions, out of some who are *Professed Adversaries* to the Doctrine of divine Analogy; which dropped from them, as being insensibly influenced by the Power of that Truth, notwithstanding a formed and set Purpose in them to oppose it. One of them, in his Sermons at Boyle's Lecture, arguing against the Deists and Atheists, *That the supreme Governor of the World cannot but testify his Favour and Displeasure according as rational Creatures act for, or against the Obligations of their rational Nature; observes that this must be true, Unless we imagine that moral Perfections in the divine or supreme Being have no manner of ANALOGY to moral Perfections in other rational Beings; which is to destroy all manner of Argument from the Nature of things.* Here he lays down that Analogy which there is between the moral Perfections of God and  
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the moral Perfections of Man, as the Foundation of all Religion: And his Argument concludes unanswerably against all who disallow that Favour or Displeasure of the Supreme Governor; because there is such a Similitude and Correspondency between the Nature of God and Man, as is a sure Foundation for an unerring Parity of *Reason*, in this moral respect, which can never fail.

BUT lo! In his very next Sermon this Foundation is quite overturned; besides that he maintains with all his Might, that *Reason must be the same in all Intelligent Beings*; which is false. For he means the *Faculty* of Reason; and that God and Angels must have the same *Kind* of natural Powers and Faculties of Knowing and Reasoning that we have; otherwise it is plain their *Knowlege* and *Reason* cannot be the *Same* with what they are in us. But if their *Faculties* of Knowlege are essentially different from ours, their *Manner* of Knowing and Reasoning must be so too, that is of quite another Kind: And this must be their Condition, unless they think and reason by the help of animal Spirits and the Labour of the Brain. But if by *Reason* he had meant the *Rational Deductions* and Conclusions only of our natural Faculties of Knowlege; and that all the *Reasonings* and *Inferences* founded on that Resemblance and Correspondence which there is between our own and the divine Perfections, are solid, and true; intirely *Agreeable*

to the infinite Knowledge, and *Coincident* with the eternal Reason and Wisdom of God; he had been in the Right, and his Argument against Deists and Atheists had concluded irrefragably.

AGAIN he asserts that *Justice*, and *Goodness* and *Truth*, and all other moral Perfections in God, are of the same Nature with the correspondent Perfections in Men. This is an Inconsistency; for to be *Correspondent* only, and to be of the *Same Nature* are two very different things. We say *Instinct* in Brutes is correspondent to *Reason* in Man; but we do not say the Reason of one Man is correspondent to the Reason of another, but that it is of the same Nature or the same in Kind: Which I take Notice of here to prevent this loose and indistinct way of Men's expressing themselves upon this Subject. Where is there a Ground for the Analogy he mentions, if they be of the same Nature or Kind? He argues that those Perfections differ in God and us, only in degree. And says, inconsistently with what he asserts in the former Sermon, *That if they are not of the same Kind, it is in vain to reason at all about them*, and that *We can have no Meaning at all* when we speak of them. Why? Because otherwise *You can have no Idea annexed to those Words, when you ascribe them to God*; that is according to that false and vile Position, *Where you have no Ideas, you can have no Knowledge*. Have we any Idea of God *As he is in himself*? and yet do we mean *Nothing* by that Word?

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Do we not mean a real or actually existent Being, whereof we neither have nor can have any proper *Idea*? Have we an *Idea* of any one essential Property or Attribute *as it is in him*, any more than of his divine Essence? How then are we to conceive his *Existence*, his *Substance* or *Essence*, his essential *Properties* and *Perfections* Natural and Moral; by Ideas? *Direct immediate* Ideas of them; or as this Author holds, *As they are in his very Nature*? And can those Words have no Meaning at all when ascribed to him, unless we have *Such* Ideas annexed to them? God forbid; for thus there is an End of all Religion natural and revealed, at one deadly Stroke. Nor is there any way of bringing it to Life again, but by frankly allowing that human Nature is not capable of the least direct Idea of them in any degree: And that we have no other way of knowing or conceiving his Essence or Perfections but by Analogy with our own Existence, and Essence, and Knowledge, and Justice, and Goodness, and Truth, and the rest of our own Perfections which we transfer and attribute to God, for want of any *Direct* Ideas or *Immediate* Conceptions of his Perfections both Natural and Moral. When Christ said *There is none good but God*, could this be true if Goodness in God were of the same kind with Goodness in us? Or is it possible for us to have any direct Idea of it as it is in him? Oh! but says this Author, Christ meant that there is none *Infinitely, Absolutely, and Essentially* good but God. He did  
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so, and therefore his Goodness differs from ours *Essentially*; or in other Words it is of quite another *Kind*. But he farther urges, How then can we *Be perfect as our Father which is in Heaven is perfect*? Not by Attainment of any of his Perfections in *Kind*, but by becoming as like him as we can: by being perfect in *Our Kind*, as he is in his *Own Nature*: It is the highest Presumption and bordering upon Blasphemy; to understand this Text of our attaining such a Kind of Perfections as there are in God.

AGAIN he reasoneth thus; Our Ideas of his natural Attributes are as imperfect as those of his moral Attributes; and therefore if we cannot reason from one, we cannot reason from the other. Very true, our Ideas of them both are equally imperfect in this sence; that we have no *Direct* Conception or Idea at all of either of them; and therefore we can reason from neither as being of the same Kind in him that they are in us; but we can reason from both, as having a Similitude and Correspondency with human Perfections. *The moral Perfections of God he yields are indeed Infinite, and those of Man are only Finite*; but, says he, this doth not argue that they are of a different Kind: Then say I; it is because this is so self-evident, that Infinite and Finite cannot be of the same Kind, that no arguing can make it more evident.

I SHALL now cite some Concessions from  
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the celebrated Author of the fifty five Arian Propositions, the Oracle from whence all the foregoing Doctrine was taken ; and the Labours of whose Life and the Credit of them among Men depend upon its Truth. *In expressing* says he *the several Powers of God* [natural and moral without Distinction] *all Language is so deficient, that we are forced to make use of figurative ways of speaking, and of Similitudes drawn from our own Manners of acting to represent our Conceptions of these divine Powers ; to which the Faculties of Man bear but a very small and imperfect Analogy.* Here he runs into an Extreme against himself which we will not allow ; for if our ways of speaking of the Powers and Perfections of God were *Purely and Only* Figurative, there could be no farther Ground of Truth in them than what depends upon our *Imagination* : And this is directly contrary to that divine Analogy he expressly asserts ; and which supposes a solid Foundation for eternal Truth in a real Similitude and Correspondency between the Divine and Human Nature ; so that the former and latter Part of that Sentence are plainly Inconsistent.

AGAIN in another Place. *God is a Being excelling not only the Souls of Men, but all other Intellectual Natures ; That is, Excelling them in his Whole Nature,* as he explains himself in another Place. Then as his *Nature* and theirs are not of the same Kind ; so neither can any of their natural or *Essential Properties* be of  
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the same Kind. *Wholy void of all Affections; such as Love, Hatred, Anger, Grief, Repentance, and the like; which are the Properties of embodied Spirits——But has these Passions of Mind ascribed to him in Scripture; only after the same figurative Manner of speaking; as the sensitive Organs of the Body likewise are: Because thereby to us are best represented such Actions of his, as in their Effect upon other things; not in their Nature within him; bear some Analogy to the like Passions and Affections in us.* Now take this Sentence to Pieces for a while; and then make them cling together again with good Sence and Meaning if you can. If God is in his *Nature wholy void* not only of all human Passions and Affections; but of all Attributes likewise any way *Correspondent or Answerable* to them; and if these *Affections*, which in us are the Faculties or Operations of Spirit and Body united, are spoken of God as *Figuratively* as our bodily Parts: Then there is nothing at all in us that can bear any *Real Similitude* and *Correspondency* to the divine Perfections; no not even our *Knowledge* or *Will*; these being equally the operations of Matter and Spirit with the others. What Truth then can there be in all that is spoken of him thro' the Scripture not only in the Language of our Passions and Affections; but even of our moral Perfections and Virtues, which are likewise the Operations and Qualities of the Human Spirit and Body united? Are all those Words and Expressions purely figurative, so as to mean nothing

thing as *Real* and *Correspondent* in respect of him and his *Nature*, as they do in respect of Man?

AGAIN, *Our Passions* are ascribed to God, in the same figurative Manner we ascribe the *Organs of the Body* to him. And yet *By our Passions* are represented such *Actions of God*, as in their *Effect* upon other things, bear some *Analogy* to the like *Passions in us*. That is, the *Actions of God* are *Represented* by our *Passions*; and yet, the *Effects only* of those *Actions* bear an *Analogy* to our *Passions*; or, perhaps he means to the *Effects* of our *Passions*. Tho' no Man living can make Sence of this Sentence, yet thus much we can pick out of it; that he jumbles *Metaphor* and *Analogy* together as if they were the same thing, tho' they are vastly different. For we transfer the Names of our bodily parts to God, as we do all things else merely material, whereof we have sensitive Ideas, by a pure Metaphor which supposes no correspondent Reality and Similitude: Whereas we transfer those Notions and Conceptions we have of the natural and moral Perfections of our Minds to him by Analogy, which supposes some similar and correspondent Perfections in the Divinity. But above all observe the Profundity of this Saying, that *We ascribe our Passions to God, because these best represent his Actions; which ACTIONS, in their Effects Bear some Analogy to our PASSIONS*. In other Places he drops such Expressions as these, *Spirit doth not signify one Kind of Being as Body doth, but several different Kinds of Beings, as*

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*different from each other as they are from Body: Then sure God, who as he says is Absolutely and perfectly Spirit is in his whole Nature different from the most exalted of created Spirits, and much more different yet from Embodied Spirits; and consequently there can be no one essential Attribute of the same Kind in both.*

AGAIN, *To frame to our selves any just Idea of the Power by which God ruleth over all, is absolutely impossible; because our Conceptions are altogether Finite. And again, Love, Hatred, Anger, Grief, are ascribed to God Figuratively, and not Literally. Just Idea.* It is absolutely impossible to have any *Idea* at all of *Power*, any more than of any thing else as it is in God; and for that Reason, as he himself is forced to own, we frame our Notion and Conception of it from Power in Man. And thus we do also as to the Attributes of *Wisdom* and *Goodness* in God, whereof it is absolutely impossible for us to have any other *Idea* or Conception than from those which are in Man: And for the very Reason he assigns; *Because our Conceptions are altogether Finite*, we can have no Conception or *Idea* of an infinite Perfection; and therefore we ascribe the Conceptions we have of our own finite Perfections to God, to express his infinite Perfections which are Similar and Correspondent. *Love, &c. are ascribed to God Figuratively, and not Literally. Not Literally; no nor any other natural or moral Attribute. There is nothing*

we attribute to God literally, but what is most unworthy of him; nay even the most exalted *Disposition* in the Soul of Man to Goodness, which is most properly so called. The intrinsic Disposition in the divine Nature to Goodness, is essentially different from it; that is of quite another Kind: And all the *Acts* or *Exertions* of that Divine Disposition, are likewise essentially different from all Acts or *Exertions* of any good Disposition in an human Soul. Let Men take Goodness in which of these two Sences they please, or in both together, they will find Goodness in God essentially different from what it is in us; that is, of quite another Kind. Then says he they must be *Figuratively ascribed*. No nor that neither; for mere Figure of Speech represents nothing in God *Really correspondent* to Love, or to any moral Perfections in us: And therefore we ascribe all these by Analogy, which supposes a real Ground of Similitude in the Nature of God and Man for a Parity of Reason which holds eternally. So that, as he himself owns in another Place, *The true Notion of the Goodness of God*, that is, the truest Notion in the Mind of Man, *Must be learned by considering what Goodness is in Men*. Yes surely, for you can have no Idea of that Perfection as it is in the Nature of God: But not as it follows, *By adding to the Idea of a good Man, boundless Perfection*; that is, by adding Infinity to the good Dispositions and Acts of an human Soul, and thereby supposing God an infinite human Creature.

THE strongest Arguments and Objections against divine Analogy common to this and other Authors, will come under a particular Consideration. And therefore I shall here only take Notice of these two things concerning this and the immediately preceding Author.

FIRST, That in relation to the moral Attributes of God in particular, they express themselves very inconsistently and even after a contradictory Manner; by asserting sometimes that we conceive and express them by *Analogy*: And at other times that they are the very *Same in Kind* with our own; and that they are the same in him as they are in our *Ideas*. These two things are directly opposite; for the same Property, or Disposition, or Quality in human Nature, cannot be said to bear an Analogy to the divine Perfections; and yet be of the same Kind with them. To bear a Similitude only, and Correspondency to the divine Perfections; is a thing directly contrary to the having a sameness of Kind or Identity of Nature with him, in any the least Degree. They differ as much as a Picture or Image doth from a Child, with respect to a grown Man; the first is a Representation only or Similitude of the Man, the latter is of the same Nature or Kind in Miniature: Or as *Natural Instinct* in Brutes differs from the natural Faculty of *Reason* in a *Child*; the first bears a Similitude or Resemblance only to the Reason  
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of a full grown Man ; the latter is of the same Kind in a very low and imperfect Degree.

IF they say that our moral Perfections, tho' of the same Kind, are however in so low a Degree, and at such an immense Distance from those which are Divine; that both our Conceptions of them, and the Words by which we express them must be Analogous; and that by *Analogy* they mean as they speak, an infinite Difference in Degree: This contains an Answer to its self in the express Words; for an *Infinite Difference in Degree* is not Sense; this is to say, our moral Properties are the same in Kind but in a low, vastly low Degree of Infinity. But if every Property or Quality in us is Finite, then it is flat Contradiction to say that any thing Finite can be of the same Kind (tho' in ever so distant a Degree) with what is Infinite. Again, as by *Analogy* they mean a very low *Degree* of the same Nature or Kind; it is plain they mean one thing, and speak another quite contrary to it: For suppose the Degree ever so low and distant, if it is of the same Kind this destroys all Analogy; that is all Similitude only and bare Resemblance. We do not say that the Faculty of Reason in a Child bears a Similitude only, or Resemblance of the Reason of a full grown Man; but that it is the same in Kind; and that Instinct in Brutes bears an Analogy to both. Conceive the Disproportion as great as you please; compare it with the Disproportion between a Grain of

Sand and the universal System of Matter : You will not say that this bears a *Similitude* only or Resemblance of the Whole in its natural Properties of Extension, Solidity, and Mobility ; but that it hath the very *Same sort* of essential Properties and Substance.

THUS you see the frequent mention of these two things, which are totally different, indistinctly and promiscuously as if they were the very same; hath occasioned great Confusion and Inconsistency in the Opposers of this Doctrine of divine Analogy. One or the other of these Positions let them adhere to for the future; either let them allow what is expressly revealed, That we are made in the *Similitude* only of the divine Nature, and in the Image only of God : Or let them make it out, that in this Revelation something is meant beyond what is expressed; namely, that we were created the very same in Kind with him, but in a very low Degree; and that we have a Sameness or Identity of Nature in any one essential Property, Affection, or Attribute. And it is of no small Concernment to Mankind, to fix and determine this Point; because one or the other of these two very contrary Positions must be a Foundation of Truth, in our whole manner of thinking and speaking of all things Divine and Supernatural; and if our Foundation should fail us, and prove to be wrong laid, all Religion Natural and Revealed falls to the Ground.



THE other Observation I shall make is, that these two Authors have, very invidiously, put this Doctrine of Analogy into the Mouths of Deists and Atheists: Who together with the Arians and Socinians, of all Men living have the greatest Reason to dread the Consequences of its being well known and thro'ly understood in the World; since nothing else can so effectually lay open the Fallacy of their Reasoning. That sort of Deists and Atheists which they mention do indeed, as they speak, in effect *Deny, or at least not expressly own, the moral Attributes of God.* And say *That they are so transcendent that we cannot make any true Judgment of them, so as to argue from thence with any Assurance for the Certainty of a future State.* But why do they proceed thus? Because their Adversaries proceed upon a false Principle in defence of the Truth, and hold the moral Attributes of God to be the same in *Kind* with ours; to be the very same that they are in our *Ideas*: They run into the quite contrary Extreme, and hold them to be something so transcendent that we can have no *just Idea* or *No-tion at all* of them; and consequently that there can be no sure Ground of reasoning from them. The Truth lies between them in the Middle; for our Virtues or moral Perfections are not of the same Kind with the divine Perfections; it is even impious to affirm it: Nor is it true that we can have no such just Notions or useful Conceptions of them, as to be a solid and unerring

Ground of Reasoning. For tho' it must be granted that the divine Perfections cannot be such as they are in our Ideas or Conceptions, because it is impossible for us to have any *Direct* or *Immediate* Ideas or Conceptions of them; yet the Conceptions we have of our own moral Perfections or Virtues are very clear and distinct: Nor do these become less so, when we substitute them by Analogy to represent what we can have no Idea at all of; such correspondent divine Perfections as are the *Antitypes* or *Realities* as some Men style them; whereof our Virtues have a beautiful Resemblance only and Similitude; and may therefore be comparatively called the Images, in respect of those divine Perfections which are the Substance and Originals. So that we can affirm God to be *Good*, and *True*, and *Just*, and *Righteous*, and *Merciful* with greater Assurance, and with more Truth than we can affirm Man to be so. And if all our just Reasonings and Conclusions from those moral Perfections of ours, are of eternal Truth in respect of our Selves and all human Affairs; surely they must lose none of that Truth when we transfer the Reasoning from the Similitudes and Representations, to the original and correspondent Reality and Substance in the divine Nature. If we say a Man is *Just*; it may with greater Assurance be asked, *Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do Right?* And if we discern an unequal Distribution of Rewards and Punishments in this Life; the sure Consequence from the intrinsic incom-

incomprehensible Perfections in the divine Nature, *Correspondent* and *Similar* to the Virtues of Justice and Equity in the inward Dispositions of the Soul of Man is, That there must be a future State, where all Rewards and Punishments shall be dispensed in exactly just and equal Proportions,

THUS we see the true Ground of that sort of Infidelity and Atheism is laid in one of these two Points. In denying that there are any Perfections in the divine Nature correspondent and like to some moral Virtues in the Soul of Man: Which we can prove with the highest moral Evidence from Reason, and with the strictest Certainty from Revelation; and which Unbelievers will never be able to disprove. Or that if there are really such Perfections, we have no Ideas or Conceptions of them clear and distinct enough for a sure Foundation of Reasoning: Which they themselves must acknowledge to be absolutely false; since all the Notions and Conceptions we have or can have of them, are as clear and distinct, as those we have of the good and virtuous Dispositions and Actions of our own Souls, which *Represent* them. Now if we grant them what is plain to common Sense and Reason, and most evident from Scripture; that there can be no Perfections of the same Kind in God and Man: But that however there are Perfections in him similar and correspondent to ours, of which we have clear and useful Conceptions by Analogy with our  
own;

own; the Argument concludes unanswerably against them. But when we relinquish this, and argue upon a supposition that *If the Virtues of our Souls, and the moral Perfections in the divine Nature are not the same in Kind; there will be no Foundation at all left on which we can fix any thing*: We put an Argument into the Mouths of our Adversaries, which, had it any Ground of Truth, we should never be able to Answer; nor to evade the Absurdities and Contradictions they might charge upon that Principle.

THEY could urge upon us, that supposing the purely *Spiritual* Principle in Man which we contend for; yet all our intellectual and moral Perfections are Dispositions and Operations of Matter as well as Spirit in essential Union; and therefore can never be of the same Kind with the Faculties or Dispositions or Operations of a pure Spirit.

THAT supposing our inward Faculties of Mind, and the virtuous Dispositions of our Souls, together with the Exertions and Operations of them, to be properties of our *Spirit only*; but necessarily acting *In* us by bodily *Organs*, as a Man plays upon the Keys of a Musical Instrument; Yet even thus they must be Faculties and Operations of a Kind essentially different from such as are exerted independently of all Matter,

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THAT if it were possible for even these properties of all *Finite* Spirits to be of the same Kind; yet that the internal natural Dispositions and Faculties of a finite Spirit, and the Operations and Acts of them, must be of quite another Kind from those of an *Infinite* Spirit: Especially if that infinite Spirit is allowed to be in his whole Nature of a *Kind as different from the most exalted created Spirit*, as this is from a *Spirit embodied*. And this holds stronger yet against those who maintain that God may superadd to Matter a Power of thinking.

THEY might object that this Notion of a Sameness in Kind or Identity of Nature between any one real Attribute in God, and any one human Property in us; is by plain Implication the highest Presumption: Because it supposes Man to possess something of the very divine Nature or *Essence* in Kind; since all the *Moral* Attributes of God are as truly *Essential* to him, as those we distinguish by the Appellation of *Natural* Attributes; and if we have any one of them in Kind, we must then have in *Kind* some one *Essential* Attribute of God in us. Nor can we have in Kind one Attribute that is truly essential to him, without having them all in Kind. So that in short if we have any one, even *Moral* Attribute of God in Kind, we must have his Kind of *Will*, and consequently his *Essence*, and be no other than Gods in Miniature.

LASTLY,

LASTLY, That we have no Ground or Foundation in all Scripture for this Opinion of having any thing in our Frame or Composition, of the same Nature or Kind with any moral Perfection of the Divinity, but rather quite the Contrary; for there it is expressly said that there is *None Good but God*, and that *He only is Holy*. And that if these Sayings do not mean that the Goodness and Holiness of the Creature is not of the same Kind with what they are in God; but on y that there is none *So Good* as God, none *So Holy* as he; it will be no difficult matter to evade the Sence and Meaning of any Text in Scripture.

To all which I shall add that in the Account we have of our Creation, we are expressly said to have a Similitude only, and Resemblance of the Divinity; and to think more arrogantly of our selves than this, is directly contrary to the Word of God. In this Similitude and Correspondency between the Divine and Human Nature, is laid the only sure Foundation of all our Knowledge of God, and of all our Conceptions of his inconceivable Attributes and Perfections. I have therefore styled this Manner of thinking and speaking, *Divine Analogy*, not only because it relates to our Knowledge of things divine and supernatural: But because it was conveyed to us by a divine Revelation from Heaven, and in Words proceeding immediately out of the Mouth of God. And the Wisdom of the whole World, and highest Reason of Man, cannot find out any other sure and  
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satisfactory method of accounting for the Truth and Certainty of our Conceptions of things Supernatural, and of all our Reasonings upon the Nature and Attributes of the divine Being.

I SHALL close all above cited *Authorities* with one from a very Metaphysical Author before mentioned, but taken out of the fashionable demonstrative Method.

*THO' the Truth of the Propositions or Points of Faith are made known to us by supernatural Means, or by Revelation; yet each single Word in which they were delivered or preached at first must be such as was in use then and there, to signify our natural Notions. This is very evident; for unless Faith had been delivered or preached to the first Faithful, in such Language as every one understood, or as suited with their natural Notions; the Hearers, having as yet no Notions but what were natural, could not have understood what had been told them; nor could have known what it was they were to believe. By natural Notions I mean, those which we have by direct Impressions on the Senses; or by such Reflexion as the generality of Mankind have——Hence those Words being proper to express Men's natural Notions, which they had from Creatures; to signify which they were agreed on, and used by Mankind in that Place: It follows, that when we apply them to the divine Nature, they must be in some sort Metaphorical, or transfered thence to God. This is evident,*

evident, for since the Sence and Meaning which Men imposed on them at first, and in which they used them all along, was of some created Being or Perfection; it is manifest that that was their first or proper Signification: And consequently if they applied them to God afterwards (without which we could not speak of God at all, nor know any thing of him) they must necessarily be transferred from Creatures to God; which is to be Metaphorical. Yet when Divines apply such Words to God, whom they hold to be infinitely perfect—They cannot mean to apply them otherwise than as divested of their Imperfections—Such are the Imperfections of Corporiety, and all Notions which arise from Matter: As also all Limitedness; which tho' essential to Creatures, is repugnant to the divine Nature. Hence all such Words thus understood, notwithstanding their Metaphoricalness, are truly said of God—Thus when Metaphysicians apply to God Mercy, Justice, Power, Wisdom, &c. which as found in our Understanding are distinct Formalities, of which one is not the other: They being well aware that the Divine Nature is one most simple Formality, which includes and verifies all those Attributes; do therefore strip them of that Limitation or Imperfection, when they apply them to God; and do not intend to signify they are thus distinct in God as they are in our Understanding—which Rule and Reason obtains in all other Metaphorical Expressions, or in all our Words whatever used by us when we speak of God.

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THE Doctrine of divine *Analogy* is here asserted in the General; but so loosely, in a Style so involved and perplexed, mingled with such Metaphysical Abstractions, and so much gross Error and Mistake: That I produce the whole Passage, rather to shew how sensible Men are become that this Analogy is real and just; than for any Illustration or Corroboration of it.

HERE he confounds *Divine Metaphor*, with *Divine Analogy*; which are as different in their Nature as the transferring mere *Ideas* of *Sensation*, and substituting the complex *Notions* and *Conceptions* of the *Mind*: Both of these he resolves indifferently into mere Figure, and so leaves us no sure Foundation for any true and solid Knowledge of God and his Attributes. He runs likewise into that prevailing Error of *Ideas of Reflexion*, things neither in Nature nor in the Mind of Man; an *Idea of Reflexion*, or which is the same thing an *Idea of Reason*, is as manifest an Absurdity as a *Notion* or *Conception of Sensation*.

AGAIN, he grossly supposes that when we devest our Ideas of things material of all *Corporeity* and *Limitedness*, we may then transfer them to God in a *True*, that is in a *Literal* Sence: Which is saying in other Words, that if you devest *Matter* of *Materiality*, it will be a very innocent Idea and no way unbecoming the Divinity. But is it not for this very Reason,

son, because all our Ideas of things merely material and sensible are unworthy of God, and can represent no *Similar* and *Correspondent* Perfection in his Nature, that we transfer the Terms in which we express them by *Metaphor* only? He hath the same gross Sentiment concerning the Notions and Conceptions we have of the Inward Affections, and Dispositions, and Operations of the Mind; that if they are likewise dejected of all those Imperfections which are natural to them, you may then transfer them to God in a literal Sense, to express Perfections in him of the same Kind. But if you deject them of *All* Imperfection, you remove all Conception we can have of the real Nature of them, and leave nothing at all, no Conception to be transferred: And on this very Account it is, that because the most exalted Degree of our Perfections are imperfect and unworthy of the Nature of God, we transfer them to him not in a strictly literal or proper Sense, but by Analogy.

L A S T L Y, He affirms with great positiveness *That Mercy, Justice, Power, Wisdom, &c. are not all distinguished in the divine Nature.* But how doth he know this? Because God is a *Simple* Being. But how doth he know what *Uncompoundedness* or *Simplicity* is in the divine Nature *It self*? All that he or any Man living can know of it, amounts to no more than a Negation only of all Composition discernible in the Creature: All that can be affirmed of God's Attributes in this Respect is,  
that

that there is no Distinction between them which is conceivable, as it is in it self, to the Mind of Man; and that if they are actually distinct in him; it cannot be after the *Same Manner* they are distinct in the Soul of Man. But however they are, or are not really distinct in him; we are under a necessity of conceiving them distinguished after the same Manner we find them in our selves; for otherwise we could neither think nor speak of God at all. God hath made a Distinction between his own Attributes thro' all the Language of Revelation; and I think it becomes *Divines* to adhere to those Distinctions, and to leave his unintelligible Notion of the divine Simplicity to the *Metaphysicians*.

I MIGHT have produced many more Authorities of this Kind to the same Purpose, especially out of our late Writers. But in some of them the Doctrine of *Analogy* is rather *Aimed* at in general; than expressly and *Particularly* mentioned; others speak of it *Indistinctly* and *Confusedly*; others handle it *Abstractedly* and *Metaphysically*; others *Enthusiastically*; others *Deceitfully* and *Disingenuously* to serve the Turn of a vile Hypothesis; and all of them *Imperfectly* and *Inconsistently*: So that it would be too tedious to trouble the Reader with any more of them (except one which I have reserved for the Subject of the next Chapter) especially since they must have been accompanied with necessary Remarks and Observations upon them. Wherefore I

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shall only make this Use and Application of them all. They shew how sensible the learned and Ingenious are become that this Divine Analogy is necessary for a more satisfactory Answer to the Arguments of Infidels and Heretics against the truly Christian Faith; and for a shorter and more easy method of obviating their Objections. For laying open their Sophisms and Evasions; and for warding off all the new invented Turns and Forms of Subtilty, whereby Men have perplexed and entangled the Doctrines of the Gospel; and involved the Mysteries of Christianity in Clouds and Darknes. In order to clear up the Terms and Propositions in which these are revealed to us, and fix them to a determinate Sence and Meaning. To rid the World of an immense Voluminous Mass of learned Trifling upon Religious Subjects, and the Holy Scriptures: And to shorten these our unhappy Days of Infidelity and Heresy; in which, as far as it was possible, the very *Elect* have been deceived.

THESE are the *Wonders* (as some have *Ironically* wrote) to be performed by divine Analogy; whenever it shall please God to raise up Men of Abilities for the further clearing and Improvement of it; and for a judicious Application of it to the particular Points in Controversy between us and the Adversaries of the antient and orthodox Faith. The thing is obvious and natural in it self; and there is no  
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Difficulty or Nicety in it, but what arises from inveterate Prejudices and strong Prepossessions occasioned by the late wrong Methods of educating Youth: From whence it is easy to account for all those Mistakes and Errors concerning divine Metaphor and Analogy, which I have had Occasion to take Notice of in the forecited Passages. They proceed from false Principles of Knowledge, imbibed out of that Fountain of Bitter Waters, which was unhappily opened about the Time of their younger Days at the University; and which hath carryed with it Poyson and Infection to human Understanding thro' the Nation, wherever it ran. The lamentable Effect and Consequences of this, do now discover themselves openly; not only in these, but in too many other Authors, who have grown up to Maturity with crooked Impressions from thence and a wrong turn of Mind; and have now commenced Authors of our Time. I appeal to any discerning Genius whether these Consequences are not visible thro' most of the modern Writers upon moral and divine Subjects; who build upon *Ideas of Reflexion, Reflex Acts of the Mind, Ideal Knowledge of divine Objects, Abstractions, Spiritual Perceptions, Internal Senses and spiritual Sensations, Moral Instincts, Moral Fittnesses; Demonstrations* (of things indemonstrable) *from the abstract Reason of things, the Natures of things in general, the Truth of Things, the Metaphysical Natures and Essences and Substances of things.* By these and many such like

empty Sounds and Forms of speaking, without any conceivable and determinate meaning in the Mind; all the truly useful and substantial Knowledge of the immediately preceding Time, under a plausible Colour of great Exaltation and Refinement, hath been resolved into Smoak and Vapour; so that there is but little left of the true Substance and Power and Influence of Religion upon the Consciences of Men. Nor are we likely ever to come about again to solid Learning, sound Doctrine, and good Sense expressed with Distinctness and Perspicuity; till a new Generation arises which shall have quite worn off all those unhappy Prejudices and Prepossessions.

## C H A P. V.

*Another great Mistake concerning Divine Analogy considered: And the true Notion of a Christian-Mystery stated.*

THE last Authority I shall cite to the foregoing Purpose is that of a learned Writer, who in one of his Sermons on the Subject of *Mysteries* expressly asserts, *That our present Knowledge of these Matters is not by Ideas immediately derived from the things themselves; but by such as are Analogous to the things they represent. Thus we see as by Reflection from a Glass, not Face to Face.* Then it is by Ideas or Conceptions derived immediately from  
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other things, which are natural and human; and which only represent things divine and supernatural by Analogy: This is no immediate Perception or Knowledge of the things as they are in their own Nature, or by any direct Ideas from them, but by Reflection; as a Man sees in a Glass, not any thing of the Face it self, but an Image only and lively Representation of it. This is a great and fundamental Truth; and a very just Explication of those last Words of Scripture: Only it must be observed here, that he uses the word *Idea* in the same crude and pernicious Sence with some other modern Authors. But I have already shewn it ought never to be applyed thus indifferently and indistinctly to all the immediate Objects of the Mind; and that when it is taken confusedly not only for Ideas of Sensation, to which it ought to be limited: But for the Operations of the Mind whereof we have an immediate Consciousness without the Mediation of any Ideas of them; and for all the Conceptions and complex Notions formed out of these in Conjunction; it serves no other Purpose than to confound and bewilder the Understanding in the search of Truth.

THIS he repeats and confirms by saying, *Our Ideas therefore of these things must be taken from other Ideas, with which they have some sort of Resemblance or Analogy.* A very obscure way of saying, that those things, from which (as he himself justly observes) we can

have no immediate Ideas, are conceived and known by Ideas or Conceptions of other things which bear some Resemblance to them; that is, the things of this World, whereof we have direct and immediate Ideas or Conceptions; otherwise this Saying hath neither Sence nor Meaning. *One Idea taken from another Analogous Idea* means nothing intelligible; but it is obvious and easy to apprehend how the same Ideas or Conceptions, and the Terms whereby we express them, should stand for things both divine and human: For these directly, and in a strict and literal Propriety; for the other mediately and indirectly, by Similitude only and Analogy. Thus the very same direct and immediate Ideas or Conceptions of human *Generation, Begotten, Proceeding, Person, Father, Son, Spirit, Making, Redeeming, Mediation, Atonement, Propitiation, Reconciling, Intercession*; do likewise stand for every one of these in a divine Sence: Each of them is a Word of human Language, in its first and strict Propriety applyed to things of Nature; and it is by Representation and Analogy only that the Conception annexed to it is substituted for something divine and supernatural, and in any other Manner utterly inconceivable to the Mind of Man, and ineffable.

AGAIN, *Our Knowledge of divine Matters is not direct and immediate, but as it were by Reflection — Represented to us by some remote Resemblance they have with things of Sence.* Then



it is indirect and mediate, by Representation only of things which, as he says, have a remote Resemblance of them; that is, things supernatural and divine are seen by Reflection only in the Mirrour of Nature. Again, *In these Cases* [of Mysteries] *they are revealed, by representing them by some other Ideas with which they have a remote Resemblance and Analogy.* Yes, because we can have no *Direct* Perception or Ideas of those things *Clear or Obscure, Perfect or Imperfect, in Whole or in Part, Adequate or Inadequate, Determinate or Indeterminate:* And therefore we could have had no Knowledge at all of them in any Degree, if they were not revealed by Ideas or Conceptions which were in us prior to that Revelation, and which had some remote Resemblance of them; that is, by Analogy with our natural Ideas or Conceptions.

AGAIN, *The Doctrines revealed are made up of such Ideas, as we are capable of receiving in the ordinary Methods of Knowledge.* That is, The Doctrines of Scripture Mysteries are revealed to us by the Help of our original Ideas of Sensation, joyned with the conscious Perceptions of the Mind's own Operations, which are *The ordinary Methods of Knowledge:* From whence it is enabled to frame not any *Direct* or *Simple Ideas*, but *Analogical Conceptions* only of things divine and supernatural. Thus far right, had he pursued it.

BUT behold ! In direct Opposition to all this, he in the same Discourse asserts as expressly and positively ; that *Mysterious Doctrines are such, concerning which our Ideas are either inadequate or indeterminite*. No, they are Doctrines concerning *Objects* of which we have no Ideas or Conceptions at all as they are *In their own Nature* ; and therefore relating to *Objects* which cannot properly be called *Mysterious* in this respect, but utterly *Unknown* and *Incomprehensible* to us. For this Reason they are conceived by the Help of *Objects* natural and human, as easily apprehended as any thing in common Life : And nothing can be plainer and more intelligible than the *Doctrines* themselves, and the *Propositions* in which they are delivered ; being all expressed likewise in Terms of common Language. These two taken in Conjunction, are properly called a *Mystery* or a *Doctrine of Mystery* ; But there is great Ambiguity and *Æquivocation* in the word *Mysterious* when applied to *Both* these Parts in the gross. Because the purely spiritual Part of the *Mystery*, or that *Divine* and *Supernatural* Object conceived by Representation and Analogy, is not properly mysterious, but utterly unknown and intirely inconceivable to us as it is in its own Nature : And that *Whereby* it is *Represented* and let down to our Capacity, cannot be called *Mysterious* ; because nothing can be less so, or more plain and obvious and intelligible. So that when we say a *Doctrine of Christian*

*Christian Mystery*, the Expression is clear and proper; as it includes both what is utterly unknown and inconceivable to us as it is in its self, and only *Represented* by another thing: And that well known natural *Representation* of it in our Mind; both which taken together, and expressed in a Proposition composed of Terms worldly and human, we call a *Mystery*. But when it is called a *Mysterious Doctrine*, whether we apply these Terms to one Part or the other of it, or to both together, they have no determinate and clear Sense or Meaning.

THUS we discern a manifest and wide difference between these two Expressions, *Doctrines of Mysteries* or *Doctrines concerning Mysteries*; which may be as clear and distinct and intelligible as any Doctrines of common Life: And *Mysterious Doctrines*; by which must be meant Doctrines, either not apprehended or understood at all; or so imperfectly that we can have but a confused, obscure, and very uncertain Knowledge of them; which is not the Case of our Christian Doctrines or Propositions concerning Mystery; for they are all as clearly apprehended and as plainly understood, as any Doctrines or Propositions relating to natural or human Affairs.

FROM the *Things themselves* we have no Ideas, as he before truly asserted; so that we are totally and intirely ignorant of them, otherwise than as they are represented by other things.

things. And yet here it is supposed that we have *Ideas* of the things themselves, but they are *Inadequate* or *Indeterminate*. It immediately follows, *This Account supposes that of these Myste-rious Doctrines we have some Ideas, tho' partial or indeterminate*. Whereas before, we had no *Ideas* derived from the things themselves, and therefore our Knowledge of them was not direct and immediate; and they were revealed to us by *Other Ideas*: Here he supposes we have some *Ideas* of the things themselves, or of the *Myste-rious Doctrines* relating to those things (which amounts to the same) but such as are partial and indeterminate.

IN this consists the fundamental Error of the whole Sermon; that the Author supposes our *Ideas* of those *Myste-rious Doctrines*, as he calls them, or of the divine and supernatural Objects, to be *Taken from other Ideas with which they have some sort of Resemblance and a remote Analogy*; and to be therefore on that Account *Indeterminate, partial, and inadequate*. Whereas in Truth we do not *Take*, no nor *Borrow* or *Frame* any *Ideas* or Conceptions of things supernatural either from those things themselves, or *From other Ideas*; but we make the *Same* *Ideas* or Conceptions which we already have of natural and human Objects, *Stand for* and *Represent* correspondent divine and heavenly Objects. He imagines the *Ideas*, which he says we have, of Things di-vine and supernatural, to be *Distinct* and *Dif-*  
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*ferent* from the Ideas or Conceptions of Things natural and human *From* whence they are *Taken*, as he words it; and at the same time to be *Analogous* to those *Other Ideas* from whence they are taken. Whereas the Ideas or Conceptions in the Mind for *Both* are still the *Same*; they differ no otherwise than as one thing may differ from its self in the *Use* or Application made of it: And are properly termed direct and immediate as they are originally derived from Things worldly and natural; and Indirect and Analogous, when substituted to represent what is Divine and Supernatural.

To render this very plain by an Instance. We do not *Take* any *Other New* Idea, from what is already in our Minds of an *Human Son*, whereby to obtain some Knowledge of the divine Son: But we substitute this, to represent that divine Filiation whereof we have no direct Idea or Conception at all. One and the same Conception stands in the Mind for what is well and directly known, and for what is utterly unknown as it is in its self. Again, Tho' it be very true that divine and human *Objects* are *Themselves* Correspondent and Analogous; yet there are not two different *Analogous* and Correspondent *Ideas* or *Conceptions* in our Mind, to represent those different Objects. Tho' the different human and divine Objects or *Things* be Analogous to each other; yet there are not *Different Setts* of *Ideas* of them

them in our Minds *Analogous* to each other. If this were the Case, one Sett of such Ideas could not be *Taken* from the *Other* as he insists; but *Both* must be derived directly and immediately from the very Objects themselves, or at least from something the same in Kind; which is impossible with respect to supernatural Objects. Hence it is plain that when these worldly and natural Objects, or their Conceptions, are substituted for things Divine and Correspondent, they cannot be called *Partial*, *Obscure*, or *Indeterminate*; as if they gave us some partial, indistinct, or indeterminate *View* of those Things themselves: But they are, on the contrary, full as clear and distinct in this *Secondary* Consideration, as when they are immediately taken for Things natural and human. Since the Conceptions are the *Same* in both Cases, and only differently applyed; how can these Conceptions, when considered as *Analogous* and *Representative only* of heavenly Things, become more indeterminate, partial and inadequate, than when taken originally for their proper and immediate Objects? He must either allow these *Analogous* Conceptions of divine Objects, to be at least as determinate and adequate as the Conceptions of human and worldly Matters which represent them: Or he must suppose we only *Take* the *Hint* from these last, and thence, by some unaccountable Means or other, form to our selves *New* but *Imperfect* Ideas of supernatural Beings; which seems from all that follows

follows to be his real Meaning, but very inconsistent with what he established before.

AGAIN, *Where we can frame no Ideas, we can—give no Assent.* A most pernicious and dangerous Assertion; which is not to be wondered at as it proceeds so frequently from our open and secret Enemies, who make a mischievous Use of the word *Idea* when applied to Scripture Doctrines; but very shocking out of the Mouth of so valuable a Friend to the truly Christian Cause. Nothing is more evident from what has been said, than that we can *Frame no Direct and Immediate Idea* of God or his Attributes, or of heavenly Objects. So that if this Author means any *Such Ideas*, when he says afterwards *We do maintain therefore that we have some Ideas of mysterious Doctrines* (that is, in plain Terms, of the divine Things contained in Doctrines of Mysteries) it is a most mistaken and fatal Notion; which by direct and immediate Consequence overturns all Religion Natural and Revealed. For thus you cannot give your Assent to any one Doctrine relating to things divine and supernatural; because you cannot have any direct Ideas of these either by Impression from the Things themselves or by the framing of the Mind: And because it is Impossible for us to have any *Such Ideas* or Conceptions of the *Extremes* in any Propositions or Doctrines which relate to the Objects of another World. And that this is his meaning of the word *Ideas* in this Sermon on *Mysteries* seems evident,

evident, not only from his frequently calling the Ideas of them partial, indistinct, indeterminate, and inadequate; but from his fundamental Notion of our *Taking the Ideas of them from the Ideas of other things*; which manifestly supposes such Ideas to be a *New Sett, distinct* and different from the *Other Ideas From which they are thus Taken*: And also from his saying that by *Revelation*—*we have a more clear and better View of some Things than—before*; and *Others do now appear to us of which before we had no View at all*. But the mischievous Tendency of this Mistake will appear more fully from the following Observation.

FOR where we have no Manner of Ideas of the Extremes in a Proposition, we can have no Perception or Persuasion. No! What would the Author think of this Proposition? *God is the Creator of all things*. Hath he any Manner of Idea (properly speaking) of either Extreme here, *God or Creator*? For want of an Idea of God, we frame to our selves a complex, *Analogical*, and *Representative Conception* of him, by the greatest Perfections in our selves: And for want of an Idea of the Production of a thing from nothing by Divine Power, we are obliged to conceive it by Analogy with human Operation or Making. And yet tho' we have no proper Idea either of God or Creating as they are in themselves, we have a clear and distinct and useful Understanding or *Conception* of both from this Analogy; a full Perception of the Connexion  
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of those Extremes; and a certain Conviction and *Persuasion* of the *Truth* of that Proposition. The Case is the very same in all Propositions relating to things divine and supernatural. Tho' we have, properly speaking, no *Idea* of the extreme Terms, or of the heavenly Beings ultimately signified by them: We have however clear and distinct *Analogical Conceptions* of both; as clear as we have of any Matters relating to human Actions; and we may have likewise a firm and unshaken *Persuasion* of the *Truth* of such Propositions.

WE do maintain therefore that we have *some Ideas even of mysterious Doctrines*. Then he maintains a most false and dangerous Position; and it is well both for natural and revealed Religion that he must surely fail in his Support of it. Had he given one Instance of any *Idea* we have of mysterious Doctrines, or of the heavenly *Objects themselves* mentioned in those *Doctrines*, tho' ever so imperfect, inadequate, or indeterminate; the whole Controversy might have been contracted into a Decision of that single Point: But instead of this he mentions only two Instances, whereof we have no *Idea* at all. The first is the *Generation of the Son of God*. But hath he even any partial, imperfect, indeterminate *Idea* of the real supernatural *Divine Generation*? And is not this Part of the Mystery, which is utterly inconceivable by any *Idea* ever so partial or inadequate, revealed to us (in his own Words) *Not by any Idea from the thing it self, but by another Idea*

*Idea by which it is represented*; that is, by the Conception of human Generation; thro' the Mediation of which we think and speak of what was otherwise utterly inconceivable and ineffable? The other Instance he mentions is, *The Distinction between the Persons of the ever blessed Trinity*. Hath he any *Idea* ever so partial, imperfect, or indeterminate, of the *Real Nature* or *Manner* of that *Distinction*? Is it not as utterly inconceivable as the real intrinsic Nature of those *Persons*? And is not this the Reason that it is revealed to us by some other *Idea* (as he erroneously calls it) that of a *Personal Distinction* among our selves; the only *Conception* by which what is to us otherwise utterly inconceivable and ineffable, becomes easy and familiar and intelligible as any thing in Nature? If he maintains this last Position, *That it is revealed by another Idea whereby it is represented*: It must be in direct Contradiction to his former Position, *That we have some Ideas even of mysterious Doctrines*; and therefore he can never support them both. Had we any *Ideas* of things divine and heavenly tho' ever so partial and imperfect, they would still be *Ideas From the Things themselves*; and our Knowledge tho' partial and imperfect likewise, would however be *Direct* and *Immediate*, and not by any *Remote Resemblance* or *Analogy with things of Sense*, or Reason. It is our Knowledge of those Matters by Resemblance only and Analogy, which renders it clear and distinct and determinate; whereas if we had  
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such *Ideas* of them as he describes, our *Knowledge* of them must likewise necessarily be imperfect, obscure, partial, and indeterminate; and our *Faith* pursuant to that *Knowledge* would be nothing better.

THAT is *unintelligible* whereof we can frame no *Ideas*; and that *incomprehensible*, concerning which our *Ideas* are imperfect. Nay, then God and his Attributes and all things divine and supernatural would be unintelligible: For as he maintained before, *We can have no Ideas from the things themselves*, and therefore no *Ideas* of the things as they are in themselves. That is indeed *Imperceptible* whereof we can frame no *Direct* Idea or Conception; but it cannot be called *Unintelligible*, if it may be conceived and well understood by *Analogy* with those Things which are perceptible by direct immediate Ideas or Conceptions. Nor can that be called *Incomprehensible*, in the true Sence of the Term, whereof we have any direct Idea or Conception, tho' ever so imperfect, inadequate, or indeterminate; for then it would be *Comprehensible*, tho' in a very minute Degree: And we should have some direct *Knowledge* of it, tho' proportionably minute, obscure, imperfect and uncertain. But the remote Representation and Resemblance by which we conceive divine Objects is clear and distinct and determinate: And it is this which renders all the revealed *Doctrines* of Gospel Mysteries as plain and intelligible as any thing in human Language;

our Faith of them firm and rational ; and all Infidelity obstinately wilful and inexcusable. The word *Incomprehensible* must be taken in one of these two Sences. Either for that whereof we have no *Adequate* Ideas or Conceptions, no intire comprehensive Knowledge : And with this Sence of the Word we have nothing to do here ; for all Things around us and within us are thus incomprehensible, as well as heavenly Objects. Or for that whereof we can have no *Direct* Idea or Conception at all ; and which must therefore be conceived by other Ideas or Conceptions, that is, by some Representation or Analogy ; which is the true Sence of the Term when applyed to Mysteries in Religion. Between these two Extremes the Word can have no determinate Sence or Meaning in this Controversy.

AGAIN, *The Incomprehensibility therefore of certain Doctrines in our Religion doth not arise from our having no Ideas of them ; but from hence, that our Ideas are either inadequate or indeterminate.* So grossly mistaken is our Author here, that, to speak properly, the Incomprehensibility of the divine *Objects* of those Doctrines (which he inadvertently confounds with what he calls the *Incomprehensibility* of *The Doctrines themselves*) arises *Only* from our having *No* Ideas or Conceptions of those Objects as they are in themselves : And for that Reason alone it is that we are necessitated to conceive them, in his own Words, by *Reflection*, by *Resemblance*,

*Resemblance*, and Representation; that is, by Analogy with things natural and human. His great Mistake here is, that he thinks the *Doctrines* incomprehensible, because the divine *Objects* about which those *Doctrines* are conversant are incomprehensible; that is, in his Sence of the Word *Incomprehensible*, inadequately and indeterminately conceived. But surely if we had any Ideas or Conceptions at all of the *Real Objects themselves*, tho' even inadequate or indeterminate; neither those *Objects*, nor the *Doctrines* of them could be styled *Incomprehensible*; for nothing is so that can be thus directly *Perceived* or *Apprehended* even imperfectly, in Part, or inadequately. Whereas had he understood the word *Incomprehensible* in its true Sence when applyed to divine and supernatural Beings, he would have easily discerned how the divine *Objects* to which a Christian Doctrine ultimately relates, may be utterly imperceptible and incomprehensible as they are in themselves; and yet the Doctrine or Proposition be as plain and comprehensible as any practical Doctrine in social Morality. For Instance, *God is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ*. Here we neither know in Whole or in Part, adequately or inadequately, what *God* is in his *Real Nature* and *Attributes*; nor what it is for him to be a divine *Father*, or to have a divine *Son*; any more than we know what it is to Create: And yet we know clearly and determinately and adequately, That what an *Human* Father is to his Son in the

Way of Nature; *That* God as really and actually is to Christ, in a *Correspondent* but a *Different*, *Supernatural*, and *Incomprehensible* Manner. This is all we are *Capable* of conceiving in this revealed Proposition, and consequently all that we are *Obliged* to *Know* or *Believe* of it; all that we have *Faculties* to apprehend; and all that was *Designed* to be *Revealed* in those Words: Nor was it ever intended by this to give us any glimmering, indeterminate, inadequate Ideas or Conceptions of the real Nature of the divine Father and Son. The *Doctrine* or *Proposition* revealed is plain and easy and determinate, in obvious *Conceptions* and human Language; but the *Divine Reality* thus *Represented* in it, is to us intirely unknown and incomprehensible; and both taken together are properly stiled a Christian Mystery.

AGAIN, *In some Instances the Doctrines revealed are made up of such Ideas, as we are incapable of receiving in an ordinary Way — In these Cases, the Ideas are themselves revealed.* Very unhappy! For the Reverse of both Parts of this Assertion is the Truth. Such *Doctrines* are made up of no other Ideas or Conceptions, than what we are *Capable* of receiving in the *Ordinary Way*; even in the Instances he produces, the *Generation of the Son of God*, and *The Distinction between the divine Persons*. The Conceptions of human Generation, and of Personal Distinction among Men, are such as we are *Capable* of receiving in the ordinary Way; and

and it is by the Substitution of these only, that the divine incomprehensible Generation and Distinction are revealed to us by way of *Re-semblance* ; and not by any *Extraordinary Ideas* of the things *Themselves*, whereof the Mind of Man is not capable. The *Ideas themselves* of these things (as he words it) could not be *Re-vealed*, without giving us new *Faculties* for the Perception of Things at present invisible and imperceptible to the Eye of Body or Mind.

NOW of these two directly opposite and even contradictory Opinions, which are placed in a clear Light by the foregoing Citations and Remarks upon them, the Author hath unhappily (for us I mean) declined and rejected the former ; by which we have lost a valuable Discourse upon the important Subject of Christian Mysteries : And he hath proceeded intirely upon the latter ; which hath been the Occasion of all that Obscurity and Confusion and Inconclusiveness, which runs thro' the whole Discourse till you come towards the End. Where he begins to speak *Like himself*, with great Judgment and Accuracy, upon the unwarrantable and dangerous Attempts which have been made to explain that Part of the Mysteries of Christianity which is inexplicable ; and for the framing imaginary Hypotheses to solve Difficulties relating to supernatural Things, by us insolvable : And he very justly observes how this hath ministered Occasion of much useless Dispute and Animosity, and how

Herefy it felf hath fprung from this Root. What Perfpicuity then and irrefragable ftrength of Argument would fhine thro' the whole Performance; if a Perfon of his Abilities fhould undertake the fame important Subject over again, with more caution, upon that unfhaken Foundation of Analogy firft laid down by himfelf? Such as would produce thofe noble Effects, as well as intitle him to that great and juft Applaufe, which otherwife in Providence will be referved for fome fuch extraordinary Genius of the next Generation: When the prevailing obftinate Prejudices of the prefent Age againft the Doctrine of Analogy fhall be worn out; and the generality of learned Men are brought to a Conviction of the great fervice it will do Religion, when rightly and fully apprehended and duly managed; and how hurtful and dangerous it may prove by being mifunderftood or mifapplied; of which that Difcourfe is a glaring Inftance. I fhall only remark farther fome other Exprefſions in it which are moft material.

*THE Knowledge which hath been communicated to us is but in Part. That is, in his Sence, by giving us partial, indiftinct, imperfect, inadequate, and indeterminate Ideas of things fupernatural and divine; not taken From the things themſelves (this he knew was impoffible) but from the Ideas of Things of Sence. Purſuant to which Notion, ſpeaking of Myſterious Doctrines, as he very improperly calls the*

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the *Doctrines concerning Mysteries*, he says We have *inadequate Ideas of their Parts*: Whereas we have no *Idea* at all adequate or inadequate, determinate or indeterminate, of the Whole or of any Part, either taken from the *Things themselves* to which the Doctrines ultimately relate, or *Taken from any Other Ideas* of things natural and human. For no *Ideas* of things natural and human can be *Made* Ideas of things supernatural and divine; nor can any *Ideas* or *Conceptions* of the Things of this World suit the *Real true Nature* of the incomprehensible things of another in any Degree: And the *True Ideas* of each, could we obtain them, must be as different in *Kind* from one another and as opposite, as the real intrinsic Nature of the respective *Objects*. So that the Opinion of our having *Purely Spiritual*, or *Merely Intellectual* Ideas of things supernatural and divine, intirely *Independent* of worldly and human Objects, infused into the Mind from above, tho' false; yet is not so grossly absurd as this upon which our Author proceeds. No; the Knowledge of those things *In Part* does not consist in our having the least minute or partial or obscure Perception and Idea of the things themselves, or of any Part of them; but a Conception of the whole by Resemblance only and Representation. One and the same Word of human Language, together with the natural Conception annexed to it, stands in the Mind both for the Image and the Original: Nor is it possible for Mankind to have any *Idea*

of the incomprehensible Reality, *Taken* from any *Other* Idea by which it may be actually and truly discerned in any the lowest Degree.

OUR natural Ideas and Conceptions can at the utmost be nothing more than so many Resemblances, by which the Originals are Imaged only and represented: And the Doctrines of Myſteries in Chriſtianity are revealed to us by the very *Same* Conceptions that we have of things natural and human, and not by any *Other Ideas Analogous to them*; which is the very abſtracted unintelligible Notion that hath unhappily led this ingenious Author into all his variety of Error. That ſaying of St. Paul's, *Now we know in Part*, he miſtook for our having a Knowledge of *Some Part* of the *Real true Nature* of things divine and ſupernatural: Whereof it is now utterly impoſſible for us to have any Conception or Idea, either in the Whole or in Part, ſuppoſe them ever ſo *Short, Obſcure, Confuſed, Partial* or *Indeterminate* as he ſtyles them. Whereas according to the Apoſtle's Explanation of his own Meaning, our preſent Knowledge is not of any *Part* of the things themſelves *Face to Face*; but of the whole of them, after the ſame Manner that an human Face is ſeen in a Glaſs *By Reflection*: Not by an obſcure confuſed direct View of the *Real Face* it ſelf, or of any the leaſt Part of it; but by a clear and total Reſemblance, and a diſtinct *Similitude only* of the intire ſupernatural Reality. That which I ſuppoſe  
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might have confirmed the Author in his Mistake was the Word *Darkly*; but this is a wrong Translation of *Ἐν ἀνίγμᾳ* in his Text; which here means *Per Involucrum, Indirectly, or Covertly* and in a *Mystery* as it is sometimes used, or *By a Sign or Semblance*, as it is in the Arabic Version. And this is exactly agreeable to the Comparison made by St. Paul, of our present Knowledge of heavenly things; with the full, distinct, and direct View we have of a *Likeness only* and Resemblance of of a Face in a *Mirroure*: Which according to our Author must be a *Telescope*, exhibiting to us a partial, indistinct, confused, indeterminate *View* of the Object *It self*, lying at a great Distance from us and invisible to the naked Eye.

PURSUANT to his Notion of our Knowledge *In Part*, he says, *Light there is let in upon us answerable to the Necessities of our present State*. That is, upon his Principle, either a *Light Taken from Another Light*; or else transmitted directly and immediately from Heaven, to give us an actual but confused, indistinct, indeterminate View of things divine and supernatural by *I D E A S*; *Direct* tho' *Partial, Ideas* of them, which by the whole Tenor of his Sermon he maintains we have, and I as positively maintain we have not: That we have no such *Ideas* at all of them; nor any other Knowledge or Discernment of them, but by the *Mediation* and Substitution of such *Conceptions* as are originally natural and human;  
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and which we had obtained by the Light of Nature or *Human Reason*: Which receives no other additional Improvement or further Illumination from above, than by the secret Influences of the divine Spirit promoting, and guiding, and assisting all its natural Operations upon the Ideas and Conceptions of worldly Objects; and then enabling it to discern and contemplate heavenly and spiritual Things in the bright and extensive *Glass* of this World. So that in respect of the *Real Nature* of divine and supernatural Beings, we are to consider our selves as a Scene or Chamber of thick Darkness, into which there is no Admission of the least *Direct Glympse* of *Celestial Light*. Wherein we are trusting intirely to natural *Reason* for all our Knowledge, as to a *Lamp* lighted up within us; which enables us not only to discern the *Ideas* of all material external Objects let in by our five Senses, and to perceive that inward *Consciousness* we have of all its own various Operations: But also to raise up to our selves, out of these, apt and *Correspondent* complex Notions and *Conceptions* of such things, whereof it is impossible for us to have any direct Idea or Perception. Therefore by this Expression of our Author *Letting Light in upon us*, he ought to have meant no more than the Care which is taken of this *Lamp* both by our selves, and by the insensible Operations of the divine Spirit; in dressing, and trimming, and stirring it up, and rendering it more clear and shining by constantly

stantly pouring in new Supplies of Oyl. Thro' this Concurrence of Nature and Grace, the Eyes of our Understanding are opened wider by Degrees, for a more distinct and comprehensive Prospect of all things natural and human, which fall within the Sphere of our direct and immediate Perception and Knowledge; and for reasoning more justly upon them: And after this, above all, for *Sanctifying* such Notions and *Conceptions* as are framed in the Mind out of those original Ideas, considered together with its own Operations upon them; by observing how far they become lively Images and Representations of things purely divine and spiritual. This is a Kind of Knowledge abundantly sufficient to answer all the Ends of Revelation, as well as of natural Religion; without any *Purely Spiritual* and *Mere-ly Intellectual Ideas*, or any Method intirely abstracted from that which is originaly Sensitive and Rational.

THIS is a Knowledge of Religion and its Mysteries (whereof God himself and all his Powers and Attributes are the greatest) *Clear*, and *Easy*, and *Determinate*: But according to this Author's fundamental Notion of a middle Way of knowing them, between pure *Analogy only*; and by Ideas of the Things themselves *Taken* from *Other* Ideas, our Case is thus. Besides our *Organs* of *Sensation*, and the *Faculties* of the *Mind* operating on worldly Ideas and *Conceptions*, there are *Other* imperceptible  
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Inlets for darting some direct but very minute and indistinct Degrees of *Celestial* Light into the Soul of Man; to raise up a Kind of supernatural *Duskiness* or *Twilight* in the midst of this Darkness of Nature: Whereby the Eye of the Mind is enabled to obtain an obscure, imperfect, inevident, and indeterminate Perception or actual Discernment of some *Ideas* of things divine and heavenly. In pursuance of this he is full of these and such like Expressions. *God hath left some Particulars relating to these Points [of Mystery] obscure.* No; all *Points* and *Particulars* relating to the *Real Nature* of those things are not *Obscure*, but utterly *Unknown* and *Inconceivable* to us. And all the particular *Points* relating to them which are really *Revealed*, are clear and distinct; and as intelligible as that natural and obvious and familiar Analogy by which those *Points* are revealed and represented. *Mysteries are Doctrines of themselves inevident.* No, blessed be God, nothing is more evident and clear to our Understanding than the *Doctrines themselves* concerning *Mysteries*. And what should hinder them from being so? They are all made up of Conceptions natural and human, and expressed in Terms of common Language; and must therefore be as intelligible as any Doctrines or Propositions relating to those things of this Life by the Help of which those of another are let down to our frail and limited Capacities. How then can that supernatural Part of the Mystery ultimately referred to in the Doctrine or Proposition, be *Obscure* or *Inevident*; which is intirely  
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unknown and altogether inconceivable to us? Nothing is more imperceptible and intirely out of the Reach of all our Faculties of Knowlege, than the true Substance or real Nature of things divine and spiritual: And nothing more plain and distinct and easy to be understood, than that natural and correspondent Analogy by which they are conceived and expressed; and that *Parity* of *Reason* which insensibly runs thro' our whole Manner of thinking and speaking of them. If Men do not always take Care well to distinguish these two very different constituent Parts of Mysteries in all their Discourses and Reasonings upon them; they cannot avoid endless Obscurity and Confusion.

AGAIN, *Other Things* [of Mystery] *do now appear to us, of which we had before no View at all.* No; the divine Reality and true Nature of them appears as little to us now after the 'Revelation, as they did before. It is the remote Similitudes only or Resemblances of them which appear to us; and which are as truly the Images of the Substance as the Likeness of a Face in the Glass. *Let us adore those Truths which we cannot comprehend.* No, let us adore those *Truths* which we as *Clearly* and *Distinctly* comprehend as any Truth in Life. For if we did not know those *Truths* to be such, and *Clearly* and *Distinctly* understand them, how could we rationally adore them? How could we adore even God himself, if we had not a clear and distinct Knowlege of him? But not arising from any indistinct, confused

fused, indeterminate *Ideas* given us of any thing relating to his real Nature and Attributes: For then we should be always feeling after him in a purblind, Owl-eyed, and gloomy State and Condition of the Mind; and if we should haply find him, the Worship to be paid him would be equally dubious and uncertain, confused and indeterminate. Surely of all Things we ought to have a most *Clear* and *Determinate* Conception of the true Object of divine Worship, as well as of the Adoration it self which ought to be paid to it. So that we *Adore* some of our Christian *Truths* (as he words it) or Doctrines of Mysteries, because we adore God and his Attributes in them, whereof we have no Apprehension or Perception at all by *Ideas*: And not because we cannot *Comprehend* them in his Sence of the Word, that is, cannot have *Adequate* Ideas of them; for what is there in this World which we can thus *Comprehend*? Nothing, not the least grain of Sand. That Term is equivocal even when applyed separately to either the known, or unknown Part of a Mystery; but it is doubly so, when applyed without Distinction, as it commonly is, to *Both* the Parts taken together. *Of these mysterious Doctrines we have some Ideas.* A Man may have *Complex Notions* or Conceptions of Doctrines, or of the Propositions wherein they are contained and delivered; and he may have *Ideas* of the *Things* concerning which some of those Doctrines or Propositions are framed; but as for *Ideas of Doctrines* it is a very obscure Expression, beyond



beyond all Propriety of Language: However this is the well known peculiar Dialect of a modern *Essay* towards perplexing and confounding *Human Understanding*: Wherein the various Kinds of Knowledge, which before were well enough distinguished, and current by their several respective Stamps and Characters, are melted down into one undistinguished Mass of *Ideas*; and all resolved into a vile Medley or Composition of baser Metal and Dross.

AGAIN, *That is strictly speaking unintelligible, concerning which we can frame no Ideas; and that only incomprehensible, concerning which our Ideas are imperfect.* No, but quite the Reverse; That is strictly speaking *Incomprehensible* (in Religious and Divine Matters) of which we have no *Immediate* Ideas or Conceptions at all; no *Direct* Perception or Idea or Apprehension in any Degree; and of which we are capable of no Knowledge at all but by Similitude and Representation, as we see a Face in the Glass, or the Sun in Water. And that is strictly speaking *Unintelligible*, of which we can have no Kind of Knowledge either directly or by Analogy; either by *Direct* Apprehension and Perception, or by some *Correspondent Semblance* and Representation among the *Immediate* Objects of our Knowledge: Or shorter, that whereof we can have neither any Idea or Conception from the *Thing it self*, nor are able to frame any just *Analogous* Notion or representative Conception of it to our selves; and

and which consequently must be to our Understanding as that which is not, that which has no Truth and Reality of Existence. We can *Frame* to our selves *Compound* Ideas; and *Complex Notions* and Conceptions; but we can never *Frame* to our selves *Simple* and *Original* Ideas; these can come no otherwise than from some immediate actual Communication with the Object.

THUS then our Answer to an Objection this Author cites out of one *Toland*, against our Christian Mysteries, is obvious and never to be evaded. The Objection is levelled at our Divines who are said by him to contend, *That there are some Christian Doctrines so mysterious as to be in themselves inconceivable*. The true Answer to this and all such like Objections is; That the *Real Nature* and *Intrinsic Properties* of the *Divine things* as they are in *Themselves*, which are ultimately referred to in our Christian Doctrines of Mysteries, are utterly imperceptible and inconceivable to us; and consequently are no *Immediate* Objects of our present Knowledge or Faith: But the *Doctrines* and *Propositions* in which those things are revealed by a correspondent Representation and mediate Similitude; are as plain, and obvious, and as easily understood as any thing in Nature or in human Language. Now our Author Answers this Objection *By allowing that there are some Doctrines [of Mystery] incomprehensible by US; but not absolutely and in Themselves inconceivable*. But how

is this an Answer to his Objection, who is notorious for having rejected Doctrines of Mysteries for that very Reason, because they are *Incomprehensible by US*, and allowed to be so by some Divines? If the Ghost of that Reviler of Christian Mysteries were conjured up by the Adverse Party for a Reply, I have some Reason to know it would be this; *That if some Doctrines of Christian Mystery are incomprehensible by us, they must all of them be equally so; and consequently, as I have proved in my Christianity not Mysterious, none of them can be Objects either of our Knowledge or Faith.* To this our Author could, upon his Principles, make no other than this short inconsistent Answer; *That those Doctrines are not so Incomprehensible to us neither but that we Comprehend them by Partial, Confused, Indeterminate Ideas.* Upon which he might expect to hear a Sound, as it were of human Voice, uttering these Words; *This is the very Reason why I was one of the Christian Unbelievers in the Flesh; because Divines held they could have but a very confused, Partial, indeterminate Knowledge of the very Fundamental Doctrines of Christianity; and because I could therefore have no other than a very uncertain, dubious, tottering Faith built upon that Knowledge.* Here the Conference must necessarily break off short; our Author being thus pushed to the End of his Reasoning.

FOR the effectual silencing such a restless and disturbed Spirit, the Answer before given  
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might be further explained and urged by observing; that the Case of Mystery is not (as some would have it) that of the one Part thereof we have *Clear* and *Distinct* and *Determinate* Ideas or Conceptions, which must be allowed on all Sides: And that of the other Part we have none but such as are *Partial*, *Indistinct*, and *Indeterminate*; according to this Author, and to many others who are under the same Mistake. For this is plainly a vain Attempt to blend the *Noonday Sunshine* of this World, with an imaginary *Duskiness* or *Twilight* of another, in order to the Composition of a Mystery. It is as if a Man who was always without the Sense of seeing, should reason himself into a fond Persuasion that he is no more than *Pur-blind*; and that he hath some *Partial*, *Confused*, *Indeterminate* Ideas of Light and Colours: And then should endeavour to put *These* Ideas, together with the fairest and most lively *Conceptions* his Reason operating on the Ideas of his four Senses could afford, into one and the same Proposition to make up a *Mysterious Doctrine*, as this Author would call it if he were the Man; and should affirm positively that he had *Ideas* of such Objects of Sight, and of the Doctrines or Propositions formed concerning them, *Distinct* from those conveyed to his Mind thro' the only Inlets of Knowledge of which he is already possessed. In short this Notion of Mystery is a mixing plain Truth with palpable Error; since we can have no direct Idea at all, tho'

ever so partial and imperfect, of things divine and supernatural either *From themselves*, or *From any Other Ideas* whatsoever.

BUT the true Case of Christian Mystery is ; That of one Part of it we have direct, clear, distinct, and determinate Conceptions: And of the other no Idea or Conception *At all* as it is *In its self* ; but only a correspondent, *Analogous, Representative Conception*. If it should be replied that this is still worse than the former Case, because it is blending *Light* with *Midnight Darkness*: I answer that this Observation is rather applicable to the former Case, where *Midnight Darkness* is mistaken, by a false Fire of the Imagination, for a real *Twilight*. In this true Case, we are so far from blending *Light* with *Darkness*, that we only put together the *Directly perceptible* Light of this World, with the Light of Heaven *Imperceptible* indeed *Directly*, but perceived *Indirectly* and by *Reflection*, for the Composition of a Mystery. As a blind Man, under no ridiculous persuasion of a glimmering Sight, so far at least as to peep at the Sun or Stars; but acting up to the Truth of genuine Reason, would choose the most affecting Ideas and Impressions conveyed to his Mind by his four Senses, to *Stand for* the true Ideas of Light and Colours, in order to frame any intelligible Proposition or Doctrine relating to such Objects; whereof no *Ideas* could be *Taken* from the Ideas of his four Senses, tho' the latter

may be *Substituted* to supply the want of the former. Thus what we *Do* know concerning things divine and spiritual, is a real true Knowledge of them; tho' by Analogy and Similitude only with things natural and human, and not by direct Perception or Ideas: It is so far from total *Darkness* or *Ignorance*, as the Objection would insinuate; that it is a competent degree of *Clear* and *Useful* Knowledge.

THUS every Doctrine or Proposition of Christian Mystery is perfectly consistent; and the Parts of it are so far from being set in a jarring Contrariety to each other, as in the former Case, that they stand together amicably and remain inseparable in one and the same Proposition; only by substituting the Light of this World to supply a present total want of Celestial Light. Thus our Knowledge of the things of this Life becomes excellently subservient to a truly competent and useful Knowledge of things divine and spiritual; by such an apt and lively Representation of them, so contrived in the Truth and Wisdom of God, and in the Frame of an human Mind; that the same, the very same *Conceptions* and *Terms*, and *Propositions* are common to them both: All of them in their first Consideration merely human, but afterwards rendered holy and religious by *Analogy*; and by a just *Parity of Reason*, which insensibly carries on the happy Parallel between things natural and supernatural, divine and human, thro' the whole Course of

all our Thinking and Speaking of what would be otherwise utterly incomprehensible and ineffable. Thus *Reason* is a true serviceable Hand-maid to *Religion*, and excellently administers to all its noble Purposes; insomuch that our most exalted Knowledge of things divine owes its Rise, and Progress, and greatest Improvements to the Knowledge we have of Nature and of our selves. Whereas in the former Case, our whole Knowledge of this World put together, and of all things in it, to the greatest Exactness and Perfection, could not promote or advance our Knowledge of things divine one step farther than those partial, indistinct, confused, indeterminate Ideas floating in the Imagination of Men who allow them to be scarcely discernable by the sharpest Sight and Observation.

IF it is farther urged, that in Mystery we however blend *Intelligible* with *Unintelligible*. I Answer that the Objection thus worded proceeds upon a Mistake of the true Meaning of those Terms. We do indeed put together what is *Perceptible* and *Directly conceivable*, with what is altogether *Imperceptible* and inconceivable as it is *In its self*: But this latter cannot be called *Unintelligible*, because it is not so in its *Own Nature*; and tho' the real Nature of it is *Imperceptible* to *Us*, so that we can have no proper *Idea* of it, yet it is sufficiently *Intelligible* by Resemblance and *Analogy* with those things natural and human which

are the Extremes in every Proposition of Mystery. So that we do not blend *Intelligible* with *Unintelligible*; but what is *Directly* and *Immediately Perceptible* and *Conceivable*, with what is *Utterly Imperceptible* to *Us* as to its *Real Nature*; but very *Intelligible* and *Conceivable* by *Image* and *Reflection*, for the Composition of a Christian Mystery. Tho' one Part of it is not to be perceived or apprehended by *Ideas*; yet it becomes very intelligible and conceivable by correspondent *Similitude* and *Representation* in our natural Conceptions.

A MYSTERY is *something hidden and concealed*. No surely, it contains *Something* clearly revealed, and most distinctly understood; or it could be no Christian *Doctrine*, so as to be an Object of either our Knowledge or Faith. Those Terms *Hidden* and *Concealed* are very ambiguous when applied, as they are here, to the whole Mystery in gross; whereof one Part is divine and inconceivable to us as it is in itself, the other obvious and easily conceived as it is in its own Nature. When they are affirmed of the latter only, they are absolutely false, for it is not hidden and concealed; but clearly and distinctly understood and perceived. And they are very unaptly and absurdly applied even to the purely *Divine* and *Spiritual* Part of the Mystery, whereof we can have no Perception or Idea, or any other Kind of Knowledge but by Representation and Analogy: Because they imply that this Part is not

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*In its own Nature*, but *Accidentally* inconceivable by us; as if we were *Capable* of seeing it, had it not been designedly and on purpose absconded from us; as if our present Ignorance of it did not proceed from *Natural Blindness*, but from some *Accidental Impediment*, which if God thought fit to remove, it would lye exposed to open View. The divine Reality or spiritual Part of a Mystery is not said to be hidden and concealed from us, as the Light of the Sun is at Midnight by the Interposition of the Earth; but as this Light may be styled, tho' very improperly, *Concealed* or *Hidden* from a blind Man; who hath no natural Faculty for the least View or Perception of it. It were well if this loose improper indeterminate Use of Terms in all Discourses of Mystery could be prevented.

NOTWITHSTANDING *this*, our *Conceptions* [of Mysteries revealed] are in many Points *indistinct*. No, every Point of the *Revelation* or *Doctrine*, and all our Conceptions of it, are equally clear and distinct in each Mystery. For Instance this Doctrine or Proposition, *Christ is the Only-begotten Son of God*, is as clear and distinct as that *One Man is the Only-begotten Son of another*. What is it then which makes a Difference between these two Propositions in respect of human Understanding? Is it that we have a *Clear* and *Distinct* Idea or Conception of an human Son; and but an *Indistinct*, confused, indeterminate Idea

or Conception of a divine Son? No surely; but that we have no direct Conception or Idea at all of the latter; and that which is direct, clear, and distinct of the former: For which Reason that which is to us utterly (not *Unintelligible* but) *Imperceptible* by any direct Perception or Conception at all, is revealed to us by Analogy with that whereof we have some direct Perception or Conception; and accordingly thus far and no farther doth the divine Generation become an Object of our Knowledge and Faith. Nothing therefore can be more erroneous as well as pernicious to Religion, than those Forms of speaking; That our Ideas or Conceptions of Christian Doctrines concerning Mysteries, as well as of God himself and his Attributes (which are the greatest of Mysteries) are *Imperfect, Partial, Dim, Obscure, Confused, Inadequate, Indistinct, Short, Glimmering, Hidden, Concealed, Dubious, Inevident, Uncertain; Above Reason* (otherwise than as the divine Objects themselves are imperceptible) *Above Comprehension; Framing Ideas; Revealing Ideas; Knowing Part* of what is intirely unknown; *Letting Light in upon us*, distinct from the Light of Reason assisted and improved; *Seeing darkly*, otherwise than *Ænigmatically* by *Exemplar, or Sign, or Semblance; Taking Ideas from Other Ideas; Myste-rious Truths, or Doctrines, or Propositions*. As to these and all such like Epithets and Phrases, spoken of our Christian Doctrines of Mysteries almost every where, and indifferently by Friends  
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and Foes; the latter make all their Advantages of them against Truth and Orthodoxy: And they are no other than so many wrong Concessions in the Mouths of the former to weaken our common Cause, and render the Defence of it more difficult and perplexing. At best they serve only to raise a Cloud and Darkness about Doctrines of Mystery, in themselves as bright as the Sun at Noon Day. They are all full of Ambiguity, and generally false in the Application of them; and intirely without any solid Foundation in Reason. For after all, the whole Truth of the Matter in relation to Mystery is in short thus. We have no Ideas or Conceptions at all in any Degree of the heavenly things as they are in themselves; and therefore the Application of such Terms and Sayings to Objects altogether imperceptible, must at best be useless and insignificant. And on the other Hand, the very Reverse of them all is true, with respect to those *Doctrines* and *Propositions*, which express and exhibit to us that natural and easy *Resemblance* and Similitude, under which what is to us imperceptible and inconceivable as to its real Nature, becomes *Thus* as conceivable and intelligible as any thing in this World, or particularly in human Nature.

A MYSTERY is a *Doctrine* which is so above our Reason, that we are incapable of comprehending it. Then every thing in Nature is a Mystery; for there is no one thing in it  
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whereof we have a perfect and truly comprehensive Knowledge. *Comprehension*, in this Author's loose, as well as the commonly mistaken Acceptation of the Term, signifies the having perfect, adequate, and determinate Ideas of an Object. Now *Thus* divine and human, heavenly and worldly things are both above our Comprehension: So that we have nothing to do with this meaning of the Word in a Treatise of Religious Mysteries. The Question here is, in what Sence we are incapable of comprehending *Divine* and supernatural Objects? Whether it is that we have only inadequate, indeterminate, indistinct, and imperfect Ideas of them, as he explains the Word *Incomprehensible*; or upon what other Account?

Now in order to understand this clearly, *Comprehension* ought to be well distinguished from *Perception*, which proceeds from some immediate Communication of an external Object with our sensitive Faculties, furnishing us with a constant supply of original Ideas of Sensation. And from *Self-consciousness*, which is the immediate internal *Feeling* of the Faculties of our own Minds and their Operations, without the Intervention of any Ideas of them whatsoever. As also from what is justly styled the *Simple Apprehension* of the Intellect; that is, the first naked view only, and simple prospect it takes of the sensitive Ideas in the Imagination, and of all its own Powers and Operations,

rations, without proceeding to any *Judgment* or *Reasoning* upon either. These are the Faculties of human Nature which furnish us with all the *Materials* of our most extensive Knowledge: From which it proceeds to its own Alterations and Combinations of sensitive Ideas: to the forming complex Notions and Conceptions out of them and its own Operations considered together; to the finding out their Agreements and Disagreements; and to all its Reasonings, Conclusions and Maxims. And now we may discern distinctly in what Sense any Part of a Religious Mystery is above our Reason or Comprehension. Whatever in Mystery is above all *Sensitive Perception*, *Immediate Consciousness*, and the *Direct Apprehension* of the Intellect, is properly above our *Comprehension*; because it lies beyond all our *Direct* Ideas and Conceptions, and consequently beyond all the direct and immediate Operation of *Reason*.

Now then, say you, here you have led us from the Beginning to the End of all our Knowledge confined to the Limits of this World, and of all Things in it: But what then becomes of Religion and the Things of another; and even of that Part of *Mystery* which is purely divine and spiritual? And what have we to do but to let it alone, as what doth not concern us; as what we can have no Knowledge of, and upon which Reason can exert none of its Operations? I Answer  
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by thus far owning the Charge, that I have here brought the Mind on to the utmost Bounds of all its *Direct and immediate Knowledge*; but not with the same treacherous Design with which some others have done the same: Namely to persuade Men that they can have *No KNOWLEDGE at all of things whereof they can have no IDEAS*; and by necessary Consequence that they must reject all the Mysteries of Christianity from being either the *Immediate, or Mediate* Objects of our Understanding or Faith; little considering that upon the same Principle they must explode all Knowledge of God himself and his Attributes, of which we have no *Ideas*. No, but with a quite different Intent; to shew Men that they are not to acquiesce intirely and take up their Rest here among Atheists and Infidels; without troubling themselves to look *Backward or Forward*, either for a *Direct* or even *Mediate* Knowledge of any thing besides what is purely natural or human. To dissuade others from all vain Attempts and impotent Struggles for looking strait before them over those Bounds; for any direct and immediate View and forbidden Prospect into the other World. For let them strain their Optics and gaze with ever so much Intenseness, they never will be able to obtain any one minute, distant, obscure, glimmering *Idea* of the real Nature of things divine and supernatural, or of any thing the same in *Kind*, by the Eye of the Mind, any more than they would by the Eye of the Body: And if

it were possible to obtain any such Idea, it must be expressed by the Tongue of an Angel, and not in Sounds of Syllables articulated by a mere Collision of Air. This is too commonly the Case both of the Orthodox, and Unorthodox; and the Consequences of it are a Multiplicity of *Errors*; great *Ambiguity* and *Confusion* in reasoning on both Sides; and several very different Kinds of *Enthusiasm* and *Heresy*.

AND lastly, to convince all Men if possible, that when they find themselves at the utmost extent of our Understanding in things temporal and human; and can proceed no farther by the Help of either Sense or Reason to any *Direct Perception*, or *Simple Apprehension*, or *Immediate Consciousness*, or *Purely Spiritual Ideas* of things divine and supernatural: That they would wisely, without any Hesitation or Delay, look behind them, and turn backward for a Review of that Knowledge merely natural and human which they obtained in their Progress hitherto; to traverse it all over again, and observe how our little System is an Epitome of the Universe, and Man a remote Image and Picture in Miniature of the divine Being himself. How it is by looking into this World, and more particularly into our selves, that we can have any Conception at all of things divine and supernatural; which are there alone to be discerned, and that by Reflection only and Similitude: but as truly and clearly discerned, as the Substance of an human Face is by a clear and lively Resemblance

blance of it in a Glafs. How the Knowledge by that Image only, is true and real and useful; tho' a Man had no Power to turn about and view the Substance it self: And so likewise, how our Knowledge of Sun Moon and Stars appearing to us in the Water only, would be thus far just and sufficiently well grounded; tho' our Eyes were naturally so prone and fixed to this little Globe of ours, that we could not look upward for the least direct and immediate View of them. How this is a sure and solid Foundation of all the divine Knowledge we have; and how therefore it is here the Mind begins to exert the noblest and most exalted of all its Operations, in substituting its Conceptions of things natural and human, for representing the correspondent but undiscerned Substance and Reality of Things divine and supernatural: And in carrying on an unerring Parity of Reason between them thro' all its own Conceptions and Notions, together with all its regular Judgments and Positions and Deductions concerning them; without glancing at the *Real Nature or True Properties* of what must be allowed intirely unknown otherwise than by this Semblance and Analogy. Thus all Nature within our *Direct View*, becomes a large and spacious Field of Divine as well as of human Knowledge, abundantly sufficient for all the Purposes of Religion in this Life: And they who are not contented with this Kind and Degree of it, must in effect renounce all Religion as well natural as revealed.



FROM hence it plainly appears how the Terms *Comprehension*, *Perception*, *Idea*, *Consciousness*, *Simple Apprehension* are no way applicable in the Affirmative to the purely spiritual and divine Part of Mystery. No nor can *Conception* be so applied to it, otherwise than as we *Conceive* it by Similitude and Representation; and thus indeed we may be truly said to *Conceive* things divine and spiritual, not obscurely and dimly, or by Part and Parcel; but as fully and clearly and distinctly as any thing relating to our own Nature: And all the Doctrines and Propositions concerning them are as plain, and intelligible, and *Comprehensible*, as any of those things whereby they are imaged and represented; or as any other Words or Propositions in human Language. From hence likewise it appears how nearly we are concerned even in the purely spiritual Part of Mystery. For tho' we can exert no one Operation of the Mind *Directly* upon any thing relating to the *Real Nature* and Substance of it: Yet all its Operations may be exercised upon the Doctrines and Propositions, in which the Mystery is revealed by natural Representation, and in Terms of human Language. Tho' that imperceptible Part of it cannot be the *Direct* and *Immediate* Object of either our Knowledge or Faith; yet by the Intervention and Mediation of Things natural and obvious, it necessarily becomes a *Remote* and *Distant* Object of both: Of our *Knowledge*, by this Representation and Analogy; and of our *Faith*,  
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in believing the *Truth* and *Reality* and *Existence* of things *Correspondent*, but inconceivable any otherwise than as they are thus beheld in a *Mirroure* only, 'Εν αἰνύματι by *Sign*, or *Similitude*, or *Representation*.

WE affirm, says he, *there are several Doctrines* [of *Mystery*] *above our Reason; notwithstanding they are revealed.* Here again, as he hath done all along, the Author confounds the *Doctrines*, with the *Divine things themselves* to which those *Doctrines* ultimately relate; tho' these ought ever to be most carefully distinguished. The *divine Objects* as they are in their own Nature, lie intirely above all Perception of Sence or Apprehension of Reason, as well after as before the Revelation; but the *Doctrines* or *Propositions* in which the Revelation is made are not above our Reason. If they were so, it is plain we could neither understand nor believe them; all *Doctrines* of *Mystery* in the Gospel would be useless and unintelligible; and there would be no such thing as a Revelation made to us from Heaven, till we were endued with some Faculty of Knowledge different from Sence and Reason for apprehending and understanding it. The *Real true Nature* of things *divine* and *supernatural*, ultimately designed and referred to in these *Doctrines*, is indeed far above all Perception of Sence, or Consciousness; and consequently above Reason, which cannot from them, or from any Thing the same in Kind, be supplied with Materials for the Exercise of any  
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of its Operations: *This* is as utterly imperceptible and inconceivable after the Revelation as before it; but how can the *Doctrine it self* be *Above* our Reason; after it is *Revealed* to our Reason? Is not this saying in the same Breath that it is, and is not revealed? And will any Man say that the Doctrines concerning Gospel Mysteries are not clear and distinct, plain and intelligible? Yes surely, as plain and distinct and intelligible as any Doctrines or Propositions relating to human Life. These express nothing indeed of the real true Nature of things divine; because of this we can have no *Perception* of Sense, or *Idea*, or *Consciousness*, or *Simple Apprehension*: But they suppose and assert every thing spoken of thus by Representation and Analogy, to be *As* substantially *True* and *Real* on the Part of the *Divinity*, as the things by which they are thus *Represented* are with respect to *This World* and our Humanity. And it is our full Persuasion of that *Correspondent Truth* and *Reality* of things no otherwise revealed than by such Representation and Similitude, which improves and exalts the *Knowledge* and *Assent* of the pure Intellect into a truly Christian *Faith*; which then becomes, according to the Apostle's Definition of it, *The Evidence of things not seen*: Of things incomprehensible and above Reason as they are in themselves; but let down to the Level of human Understanding in *Doctrines* or *Propositions* plain and intelligible and obvious to the common Reason of all Mankind.

FOR want of observing the above mentioned Distinction, the Author runs into many such loose and ambiguous Expressions as these. *We allow and contend for it, that there are some Doctrines [of Mystery] in our Religion above our Reason.* But why *Some* Doctrines? Surely all Doctrines concerning Mystery are equally above our Reason, in respect of the spiritual Part of them or the divine things as they are in themselves: And in respect of the Doctrines, or of the Terms or Propositions in which they are delivered, they are all equally plain, and distinct, and intelligible. Again, *A Doctrine may be very true notwithstanding its being above our Reason.* But surely if the *Doctrine* or Proposition is above Reason, we can never be the wiser or the better for it. Suppose it ever so true in *Its self*, how shall it appear to be so to *Us*; if our Reason cannot understand it clearly, and judge of it, and form certain and determinate Conclusions concerning it? And how can it judge or determine any thing concerning what is so above it, as to be out of the Reach of all its Operations? From whence it is plain that *something* in Christian Mystery must not be above our Reason; but must be as truly the *Immediate, Direct, and Proper* Object of our understanding Faculties, as any thing in Nature. And whether this be the *Doctrines* and *Propositions* in which they are delivered, composed of analogous Conceptions and Terms worldly and human; of the *Divine Things* as they are *In themselves*, ultimately

timately refered to in those Doctrines, is easy to determine: Which if the Author had well considered, neither that *Sermon*, nor this long Chapter of Remarks upon it had ever seen the Light.

As he affirms that there are *Some Doctrines* in our Religion above Reason; so he observes that the *Socinians* on the contrary *Affirm that there is nothing in the Christian Religion above Reason*; and both erroneously. Whereas had the *Socinians* affirmed only, That there are no *Doctrines* in the Christian Religion *Above our Reason*; and our Author, That not only *Some*, but that *All* the divine and heavenly *Objects themselves*, ultimately refered to in those Doctrines, were *Above our Reason*; they had been both so far in the Right: But the real Mistake of one, is perfectly the Reverse of the other. For He asserts not only the *Real Nature* of the divine things themselves, but even the *Doctrines* in which they are revealed by Analogy, to be above Reason: And the great and fundamental Error of the *Socinians*, which runs thro' their whole System of Religion is; that neither the *Doctrines*, nor the *Things themselves* represented and designed in those Doctrines are above Reason. They intirely reject all the divine and supernatural Objects and Transactions, ultimately refered to and intended in those Christian Doctrines of Mystery; they turn all the Terms of them into pure Figure and Metaphor; and will have them allude to any thing, rather than

a substantial *Correspondent* Truth and *Similar* Reality on the Part of the *Divine Nature*. The Mistake of this Author is, That he applies this last Affirmation of his to the *Representation* or *Analogy*, as well as to the *Things themselves* so represented; and the Herefy of the Socinians is, That they utterly reject the *Divine Analogy*, and explode all Comparison or Similitude between things divine and human, founded in the *Real Nature* of both: And from thence by an insensible and fatal Transition they glide into *Human Metaphor*, and make all the Terms of the Gospel concerning Mystery, no more than a bare Allusion to the Things and Transactions of this Life; and particularly to the Rites and Ceremonies under the Jewish Dispensation. Both these Extremes are dangerous to Religion; where some, out of a mistaken Zeal for Orthodoxy, assert that we have *Direct* Ideas or Conceptions of things divine and supernatural, *Distinct* and different from those of worldly and human Objects; tho' such as are partial, indistinct, and indeterminate: And where others, for the Support and Maintenance of their Heterodox Principles, will not allow that in Doctrines or Propositions of Christian Mystery, any *correspondent* tho' incomprehensible Substance and *Reality* on the Part of the *Divine Nature* is Imaged out and represented. From whence it may be observed, that most of all the Mistakes and Errors of Men concerning our Christian Mysteries proceed; either from their attributing to the whole Mystery in *Gross* what is truly applicable

plicable only to one, or the other Part of it: Or from their unfairly *Separating* the two essential constituent Parts of it, which ought ever to remain inseparable; and that with an invidious clandestine Design to dash them against each other for the Dissolution of the Whole.

THIS lays open the Mistake in his other Definition of Mystery, *A Doctrine concerning which our Ideas are either inadequate or indeterminate.* No, a *Doctrine* concerning which both the Conceptions, and the Terms in which they are expressed, are very clear and distinct and determinate; tho' the *Real Nature* and true Properties of the *Things themselves* ultimately referred to in those Doctrines, are utterly inconceivable: Inasmuch that *We* can have no Idea or Conception at all of these, or of any thing the same in Kind, either by an internal Perception or *Consciousness*, or *Simple Apprehension* of the Mind; or by any *External Sensation*. Nothing is truly *Above Reason*, but what must first be supposed *Above* the Reach of all these, which are the only Faculties whereby Reason is supplied with *Original Materials* to work upon; call these *Ideas* or what else you please, they must be supposed antecedent to all its Operations; without them it is an unactive Principle, and cannot operate upon Nothing. So that the divine and *Supernatural Things themselves* are above Reason, only because they are above all external or internal Perception or Sensation; they are *Inconceivable*, because they are altogether *Imperceptible*. They

are with respect to their *Real Nature* above Reason, as the Light of the Sun is above the Reason of a Man born blind; who hath no Faculty in his Nature for any internal or external *Perception* or *Idea* of it, as some Material for the Work and Imployment of his Reason. From the first Instant he obtained any the least Glimpse of Light, Reason would begin with its Operations upon it; But it cannot work without Materials; and must therefore be confined to operate upon such Ideas as are administred by his *Four* remaining Senses, together with the *Consciousness* he hath of his own Mind's internal *Sensations*, and its *Operations* upon these Materials. The Operations of Reason are likewise ever exerted to greater or less Advantage, in Proportion to the Soundness and Aptitude of those Materials: If the Perceptions and Sensations are strong and clear and distinct, the Operations of the Intellect or Reason upon them will be proportionably distinct and clear; and it is so much the less liable to Error and Mistake. But if the original Perceptions and Ideas are obscure, confused, and indeterminate; then all the Operations of our Reason upon *Them* must be likewise full of Obscurity and Confusion; the first simple View the Intellect takes of these, as well as all its subsequent Observations and Judgments upon them must at best be very dubious and uncertain; and no Conclusions can be drawn concerning them with any sure and determinate Marks of Truth or Falshood: Which according to this Author's Principles must necessarily



necessarily be the Case of every Christian Mystery, as he takes it in gross; and without any Distinction of its Parts into comprehensible and incomprehensible, perceptible and imperceptible.

SINCE therefore Reason cannot operate till some actual Ideas, Perceptions, or Sensations offer themselves as Materials for it to work upon; and since it hath no inherent Power of *Creating* simple Ideas and Perceptions, or of producing them spontaneously for the Exercise of its own Operations: The remaining Question is, what shall Reason do where it hath no Supply of any such original Materials, no immediate Perception, Idea, or Consciousness; which is its true Case with respect to the purely spiritual and divine Part of all our Christian Mysteries? I answer that the Intellect or Reason hath nothing to do here, but to suspend all its Operations; not to pretend to Work without pre-existent Materials, nor to assume to it self a Power of creating them where they are not otherwise to be found: They are both equally presumptuous, and by a just Retribution they consign Men over to Error, Infidelity, or Enthusiasm. Here then, Reason is to exert all its Operations on that Part of Mystery whereof the Ideas and Conceptions are natural, and the Terms worldly and human: As these are all clear and distinct and determinate, all its Operations upon them will be so likewise. And then it

hath nothing more left to do, but to conclude that a divine *Supernatural* incomprehensible Substance and Reality, *Correspondent* and Answerable to those *Natural* and Obvious Images and Representations, is ultimately designed and intended in every *Doctrine* and Proposition of Mystery expressed by the plainest and most intelligible Words of human Language.

OUR Case then in respect to Mystery may be illustrated by the State of a Man under natural Blindness from his Birth. The Light of the Sun and Colours are above his Reason, for want of a Faculty to supply some simple Idea or Perception of them; and because his Intellect or Reason is void of all Power to frame or raise up to it self any such Idea or Perception ever so imperfect, confused, or indeterminate. If the Truth and real Existence of Light and Colours were to be discovered to this Man, as yet in total Ignorance of them, by human Information or divine Revelation; it would not be done by opening his Eyes just wide enough for an obscure glance at Light and Colours, for this would be contrary to the Supposition: But by Substitution of those simple *Ideas* he received from some of his four remaining Senses; or by some of those *Conceptions* already formed in his Mind, and natural to him before the Revelation was made. Suppose then that *Scarlet Colour* were revealed to him by the Idea or Conception of a *Delightful smooth Surface*; and *Light* under the Conception

ception of a very *Extensive Reach* or *Feeling*, which would enable him to *Distinguish* many Objects at once and at a vast *Distance* with exquisite *Pleasure*. Grant these at present to be the aptest Symbols and most correspondent Conceptions of those things imperceptible and incomprehensible to him as they are in themselves, which all Nature could supply for that Purpose. What then hath he to do here? Surely not to work himself up to a Persuasion that he can see without Eyes; so far at least as to have some *Partial, Confused, Inadequate, Obscure, Indistinct, Glimmering Views* of Colour or of Light; nor vainly to think that he can supply his total want of Sight, by an awkward unnatural Effort of Reason or Stretch of the Imagination: So as to raise up or frame to himself *Ideas* of Things whereof he can have no actual Perception or Consciousness; or to find out some *Abstracted* and *Purely spiritual* Ideas infused into his Mind from above; or according to this Author's grand Notion, to *Take* Ideas of Scarlet and of a Sun Beam, *From* the *Other* Ideas of a smooth Surface and Feeling at a great distance; Ideas which shall not be the *Same*, but intirely *Distinct* and different from those *From* whence they are *Taken*, and which only bear some Resemblance and Analogy with them. No, he hath nothing else to do, but to submit to his Informers in a full Conviction of his total want of Sight; to acquiesce in his Blindness; and to rest contented without any the least minute Glimpse of Light,

or most feint and imperfect Discernment or Distinction of Colours: And in the midst of thick Darkness, to adhere intirely to the most apt and proper Symbols and Types offered him of things utterly imperceptible to him; which are to be found among the natural *Ideas*, or *Conceptions*, or *Complex Notions* of his scanty Mind. He is to leaye one and the same Conception to stand both for a *Delightful smooth Surface*, which he can easily touch; and for *Scarlet* which he cannot see: The same Idea or Conception for his *Feeling* with exquisite *Pleasure* at a great *Distance* all around him; and for *Light* whereof He can have no Perception, Idea, or Consciousness.

THERE is no other way whereby those things, imperceptible and utterly inconceivable to him as they are in themselves, can become the Objects of his Understanding; if he will think of them at all it must be after this Manner: And if he will speak of them at all, so as to affirm or deny any thing concerning them, he is under a Necessity of putting together the *Direct* and well known Objects or Conceptions which are *Substituted*, and the *Incomprehensible* and *Imperceptible Objects* thus figured out and ultimately refered to, into one plain, simple Proposition; which in respect of him is an *Information* or *Doctrine* concerning *Mystery*. Of this Mystery there are two Parts, which to avoid endless Confusion in all his Discourses and Reasonings,

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ought ever to be well distinguished from each other. One, utterly imperceptible and incomprehensible to him ; upon which therefore his Reason cannot operate at all : The other, a Symbol or Type of the first ; apprehended by the direct Ideas and Conceptions of a blind Man, and expressed in Words of his own Language ; and therefore as perfectly plain, and distinct, and intelligible to him as any thing else within the Compass of natural Blindness. As to this then he may give his Reason full Scope, and be as curious and inquisitive as possibly he can ; whether any Information concerning things imperceptible and inconceivable could be given him by God or Man, any otherwise than by a little opening his Eyes ? And whether the Revelation of the Existence and Reality of Light and Colours could be made to him with any useful Purpose and Design, by the Mediation of some of the Ideas of his four remaining Senses ; or of those complex Notions and Conceptions which arise in his Mind from the Operations of his Reason upon them ? But how ridiculous would this Man appear in his own Eyes, whenever they came to be fully opened ; if instead of this Manner of Procedure, thro' a vain Affectation of being wiser and a greater Master of Reason than other blind Mortals ; he should intirely lay aside and explode the main and single Point of Comparison designed between *Light* and *Scarlet*, and those other Ideas under which they were revealed and described ; And should exert all  
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the Talents of his Mind, in arguing away the *Truth* and *Reality* and *Existence* of them; by understanding the Terms either in a strictly *Literal* only, or a *Purely Figurative* and *Metaphorical* Sence, as they best serve the Purpose of his Fancy and Humour: Or by a frivolous and groundless *Comparison* between *The Originals* and *Images* in any *Other* Instances, which were never designed or intended in the Revelation.

Now do but transfer this natural Blindness from the Body to the Mind, whereby we discern as little of the spiritual Part of Mystery as we do with our Eyes, and you will find the Case parallel, only with these material Differences. That whereas a Person blind from the Womb could never have had the Terms *Light* and *Scarlet*, otherwise than from some others who had seen them; because having no Ideas of the things themselves, he could not himself affix any proper Names or Denominations to them: We can have no Words strictly proper and literal for things divine and supernatural, either from our selves or others; for St. Paul who had a visionary Prospect of those things, and heard the Language of another World, tells us that the Words are *Un-speakable*, nor is it *Possible* for a Man to *Utter* them. And that whereas there is little or no *Correspondent Similitude* or *Real Analogy* between Scarlet and a smooth Surface, or between Light and an extensive pleasant Feeling: Yet  
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there is a correspondent Resemblance or true Analogy in the very Nature of the things, between the divine supernatural Originals, and those natural and human Objects and Conceptions by which they are represented to the Mind of Man; which we found upon the Goodness and Veracity of God, as well as upon our being originally formed in his Likeness and after his Image. What we have to do therefore is, at present to acquiesce in this natural Blindness of our Intellect, and lay aside all groundless and even presumptuous Opinions of *Direct* and *Immediate* Views of heavenly things, in any degree ever so obscure minute and imperfect; as well as all imaginary Analogous Ideas or Conceptions of them *Distinct* from those *Other* Ideas from whence they are supposed to be *Taken*. The Ideas or Conceptions we have from things natural and human, can never beget *Other* Analogous Ideas, *Distinct* from *Themselves*, of things divine and supernatural: But they can themselves *Supply* the *Want* of all other Ideas and Conceptions whatsoever of those things; only by a new Use and Application of them, as analogical Representatives of Objects correspondent and otherwise inconceivable.

THUS are we also under a Necessity of putting these two Parts together in every Christian Mystery, One, the well known *Analogous Object* of *This* Life, under the plain and obvious and direct Conception of which God reveals

reveals any thing of another ; and consequently upon which Reason is to exert all its Operations in their utmost Latitude : The other, a divine and *Supernatural* Object ; *Correspondent* indeed to the first, but intirely *Imperceptible* and inconceivable to us as it is *In its self*, and therefore in this respect altogether above our Reason.

Now, no Man can pretend to see any *Inconsistency* in this Part of a Mystery, or in the *Real Natures* of the divine and heavenly things themselves : Because it must be allowed on all Hands, that these are so intirely imperceptible and inconceivable, as to be no Objects of Reason, but altogether above it ; as affording no Materials, either from themselves, or from any thing the same in Kind, for the Exercise of any of its Operations. Nor can any Man assert the *Doctrines* or Propositions in which those incomprehensible things are revealed by Analogy, to be either above Reason ; or any way more obscure, confused, and indeterminate, than any other Doctrines or Propositions relating to things merely natural and human : Because they are composed of Ideas or Conceptions and Terms equally clear and distinct and intelligible with any Propositions relating only to common Life. Nor lastly, can it be said that there is any Inconsistency or Contradiction between these two *Distinct Parts* when put together at once into the *Same Doctrine* or Proposition ; because we are supported in doing this by the Example of God himself, as well as by Arguments from his Veracity

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ty and Goodness; nay this is unavoidable, since we have no other way of thinking or speaking concerning things divine and supernatural. So that tho' these two Parts are very different and distant in their real Nature and Properties, yet they delightfully combine to the Constitution of a Christian Mystery; and do never clash one against another, but when they are set at Variance by Men who have an ill will to both: And that by unwarrantable and odious Comparisons between them in such Instances as suppose their *Real intrinsic Natures* to be the same in *Kind*, and are quite beside the only main Point of Analogy designed and intended by the Wisdom of God. Nor can they be *Separated* from each other, and the Mystery dissolved; otherwise than by turning the well known Part of it into mere Figure and *Metaphor* for the *Other*, or only for something else well known and alluded to in *This Life*, and so resolving the Mystery into *Nothing*. And accordingly these are the two Ways the Enemies of Revelation and Mystery in general, and of the Orthodox Faith in particular, go to work in all the Opposition they give us: Tho' it is manifest that at the same time and by the same Methods they are effectually cutting off all our *Real* and *Useful* Knowledge of another World, even of God himself and his Attributes.

To explain all this by an Instance. In this Doctrine or Proposition, *The Logos is the Only-begotten Son of God*; The two Parts of this Mystery

tery are, first the *Divine Supernatural Derivation* or *Generation* of the Word from his divine Father as it is in it self. Of this we have not the least partial, obscure, imperfect, indeterminate or glimmering Perception or Idea, either directly from the thing it self; or from any *Other* Idea from which it is *Taken* and to which it is Analogous: If we had, in either Case the Terms by which we expressed those Ideas must have been intirely *New*; and quite different from the Terms proper to the *Other* Ideas or Conceptions natural and human by which they are *Represented*, or *From* whence they were *Taken*; which was not well considered by this Author. This Part of the Mystery cannot therefore be styled *Indistinct*, *Confused*, *Indeterminate* or *Mysterious*; but altogether *Imperceptible*, *Unknown*, and utterly *Incomprehensible*; as well as *Ineffable*, there being no Word in human Language to express it with any literal Propriety. Secondly, The other Part of this Mystery is that *Analogous Representation* of this Divine Derivation under that of an *Only-begotten Son*; whereof the Conception is merely natural, and expressed in Terms of common Speech; and accordingly nothing in human Life can be more obvious and plain and more distinctly intelligible. These two Parts constitute this Mystery, and are necessarily apprehended by the same Ideas or Conceptions; expressed in the same Terms; and put together at the same time into one and the same Proposition. No Man can say there is any Inconsistency, Absurdity,

or Contradiction in the imperceptible *Real Nature* of that *Divine Derivation* it self; for that very Reason, because it is altogether imperceptible and incomprehensible. Nor can it be said that the *Doctrine* or *Proposition* in which the Revelation of that Supernatural Derivation is made, is *Above Reason*; or more indistinct or confused or indeterminate, than any other Doctrines or Propositions relating to things merely natural and human: And consequently that there is not full Scope for Reason to exert all its Operations upon it; to examine whether the Proposition is good Sense and Grammar; and not so many Words joyned together absurdly and improperly so as to have no intelligible Signification? Whether it contains any Absurdity or Contradiction in it, that there should be such a divine Generation possible as we cannot perceive at all, or have any the least Idea or Conception of; and therefore can never discern it to be impossible.

LASTLY, Nor can any Man argue natural Generation to be an unapt or improper Representation of that divine Derivation, unless he had some direct Idea or Conception of the real true Nature and Manner of this last. God himself is the only Judge of that; and we are good Judges of the *Main Point* of Analogy designed and intended in the Revelation. Namely, *That we should believe and conceive Christ to be as really and truly the SON of God in a correspondent and divine Sense of the Word, as One Man*

*is literally the Son of another*; and *In a Sence as distinct from divine Efficiency* (according to the common Acceptation of the Terms) as *Human Generation is from any Work of human Efficiency*. Whilst Men adhere to this Analogy, the two Parts of this Mystery, as distant from each other in their Nature as Heaven and Earth, do however perfectly agree; and combine together to make up one and the same Object or Point of clear and certain Knowledge, and of a sure and well grounded Faith. The *Mutual Relation* they have to each other, by a *Correspondent Resemblance* or *Analogy* in their very natures, is the firm Cement which joyns together these two things into one eternal Truth; revealed indeed from Heaven, but at the same time as truly *Thus* the Object of our Reason by Analogy, as any thing merely human.

BUT some Men will perversly *Confound* these two different Parts of Mystery, so as to understand the whole Doctrine or Proposition either as referring intirely to human Generation alone; or totally in the other Extreme, as referring purely to the divine supernatural Derivation of the Son from the Father: And then they can never think or speak of it intelligibly; but must ever run into endless Ambiguity and Confusion. Others on the Contrary labour to *Dissolve* the close inseparable Union between these two essential Parts of this Mystery; to tear them asunder with Violence, and set them  
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at *Variance* in direct *Opposition* to each other: By groundless Comparisons between the *Real Manner* in a Derivation of an human Son from his Father; and the Manner in the Derivation of the divine Son from God. This is either done expressly or by Supposition, in such Instances of the Nature of human Generation as were never intended in Scripture; and which all must allow to be unworthy of God; from whence they frame their Conclusions against the Reality and Truth of *Any* actual divine Generation: And by this Artifice they insinuate the Necessity of turning the Terms *Son* and *Only-begotten* in that Proposition, into a mere Figure or Metaphor for divine *Efficiency* or *Making*; to which it is plainly opposed, and from which it ought of all other things in the World to be distinguished as well in Exactness of Thinking as in Propriety of Language. Whereas after all, the only Conclusion to be drawn, which can truly serve the Cause and Purpose of Arians as well as professed Infidels would be; That even the very *Representation* or *Analogous Resemblance* it self; under which we conceive and hold a real, and true, and actual Derivation of the divine Son from the Father, is altogether *Unworthy* of God; and therefore cannot be any more than purely Figurative and *Metaphorical* when applyed to him: But this would evidently strike not only at the Truth and Reality of the Mystery; but at the Goodness and Wisdom of God himself, who hath revealed to

us the supernatural Derivation of the Son from himself by Representation and Analogy with that of human Generation.

I SHALL here once more observe to this Author how we have no proper *Idea* of the Extremes in this Proposition, *The Logos or Word is the Only-begotten Son of God*; No *Ideas* I say, either *From* the divine things themselves; or *Of* those things themselves, *Taken* from any *Other* Ideas whatsoever, as he asserts: So that according to his Principles it will follow, that we can have no Apprehension or Knowledge of that Proposition; we can give no Assent to it, nor can we have any Persuasion of the Truth of it; and consequently no Faith pursuant to that Knowledge or Persuasion. But I hope it is now fully evident that without any *Ideas* of the Extremes, or even *Conceptions* of the divine Objects as they are in themselves, or indeed of any thing the same in Kind; we may have a clear Notion and a distinct Knowledge of that Proposition; a full Persuasion of the Truth of it as coming from God; and a stedfast firm *Belief* of the correspondent supernatural Realities, revealed in it by Resemblance only and Analogy with the Conceptions of things natural and human; and not by any *Other* or *Distinct* Ideas *Taken* from them (as he says) and then appropriated to things divine and supernatural.

To render the true Notion of Christian Myſteries plainer yet, by a more obvious Inſtance if poſſible. It is a Doctrin of Scripture that *Chriſt ever liveth to make Interceſſion for us.* The *Correſpondent Conception* under which this heavenly Interceſſion is revealed; is that of an human Perſon's interceding with an earthly Monarch juſtly offended, ſo as to reconcile him to a Subject guilty of a capital Crime. This Part of the Myſtery, or the *Analogous Representation*, falls under the ſevereſt Tryal and Diſquiſition of our Reason: In reſpect of this, it is not only allowable, but our Duty and commendable to give Reason its full Scope. We ought to know the true Meaning of the Words; that the Doctrin or Proposition is contained in Scripture: That it implies no Contradiction in its ſelf, nor any manifeſt Inconſiſtency with other Truths natural or revealed. We ſhould have clear and convincing Proofs by Prophecies and Miracles that this Doctrin came from God; and the higheſt Moral Evidence that the Book in which it is found was written by Perſons divinely inſpired. We ſhould underſtand alſo the important *Relation* this Doctrin of Chriſt's Interceſſion bears to *Us*, and our near Concernment in it; together with the powerful Influence the Truth of it ought to have upon our Love, and Gratitude, and Obedience: And we ſhould conſider whether it be *Poſſible* for God, to communicate to us any *Solid* and *Uſeful* Knowledge of things imperceptible and

inconceivable as they are in themselves, by Analogy and Resemblance with those things whereof we have direct Ideas and Conceptions. Thus far we are ready to joyn Issue with all the Adversaries of Revelation and Mystery, in this and every other Doctrine of the same Sort, purely upon the Foot of Reason. But as to the other Part of this Mystery, namely the *Real Nature and True Manner* of Christ's *Intercession* in Heaven; it is at present above Reason and wholly exempted from all our Enquiries: And to demand any Account of it, is to ask for an Explanation of what is now imperceptible and inconceivable to us. Herein then properly consists my Christian *Faith* with respect to this Proposition: That I give my full Assent to it upon the Testimony of God, tho' I have no Idea or Conception at all of this heavenly Intercession as it is in its self; and tho' I know nothing more of this now, only that it is *Incomprehensible*, but yet *Real*, and *Analogous* to the worldly Conception substituted to represent it. From these Instances it plainly appears, that if we ought not to give our Assent to any thing, but where we have Ideas or Conceptions of its *Real Nature and Properties as it is in its self*, or at least *Of something the same in Kind* (as some hardily and positively assert) then we must not acknowledge a God, or believe any Thing relating to another World.

If the Reader will be at the Trouble of  
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viewing every other Christian Mystery in the Light I have placed these two, he will find the Case exactly parallel in every respect: And will plainly discern how the injudicious Application of a certain Sett of Words and Phrases indifferently to the whole Mystery in gross, and without any just Distinction of its Parts so widely distant from each other in their real Nature; occasions all that Intricacy and Confusion too visible in Men's Dissertations upon this Subject. How it is this which draws out the Controversy concerning Mysteries into such tedious Lengths; hinders it from being brought to any certain and determinate Conclusion; and opens a much larger Field of Opposition for the Enemies of the truly Orthodox and Christian Faith. I mean such as the calling them *Mysterious Doctrines*; saying that we have *Ideas* of those *Mysterious Doctrines*; not distinguishing between the *Conception* or *Knowledge* of a *Doctrine* or *Proposition*, and *Ideas* of the *Things themselves* ultimately referred to in that *Doctrine* or *Proposition*; asserting our *Ideas* or *Conceptions* of those *Doctrines* to be *Partial*, *Indistinct*, and *Indeterminate*; that our *Ideas* of such *Doctrines* or *Propositions* are *Taken* from *Other Ideas*; that where we can frame no *Ideas*, we can give no *Assent*; that where we have no *Ideas* of the *Extremes* we can have no *Persuasion*; affirming that to be *Incomprehensible*, whereof our *Ideas* or *Conceptions* are only *Imperfect*; ever confounding the Term *Incomprehensible*

with *Imperceptible*, or with *Inconceivable as a Thing is in it self*; the *Simple Apprehension* of the Intellect, with the *Simple Perception* of Sense: And never making any Difference between the *Natural* and *Analogical Representations*, which are the well known Extremes in every Proposition or Doctrine of Mystery, and the *Supernatural* but correspondent *Originals* of whose real Nature and Properties we have no Conception or Idea. But above all the perpetual Use of the Term *Idea* in a loose, confused, indeterminate Sence; and the Application of it equally and universal to all Manner of Things natural or supernatural, divine or human, sensitive or rational: And that without any Distinction of it from the *Conceptions*, or *Complex Notions*, or *Consciousness* of the Mind. An Error so generally prevailing and of such pernicious Consequence, that I may be bold to affirm, the thick Cloud of Dust which hath been thereby raised to darken the Subject not only of Christian Mysteries, but of all Things supernatural and spiritual, and even of God and his Attributes; will never be thro'ly dispelled, till that ridiculous Affectation is quite worn out of the learned World: And till the Term *Idea* is duly and constantly restrain'd to those Images in the Mind obtain'd thro' the Perception of Sense, according to its original Use and Propriety. I have instanced in the foregoing Particulars because they are such as occur in this Author, and not as it is an Error peculiar to him;

him: For there are many such like Terms and Expressions, applyed after the same indistinct ambiguous Manner to both the Parts of Mystery in gross, in most other modern Authors, too numerous to be recited here; especially since from what hath been already remarked they will easily fall under the Reader's own Observation.

ON the other Hand the Reader may observe, how all the Opposition given to the rest of our Christian Mysteries from clandestine *Arians* as well as other Christian *Infidels* is; by their *Dividing* the two Parts in each of them, and placing them in a direct Opposition and open Enmity, in order to the Destruction of the whole. Their Procedure is thus; they either leave it always to be presumed, or expressly argue the Terms of the Propositions in which the Doctrines of Mystery are delivered, as well as the Conceptions annexed to them, to be altogether unworthy the divine Nature in their original Application and literal Sence; In which we freely and fully concur with them; but do abhor and explode their perpetual Consequence from thence; That therefore they are to be turned into *Pure Figure* and *Metaphor* only; so that those Terms and Conceptions shall not express and represent as *True* and *Correspondent Realities* on the Part of the Divinity, as they do on the Part of this World and of our Humanity. No Consequences can be drawn from all their Premises

mises to their Main Purpose, and which will rightly conclude against Christian Mystery but this one; which they have never yet attempted, nor will ever be able to perform. That in these and all our other Doctrines of Mysteries relating for Instance to the *Divine Unity*, the *Distinction of the divine Persons*, the *Procession of the Holy Ghost*; or to the *Propitiation*, *Atonement*, *Mediation*, *Intercession* of the Son; or the *Sanctification* of our Nature in taking away the Guilt of Sin by his Blood; That in these I say and such like Doctrines concerning Mystery, the *Obvious Instances* of Comparison or chief *Points* of Analogy plainly design'd, and accordingly contended for in each of them; are altogether so unworthy the divine Persons, that they can never represent any *Correspondent Realities* on the Part of the *Divine Nature*. In the literal Acceptation only, wherein they understand the *Terms* of every Doctrine or Proposition concerning Mystery, we willingly close with them in that Consequence; that they are unworthy of God; Let them in Return close with us in allowing a *Similar and Correspondent Reality*, signified by those Conceptions and Terms when transferred to things divine and spiritual; and we are all agreed to leave the Mystery whole and intire, with the two very different but essential Parts of it inseparable and in perfect Harmony. But if they persist in renouncing all Analogy, adhering intirely and only to the strictly proper and literal Acceptation of the

Terms,

Terms, in every Doctrine and Proposition relating to things spiritual and divine; in order to wrest them at last into mere Figure and Metaphor: Nothing can be more evident, than that they do thereby render these Terms utterly insignificant to any *Religious* Purpose, and void of all real and *Useful* Meaning; and resolve the whole Tenor and Substance of the Gospel into an unintelligible Cant and empty Sound of Words.

UPON this Author's Principle of partial, indistinct, indeterminate Ideas of *Mysterious Doctrines*, as he styles them, Analogous to *Other* Ideas from which they are taken; He answers this grand Objection of our Adversaries, *How can a Thing be revealed, and yet Mysterious?* The *Truth*, says he, of the Proposition is revealed; tho' the *Manner* how it is true, may notwithstanding remain a Secret. But surely even the *Truth* or *Existence* or *Reality* of the divine and heavenly *Things* which are ultimately and necessarily referred to in such Propositions; as well as the true and *Real Manner* of them, are equally inconceivable and altogether impossible to be now revealed to us *As they are in their own Nature*: And since in respect of us they are thus *Both* alike inconceivable *As they are in Themselves*, they must be both alike revealed in the *Same Degree* and in the *Same Way* by Representation only and Analogy. So that the Objection can never be surmounted upon his Principle.

ple. For the *Proposition* in which the Doctrine or Mystery is revealed, whether it relates to the *Truth* and *Existence* only; or to the *Real Manner* of things divine and heavenly, must according to him be made up of Ideas or Conceptions and Terms confused, partial, imperfect, and indeterminate. Consequently the *Doctrine it self* must be so likewise; and *Whatever Thing* is *Thus* discovered or revealed to us, must at the same time be indistinct confused and indeterminate, that is *Mysterious* in his Sence of the Word. Surely if the Ideas and Conceptions we have, not only of the supernatural *Things themselves*; but even of the *Doctrines* or Propositions in which they are revealed and delivered, be such as he describes them; we can now have no other than partial indistinct and indeterminate Revelations of those Matters in the Gospel; that is they will *Both* still continue *Mysterious*, as the Objection urges. And indeed what should make either of them otherwise than partial and indistinct, and *Mysterious* in his Sence; unless the very *Same* Ideas and Conceptions and Terms which make up those Propositions, are first most *Distinctly* apprehended and *Clearly* and *Determinately* understood in their literal Sence; and then substituted by *Analogy* to express and represent Things for which we have no Idea or Conception, or strictly proper Word or Expression as they are in their own Nature.

As the Objection is here stated, no other Return ought to be made to it but this; That the same thing cannot be clearly and actually *Revealed*, as all our Christian *Doctrines* concerning Mysteries are; and yet remain *Mysterious* at the same time: It is flat Contradiction by plain Implication, and ends in this; That the same thing is *Clearly* and *Fully* and *Distinctly* revealed, and yet at the same time it is but *Partially* *Confusedly* and *Indistinctly* revealed. Do but word the Question right by dropping that ambiguous and fallacious word *Mysterious* (which in the Sence of the Objection, as well as of this Author, means *Partial*, *Confused*, *Indistinct* and *Indeterminate*) together with *Partial* and *Indistinct* Ideas of *Doctrines* taken from other Ideas, and that capitious Question receives a clear and Satisfactory Answer. *How can a thing be revealed, and yet remain a Mystery?* Very consistently; if we consider what hath been observed before, That a Christian *Mystery* consists of two very different Parts at once. First, the *Real Nature* and *True Manner* of the *Divine* and *Supernatural* Objects; whereof we can have *No Ideas* or *Conceptions* at all either in whole or in Part, distinct or confused, clear or obscure, determinate or indeterminate; and for which we can have no strictly proper Terms or Expressions: And accordingly we can form no Judgments, Conclusions, or any Propositions whatsoever concerning those Objects *As they are in themselves*;

*ſelves* ; and therefore theſe are not to be called *Indiſtinct*, *Confused*, or *Mysterious*, but things *Utterly Unknown* and *Imperceptible* to us. Secondly, The real Nature and true Manner of ſomething in *This World* whereof we have *Clear*, *Diſtinct* and *Determinate* Conceptions; expreſſed in Terms of common and familiar Speech; *Subſtituted* for, and *Representing* the other Analogically. In reſpect of the former; it is truly and properly called a *Mystery*; becauſe the divine *Truth* which is contained in the Proposition could not have entered *At all* into the Head or Heart of Man, otherwiſe than by immediate Revelation from Heaven: And becauſe even after this, the divine and heavenly Objects to which it ultimately relates, are ſtill as imperceptible and inconceivable as they were before, in reſpect of the *Real Nature* and *True Manner* of them; and will continue ſo till we come to ſee directly, or Face to Face in another Life. In reſpect of the latter, the important Truth is clearly and diſtinctly revealed by lively *Representation* and *Correſpondent Similitude* in the Mirrour of Nature; and eaſily conceived and underſtood by a well grounded Analogy and unerring Parity of Reaſon.

IF it is here asked, How can theſe two things as diſtant from each other in their Nature as Heaven and Earth, God and Man, be ſo put together as to make up one and the ſame *Mystery*? I anſwer as Body and Spirit are combined  
and



and blended together, so as to constitute one and the same Man. The *Terms* of each Proposition in which a Doctrine of Mystery is revealed, have originally a strictly proper and literal and wordly Signification; and the first Ideas or *Conceptions* affixed to those Terms are of Objects purely natural and human; and both are clear and distinct and determinate. When those literal Terms with the worldly Conceptions annexed, are substituted to express and represent Things divine and supernatural, then is the gross and earthly Proposition *Sanctified*; not into a Signification *Purely divine* and supernatural, or intirely *Abstracted* from all Ideas and Conceptions of Things *Natural* and *Human*, for then it could have no intelligible Meaning; and the *Whole* Mystery, as our Adversaries object, would be altogether unintelligible and inconceivable to us: But into a *Compound*, *Secondary*, *Representative*, and *Analogical* Signification: So that *Together* with the easy and obvious and *Worldly Propriety*, it *Connnotes* a *Correspondent Reality* in the very Nature of *Divine* and *Supernatural* Objects; and thus the Letter of the Proposition is sanctified and exalted into a Religious and Gospel Meaning. Now if you divide these two distinct Significations, thus joyned and united together into one Doctrine or Proposition by the Wisdom of the Holy Ghost; so as to consider them quite asunder, and to understand the Proposition either in a Sence intirely abstracted from all things worldly and human; or in a Sence strictly proper and literal *Only*, in order after-

wards insidiously to convert the Terms of it into a hollow empty Figure when applyed to Heaven and the Divinity: Then it ceases to be *Mystery*; which is thereby as surely destroyed, as a Man dies upon the Separation of Soul and Body: the Religious and Heavenly Sence intirely disappears, *Returning to God who gave it* in his Revelation; and the merely human and worldly Sence or strict Propriety of the Proposition sinks into a dead Letter, and returns to the *Earth* from whence it was taken.

I HAVE been thus particular in my Remarks upon this Sermon, which proceeds upon that Error of our conceiving things divine and supernatural *By Ideas taken from other Ideas to which they are Analogous*, because it is gross and fundamental. For which I hope there is no want of an Apology, either to the *Reader*; if thereby some things have occurred to him for clearing up the true Notion of a Christian Mystery, which hath been of late so involved in Cloud and Darkness: Or to the worthy *Author*, who I presume will not be displeased at his being occasionally reminded (tho' by a Fellow-Soldier of inferior Abilities for the Combate with Unbelievers) that he hath unhappily engaged the Enemy upon wrong Ground; where there is no Safety for him but in a timely Retreat. The only Means now left to prevent fullying the Brightness of his own Character; as well as all that apparent Injury which must otherwise accrue to the Common Christian Cause,

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from any Defeat given by our Enemies to one, who hath in his other Writings distinguished himself with fo much Conduct and Honour in its Defence.

## C H A P. VI.

*A positive Proof of Divine Analogy.*

**T**HO' from what hath been already said, all reasonable and unprejudiced Persons must be sufficiently convinced, that the only true Manner we have of apprehending and conceiving things Divine and Spiritual is by Analogy. Yet because I have to deal more particularly with a Sett of Men, whose Credit and Reputation in the World for good Sence and Learning; whose whole Hypothesis and Scheme of Religion; and whose Faith and Worship depend upon the quite contrary Opinion; and who disregard every thing which doth not appear in the Dress of strict Evidence and Demonstration: I shall therefore now proceed to a more direct and positive Proof of this Doctrine of divine Analogy: First with relation to purely spiritual Beings and the divine Attributes in general; and Secondly, in relation to the moral Attributes of God in particular.

1. As to the First then, I shall begin with an Argument drawn from the only two ways

we have of obtaining a *Direct* Perception or Apprehension of any thing; that is either by Ideas or by Consciousness. From thence I argue thus.

IF we have neither such *Direct Ideas*, nor *Immediate Consciousness* of things Divine and Supernatural, as we have of things Natural and Human; then we must necessarily conceive them by *Analogy*.

BUT we have neither such *Direct Ideas*, nor *Immediate Consciousness* of things Divine and Supernatural, as we have of things Natural and Human. Therefore.

THE Consequence of the Major can never be denyed, till it is proved that the Mind of Man hath some third way of *Directly* apprehending and conceiving Things besides those mentioned.

THE Minor will hold for ever; and needs no other Proof than an appeal to every Man's Senses and Consciousness. That we have no *Sensitive Ideas* of *Purely spiritual Objects*, is past Controversy. And if we had *Purely spiritual Ideas*, or an *Immediate Consciousness* of them in our Minds, there could be no Doubt, no Dispute or Controversy about it; any more than, whether we have the Idea of a Tree, when we see it? Or whether we have a Consciousness of Thinking, in the very Act or Operation

ration thereof? If we had any direct Idea or Conception of God, we should never have conceived him by the sensitive Idea of *Light*: And if we had an immediate Consciousness of any one real Property or Attribute *As it is in his Nature*, we should think it a thing as ridiculous to go about to *Prove* his Existence, as to prove our own. But that this may appear self-evident, as it really is, to our modern Reasoners, let them take it in their own *Juxta-Position* Form. *Things Divine—Direct Idea or Consciousness—Should have no Doubt—Perceived by Analogy.* And now I hope they see clearly, that if they had any direct *Idea* or immediate *Consciousness* of things Divine and Supernatural; they would have as little Doubt whether they had such a Perception of it, as whether they have an Idea of an House before their Eyes; or whether they have a Consciousness of Thinking, when they consider this their new fangled Form of Argumentation. We can have no Notion of pure Spirit but what is a substituted Composition, framed out of these two Ways of *Direct Perception* or *Apprehension*, together with the Operations of Reason upon them. If we had any *Direct Idea* or *Conception* of God within us, we should never have been beholden to our Eyes for a Metaphor, and have conceived him by the Sensitive Idea of *Light*; which hath no more in it of the *True Nature* of Him or his Glory than thick Darkness. And we can no more have a *Consciousness*, than an Idea of *Pure Spirit*;

rit; because there is no such thing, properly speaking, *Within* the Body as in a Case; but in the *Man*, as an *Essential Part* only of his Frame: Insomuch that *Consciousness* it self is a mixed Act or Operation of Body as well as Spirit; and since we cannot exert any Act abstractedly and independent of Matter, this Consciousness can never qualify us for any direct Perception or Conception of a pure Spirit, intirely separate from any necessary and essential Union with Body. If this were practicable, we should be as immediately and clearly conscious to our selves of such direct and purely spiritual Perceptions of immaterial Beings, or at least of their real Properties, as we now are of the Operations and Properties of our own Minds; nay or even of the Ideas of sensitive Objects; and should as little dispute the Ability or Capacity of the Mind for one, as for the other. Since therefore neither any direct Ideas or Conceptions, nor inward Consciousness of pure Spirit or its real Properties can be obtained; the absolute necessity of divine Analogy follows by a plain Consequence; there being no conceivable *Medium* between perceiving or apprehending the true Nature and real Qualities of such Beings *Directly* and *Immediately*, and conceiving them by *Substitution* and *Analogy*: Excepting that of a pure *Figure of Speech* only or bare *Allusion*: which can never amount to such a just and useful Knowledge, as is necessary to all the Ends of Religion natural and revealed. Nay tho' we

should allow such a direct Perception by Ideas or Consciousness possible to us in our present State, with respect to other *Created* Spirits and their Properties; yet it would not follow that even with this Capacity, we could ever attain any such direct Perceptions or Apprehensions of an *Infinite* and *Uncreated* Spirit.

2. MY second Argument is taken from the *Essential Difference* between an Intelligent Being which is altogether *Pure Spirit*; and that which is a Composition of *Matter and Spirit*, thus.

IF the Essence and Faculties and Operations of a *Pure Spirit*, cannot be of the same Kind with those of *Spirit and Body* in essential Union; then we can apprehend and conceive them no otherwise than by Analogy with our own.

BUT the Essence and Faculties and Operations of a pure Spirit, cannot be of the same Kind with those of Spirit and Body in essential Union. Therefore.

THE Consequence of the Major is very safe, till it is shewn that we have some other way of conceiving or apprehending Things purely Spiritual and of a different Kind from ourselves, than by a Consciousness of what passes within us. Now the Conception and Apprehension of them no otherwise than by

correspondent Semblance and Representation of what passes in our selves is properly Analogy.

THE Minor is as plain as a first Principle. For certainly a *Purely simple* Being or Substance cannot be of the same Kind, either as to Essence or Attributes, with a Being compounded of *Two sorts of Substances*. Nay we have no other way of conceiving Intelligences which are all pure Spirit, but first, by a *Negation* of their having the same *Kind* of Substance and Attributes with human Spirit and Body blended together into one Intelligent Being: And then *Substituting* the known Properties and Faculties of the latter, to *Represent* that different Kind of correspondent Perfections in the former. Infomuch that even *Thinking* must ~~be taken~~ rest be taken into that *Negation*; ~~and the~~ Ground of all our Knowledge are first Ideas of *Sensation*; then a *Consciousness* of the Operations of our own Mind; and lastly the Working or Observations of *Reason* upon these; which is it self no Operation of pure Spirit, but of Body and Spirit united into one individual Agent. The Actions and Operations of which are not those of Matter and Spirit considered either separately, or in Distinction from each other; nor are they Operations which are *Mutualy* or *Alternately* performed; nor is one the *Instrument* only of the other: But they are all indiscriminately the Operations of both together, proceeding from natural



tural Powers and Faculties compounded of Both; so that all our Faculties and Operations are as truly of a different Kind from those of pure and simple Spirit, as the Faculties and Operations of Brutes are from those of Mankind. So far are pure Spirit and our compounded Nature from differing in Degrees only of Perfection; that no two things can be put together in the Mind with greater Inconsistency and Contradiction, than that a Being compounded with Matter, should be of the same Kind either as to its Nature or Attributes, with an Essence *Intirely Simple*, and Attributes *Purely Immaterial*.

Now when any thing differs thus totally in Kind from all things whereof we have any direct Idea or immediate Consciousness; we must either remain utterly Ignorant of its Nature and Properties, without being able either to think or speak of it at all: Or we must form Conceptions of it by substituted Representations, and Analogy with those Beings and Properties whereof we have some direct and immediate Perception or Consciousness. And tho' it should be allowed that, notwithstanding this Incapacity, we may in general infer the *Existence* of *Other* intelligent Beings not compounded with Matter: Yet of the *Kind* and *Manner* even of that *Existence* we can form no other Notion than from that we already have of our own; and we should be still intirely in the Dark as to any *Farther* Know-

lege of their *Nature* or *Attributes*, without the Assistance of this Analogy.

3. ONCE more, which I hope would be an Argument sufficient of it self if there were no other.

IF the *Natural inherent Attributes* of God are totally different in *Kind* from ours; then we have no way of conceiving them but by Analogy with our own.

BUT the natural *Inherent Attributes* of God are totally different in *Kind* from ours. Therefore.

THE Consequence of the Major is apparently good, and has been sufficiently corroborated already.

THE Minor is proved past Contradiction thus.

IF the *Essence* or *Substance* of God is of a different Kind from ours; then *All his Natural Inherent Attributes* are different in Kind from ours.

BUT the *Essence* or *Substance* of God, is of a different Kind from ours. Therefore.

THIS Minor is next to self-evident, and needs no other Proof than a Recital of the monstrous Consequences which follow upon the Denial of it, which are so obvious that I leave them to the Reader. The Consequence of the last Major is founded upon this undoubted Universal Maxim; *That all natural inherent*

*inherent Attributes or Properties flow immediately and necessarily from the Substance or Essence to which they belong : And that The respective Substances or Essences, and their Natural inherent Properties or Attributes mutually infer, and Necessarily suppose each other.*

IF therefore the *Natural positive Attributes* or Perfections of God and Man, are the same in Kind (contrary to the *Minor* in the first Syllogism) the respective *Substances* are so likewise; and then the internal *Essence* or *Substance* of God will be inevitably the same in Kind with that of an human Creature. But this no Man can assert without affirming, that he possesseth the same in Kind ALL the natural Attributes or Perfections necessarily belonging to that Kind of Substance; and among the rest *Self-Existence, Eternity* and *Infinity*; which are equally *Positive essential Perfections* In God as *Knowledge* or *Wisdom* or *Power*; and which in their very Nature and Conception admit of no *Degrees*. This way of arguing for a Difference in *Kind* between things will for ever hold true; tho' the different Substances or Essences, and their respective inherent Attributes, with regard to to any *Other* and *Farther Knowledge* of them and their real Nature, were hid in impenetrable Obscurity. And if this sort of Proof will not stand the Test of impartial Reason, we have no way in the World of knowing any two *Substances* and *Essences* to be different in *Kind*; or that there are any different *Kinds* of *Beings* in the Universe.

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IT is in vain to endeavour the evading this by the vulgar Distinction of *Incommunicable* and *Communicable* Attributes in God ; and by saying the First only are *Essential* or *Proper* to him *As God*. For *All* the *Natural* Attributes of God are *Real positive Perfections* in him, flowing with an *Equal Necessity* from their Principle or his Essence ; and therefore all *Equally* Essential, Proper, and Incommunicable. If it were otherwise, and there were some real Attributes in God *Incommunicable*, and others *Common* in kind to created Beings ; then, since all natural inherent Attributes or Perfections necessarily imply their respective Essences, we must imagine two different *Kinds* of *Substances* or *Essences* in God ; one with its Attributes *Peculiar* to him ; and another *Common* to him with other Beings : Unless we will absurdly suppose it possible for God to give another Being a positive real *Attribute* or *Perfection*, without giving at the same time the *Substance* or *Essence* which it *Necessarily implies*, and to which it *Really belongs*. So that this erroneous Distinction is a mere begging of the Question in Dispute ; which is, Whether any of God's Attributes *Are common in kind* to God and Man ? Or else can mean no more than that some of them are called by the same *Names* with Properties in us ; which is nothing to the Purpose ; and proceeds not from their being of the *Same Kind*, but only from our Inability to form *Direct* Ideas or Conceptions

tions of them as they are in themselves, and to know or express them any otherwise than by *Analogy* with our own.

WHAT hath hitherto been said relates only to those *Natural* Attributes which are falsely imagined to be *Primary* Properties (as they are termed) *Common* to all Intelligent Beings; without adding *Infinity* to them, which is supposed to exalt them in *Degrees* of *Perfection* only. But it should be considered besides, that such Properties, namely *Knowledge*, *Power*, *Wisdom* and *Will* in God are as *Truly*, *Essentially*, and *Necessarily* Infinite, Self-existent, and Eternal, as the Principle it self or his *Essence*, from whence they *Necessarily* flow; and therefore must be as different *In Kind* from ours, even upon account of this *Infinity* necessarily annexed to them, as his *Substance* or *Essence* is.

THOSE who assert the Divine Attributes to differ only in *Degree* of *Perfection* from ours, must yet allow them to be as Infinite as his *Essence*. Now *Infinite* in the very *Notion* of it admits of *No Degrees*. Any thing *Finite* indeed may be capable of different *Degrees*, because it is *Finite*: But whatever is *Infinite* is *In it self* incapable of *More* or *Less*, *Higher* or *Lower*, *Greater* or *Smaller* in any respect. So that if God's natural Attributes differ only in *Degree* from ours, they are *Indefinite* and not *Infinite* Perfections. If they were the same in *Kind* with ours, they could not be *Infinite*; because

because the *Addition* of any thing *Finite*, ever so often *Repeated*, would only make up an *Indefinite*, but never an *Infinite*. And therefore one would think it sufficient here to ask any Person, Whether *Infinite* and *Finite*, *Uncreated* and *Created*, *Purely Spiritual* and *Compounded*, *Immutable* and *Mutable*, *Necessarily Existent* and *Precarious*, *Independent* and *Dependent*, *Incomprehensible* and *Comprehensible* Attributes are not of an intirely different Kind? As different as we conceive any two things in the Universe can possibly be? At least as different as Properties or Attributes which may be formed into *Contradictory* Propositions; one *Dependent* (as much and as *Necessarily* as the *Essence* or *Substance*) the other *Not Dependent*; one *Necessarily-existent*, the other *Not*; one *Finite* the other *Not Finite*, and so on; and are therefore Attributes intirely *Incompatible* in the same *Kind* of Subject or *Essence*.

THE grand Objection against what I have said, and which I conceive to be the true Ground of all those *Warm* and *Zealous* Expressions, in different Authors, against this last Reason for the Truth of divine Analogy; I have here extracted in its full strength out of one of the most fashionable Authors of the Age, who is vainly boasted by a Writer of his own Strain to have been *The greatest Master of Reason that ever lived*.

O B J. *No effect can have any Perfection which*  
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*was not either actually, or at least of the same Kind tho' in an higher degree, in the Cause. For if it could, then that Perfection would be caused absolutely by nothing; which is a flat Contradiction: And consequently God could not give any Perfections to Man, which he had not in himself either Actually, or of the Same Kind tho' in an Higher Degree.*

I. I ANSWER, That this Objection no way affects the foregoing Argument; nor removes the gross *Absurdities* which follow from supposing God's inherent Attributes the same in Kind with those in Man. Namely, either that our human *Substance* or *Essence* is the same in Kind with his, or that God consists of *Two* Kinds of *Essences*. But

2dly. I ANSWER more directly, That the Assertion contained in the Objection is true only of *Finite* and *Created* Causes. No *Finite* Cause can give any *Perfection*, or indeed any *Essence*, or real *Positive Attribute* or Property whatever, which it has not either *Actually* or *In Kind* in its self. But a *Creating* Cause *Can* do it, or else *Matter* and its *Properties* were not *Created*. The Reply to this is, that *Matter* and its *Properties* are not *Perfections*. But it is enough that the *Substance* or *Essence* of *Matter* is a *Real Thing*, and not a mere *Negation*; and that *Solidity* or *Impenetrability* is a *Positive inherent Property* of it, which God had not in *Fact* or in *Kind*. A Cause that can give Existence to any one *Real Essence*  
and

and its *Positive Properties* without having them in Fact or in Kind himself, may as easily give a *Perfection* different in Kind which he had not. For since *Both* are equally Productions from *Total Non-Existence*; no imaginably higher degree of Ability in the Cause is required for one, than for the other. Both Instances equally demand such a *Kind of Power* as can never be made up by adding only repeated *Degrees* to any *Finite Powers* in human Nature. And therefore, contrary to the Objection, we can as *Easily* conceive it *Possible* for an infinite Creator *Thus* to produce *From Nothing* a *Perfection* of the *Human Essence*, as *Material Substance*; since we know no more of the real *Nature* or inconceivable *Manner* of either Performance, than we know how to Create: And since neither of these Productions are *Impossible*, or imply any *Contradiction*; and therefore may be equally Objects of Almighty Power. So that the true Consequence from hence is, not that *Something is caused absolutely by Nothing*; but that some Essence, real Attribute, or Perfection is *Produced by Nothing of the same Kind*: True; but by a Cause of a quite *Different* and *Transcendent Kind*, who had a Power to produce it; and who never *Could* have *Thus* produced it, had not his Power been of a *Superior Kind* from any in the Effect. In this Case Something is caused or produced absolutely *From Nothing* indeed, or from *Non-Existence*; but it is not caused absolutely *By Nothing*.

BESIDES, Why should not *Solidity* or *Impenetrability*,



*netrability*, which is a *Real Positive inherent* property of Matter, be allowed as much a *Perfection* with regard to the *Substance* or *Essence* in which it inheres; as *Thinking* and *Willing* with regard to the *Human Substance* or *Essence*? Unless we affirm God created Matter *Imperfect in its Kind*.

THE foregoing Answer to this Objection must hold good, till it be proved that material Substance is a *Mere Negation* and not a *Real positive thing* actually Created; and that it is impossible and *Contradictory* for Almighty Power, to produce from nothing *Essences* with *Properties* or *Perfections* which he had not *Any way* in himself.

THIS Objection against Analogy is varied by the same Author in his Posthumous Works after this Manner. *That God must be himself a Being indued with perfect Knowledge* (for Instance) *Appears from his having communicated to other Beings certain degrees of that Perfection; for whatever Perfection is in any Effect, must of necessity be much more* (that is more in degree) *in the Cause that produced it*. Now this is plainly taking for granted what ought to be proved. For the Question is, Whether God *Has* really communicated to other Beings any *Degree* of his *Perfections*? Whether our *Knowledge* for Instance be not an Attribute different *In Kind*, and not in *Degree* only from God's? As to the *Reason* given here, That whatever Perfection is in any Effect,

fect, must of necessity be much more (that is in degree) in the Cause producing it; it is still begging the Question as to a *Creating* Cause, which is the only one can be meant *Here*.

*As to Imperfections or mere Negations* (says the same Author) *such as Finiteness and all its Consequences, Figure, Divisibility, Motion, Composition, Division, &c. the Argument lies otherwise; These may be in the Effect tho' they were not in the Cause.* And what is the wise Reason given for the Disparity? *Because tho' nothing can give or communicate More than it has it self, yet it can communicate as much Less as it will.* Observe the Fallacy; That God can neither give or communicate *More* than he hath in himself, is most true. And that he can communicate *Less* than he hath in himself; is as true. All created beings are less than any thing God hath in himself; less in *Kind*, and not in *Degree*. The Quibble lay in the word *Less*, by which he meant less in *Degree*; so that according to him, no Intelligent Being could have been created, or produced even from nothing, but what must be a God in little. In the Case of such *Mere Negations*, none of them are *More* or *Less*, in *Kind*, or *Degree*, or *Any way at all* in the Creator. Nay what is more, *Matter* it self, which is a *Positive* thing and not a mere *Negation*, is no way in the Creator. But what does all this signify to the true Question in dispute; Whether God has *Created* any Being with a real *Perfection*, different not in *Degree*,  
but

but *In Kind* from his own? And whether it be not as possible for him, without a Contradiction, to do this as to *Intelligent Creatures*, as in the Case of *Matter*?

IN short what deceives Men here, is the Expression of *Communicating* or *Giving* Perfections; as if this were a Kind of Production *Different* from *Creation*; or as if God gave and communicated *His own*; that is, his *Own Kind* of Perfections; which is the very Point controverted. And did Men, instead of *Giving* and *Communicating*, use the proper word *Creating*, they would immediately perceive the Fallacy; and discern that to say, Nothing can *Create* what it had not in it self; and that God cannot *Create* an Attribute or *Perfection* which he has not in himself in *Kind*; is just as false as to say God cannot create *Matter* which he has not in himself. But if they must and will use those Words for *Creating*, they ought to reflect that in truth both *Matter* and *Thinking* are equally *Given* and *Communicated* by *Creation*; that is, produced not *From* God *Himself*, but from *Nothing*, by an *External Act* of his infinite *Power* and *Will*: And that no thought can be more absurd and Contradictory, than that God should really *Create* any *Essence* or *Perfection* of the same *Kind* with his own.

INDEED if any Thing was either produced out of the very *Substance* of God himself, or had his *Essence* communicated, it would be

contradictory that *Such* a Being should have any *Perfection*, or any *Essence* or *Real Property*, but what God had either *Actually* or *In Kind*; but this is not necessary in *Creation*, or distinct external Productions from *Absolute Non-Existence*. No, but the *Contrary* appears to be *Necessary*; namely that the *Created* effect *Cannot* possess any *Perfection* (or *Essence*, or *Any thing* pertaining to it) the same *In Kind* with those of the *Creator*; no not even an *Existence* of the *Same Kind*. Were it *Otherwise*, we must suppose it *Formed* or *Derived* out of the *Divine Substance*; and not produced *Originally* from *Nothing* as to *All* that *Belongs* to it, and *All that it is*. In short God could have none of our *Properties* or *Perfections* in him, any otherwise than he had *Matter* and its inherent *Properties*: That is, He had the *Patterns* of both in his *Divine Mind*, but neither of them *Actually*, or *In Kind*, or in an higher *Degree*. A *Self-existent necessary Being* must differ in *Every Respect* from all things *Created*; or otherwise it will be impossible to conceive how any one thing can differ in *Kind* from another.

## C H A P. VII.

*A positive Proof of Divine Analogy, with respect to the moral Attributes of God. And the Divine Attributes rightly distinguished.*

SOME Men who are very ready to allow a Difference in Kind between God's *Natural*

*ral* Attributes and ours, yet persist in denying the same Difference in the *Moral* Attributes; tho' this is an unavoidable Consequence of the former: For all the Perfections or Attributes of God are equally natural, as considered in respect of his real internal Essence. *Natural* and *Moral* is a Distinction arising from the Observation of our selves, because our moral Virtues are mostly acquired by Reflexion and Habit; and seem therefore to be things *Super-induced*, and *Additional* Qualities only, over and above all that is truly Natural and *Essential* to our Humanity. But we are now to be considered as in a preternatural State and Condition, with all the Powers and Faculties of Body and Mind greatly out of Course; with our whole Frame miserably broken and distorted; and as upon the Recovery only of our original Make and Constitution: In which the whole Man was an unfullyed Similitude and lively Resemblance of God; and an Image of the Divinity as yet intire and unimpaired. Then all our moral Perfections were truly Natural and Essential to us; and all the Powers and Faculties of Soul and Body were combined together into an harmonious Disposition for Virtue and Holiness. *Natural* and *Moral*! This is the Language only of corrupt degenerate Mortality; it had no Place even in our selves in a State of Innocence; and the Distinction will cease, together with the Terms whereby we express it, when we come to be all Supernatural. Much less then can this Di-

stinction have any Place in the Fountain of all Perfection Natural and Moral; in whom all his natural Perfections are Moral, and all his moral Perfections are Natural. Tho' this Distinction is necessary in respect of our Understanding, who are obliged to think and speak of God after the best Manner we can; that is by Analogy with the Powers and Faculties and Operations of our own Minds: Yet nothing can be more groundless than intirely to lay aside this Analogy; and found an Argument upon the *Reality* of a Distinction in the Divinity (which agrees only to a State of Corruption in us) for a Sameness in Kind with God, in respect of any Properties in Man, either Natural or acquired.

BUT I almost forgot that I was here to deal chiefly with a *Mungril particoloured* Generation of Infidels; who at the same time that they make an open Profession of revealed Religion in the Eye of the World, and seemingly admire the Superstructure, are labouring to undermine and subvert the Foundation; under a specious Colour of Abstract Reasoning, strict Evidence, and Demonstration of Principles of *Reason*, and *Natural Religion*: And by alluring Wiles and Subtilty, corrupting and suborning those her two Servants and Handmaids; to insinuate the innocent Matron guilty of their own detestable Crimes of Falsity and Diffimulation towards Man, and of Enthusiasm and Hypocrisy towards God. Wherefore before I  
propose

propose my Argument in Form, I must prepare them for it by this material Distinction.

T H E R E are two things very different from each other to be considered in all moral Virtue in Man; as well as in all the moral Perfections or Attributes of God, before either they or we can speak or argue to the Purpose upon this Head. First, the inward *Frame*, or *Temper*, or *Disposition* of the Soul of Man to Virtue and Holiness, in every particular Instance. This is styled Virtue or moral Goodness in the true Propriety of the Word; and in Scripture it is called *The Heart*, the *Hidden Man of the Heart*, and *The inward Man*; out of which proceeds all moral Goodness, as well as moral Evil; And one of the bright Revelations of the Gospel is, that all Degrees of Virtue and Goodness are to be computed in Proportion only to the inward Disposition of our Souls. This is the Fountain of all Morality; and as it is more or less Clear or Muddy, all the external Actions and Performances which flow from it have a greater or less Degree of unmingled Purity, and of genuine Virtue and Holiness. Secondly, The *External Exertions* and *Operations* proceeding from that Virtuous Disposition of the Soul; which are not absolutely necessary to the very Nature and Essence of Goodness, but so accidental to it, that if no proper Occasions or Opportunities should offer of exerting the inward virtuous Dispositions externaly, our Goodness and Vir-

tue may thereby receive neither Increase nor Diminution in the Account of God the Searcher of Hearts. The habitual external Exercise indeed of our virtuous Dispositions of Mind when proper Occasions and Objects offer, are then the indispensable Result of those Dispositions, and serve to strengthen and confirm them; and we may by that Means become more Virtuous and Holy every Day; But still the Virtue remains where it was at first; and all the external Exertions and Performances proceeding from it, are so many proper Instances and necessary Indications of the inward virtuous Dispositions of the Soul; from whence they derive all their Morality and Worth, and even borrow the Name of Virtue and Goodness.

THESE two things must likewise be well distinguished on the Part of the divine Nature, First, The real intrinsic Dispositions or Determinations in the very divine Nature it self, or those essential Perfections which are altogether Incomprehensible and Ineffable; that is, for which we have neither any *Direct* Idea or Conception, nor proper Word or Expression; For want of which, we think and speak of them by Analogy with the inward moral Dispositions of our own Souls; which, when we ascribe them to God to represent correspondent Perfections in him, take the Denomination of divine Attributes. Secondly, The external Exertions or Manifestations of those divine supernatural Perfections, in Actions or Ope-



Operations equally Divine and Supernatural ; observable in all his Dispensations toward the Creature, and toward Mankind in particular. These are all so many different *Exertions* of the intrinsic essential Perfections of the divine Nature ; the true and *Real Manner* of which is as Incomprehensible as the real Nature of those internal *Perfections* and *Dispositions* from whence they proceed : And therefore even these external Actions, or Operations, or Manifestations, we can neither think nor speak of, otherwise than by Analogy with the external Operations of the inward virtuous Inclinations and Dispositions of our own Souls. Both these latter together we transfer in one complex Notion to the Divinity, under the Denomination of Attributes ; and call them *Moral* by a Word expressive of the Regulation of our Manners, and of our external virtuous Behaviour. This being premised I argue thus.

IF the real *Intrinsic Dispositions* and *Determinations* of the divine Nature and Will to all Acts of Goodness ; are *Essentially* different from the correspondent Dispositions and Determinations in the Soul of Man to Acts of Goodness : Then the *Moral* Attributes of God are different in *Kind* from the correspondent moral Attributes in the Soul of Man.

BUT the real intrinsic Dispositions and Determinations of the divine Nature and Will to all Acts of Goodness, are *Essentially* different  
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from the correspondent Dispositions and Determinations in the Soul of Man, to Acts of Goodness,

THEREFORE the moral Attributes of God are different in *Kind* from the correspondent moral Attributes in the Soul of Man.

THE Consequence of the Major is so plain and just, that I leave it to stand upon its own Evidence.

THE Minor is as evident, as that the divine and human *Nature* differ essentially; for if the *Intrinsic Essence* or the real Nature of God *As he is in himself*, differs intirely from the real intrinsic Nature or Essence of Man (as I have plainly proved before) or if he is above all Nature and created Essence: Then the internal *Powers*, and *Faculties*, and *Dispositions*, and *Determinations* of that Nature or Essence, must in all Respects differ from the inward Powers and Faculties and Dispositions in the Soul of Man to moral Goodness and Virtue. And now as to the other Member of the aforementioned Distinction I argue thus.

IF the *External Exertions* and *Operations* of the intrinsic Faculties and Dispositions for Acts of Goodness in the divine Nature, differ in *Kind* from the external *Exertions* and *Operations* of the inward Faculties and Dispositions for Acts of Goodness in the Soul of Man; then  
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the moral Attributes of God differ in *Kind* from the correspondent Virtues and Graces in us;

BUT the external Exertions and Operations, of the intrinsic Faculties and Dispositions for Acts of Goodness in the divine Nature; differ in Kind from the external Exertions and Operations of the inward Faculties and Disposition for Acts of Goodness in the Soul of Man.

THEREFORE the *Moral Attributes* of God differ in Kind from the correspondent *Virtues and Graces* in us.

I LEAVE the Consequence of the *Major* to stand upon its own Evidence. The *Minor* is to be proved by an Induction of Particulars; and to shorten the Dispute, I leave it upon the Opposers of the Doctrine of Analogy to produce any one Instance against the Truth of this Proposition. As to the external Exertions and Operations of the intrinsic Faculties and Dispositions in the Nature of God, with respect to all his Dispensations of *Justice*, or *Mercy*, or *Truth* relating to *Another* World; it must be granted that no external Exertions or Operations of our internal Faculties or Dispositions for moral Goodness can be of the same Kind with them, No external Actions or Operations of ours can be of the same Kind, or performed after the same *Manner*, with the divine Dispensations of eternal Rewards and Punishments,

nishments, or any other Glorious Manifestation of God's Attributes in *Another* Life. These are such Manifestations of the inward Rectitude and Goodness of his Nature, of his intrinsic Justice, and Mercy, and Truth; as it must be allowed we have not the least *Direct* Conception or Idea of.

THESE therefore being out of the Question, the *Minor* must be understood of the outward Exertions and Manifestations of God's inherent Attributes or Dispositions in *This* Life: And the Question is, whether any of these are of the same Kind, with the outward Acts and Operations of the virtuous Dispositions of our Souls? Here then again, I leave it upon one single Instance to be produced to the contrary, of any Exertion or Manifestation of Justice, or Mercy, or Truth; or of any other moral Attribute of the Divinity, which shall appear to be of the same Kind with the outward Exertions or Performances flowing from our own virtuous Dispositions. Take any Instance of the Exertions or Operations of that infinite Perfection in the divine Nature which is called his *Justice*; let it be in the Distribution of any *Temporal* Reward or Punishment; and you will find it of a quite different Kind, and performed in quite a *Different manner* from any external Act of Justice performed by us. Nay tho' God inflicts immediate Death, as in the Case of Ananias and Saphira; it is not after the same manner as in human Executions:

Nor can any external Act of Justice among Men be of the same Kind, with that of God's raining down Fire from Heaven upon Sodom and Gomorrha. So likewise consider the *Divine Truth*, either in the Veracity of his Informations by Revelation; or in his fulfilling any of his Promises even in this Life; they are in every Instance of quite another Kind, and brought about in quite a different way, from any Instance of our exerting the Truth and Veracity of our Souls. Lastly, Take God's *Mercy* in what Sence you please, either for Pardon and Remission of Sin; or for relieving the Miserable; no one external Exertion or Manifestation of that infinite Perfection in the divine Nature, is of the same Kind with the correspondent Exertions of that Virtue in our Souls. Carry on the Comparison between all our virtuous Performances, and the Manifestations of the intrinsic moral Attributes of God, either in his ordinary or extraordinary Providence; and you will not find them to be of the same Kind in any one Instance. It may as justly be said that God governs the World after the very *Same manner* an *Earthly Monarch* rules his People; as that any moral Disposition in him is exerted in the same way with ours. If the *Faculty* which operates, be not the same in Kind with the human Faculties, the Method and *Manner* of their *Operation* cannot be the same.

IF it is said, that tho' the *Manner* of exert-  
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ing externaly those internal moral Perfections in the divine and human Nature, is different ; yet the external *Effects* and *Consequences* of them both are of the same Kind, as in the Instance of Ananias and Saphira, compared with an human Execution, where *Death* is the Effect and Consequence in both Cases. To this I Answer that the *Manner* is indeed different ; the Exertions and Operations of the divine Attributes are performed after a divine incomprehensible Manner ; those of our virtuous Dispositions after an human Manner, whereof we have some direct Conception or Idea : And for that very Reason it is that they differ in Kind ; and that we think and speak of all the Exertions and Manifestations of the divine Perfections, by Analogy only with such virtuous Actions and Performances as flow from the good and regular Dispositions of our own Souls. Let the *Real Manner* of exerting the divine Powers and Faculties be ever so much above our Knowledge, ever so unknown to us ; it will still be as totally *Different a Manner* of Action and Exertion from ours, as the intrinsic Powers and Faculties of God which thus exert themselves, are different from ours ; tho' the *Sensible Effects* or *Consequences* should be allowed to be exactly the same.

BUT you may urge, that whether those Exertions and outward Manifestations are from God or Man, they are still *Just*, and *Merciful*, and *True*. Yes they are ; and our thus using the same Words for them both in common, is the

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Ground of the Mistake, that they are of the same Kind. But alas! We are as little able to conceive the divine manner of externaly exerting the intrinsic moral Perfections of the Divinity, as to conceive the real internal Perfections themselves from whence they proceed: And accordingly, as we conceive the latter by Analogy with the virtuous Dispositions of our own Mind; so we conceive and express the former by our own external moral Actions and Performances. In short, as all the discernible Works of the Creation are the outward Exertions and Manifestations of Power, and Will, and Wisdom, and Reason in the intrinsic Nature of God: So his *Holiness, Goodness, Justice, Mercy, and Truth*, and all the rest of his moral Attributes, are to be conceived by us as so many different inward Dispositions of the divine *Mind and Will*, which are outwardly exerted in a great variety of Operations towards all Intelligent Agents more especially; and towards Mankind in particular. Accordingly the Operations or Manifestations of those moral Attributes, must differ as much from those Operations or Performances of ours, called by the same Names: As his *Will*, whereof they are the Dispositions and Determinations; as his *Power* whereof they are the external Exertions; as his supernatural *Reason and Wisdom* whereof they are the Dictates, differ from the correspondent Attributes and Faculties in human Nature.

THIS Argument sufficiently proves, that the  
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moral Attributes of God cannot in any Sence be of the same Kind with our moral Virtues and Graces; and it is such as will never admit of any reasonable Answer or colourable Evasion. However, because the want of rightly distinguishing the divine Attributes, and the very different Manner of our conceiving and expressing them; hath been the true Cause of Men's denying the moral Attributes to be conceived by Analogy: As well as of much Confusion, and of many gross Errors in their Discourses and Reasonings upon the Nature of God, and his Attributes; I shall therefore distinguish and range them into the following Order.

I. THE first Head then of the divine Attributes are such, as can be conceived no otherwise than *Negatively*; and we accordingly express them in negative Terms, such as *Infinite, Immense, Undivided, Independent, Unoriginated, Underived, Invisible, Immaterial, Immortal, Uncompounded, Incomprehensible, and Uncreated*. These and such other negative Attributes have occasioned some Men very erroneously to assert *All* our Knowledge of God to be purely *Negative*; and it is too current a Saying among the Fathers, *That the Substance of all our Knowledge concerning God, is the knowing what he is not, rather than what he is.*

By the term *Infinite* when applyed to God, is commonly meant that He is infinite in *Expansion, Duration, and Perfection*. Now to conceive  
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God actually infinite in Extension or Expansion, is most absurdly attributing to him our Idea of *Matter* or *Space* stretched out as far or farther than our Imagination can reach; so that in this respect that Term when applied to God can mean nothing but a Negation of his being bounded by Matter or Space. To think him infinite in Duration; is no other than adding to his Existence as many *Hours*, and *Days*, and *Years* backward and forward as exceed our Power of reckoning: So that here it is a Negation only of his Existence being bounded by Time or duration. To say that he is Infinite in Perfection, means nothing *Real* and *Positive* in him, unless we say in a *Kind* of Perfection altogether inconceivable to us as it is in it self: For the multiplying or magnifying the greatest Perfections whereof we have any direct Conception or Idea, and adding our gross Notion only of *Indefinite* to them; is no other than heaping up together a number of *Imperfections* to form a Chimera of our Imagination; which is so far supposed to become the more worthy Object of divine Worship, the more it is swelled up beyond the stated Dimensions of Nature, and exceeds all human Size and Proportion. Whereas what we call *Perfections* even in our selves, especially since the Fall, are only such *Comparatively* with other Beings below us in the Scale of Existence; that is, it is better to have them than to be without them, as being perfective of our *Kind*: But they are in reality monstrous Imperfections with respect to God,

God, when refined and exalted in *Degree* only; and thus attributed literally and in *Kind* to the inexhaustible Fountain of all *Absolute* Perfection. So that in this respect the term *Infinite*, when spoken of God, can mean nothing conceivable but either a Negation of all Perfection to be found in the Creature; as to *Kind* and *Degree*; or else a Negation of any *Bounds* to his own *Real* and incomprehensible Perfections. In short, whatever real positive Perfection in the very Nature of God this Word *Infinite* is expressive of, we can have no other than a negative Conception of it; namely that God is not Finite or limited in any respect, as the Creatures are.

FROM hence then we see, how the Argument drawn from this Attribute of God by our modern Arians, against the orthodox Doctrine of the Trinity, namely that *There can be but one infinite Person*, concludes fallaciously. If you take *Person* in a strictly proper and literal Acceptation, and the Term *Infinite* in a positive Sence, then they have you fast in a Noose; but take the first *Analogically*, and the latter *Negatively*, according to the only conception we can annex to it, and you are loose again: And will find that by that Assertion of theirs no more can be meant than this; There can be no supernatural *Incomprehensible Distinction* in the Nature of a divine Being (of whose *Infinity* we can form no positive Conception or Idea) of which the personal distinction among Men affords us the most just *Representation* we are capable of.

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Which is so far from an Argument, that it is only a bold presumptuous Affirmation, in relation to the intrinsic real Nature of a Being altogether Incomprehensible and Ineffable as he is in himself: And infered from a Conception and Term purely Negative, which can exhibit to the Mind of Man no *Positive* Perfection, either *Directly* and immediately; or by Comparison and *Analogy* with any thing conceivable by human Understanding. And therefore to argue from that Term, that there can be but *One infinite* Person, is to argue from a mere Negation only; and not from any thing in the Nature of God conceived by us *Positively*; and which renders it an Inconsistency or Contradiction that there should be such a *Distinction* in the Divinity, as is no otherwise so aptly conceivable as by that of a personal Distinction among Men. So that instead of three, if it were as clearly revealed that there were six divine Persons; this could never have been proved impossible and only contradictory, from a *Pure Negation* of all conceivable Bounds and Limitation in the Creature; and from a Word to which no positive Notion or Conception can be affixed in the Mind of Man, no not even by Analogy, for the Ground of an Argument. And it must not be omitted here, how evident it is from hence what a crude and superficial way of thinking those Men have; who make up Attributes for God by adding Infinity to our intellectual and moral Perfections taken even in a literal Sense: That is, how they

first make up a chimerical Composition of a Notion or Conception, in each of them half *Negative* and half *Positive*; and then transfer it to the Divinity to express a real Perfection in the very Nature of God, and of the very same *Kind* with the intellectual and moral Faculties and Operations of our Humanity.

UNDIVIDED, when ascribed to God, can mean no more than a Negation of all Division or Distinction conceivable in the Creature; and particularly of that human Division or Distinction into Spirit, and Soul, and Body; into which tho' Man is distinguished, as into so many essential Parts, yet he is still but one Man: Thus the intrinsic Nature of God as it is in itself being utterly Incomprehensible, all the intelligible meaning which can be affixed to that Term is, that he cannot be divided into more Gods than One: So that the full Import of it is, only a Negation of any other Gods whatsoever, co-ordinate or Subordinate. But whether he is distinguished *In himself*, or after what manner; and particularly whether there is in his Nature any thing correspondent and answerable to the Distinction of the essential Parts of human Nature; or a divine Distinction no otherwise conceivable than by our Conception of three human Persons? Can no way be inferred either one way or other, from a mere Negation of all Division and Distinction in this World.

ALL the Idea or Conception we have of *Dependency*, is that of one *Material* Substance upon another, as a Cause and Effect; or the Dependency of any sort which one Man hath upon another, or other things upon the Power of *Man*. This latter Conception we transfer to God analogically, to express the Dependency of all Creatures, and of Mankind in particular upon him for their Being and Well-being. In direct Opposition to this, and by way of Negation only, we term God *Independent*; and thus there is no greater harm in it, than that it is an unscriptural, affected, Metaphysical Term for a very plain thing, that God hath no Dependence upon his Creatures. But as our modern Arians make this an essential Attribute of the Father *Incommunicable* to the Son and Holy Ghost; it can thus have no other intelligible Sence or Meaning to us, than a mere Negation of his being *Begotten* or *Proceeding* from either of them: And what real Dependency or Subordination these last Terms imply, in two Persons truly Divine, to the third, is altogether inconceivable; otherwise than by Analogy with that of an human Person's being derived from the very Substance or Nature of another; or coming forth from the Presence of another. Whatever the *True* incomprehensible *Nature* of that Dependency is in it self, we cannot conceive it to be the same with that of Creatures produced by an Efficiency from Non-existence. Thus therefore it

appears, that all their Arguments drawn from a dubious undistinguished Acceptation of this *Negative* Term, to prove the Dependency and Subordination of the Son and Holy Ghost to be, in common, of the *Same Kind* with the Dependency and Subordination of created Intelligent Beings, are Sophistical and Fallacious.

WHAT an *Origin* is among Mankind, and in the Course of Nature, we clearly apprehend; and the Conception we have of it we transfer to God, as he is the Origin or Cause of all created Beings: And thus the Notion or Conception we have of it is just and useful; and as clear and distinct when ascribed to God as when it is applyed to a Cause in Nature which is the Origin of its Effects. But *Unoriginated* when applyed to the intrinsic Nature of God by way of an essential Attribute or Perfection, can have no intelligible Sence or Meaning to *Us* but what is Negative. For tho' we can distinguish well between a Cause and its Effect in Nature, and by Analogy with this can conceive God the Maker or Origin of all his Creatures: Yet a manner of Existence *Without any Cause or Origin*, is as far out of the reach of all our Capacities; as a Substance which neither exists from itself, nor is derived from any other. So that *Unoriginated*, whatever *Positive* and *Inherent* Attribute *In* God it may signify, yet can have no Conception annexed to it by us, but a mere Negation only, either of being *Created* by another; or of being

ing *Begotten*; or of *Proceeding* from the Nature of another: All of them equally representing so many supernatural Operations of the Divinity incomprehensible to us as they are in themselves; and all alike conceived only by Analogy. From whence it appears, that the Inferences of our modern Arians, from this Term *Unoriginated* (which they style an incommunicable Attribute) for an Inferiority of Nature in the Son and Holy Ghost, and for a Priority of Existence in the Father; are all founded upon a mere *Negation* of something *Incomprehensible* to us as it is in the *Nature* of God, or in his Operations.

UNDERIVED, whatever incomprehensible *Positive* Perfection it may mean in the intrinsic Nature of God, yet exhibits no more to the Mind of Man than a pure *Negation*. And even this *Negation* is *General* and *Dubious*; and can be no way particular and determinate till it is distinguished, *First* into a *Negation* of being derived by any *Creation* or *Efficiency* from another; which is a very true meaning of the word *Underived*, when thus applyed to the Creator considered in respect of the Creatures derived by an *Efficiency*: Only that there is an *Impropriety* in the Term thus applyed; for *Derived* in propriety of Speech is ever used in Distinction from *Efficiency*, and rather for any other manner of Derivation of one thing from another, than as from an efficient Cause; and you will never meet with it in this Sense but

thro' Ignorance, or with design to insinuate the Generation of the Son, and Proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt, to be Figures only for Efficiency; and that the Son and Holy Ghoſt are derived from the Father in the ſame manner with all other Intelligent Beings. *Secondly* into a Negation of being derived by *Generation* or *Proceſſion*; both which Terms when ſpoken literally of Mankind, are properly enough expreſſed by the general word *Derivation*, in oppoſition to a Man's *Making* an Image, or any other Work of Art, as an *Efficient* Cauſe. And therefore if the Arians will apply the Word *Derived* not only to the Creatures, but to the Son and Holy Ghoſt, with reſpect to the Father whom they term Underived; it ought to be done with the very ſame eſſential Diſtinction here which it conſtantly imports in human Language. So that Chriſt is truly derived from the Father, not by Efficiency, but as truly as a Son is derived from his Father in the way of Nature; and the Holy Ghoſt truly and ſupernaturally *Proceeds* from the Father: And therefore they may be ſtyled *Derived* in reſpect of the Father; but in a Sence eſſentially different from that of all created Beings, who can be called *Derived* from him no otherwiſe than in a very improper and equivocal Sence of that Term. As that of the Son and Holy Ghoſt is truly a *Derivation*, and no *Creation*; ſo the incomprehenſible *Subordination* of theſe to the Father, muſt be eſſentially different from the *Subordination* of the Creatures, which is  
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conceived by that of Subjects and Vassals to an Absolute Monarch: And all the Arian Consequences from this Term *Undersived* must for ever fail, till they shew that we have a more direct and immediate Conception or Idea of the manner of the divine *Making* a thing from Non-existence; than of the Manner of divine *Begetting* and supernatural *Proceeding*; and that they are not Terms equally Analogical, but that Begetting and Proceeding are mere Figures only and *Metaphors* for a divine Production by Efficiency.

THE Term *Uncompounded* likewise, when spoken of God, conveys no other Conception to us than a Negation of any Mixture or Composition in the Divinity, which we directly know, or which can possibly enter into the Mind of Man to conceive or imagine. Nay we may venture to proceed so far as to include in this Term a Negation likewise of all Mixture or Composition which is in any Intelligent Being of the whole *Creation*. But this helps us to no *Positive* Idea or Conception of any thing *Inherent* in the Nature of God; in respect of whom the term *Uncompounded* (whatever real Perfection *In* God it implies) can have no other conceivable Meaning at all to us than what I have just mentioned; So ill grounded and even ridiculous are all the Conclusions made by Deists and Socinians and our modern Arians, from any Conception we can form of the *Simplicity* or *Uncompoundedness* of

the divine Nature, against the Doctrine of the Trinity.

THE Term *Incomprehensible* is purely negative, not only of a *Full* and *Perfect* and *Adequate* Knowledge of the divine Nature; but of any *Direct* and *Immediate* Conception or Idea of him; no not ever so partial, or confused, or obscure: It means that he is utterly imperceptible, inconceivable, and unknown to us *As he is in himself*; or any way at all but by *Representation*, and by *Analogy* with such things natural and human as fall within the Compass of our *Direct* Ideas and Conceptions, and *Immediate* Consciousness.

II. SECONDLY, Another Head of Attributes are such as we do indeed express in *Positive Terms*; but they are general and compounded, and without any particular Signification, or any certain, distinct and *Intirely positive* Idea or Conception annexed to them in the Mind. Such as *Omnipotent*, *Almighty*, *Omnipresent*, *Omniscient*, *Self-existent*, *Necessarily-existent*, *Self-originated*, *Self-sufficient*, and *Eternal*. Which tho' they are not altogether Negative, yet there are no such determinate, and intirely positive Conceptions annexed to them, as we have of the *Simple* words *Power*, *Knowledge*, *Presence*, *Existence*, *Origin*, *Sufficiency*, and *Duration*. Nor have we any Notion of that Kind of Attributes, but what we form either by Enumeration of the sensible *Effects* only of each

each of them, as far as the Mind can stretch, when it proceeds by a gradual Increase, or Multiplication, or Enlargement; or by a Negation of some Deficiency and Imperfection in our own Nature. To explain this more fully because it is of no small Consequence.

OUR Conception of *Power* is positive and determinate, formed from *Natural* human Power, or from the *Civil* Authority of a temporal Prince: And from thence both the Conception and Term is transfered to the Divinity to denote a Perfection similar and correspondent to it. But we can form no purely positive Notion or Conception of *Omnipotence*, or *Almightiness*, from our *Limited* human Power; nor can we have any direct Idea or Conception of what Omnipotency is *In God*. So that the term *Omnipotent* or *Almighty* can have no fixed and *Intirely positive* Conception, either direct, or by Analogy with any thing else which we know: It is no other than a Word we have for a very extended Conception of Power, framed from our Observation of the *Effects* only of the divine Power in the visible Creation; and when we can proceed no farther in our Enumeration and Enlargement of those Effects, we sum up all at once in this Negation, *There is nothing impossible for that Power to perform*. For we can never form an *Intirely positive* Conception of a *Power able to do all things*, from our *Power of doing some Things*, any more than we can form a purely *Positive* Conception of *Infinite Power*,

Power, from a Power which is *Finite*. Which last Observation I desire the Reader to apply to other Attributes of the same Kind under this Head.

THUS again our Notion or Conception of the *Presence* of a Person is positive and determinate; and accordingly the Term whereby we express it includes no Negation. This Conception we take from an human Person's being in a certain particular *Place*: And it is by the help of this Conception that we can think and speak of the presence of God. But of *Omnipresence* we can have no Notion or Conception intirely positive, from any known Being of the Creation, which we might transfer by Analogy to the Divinity; and we are likewise utterly void of any direct Conception or Idea of what it is in the very Nature of God. So that to this word *Omnipresence* we can affix no other than a general and compound and indeterminate Imagination of his Being here, and there, and every where we know not how; and at last it is resolved into this Negation, *There is no Place or Space in which he is not, or from which he is absent.*

KNOWLEDGE is a positive Term for a determinate Conception formed from our own manner of Knowledge by Ideas, and Consciousness, and Reasoning, and Deduction. This we transfer to God, to *Represent* a correspondent and otherwise inconceivable Perfection in  
his

his Nature; and it still continues as determinate and Positive, as clear and distinct when thus ascribed to the Divinity, as when it is applied to Man. But of *Omniscience* we can form no Notion or Conception *Intirely positive*, from any Kind of Knowledge in Man, and can therefore have no positive Analogical Conception whereby we may even represent it: And being utterly void of any direct Notion or Idea of what it is in the real Nature of God, the Signification of this Word must be likewise very uncertain and indeterminate; and can amount to no more at last than this, *There is nothing which he doth not know.*

OF *Existence* likewise we have a determinate and most distinct Notion, from the Consciousness of our own Existence, or the Conception of the Existence of other things about us; the Term is positive and its Signification not to be resolved into a Negation: And it is by this as a Representation, that we are enabled to think and speak as clearly and distinctly of the Existence of God, as we do of our own, or of the Existence of any Being of the visible Creation. But of *Self-Existence*, we can form no consistent Notion or Conception *Intirely positive*, even by *Similitude* with our own manner of Existence; the Mind of Man hath nothing intelligible to annex to that compound Term when taken thus, which can be transferred even analogically to the Divinity: In short the Word *Self-existent* can have no purely

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ly positive determinate Meaning when spoken of him; but a Signification so loose and uncertain, and even Negative, that it is at last resolved into this, *He hath not his Being as we have, from another*: Unless we absurdly take it in such a *Positive* Sence as to signify, that *God gave Existence to himself*. And thus it is as to *Necessary-Existence* also: When we attempt to annex any plain intelligible Conception to it in our Mind, it ends at last in this, *God cannot but always Exist, or Cannot not Exist*.

WHAT it is to have an *Origin* or Beginning we well know; of this we have a clear and distinct and positive Notion or Idea. But of *Self-Origination* we are so far from having any *Positive* Conception or Idea from any thing either in God or Man; that we must know it to be a Senseless Term when taken thus; and without any consistent Meaning either strictly Proper or Analogical. For when it is understood positively of God, it includes in it two monstrous Absurdities, one, as it implies God to have an *Origin* or Beginning; and the other, that he had this Beginning from himself: And to make the best of it, it can signify no more than a Negation directly contradictory to what it expresseth; that his Existence is *Not from himself*, for that he had *No Origin* at all.

SUFFICIENCY is likewise a determinate Conception, which we form from a Man's having  
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ing in his own present Power or Possession what is necessary to his Being and Well-being; this we transfer to God to represent that divine Sufficiency whereof we can have no direct Conception or Idea. But the compound term *Self-sufficient* expresseth nothing conceivable to *Us* in respect of the real internal Nature of God but this Negation, *There is nothing in him but what he hath Independently; nor doth he stand in need of the Concurrence of any other Being.*

LASTLY, Of *Duration* or the Continuance of Existence, we have a positive and determinate Conception, formed from the conscious Succession of Ideas or Notions in our own Mind; and measured out by stated portions of Time, such as Hours, and Days, and Months, and Years. This serves to represent Analogically an incomprehensible *Divine Duration*, correspondent and answerable to ours, tho' of quite another Kind. But of *Eternity* we have no purely positive Conception or Representation in the Mind of Man; and we can affix no Notion to it but either a negative one of *Infinite Duration*, that is *Without Beginning or Ending*; or a Negation of all Time and Succession, and any other manner of Duration directly conceivable by us.

AND thus it is in all the rest of this Kind of Attributes; so that when any of them are attributed to the *Father* only, by our modern *Arians*, as being incommunicable to the Son  
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or Holy Ghost; they can conclude nothing real and *Positive* with respect to the divine Nature. For whatever intrinsic positive Perfections they may signify in the very Nature of God, no Inference can be made how far they are *Communicable* or *Incommunicable* to the two other divine Persons; from our indistinct and very indeterminate manner of conceiving them, by the utmost Enumeration or Enlargement of their *Effects* only in the visible Creation, whereof we are capable; or by a Negation only of what we observe to be a Defect or Imperfection in the Creature. Accordingly observe the only Inference which the Arians can make from those compound Terms, the weakness of which will appear at first Sight; These do signify some real Perfections in the Nature of God, whereof we can frame to our selves only indeterminate and *Negative* Conceptions; therefore they must signify such positive and essential Attributes in the *Father*, as are *Incommunicable* to the Son and Holy Ghost.

I M U S T not here pass over a grand Objection made against what hath been said concerning the *Purely negative* Attributes; as well as concerning those which have no *Distinct* and *Intirely positive* Idea or Conception annexed to them in the Mind, tho' the Terms are positive; because I find it proposed with an uncommon Air of Assurance and Disdain. *It is a great Mistake, says the Objector, To think all these or any of them negative Characters; for tho' according to the Gram-*  
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*grammatical Composition those Words are NEGATIVE, yet the Ideas expressed by them are POSITIVE: Thus INFINITE, or IMMENSE according to the Grammatical Composition is merely Negative; but the Idea annexed to it is not a mere Negation of Bounds, but that of a positive Greatness. So Unoriginate, or Underived, which means the very same as Self-Existent, do not express a mere Negation of being derived; but a positive Ground or Foundation of Existence in the divine Substance it self. And thus, He infers, the whole Orthodox Scheme, of the Trinity, falls to the Ground.*

To which I answer, that whatever positive Perfections in the divine Nature either the ~~negative~~ or Positive Attributes may express, we can have no *Direct* Idea or Conception at all of them: And for that Reason we are necessitated to conceive even the Positive Attributes by Analogy with Properties natural and human. But of the purely Negative Attributes we have no positive Idea or Conception even by Comparison and Analogy with any thing natural or human; and therefore it is that we both conceive and express these only by Negation. To take his own Instances, *Infinite* signifies a *Positive Greatness*; true, but it is a divine Greatness whereof we can have no *Positive Idea or Conception* even by Analogy, as we have of other Attributes of God, such as his Power, Wisdom, Goodness: And therefore we are under a Necessity of conceiving and expressing this Infinity by a Negation only of all Bounds or Limits.

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Thus likewise *Endless* and *Unlimited*, as he observes, without doubt expresseth some real essential Perfection in the Divinity, a real positive Duration which we express by the word *Eternal*. But this is such a Duration or Manner of Existence, as is incomprehensible to us as it is in it self by any positive Conception, either *Direct* or *Analogical*: And therefore we conceive and express this *Eternal* Duration no otherwise than by a Negation of Beginning or Ending; and of every Manner of Duration which can enter into the Head or Heart of Man to conceive or imagine.

So again *Unoriginated*, and *Underived*, which we express by *Self-existent*, do signify a *Positive* and *Real Manner of Existence* in the Substance of God; but of this *Self-existence* it is impossible for the Mind to have any purely positive Conception or Idea, not only *Directly*, or of the thing as it is in it self; but even by *Analogy*: Because tho' we have a positive Idea of God's *Existence* from our own Existence; yet there is nothing in Man, or in the whole Compass of the visible Creation which can be any positive Symbol or Representation of *Self-Existence* in an human Mind; and therefore the Conception of it, however expressed, can be no other than purely or mostly Negative. So that tho' *Self-Existence* or *Underived* be a positive Property in the Substance of God, yet it is such an essential Perfection of it as is more incomprehensible than the Substance it self. For we can form a positive

sitive Conception of the divine Substance by Analogy with what we know of that which is human: But nothing in Nature can be a positive Representation of Self-existence: and accordingly we must think and speak of that Perfection by way of Negation, or not think and speak of it at all. From whence it is plain that the Term *Self-existent* is altogether Senceless and without any intelligible Meaning in Religion, otherwise than as the Word, together with the Conception annexed to it, is a Negation of being derived from another; either *First* by being *Made*, that is, produced by an *Efficiency*, as all created intelligent Agents in particular are: And thus it is a very useful and significant Term; as it very well expresseth our Dependence upon a Being who could not have been himself made or created by any other, and must therefore have existed from without Beginning. Or secondly a negation of being *Begotten* or derived by a supernatural Generation, as we are taught the only begotten Son of God was: And thus far likewise *Self-existent* may be a very harmless and innocent, tho' a very useless and unscriptural Word; and can have no farther intelligible Meaning, but that the Father is not derived from the Son, or from any other Person by any supernatural Generation. And the most that can be infered from the Self-existence of the Father in this respect, is a real Subordination of the Son to the Father; but a *Kind* of *Subordination* altogether as inconceivable and ineffable as it is in it self, as the real intrinsic *Nature* of the Fa-

ther and the Son, or the real Manner of the divine *Generation*; and therefore to be no otherwise conceived than in general, by Analogy with the filial Dependence and Subordination of a Son to his human Father. And consequently when Men proceed to explain, and limit, and define the very *Peculiar Nature and Manner and Degrees* of this incomprehensible Subordination *Literaly*, by the Subordination even of an human Son in all respects to his Father, and as if both were the same in *Kind*; their Inferences are all false and groundless: But when they explain it by the Subjection and Dependency of a *Subject* or Vassal to an absolute Monarch, as our modern clandestine Arians do thro' their whole Scheme of Religion, it is not only prophane and impious, but open Blasphemy against the Father and the Son.

ACCORDING to this way of arguing, says the Objector, *All the Attributes of God may be turned into mere Negatives; as his Unity, into not being more than one.* This is a very true Assertion with regard to *Some* of the Attributes, and particularly with respect to the divine *Unity*: that tho' it be a positive Perfection both in the real Nature of God; and *Also* in our Conception of it; yet at the same time it may be *Turned* into a Negative, or conceived and expressed after a negative Manner also, namely *That there are no more Gods than One*: But this Assertion is egregiously false with respect to those other Instances which he confusedly produces to confirm his

Objection.; and which tho' they should be allowed to *Express* positive Perfections in the real Nature of God, yet are conceivable by *Us* after a negative Manner; For thus he goes on. *His Omniscience into not being ignorant of any thing.* Now we have a purely positive Conception of *Knowlege* or *Wisdom* in God by Analogy with *Knowlege* or *Wisdom* in our selves; but let that Author assign something in Nature which can be a purely positive Resemblance or Representation of *Omniscience* or *Infinite Knowlege*; till that is done we can annex to that Term the very negative Conception he mentions. *His Omnipotence, into not being limited in Power.* Very true; for want of any direct, or even Analogical *Positive* Idea or Conception of *Omnipotence*, we are under a Necessity of affixing that Negative Conception to it; and must ever do so, till we have a purely positive Idea or Conception of *Infinite Power*. *His Omnipresence, into not being absent from any Place.* Very true again; excepting only his Word *Turning* it into a Negative; whereas the Term *Omnipresence* must necessarily have a negative Conception annexed to it in the Mind of Man, and cannot possibly be turned into a purely positive Conception: Of the *Presence* of God indeed we can form a positive Conception by Analogy with the Presence of a Prince; but of *Omnipresence* we can have no such positive Conception or Idea either Direct or Analogical.

THAT we have no direct and immediate Con-  
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ception or Idea of any of the divine Attributes as they are in themselves, or of any Properties the same in Kind; has been proved clearly and evidently. The next Question then is, which of those Attributes are conceived by any *Positive correspondent Representation* in human Nature? For such only are properly positive Attributes; as Power, Wisdom, Goodness, Will: And which of them can have no actual correspondent Representation in things Natural and Human? For these are properly the negative Attributes; both as to the Grammatical Composition of the Word, and the Conception annexed to it: Such as *Unoriginated* and *Underived*, *Infinite* and *Immense*; as well as those which, tho' *Grammatically* Positive, yet are Negative in the Signification or *Conception* annexed to them; such as *Eternal* and *Self-existent*, *Necessarily-existent*, *Omnipresent*, and *Omniscient*. And thus that contradictory ungrammatical Notion, of positive Ideas or Conceptions being annexed to negative Terms when applied to God, falls to the Ground; I hope never to rise again; not even at the last Day, to upbraid the Objector with the Application of it for the Support of a detestable Heresy.

III. ANOTHER Head of divine Attributes are such as Men express by Hyperbole; not that any Term in human Language expressive of Perfection can be truly hyperbolical in respect of the Divinity, whose real Perfections are equally above all Apprehension or Expression:

sion: But in respect of our limited and imperfect way of thinking and speaking of him, of whom we have no direct Conception or Idea. Of this Kind are some of those Attributes before mentioned ὑπεράγαθος, ὑπεράγνωςτος, ὑπεράρχιος, ὑπερούσιος, ὑπεράνωμος and such like, for which we have no single Synonymous Terms in the English Tongue; and whereof the Greek Fathers are full, as also the Mystic Areopagite. These are all no other in reality, than a Negation of God and his Attributes to be in any Sense of the *Same Kind* with created Intelligent Beings, and their Attributes or Properties; but something in his whole Nature infinitely beyond them all. The only things to be observed here are, First, That since these compound hyperbolical Terms have no real meaning beyond what may be and often is expressed in simple and common Terms; they carry in them an empty Appearance only of a superior and real Knowledge of the divine Nature: They are in Truth no more than so many different ways of describing our own Ignorance, and intire want of all Degrees of any direct Apprehension or immediate Perception of what relates to the real Nature of God and his Attributes. And Secondly, That most Infidels and Heretics run into a quite contrary Extreme; and found their reasoning upon a Supposition, that the Attributes of God are of the very same *Kind* in him that they are in us; and all the Terms of the Gospel which they cannot strain to pure Metaphor, they under-

stand in a *Literal* and proper Acceptation; so that one way or the other, they bring all the Myſteries of Chriſtianity to nothing.

Now tho' theſe three Heads of Attributes give us no *Positive* Knowledge of God, and are no more than either *Mere Negations*; or very looſe, indeterminate and *Moſtly negative* Conceptions, formed out of our Reasoning upon the viſible *Effects* of the Creation; or *Hyperbolical* Terms and Expreſſions, invented with deſign to ſpeak of God in a Style above Nature, above our ſelves, and above all things whereof we have any Conception or Idea. Tho' moſt of them exhibit to the Mind of Man nothing in the Nature of God it can apprehend by any diſtinct *Positive* Conception, or by any truly Analogical Semblance or Representation: Yet it is a very uſeful Degree of divine Knowledge, well proportioned to the Shortneſs of our Underſtanding in this Life; very neceſſary to all the Purpoſes of Religion; and hath no ſmall Tendency to the promoting of all Virtue and Holineſs. For they ſerve to expreſs that the Divinity vaſtly tranſcends in *Kind* all the Bounds of Nature and Creation; they enable us to condemn not only this World, but all created Beings of another in compariſon of that *Still incomprehenſible* Being; of whom by the help of theſe Attributes we can ſpeak in a Style no way applicable to any other Intelligent Agent in the Univerſe. The due Conſideration of them hath an immediate Tendency to produce  
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in us a great Love and Admiration of that divine Being, which is so far out of the Reach of all our direct Apprehension or Conception, that we are often forced to have recourse to negative and hyperbolical Terms to express his Perfections. They strike the Soul with the most profound Awe and Veneration of him; this inclines it to the humblest Adoration and Worship; and there is not any one Instance of Virtue and Goodness to the Promoting and Encouragement of which they do not greatly contribute. But when Men draw Consequences from any such Conceptions as we are able to form of these, to the *Real intrinsic Nature* of the Divinity; whereof they give us no *Distinct* and *Positive* Conception or Idea: Then they pervert the true Use and whole Intention of them; so that from being great and prevailing Motives to all Virtue and Holiness, as well as constant Ingredients and Helps in all our Piety and Devotion; they render them Instruments of clandestine Heresy and Infidelity.

AND now I am to proceed to those divine Attributes which, in our manner of thinking and speaking, are *Determinate* and *Positive* and truly *Analogical*. Accordingly

I. THE first divine Attribute under this Head, is that which we conceive by Analogy with the *Spirit* of a Man. To apprehend this rightly, we are to consider that these two following very different Notions are affixed to

this Word, when 'tis understood either of our own and other created Spirits, or of God.

FIRST, It is taken for an *Immaterial* Being or Substance. In this Sence it has no other Notion affixed to it than a *Negation* only of Matter and all its Properties; and can include nothing positive, but a Notion of *Being* in general, or of a *Substance* in particular, whereof we can have no *Direct* Perception or Idea. When it is understood thus of God, it properly falls under the former Head of the negative Attributes. Accordingly it is said in Scripture that *God is a Spirit*, that is an *Immaterial Being*: Which is no obscure Indication that our human Spirit also is *Immaterial*; especially since there is such express and particular mention made in Scripture of the *Spirit of a Man that is in him*, and the same word רֹחַ used for both: Nay it is a ground of sufficient Conviction to any one who hath Reason to rejoyce that it is such, and that he is not to perish like a Beast. And since we observe no such kind of Operations as those of our own *Minds*, in other animate Bodies in all appearance sufficiently organized, and in all other respects seemingly qualified for them; we naturally infer that there must be a Concurrence of some substantial Principle within us which is *Not Matter*.

SECONDLY, This word *Spirit* is taken in a *Positive* Sence, to express that complex Conception or Notion we are able to form of our  
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own Spirit. Now it must be observed, that of the *Substance* or *Essence* even of our own Spirit, we have no direct Perception or Idea sensitive or Intellectual; or even any immediate Consciousness: But a complex Notion only or Conception of *Spirit*, from a Consciousness of the various *Operations*, *Faculties*, and *Properties* of our own *Minds*; that is, from the Faculties and Operations of Spirit and Matter in essential Union. This complex Notion we attribute to God, to express and represent the *Divine Spirit*, as a Being endued with incomprehensible Perfections *Correspondent* and *Similar* to those we are conscious of in our selves, but of a Kind totally different: So that the common Use and whole Import of the Word, when taken positively, and ascribed thus to purely spiritual Beings, is *Analogical*. And the Reason why we use the word *Spirit* thus in common for God and all other spiritual Beings; is the want of any direct Idea and Conception, or proper Term, to distinguish him as he is in his own Nature, from Angels: Whereas his intire real Nature is as much or rather vastly more of another *Kind* from that of all created pure Spirits, than theirs is from such as are embodied; and consequently cannot be apprehended by us under any positive Conception but what is merely *Analogical*.

As the word *Spirit* is thus transfered to God by Analogy; so likewise we attribute to him the Terms *Substance*, *Essence*, *Existence*, and  
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*Nature*.

*Nature.* That is, we substitute the Conceptions we form of the human Substance or Essence, and Existence; to represent Analogically an inconceivable but correspondent Substance or Essence, and Existence, of which we have not the least glimmering *Direct* Idea or Conception. And from the Necessity we are under of proceeding thus, we call God and Angels *Substances* in common; for want of any direct Idea and Conception, or proper Term to distinguish an *Immaterial Substance* from that which is material; or the Substances of different immaterial Beings from each other: Not but that it is as gross to call an Angel, and much more the divine Being a *Substance*, in the literal propriety of the Word, as to call it a *Body*. As we justly attribute these Terms and Conceptions to every Thing, of which, or its Properties, we have a *Direct* Perception and Idea, or any *Immediate* Consciousness; and which by this means we observe to have a real and actual Being; and since what hath not a real *Substance* or *Essence* of some Kind or other, must be as nothing to *Us*, that is with regard to our manner of conceiving things: So also we justly attribute them to God, as to a real and actual Being altogether Supernatural; that we may have a way of thinking and speaking, proportioned to our Understanding, of him who is otherwise inconceivable and ineffable,

FOR any one therefore, with the clandestine Arians, to speak of God as a *Person*, abstract-  
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ed from all *Substance* or *Essence*, is not to conceive him at all; Nay it is by a direct Implication to deny even his *Existence*. And yet this is the very Blind with which a Reader must be contented to cover his Eyes, at his first Entrance into the modern fifty five Arian Propositions: So that tho' he may chance to discern the venomous Tendency of them in the General, yet he shall not be able to point out distinctly where the Fallacy lies. In the first of them the Author styles God, not an Intelligent *Essence* or *Substance*, but an Intelligent *Agent* or *Person*, abstracted from all *Substance* or *Essence*: And the Reader must not see how impossible it is, for the Mind of Man to conceive a *Person* abstracted from some Substance or other, natural or supernatural, conceivable or inconceivable; or to imagine an *Agent* without any actual Substance *For Agency*. Now, do you but insert into that Proposition *Intelligent Substance*, instead of *Intelligent Agent* or *Person*; and carry this Distinction with you as far as the fifty first Proposition, in which he begins to reduce all his Doctrine to Practice; and there again apply that Distinction to the *Paying Honour or Worship to an Intelligent incomprehensible* ESSENCE or SUBSTANCE, as all People do who call themselves Christians (the clandestine Arians only excepted, who call this a *Worshiping We know not what*) and to the *Paying Honour or Worship to a PERSON only, abstractedly from all Nature, Substance, and Essence* (which we call *worshiping an Idol only*

ly of our own Imagination; that is worshipping Nothing, or no *Real Being* either in this World or the other) If you do this I say, you will discover a fundamental Fallacy which reaches from the Beginning to the End of that long Chain of Propositions; and without which no two Links of it could hold together. I must own this requires more intense Thought and Application, than is necessary to discover the Fallacies of the Socinians and other Heretics. For in those Propositions all the Poyson of the Arian and Socinian Heresies is extracted and heightened by the Author; and artfully blended together, to fit the Taste of such Persons as are already of a broken Constitution; and in a sickly Disposition of Mind and Conscience, which inclines them to nauseate all plain and wholesom Food; and to choose rather to gratify their vitiated Palates with notional abstract Novelty, and Metaphysical Rarities.

II. A SECOND head of Attributes to be mentioned in Order here, are those which we conceive and express by Analogy with the intire *Man*, composed of Spirit and Body in essential Unity. Thus we say the *Living God*; tho' of that *Life* we have not the least direct Idea or Conception; and therefore we conceive it by Analogy with the Life of Man, *Whose Breath is in his Nostrils*; which consists in the Conjunction of Spirit and Body; in the Circulation of the Blood and animal Spirits; and ends with the Separation

paration of the Spirit from the Body : And yet this Attribute, which can exhibit no more to the Mind of Man than an incomprehensible Perfection, and a manner of Life and Existence *Correspondent only* and answerable to our Life; serves very well to denote the *Living* God, in Opposition to lifeless Idols of Stock and Stone; and that eternal Omnipotent Being who is the Cause and Fountain of Life to all Creatures. Nay the very word *Man* is thus ascribed to him in Scripture, in which he is styled *A man of War*. We call him *One*, an *Agent*; we say he is a *Maker*, *Author*, *Cause*, and *Principle*. In the same Analogical Sence we say he is *High* or *Powerful*, and most *High*, *Great*, *Mighty*, and *Happy*. After the same manner we attribute to him our Personal Operations, such as *Making*, *Communicating*, *Giving*, *Disposing*, *Distributing*, *Pardoning*, *Blessing*, *Rewarding*, and *Punishing*; together with *Providence*, *Oeconomy*, *Supremacy*, and many such Terms of human Language, which run thro' all our Discourses and Reasonings of God. Thus again we attribute to him our own *Personal* Characters and Offices, such as *Father*, *King*, *Ruler*, *Governor*, *Lord*, and *Lord of Hosts* or of Armies, *Redeemer*, *Saviour*, *Judge*, *Searcher of Hearts*, *Lawgiver*, *Monarch*, and all other human Titles of an absolute and extensive Power, that is *Potestas* or *Dominion* among Men.

HERE it ought to be remarked, that when we attribute the word *Greatness* to God, which includes most of the rest; the Idea of that Greatness

ness we borrow either from the *Size* or *Bulk* of a material visible Substance, which is very improperly applyed to any Spirit, of which we can have no Notion or Idea whether it is great or small: And very unworthy of God, any otherwise than *Metaphorically*. Or that Term must have a Conception annexed to it borrowed from the Grandeur of a Prince, and the *Power* and Magnificence of an earthly Monarch; which is likewise unworthy of God in a literal Acceptation, whose Power or Grandeur is not external only, separable, and accidental, or seated in the Number and Magnificence of his Creatures and Subjects; but all within himself, essential and inherent; and can receive no Increase or Diminution from any thing without him. In this latter Sense we ascribe the word *Greatness* to him by Analogy; which is therefore worthy of him, because it is an apt and correspondent Representation of that supreme *Dominion* of his *Overall*, which is otherwise utterly Incomprehensible and Ineffable; according to that Saying of David, *There is no End*, עֵדֶיךָ no *Scrutiny*, or *Knowledge* or *Conception* of his *Greatness*, as it is in it self.

IN relation to this last head of Attributes, it will be necessary to observe these three things particularly.

I. THAT we attribute the very Term *Unity*, together with the Conception annexed to it,



it, to the divine Nature, by Analogy with *One Man*. This being the only direct Idea or Conception we have for the Unity of *One Intelligent Nature*; this therefore is the Conception which necessarily stands in the Mind to represent the divine Unity, and recurs as often as we say God is *One*. The Necessity of which arises from hence; That tho' it may be evidently proved, there can be no more Gods but One, yet *How* or after what *Real Manner* he is one *In himself*, we have not the least Conception or Idea: We cannot single him out as one in our Imagination; nor could we distinguish them by the Intellect, and reckon them, if it were possible there could be *More* Gods than one. For which Reason God is styled by the Fathers ὑπεράπειρος *Above all Infinity*, in respect of Number or Extension. ὑπεραριθμητος *Above all Number*. They assert him not to be *One* in Number; to be ἀκατανόμαστον ἐν *An Unity without any Word to express it*. Παντὸς ἐνὸς ὑπεραπλούμενον *A transcendent Simplicity above all Unity*: And say that he is ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν ἀπλότητα *Above all Simplicity*; pursuant to which he is in Bernard's Style called *Unissimus*. Now since the *Real Unity* of God is thus incomprehensible as it is in it self, and apprehended by Analogy only with our Conception of one human Intelligent Agent; it is plain the Terms *Individual* and *Numerically one*, can have no Sence or Meaning when applyed to the Divinity. Because tho' they denote an *Unity*, yet they at the same time *Imply* and *Connote* a *Multiplicity*, either

*Actually*

*Actually* or *Potentially*: And are therefore properly enough used to express the Unity of such Intelligent Agents of whom there may be *More* in *Number* of the same *Kind*; or of such things as we can distinguish in the Imagination by Number, and even point out with the Finger. They serve very well to express an *Intelligible* and *Directly conceivable* Unity with a good Emphasis; but to say God is *Individually* or *Numerically* one, or that he is one *Individual Substance*, or *Numerically one Substance*, is so far from being emphatical; that it is altogether senseless and impertinent: From whence it appears not only how useless, but how mischievous these Terms are in all our Controversies with Heretics and Infidels.

2. THAT all the Arguments drawn by Arians, Socinians, and Deists, from the *Unity* of God, against the orthodox Doctrine of the *Trinity*, are altogether inconclusive and without any Foundation. For there are but these two ways for them to proceed. Either they must conceive the divine Unity positively and by Analogy with that which is human; and then no just Inference can be drawn from any thing in the human Nature, to the reality of something of the *Same Kind* in the Divine Nature; since nothing is more sure, than that the true Nature, and *Kind*, and *Manner of Unity* in one, and in the other is infinitely different: And if they adhere to this Analogy, the whole Argument will turn against them; for tho' in  
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this way, the Distinction of Spirit, and Soul, and Body in Man, is no direct Proof of a Trinity; yet it is a good Presumption against them; this being at least a distant Illustration of an incomprehensible Distinction in that divine Nature, after whose *Likeness* and in whose own *Image* we are so expressly said to be formed. Or, if they reject this Analogy, then it is evident they can have no other than a merely *Negative* Notion of the divine Unity; that is a Conception that there can be *No more Gods than one*: And they themselves must allow that none of their Reasonings from a *Purely negative* Notion in our *Mind*, can justly infer any thing against the *Possibility* of a *Real* and *Positive* tho' *Incomprehensible* distinction in the *Intrinsic Nature* of God.

3. THAT as we necessarily conceive the Unity of God, by that of one Man, or one human Intelligent Agent; so we have no other way of speaking of him but as we do of one of our selves, in the third Person of Verbs; and as it is particularly in the Latin and the Greek, by the masculine Article, and Adjectives of the masculine Gender. And yet it is a very evil as well as senseless way of speaking, which our modern Arians are fallen into, to say the *Person of God*; and it is yet worse to argue him, as they do, to be but *One Person*. For if they use the term *Person* in a *Metaphorical* Sence when applied to God, it is a *Metaphor* without any real Meaning; that is, for something utterly

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and intirely incomprehensible; for what is neither *Directly* conceivable, nor to be apprehended by any *Analogy*; so that *Thus* it is a Metaphor for *Nothing*, or for *No Person* at all. If they attribute this Term to God, on the quite Contrary in its strictly literal Propriety, it is highly impious; and the very same thing as to assert and argue him to be literally one Man; for *Person* and *Man* in their literal Propriety and Meaning, and with regard to any direct Conception we can affix to the word *Person*, are equivalent Terms: And yet this the Arians are necessitated to do; because their whole Scheme of Religion is built upon the strictly proper and literal Acceptation of that Term; for which Reason they proceed so far as to argue him to be one *Individual numerical Person*. Nay if we even take the middle way, and apply the word *Person* to God in its Analogical Acceptation, it is highly absurd and unjustifiable. Because as *God* is no Personal Term among Men themselves, but a Name appropriated by us to the *Divine Being*; so it can admit of no Analogical Word to express it. Whereas *Father*, and *Son*, and *Spirit*, are in themselves Terms of Analogy; first appropriated to Man, and thence transfered to the divine Nature; they are Personal Denominations and Distinctions: And accordingly the Term *Person* can be transfered together with them by Analogy likewise; to express that incomprehensible Distinction in the divine Nature with great Aptitude and Significancy.

III. A THIRD Kind of Attributes under this Head are such as we apprehend by Analogy with the *Mind* of Man. The *Spirit* of a Man is that immaterial Part of our Frame, which is in such intimate Union with the Body; that the most abstracted of its Operations are not performed only *In* the Body, or *By* the Body as an Instrument: But by both of them together, so essentially blended into one Nature; that neither of them can act in our Frame either in separation from each other, or reciprocaly on each other as distinct or disunited Agents. This is to be carefully distinguished from the *Mind*, which is a Principle in us resulting from that essential Union of Spirit and Matter; the Actions and Operations of which are the Operations not of the Spirit only, but of the intire Individual Man composed of both. The *Mind* is a Word of a more general Signification than that of the *Intellect*, which is restrained to the Operations of Thinking and Knowledge alone, and the several Modifications of them. It is called the *Soul*, as it takes in all the Passions and Affections in human Nature which are the more immediate Subjects of Virtue and Goodness in us. And it is called *Conscience*, in respect of that inward Knowledge we have of our selves, relating particularly to Religion and Morality; to the restraining our Appetites, the Regulation of our Passions and Affections; and to the Degrees

of our Attainments in the Practice of all Instances of Virtue and Holiness.

As we transfer this *Mind* of ours to God by Analogy, and speak as familiarly of the Mind of God as we do of the Mind of Man; so we likewise transfer all the Faculties and Operations of it to represent correspondent Attributes and similar Perfections in his Nature.

THE first of its Faculties, or rather Operations, is that of *Understanding*, with all the various Modes thereof, as *Thinking*, *Knowing*, *Reasoning*, *Perceiving*, *Apprehending*, *Discerning*, and *Judging*; together with *Wisdom* the greatest Perfection of our Understanding. Nay we thus attribute to God the very Operation of *Memory*, which in Man is a Power of reviving our Ideas when they are grown obscure and confused; and of bringing into View all our various Notions and Conceptions: Thus we say God *Calls to Mind*, that he *Remembers*; and we apply to him, in an Analogical Sense, the several Expressions which relate to a *Recollection* of former Transactions.

Now it is very natural for Men here to run into this mistake: That there is no other difference between the *Knowledge* of God and Man than this; that whereas we know but very few things, such as are past and present, and that in an imperfect *Degree* too; God knows

all things Past, Present, and to come, and in the most perfect *Degree*. This it must be confessed is the common and ordinary Method of conceiving this and the other Attributes of God ; and it were well if our avowed and clandestine Enemies had left the World in quiet and peaceable Possession of that innocent way of thinking. But since they to serve a vile Hypothesis, have with uncommon Zeal and Earnestness maintained the Attributes of God in general, to be of the very same *Kind* with those which are in us : It is now become necessary to put this whole Matter in the Light the Reader will find it here ; and to observe in respect of the divine *Knowledge* in particular, that it is so far from being of the same Kind with ours ; that all the Knowledge we have doth not only take its first Rise from our Sensations, but is built upon them ; and hath no other original Foundation but those Seals or Impressions they leave upon our Imagination, which we call *Ideas*. The Mind of Man works upon these mean Materials, this we call *Thinking* ; these it compounds, or divides, and alters at Pleasure, and raises up to it self from thence a great many *Notions* and *Conceptions*, formed out of these considered jointly with the Operations of the Intellect : It makes many Inferences and Deductions from these ; then it forms to it self several Conclusions, Maxims, and Principles ; this we call *Knowledge* ; and when upon Observation and Experience we find our Notions, and Conclusions, and Maxims to be just, and regulate

our Conduct by them, particularly in choosing proper means to obtain a commendable End, we call that *Wisdom*. Lastly, when we transfer merely sensitive Ideas to things spiritual and immaterial which are not directly perceptible, we call it divine *Metaphor*: When we substitute the Notions and Conceptions of our own human Perfections to stand for *Similar* and *Correspondent* Perfections in those Beings, that we may think and speak of things otherwise inconceivable and ineffable; we call that divine *Analogy*. When by help of this divine Analogy, things supernatural and otherwise incomprehensible, and the divine Nature and Properties in particular, are rendered the Objects of our Reasoning and Meditation, as far as Man can see by the Light of Nature; and when we from thence deduce rules of Behaviour in the different relations of Life; this we call *Natural Religion* or *Morality*. When there is a farther Discovery of things supernatural and incomprehensible, and of the divine Being in particular, vouchsafed to us by an additional Light from Heaven; not by any immediate Rays which strike *Directly* upon the Eye of the Mind: But by *Reflexion* only from the Earth; that the Mysteries of another World might be suited to our Capacities by Semblance and Representation of things natural and human which are easy, familiar, and directly perceivable; this is *Revelation*.

AND now who will say that the Knowledge  
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of a pure Spirit, independent of all Matter, without any Labour of the Brain, or use of Animal Spirits; infinitely removed from all Sensation; in no sense Progressive; intirely without the help of Semblance or Representation; no way intermediate; and without the need of Reflection, or Metaphor, or Analogy; and for which human Language cannot supply a strictly proper Term or Expression: In short a Knowledge without a *Mind*, without *Ideas*, without *Thinking*, without all *Reasoning* or *Deduction*; such as that the Knowledge even of the most exalted Being of the Creation can no more be of the same Kind with it, than he himself can be of the same *Essence* or Substance with God. Who then I say, will presume to affirm that such a divine Knowledge is of the same *Kind* with ours; and that if it were not, a Man could not speak with Truth when he says, *God knows*? All I contend for is, that he Knows more truly than we do; that our Knowledge is but a distant Image only or Semblance of what is in him an infinite incomprehensible Perfection: And that for want of any direct Idea or Conception, and proper Term for the Latter, we are under a Necessity of using the same Word and Conception in common for them both. It is the great weakness of human Understanding, that we have not a very different Conception of that divine Perfection which we denote by the word Knowledge; and the shortness of human Language, that we have not a proper Term to express it.

THE other great Property or Operation of the Mind is that of *Willing*. According to the vulgar Notion, the Will, more particularly as it respects Religion and Morality, is considered as a distinct *Principle* or *Faculty* in the Mind of Man; which qualifies him for choosing indifferently, what the Understanding shall judge to be morally Good or Evil. Whereas this is but a crude and ill digested Notion, that God should from the first create Intelligent Agents with any Principle or Faculty in their Frame equally free and *Indifferent* to what was morally Good or Evil. No, they were all, and Man in particular, originally formed with a *Voluntary Inclination* and Tendency of all their Powers and Faculties to *Good* only; and moral Freedom in Man must be ultimately resolved, not into any one peculiar Faculty of the Mind distinct from the rest, which we call the Will: But into the Original inherent Prevalency of the purely spiritual Part of our Frame; which in a state of Innocency was the predominant Ingredient in our Constitution, by means of which we were intirely free and inclinable to Goodness in *All* our Powers and Faculties; so as to have neither a *Knowledge* of moral Evil, nor the least *Will* or *Inclination* towards it; but only a *Power* of incurring Evil. By the Fall that moral Freedom was miserably impaired, and almost lost together with that Prevalency of the Spirit; and the whole Purpose and Design of all Religion Natural and Revealed

ed is to recover in us this original prevailing Tendency of the Spirit; that we may regain a more commendable degree of that Freedom, from the Load and Pressure of bodily Appetite, together with the exorbitant Passions and Inclinations of the Soul; which bear down the Spirit along with them to the Earth, where it wallows in Dirt and Filthiness; and cannot, without the divine Assistance, commendably raise it self above the Objects of Sense and Appetite, the groveling worldly Aims and Views of a corrupt and vitiated Mind.

THIS Liberty or Freedom of ours, both Natural and Moral, we express by the Term *Will*, and this is transfered to God by Analogy; together with all the Forms we have of speaking concerning our own human Will. Such as *Election, Reprobation, Choosing, Refusing, Good Will and Pleasure, Doing the Will of God, Fulfilling his Will*; and every other Phrase we use for a freedom of Action, or for our voluntary Operations of Body or Mind.

THO' this is not the proper Place to enlarge upon human *Liberty* and *Freedom*; yet I cannot forbear remarking the many erroneous Opinions, and groundless Disputes and Controversies, very tedious and full of Obscurity and Confusion, which have been occasioned both in Metaphysics and Divinity, by that mistaken Notion of the *Will* as a *Distinct* Faculty and Principle of Liberty in the Mind of Man.

Man. It would require a Volume to recite them all, from the Monothelites (who asserted Christ to have but one Will) down to the seventeenth of the fifty five Arian Propositions, wherein it is asserted, that Christ is derived from the Father by an *Act of his Will*, and not by a mere *Necessity of his Nature*: The Author of which had a celebrated Contest with a certain Foreign Antagonist of Name, concerning human Liberty and Freedom upon that vulgar Notion. And I leave any indifferent Person to judge from the Event, whether, if they had knocked those two learned Metaphysical Heads together, to try which was hardest; they had not struck out as much Light for the Information and Benefit of Mankind, as they have done by that Controversy? Had they entered upon an eager and zealous Debate thro' whole Volumes, whether a Man *Thinks*, or not; would it not all be resolved into this at last, that we are conscious to our selves that we do certainly think? And if all the Learning and Metaphysics in the World were laid out in proving that we have not the Power of Thinking; one single Instance of Thought or Self-consciousness would overturn it all. The very same theatrical Folly it is in Men, to run into tedious abstracted and intricate Debates, concerning the Liberty and Freedom of human Actions from any internal Necessity or external Compulsion; since the Point can never be otherwise determined than by a like Self-consciousness,

sciousness, whereby we come to the certain Knowledge of our Power of *Thinking*.

IV. ANOTHER Head of divine Attributes are such as are conceived by the *Passions* and *Affections*, and *Inclinations* or *Dispositions* of an human *Soul*. This, as I observed before, is but another Word for the *Mind*, only limited to Matters of Religion and Morals in particular ; and especialy as it is the Seat of all our *Passions* and *Affections* and *Inclinations*, which are the more immediate Subjects of moral *Good* or *Evil*, according as they are directed to their proper Objects, that is chiefly to *Things above* ; and are under a due Conduct and Regulation ; Or as they are on the contrary suffered to grow headstrong and rampant, so as to become past all Check and Guidance of the *Spirit* or *Inner Man* in St. Paul's Phrase ; which having once let go the Reins, is unexpectedly run away with ; not without much helpless Terror and Reluctance, into utter Ruin and Destruction in clear full Prospect before his Eyes, but certain and inevitable. Even this human *Soul* of ours is frequently attributed to God in Scripture by Analogy ; and so are our *Passions* and *Affections*, such as *Love*, *Aversion*, *Anger*, and *Displeasure*, *Pity* and *Compassion*, *Hatred*, *Pleasure*, and such like ; by the help of which we conceive incomprehensible Perfections in his Nature, correspondent to our *Passions* and *Affections* duly regulated. Concerning these I shall only make these few short Observations.

I. FIRST,

I. FIRST, That these Passions, and Affections or Inclinations, are so far from being of the same Kind in God with what they are in us; that, as our Church asserts, there are none of them in him, who is without *Body, Parts, or Passions*. He can no more have any of this *Kind* of Passions and Affections or Inclinations, than he can have an human *Soul*, or human *Mind*: And this he cannot have without a spiritual and bodily Substance blended together in his Nature; framed and constituted for a Principle of mixed and compounded Acts, of a quite different Kind from those of pure Spirit; or of Matter intirely disjoined and separate from Spirit. The very Import and Etymology of those Words taken in a literal Sence shew, how unworthy they are of the divine Nature; the Term *Passions* expresses that Suffering or Passiveness of the Mind, and that sensible Commotion of the Blood and Spirits which is consequent to each of them, in Proportion to the Strength and Violence to which they arrive. *Affections* is a Term one Degree farther removed from Sence, and bodily Commotion; and yet they have their Name from affecting us even in our bodily Parts, sometimes very strongly and sensibly; and they frequently become visible to others in our very Countenance. The *Inclinations* are to the Mind, what Appetites are to the Body; more remote and concealed from the Observation of others: They are deeper rooted in the Mind and never discover them-

themselves otherwise than by putting the Passions into motion; and setting them to work towards the Objects to which we secretly incline. And yet even these *Inclinations* are not exerted without an inward Feeling or Consciousness of some Workings and Commotion within us; and are not any Operations of the pure Spirit alone, but proceed from it in Concurrence with the imperceptible Fibres of the Body and our Animal Spirits. Now if the Inclinations of the Mind, which are most remote from all sensible Commotion, are so unworthy of God, and of a quite different Kind from any of the divine Perfections: Surely our *Passions* and *Affections*, which are attended with such sensible bodily Commotions as even to become often visible in the Countenance, must be much more unworthy of him. Nay tho' we should remove from all these every Imperfection and irregularity to which they are subject; all Corruption, Uneasiness, and Disturbance; we could not however attribute them to God in a literal Acceptation and Meaning: For at best they are the Result and Operations of Matter and Spirit in an essential Union, and considered as the constituent Ingredients of the Mind or Soul of Man; insomuch that to say the Body is the Instrument of the Spirit, is such another Impropriety of Speech, as to say the Spirit is the Instrument of the Body.

2. THAT tho' there can be literally none of those Passions, and Affections or Inclinations in God,

God, of the same Kind with ours; yet they being ascribed to him all thro' the Scriptures, Men have not been sufficiently aware of their Rashness in peremptorily asserting that there are no Passions in him; without removing the Objection which is so natural and obvious against that too general Assertion: Namely, that then what is spoken of God thro' the Scripture in the Style of human Passions, can have no determinate and intelligible Meaning. If he is altogether without any Passions at all, then the Terms expressive of them must be altogether without a solid and usefull Meaning when they are spoken of him. This Objection, I say, should at the same time have been removed, by shewing that tho' there are no Passions or Affections in God of the same Kind with ours; yet there must be such a correspondent Similitude or Proportion between some incomprehensible Perfections of the divine Nature, and our human Passions and Inclinations, as is a sure Foundation for a Parity of Reason between them: Such as shall render the Language of our Affections expressive of something as real, and true, and answerable, when they are ascribed to God; as when they are spoken of Man in their most strict and literal Propriety. Since no Man scruples to attribute the Affection of *Love* to God, in order to express a correspondent Perfection in his Nature; why should we not attribute to him after the same manner, those other Affections I have mentioned? For they being not only Perfections in our human Nature, when duly directed; but also so many Operations



perations of the *Mind*, cannot be ascribed to God by mere Metaphor: But are transfered to him by the same Kind of Analogy with the other Perfections and Operations of it; and particularly with the virtuous Dispositions of the Soul; with which they have so close a Connexion, that most of our inward Virtues and Graces consist in the due Conduct and Regulation of our Passions and Affections. And therefore if you take away all that true and real Similitude and correspondency, which makes them analogous Representations of some divine Perfections; you render them as void of all Sence and Meaning when spoken of God, as if they were so many inarticulate Sounds.

To take off any surprize this may give the Reader, it must be considered; that tho' our most commendable Passions are now become very faint and distant Representations of the divine Perfections; because of that miserable moral Crookedness and Distortion of them even at the best, from their native Uprightness and Regularity: Yet in a State of Innocence, they were so far from being attended with any moral Corruption, or uneasiness and ruffling, either of Body or Mind; that they then tended to their proper Objects with a most delightful Serenity, and were the more immediate Instruments both of our Virtue and Happiness. Their whole Bent and Tendency was to moral Goodness, without any Reluctance or Murmuring of the Soul; from whence arose an  
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uniform Pleasure and unmingled Complacence of Mind in our first Parents; heightned by a Prospect and Consciousness within them, of that lively Resemblance and Similitude they bore to the Fountain of all Perfection, after whose Image they were created. In that blessed State of Harmony and Agreement among all the Powers and Faculties of human Nature, we may well presume our Passions had a vastly greater and more complete Conformity to the divine Perfections: And were such lively Transcripts of them, that our whole manner of thinking and speaking of God now, by Analogy with them, must still exhibit to us something real and correspondent in respect of him; even in this State of Imperfection and Degeneracy. And when these Passions of ours, which are so generally vitious and contemptible, are in some good Degree set right again in this Life, under the Regulation and Conduct of Reason and Religion; and come to receive a proportionable Improvement with the rest of our Nature at the great Change: Then will it appear how bright and shining Representations they are of the incomprehensible Perfections of the Divinity; and the glorious Resemblance will become more Conspicuous and Admirable.

3. THAT tho' in a State of Innocence all the Faculties and Operations of the Mind, our Intellect, and Reason, and Will; our Passions and Affections and Inclinations; and those Vir-  
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ties and Graces of our Souls which consist in the due Conduct and Regulation of them, were all of them equally intire and lively Images and Representations of the divine Perfections: Yet in the State of Corruption and Degeneracy we now are, our Passions and Affections carry in them but a Degree of Analogy inferior to the rest; as having more of bodily Disturbance and Commotion in their Composition, and a greater Concurrence of the material Part of our Frame, than the Intellect and Will; or those virtuous Dispositions of the Soul, which become no otherwise conspicuous than in the external Performances which proceed from them. These are more remote from Sense, and from any Impressions made on the grosser and visible Parts of the Body, than our Passions; And seem therefore to us to approach nearer to the Operations of Beings altogether immaterial; and for that Reason to be more apt and complete Similitudes and Representations of the correspondent Perfections in the divine Nature. But the Passions and Affections being attended with so many different irregular Commotions of our sensible bodily Parts, caused by an Inclination towards what is grateful and agreeable; or an Aversion from what is unpleasant and disagreeable, are therefore to be considered in a lower Degree of Analogy: As it were in the middle betwixt the purely Intellectual Powers of the Mind, on one Side; and our bodily Senses and Members, in the other extreme; which last, together with the

Ideas of other things merely sensible and material, can be ascribed to God in Metaphor only, as having no Foundation of a *Similar* and *Correspondent* Reality in the Divine Nature.

4. LASTLY, From hence we may observe wherein consists the true Kind and Manner of our Imitation of God, with respect to our human Passions, and Affections, or Inclinations. Nothing is more evident than that there can be no Imitation of what we do not at all know; and if all the divine Perfections are altogether inconceivable to us as they are in themselves, they must all likewise be in the same Sense altogether inimitable. What then must we mean when we speak of our Imitation of God, and of his Perfections; Surely we mean that we are to imitate them, after the same manner we come to know them; our Imitation must be agreeable and proportionable to our Knowledge and Conceptions; So that if we know and conceive them no otherwise than by Analogy with our own human Properties, particularly our Affections and Inclinations; we can have no other method for our Imitation. This must be as mediate and indirect and Analogical as our Knowledge; and must consist in the Exercise of a vastly lower and inferior *Kind* of Powers and Faculties, regulated according to that Knowledge we are able to procure of the Pattern and Original of all Perfection. As the divine Being is absolutely perfect in himself, so  
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ought it to be the whole endeavour of our Lives to improve our Nature in the utmost degree of Perfection possible to Creatures of our Kind. As the internal Dispositions of the Divinity, as well as the external Exertions of them, are always directed according to his infinite Wisdom and Knowledge, which are Analogous to those Properties in us called by the same Names: So ought our Inclinations and Affections and Passions, which are likewise correspondent to the Divine Dispositions and Affections, to be constantly regulated agreeably to the Dictates of Reason, improved and cultivated to the utmost of our Power, and guided by the best Light we can procure. Consequently all this must be performed, by taking off our Passions and Affections from the things of this World, and placing them upon their most noble and proper Objects, the things of another: That is, from things whereof we have direct and immediate Conceptions and Ideas, to things altogether imperceptible and incomprehensible to us as they are in themselves, and of which we have only mediate and representative Conceptions. Or in the Apostle's Expression, *Setting our Affections on things above, and not on things on the Earth*; and again, *Looking at the things that are not seen, The invisible things of God which are clearly seen—being understood by the things that are made.*

OUR Imitation of God therefore in this respect, consists in the due Regulation of our  
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Passions according to the governing Part of our compound Nature; and in restoring them as near as we can to that original state of Rectitude and Perfection, wherein they gave us a much greater Resemblance and Similitude of the incomprehensible Perfections of the Divinity: By raising them up to Heaven and things divine; not viewed directly, but in those representative Images only which we have of such Beings; by placing them on God, as the primary and ultimate Object of them all, but still conceivable only by Analogy; and by leaving the things of this World no farther share in our Affections, than in proportion to the Relation they bear to him, and as far only as they are consistent with his more immediate Service. They who disallow this *Analogical* manner of *Imitating*, as well as conceiving God and his Perfections, do most effectually cut off any real and *Practicable* Imitation of him: They who presume upon an Imitation of his Perfections from any *Direct* and *Immediate* Knowledge of them, or as if they were of the same Kind with any correspondent Properties in us, and as if this rendered us capable of an Imitation of God in an inferior *Degree* of his moral Perfections; may as well pretend to imitate his inconceivable Essence or Substance. Nor on the other hand can Men account for all that is spoken of God thro' the whole Scripture, in the Language of our commendable human Passions, Affections, and Inclinations; otherwise than upon a Supposition that they

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must all refer to some incomprehensible Perfections of his: For to what Use or Purpose are all those Terms if they are mere Figures only and Metaphors for *Nothing in God*; and how could they excite our Love, and Gratitude, and Admiration of him; or be any Pattern or Example for our Imitation, unless they exhibited to our Understanding something as real and actual, tho' not of the same Kind, on the Part of the divine Nature, as of the Human?

ALAS for those fiery Zealots against Analogy! It is in this that the great Dignity and Excellency of our Imitation of God consists; in bringing all our Passions and Affections and Inclinations, so intirely under the Dominion and Influence of the spiritual and governing Part of our Frame; that things unseen and incomprehensible shall become the chief Objects to which they tend; so that the main of our Affections and Inclinations shall be to *Things we know not what*, in the short and captious Phrase of our modern *Arians*. Yes, to things we know not what, by any direct or immediate Conception or Idea; Yes, to things we have now no other Knowledge of, but by Semblance only and Analogy: And it is the farther more direct and immediate Knowledge and Enjoyment of them in Reverſion, which become the great and prevailing Motives with us to rectify and overcome that almost inflexible Turn our Passions took, since the Fall, to things which give

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them

them only an immediate, fenſitive, and preſent Gratification.

THUS then, ſay the Oppoſers of Analogy, we imitate our ſelves, and not God. No, the giving a Loofe to the natural Corruption, and Irregularity, and exorbitant fallies of our Paſſions, is more truly to be called an Imitation of our ſelves, in our preſent State ; the regular Conduct and rational Management of them is no *Imitation*, but a real *Improvement* of our ſelves, and a Reſtitution of our Nature, as far as we are able, to our primitive Likeneſs and Reſemblance of the Divinity : And our gradual habitual Progreſs in regaining that original Likeneſs, is the true and only Imitation of the divine Perfections whereof we are capable. Then, they will urge, in the State of Innocency there could be no Imitation of God. Yes, a more exact and perfect Imitation of God, than is poſſible for us now. Our firſt Parents Imitation of him conſiſted in an *Exact* and *Intire* Conformity of all their Faculties and Operations to the great Pattern and Standard of all Perfection, as far as their Nature and *Kind* was capable. It was ſuch an exact Imitation, in a lower *Kind*, as there is now in Angels and glorified Saints ; which may perhaps for ever receive additional *Degrees* of Improvement : But they can never be employed as we are, in waſhing off Stains ; and cleaning ſuch Defilements as have miſerably defaced and ruined that wonderful Performance, which came out  
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of the Hands of the divine Artist with a lively and amiable Resemblance of himself.

V. THE last Head of positive divine Attributes, are such as we conceive by Analogy with our own moral *Virtues* and evangelical *Graces*. These are what Men commonly call the Moral Attributes of God; but when they hold them to be of the same Kind they are in us, they at best think very loosely, and speak too much in the General. Whereas if we come to consider them distinctly and in particular; we must first except all those Virtues and Graces of our Souls which relate to the Duty we owe our selves; such as *Temperance, Chastity, Regeneration, Poverty of Spirit, Meekness, Fortitude, Diligence, Humility*, and such like: None of this sort of Virtues are ever attributed by any body to God. Secondly, We must remove likewise from the Divinity all those Virtues and Graces, which come under the Head of our Duty to God; as *Faith, Fear, Hope, Trust, Gratitude, Thankfulness, Devotion, Reverence, Worship*, and such like: For none of those Qualifications or Dispositions of our Mind, or the Offices and Performances consequent to them, which respect God as our Creator and the Object of all our Obedience and Worship, can be any way attributed to him consistently with common Sense. So that no other of our Virtues or Graces can be even imagined of the same Kind in God and us, or be rationally ascribed to him after any manner, and consequently come

under Consideration here; but those of a third Rank, which relate altogether to the Duty we owe to one another: Such as *Justice, Mercy and Compassion, Bounty, Benignity, Liberality, Truth and Sincerity, Long-suffering, Forgiveness, Benevolence, Mildness, Clemency*, and such like; by Analogy with which we conceive and represent to our selves supernatural, but similar and correspondent moral Perfections in the divine Being, which are otherwise utterly inconceivable and imperceptible to any Faculty in the Mind of Man.

Now the Question here is, whether any of those moral Attributes in this last Rank, are of the same *Kind* in God that they are in us? And whether the divine Perfections which we term Moral, differ only in *Degree*, from those in us called by the same Names?

To answer this more distinctly I shall here again remark, that the word *Virtue* or *Goodness* in any Instance means; either first that Inward Temper or *Disposition* of Soul, which inclines us to the outward Performance of all good Offices towards the rest of Mankind. Or Secondly, the *External Exercise* and *Exertion* of the inward good and virtuous Dispositions of the Soul, in such Acts and Performances as are the natural result and Consequences of those good Inclinations and Propensions. Or lastly the word *Virtue* is taken for both these considered together. If it is asked here which of

these it is that we ascribe to God for a divine Attribute? I answer, both of them together in one complex Notion or Conception; the very same we frame to our selves of our own human Virtues or moral Perfections: This being the best thing we can ascribe to him, as the most apt and lively Similitude and Representation within the compass of our Knowledge, of an incomprehensible moral Perfection in the Divinity. Now if neither the real intrinsic Disposition of the divine Nature to any moral Action, can be the same in Kind with the virtuous Disposition of an human Soul or Mind, which is composed of finite Spirit and Body: Nor the outward Exertions and Manifestations of moral Goodness, flowing from the intrinsic divine Perfections; are the same in Kind or Manner, with any good Actions or virtuous Performances proceeding from the inward Disposition of the Soul of Man; Then the moral Attributes of God cannot be of the same *Kind* with any of our Virtues and Graces, either in Whole or in Part; nor can we otherwise ascribe any of these to him, than by the same Analogy thro' which we attribute to him the *Soul* or *Mind* of Man, and any of its natural Powers or Physical Properties.

THIS leads us directly to the true Cause of Mens great Error in imagining the moral Attributes of God to be of the same Kind with what they are in Man. They mistake the external Exertions and Manifestations of the divine Perfections,

fections, visible in the Works of the Creation and in the Course of Providence; for the inconceivable Perfections themselves which are intrinsic to the divine Nature, and from whence those Manifestations and Effects flow: And then imagine the outward Performances of Virtue and Goodness proceeding from the inward Inclination and Disposition of our human Soul; to be of the same Kind with the outward Exertions and Manifestations of the Perfections inherent in the divine Nature. Whereas even these have a Similitude only, and Resemblance of the correspondent Exertions and outward Manifestations of the divine Perfections; which are performed after quite a different and supernatural Manner; as vastly different, as the Power and Knowledge of God and his other natural Attributes, are different from those of frail and impotent Mortals. For want of considering this duly, Men grossly mistake those complex Notions we form to our selves of our own Virtues and Graces, before we attribute them to God; for direct Perceptions or Ideas of moral Perfections as they are inherent and even essential to the divine Nature.

I HAVE made this Point sufficiently evident before; and it cannot but already open in full prospect to the Mind of every Reader; that no Perfections inherent in the Divinity, and even essential to it (as it hath already appeared all the real true Attributes of God are) can be of the same Kind with any inward Tendency or moral Disposition of an human Soul; And that all the  
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external Exertions and Actions of one Intelligent Nature, must differ as essentially from those of another; as the inherent essential Powers and Faculties from whence they proceed; and that these again must be as different as the Essences to which they respectively belong. But because this is a point of great Importance, and cannot be too plainly inculcated; I shall again clear it up farther, by instancing in those moral Attributes of God which have been most contested, and always mentioned in opposition to this Doctrine of Analogy.

GOODNESS is a general Word including *All* moral Virtue in Man, and all moral Perfection in the Divinity: If Men say that this is intirely of the same Kind in both, and different only in degree; these two Consequences must necessarily follow, neither of which they themselves will allow. First, That all Instances of human Goodness under the two first Heads of moral Virtues, which relate to God and to our selves, must be ascribed to him equally and upon the same Foot with all the Virtues of the third Rank. So that he must have true *Faith*, and *Resignation*, and *Trust*, and *Devotion*, and *Thankfulness*; and in respect of himself he must be very *Temperate*, and *Chaste*, and *Humble*, and *Patient* under Affliction, and full of true *Contrition* and *Repentance*; all which tho' they are great Instances of Goodness in Man, yet are never even imagined to be of the same Kind with any Goodness in God. Secondly, That

the whole inward *Nature* and *Frame*, as well as the internal *Disposition* of the human Soul to Goodness; must be the very same in Kind, with the intrinsic *Essence* as well as the *Moral Perfections* of the Divinity.

BUT let us restrain the word Goodness to the last mentioned Rank of Virtues only, which some call the Social Virtues, and which make up but a third Part of our moral Goodness; and yet are by some made the whole Sum and Substance of all Virtues: By some Men ridiculously ranged under the general Head of *Benevolence*, and impiously under the Head of *Honour*, by your Men of Honour without Conscience; and both of them generally considered and treated exclusive of our Duty to God and our selves, and of the glorious Improvements of Morality into evangelical Graces by Revelation. Even in this Acceptation of *Goodness*, you can do no more than put together the several different Notions you form of all the Social Virtues, from the inward virtuous Dispositions and Inclinations of an human Soul; and from all the suitable Exertions or Exercises of those inward good Qualities and Dispositions in external Performances, into one very complex Notion compounded of them all under the name of *Goodness*: And then preposterously attribute that very general Notion or Conception to God in the Gross, as one real Perfection of the same Kind with a correspondent moral Virtue in the Soul of Man.

BUT they will urge, that if the outward Exertions and Acts of God's Goodness, are of the same Kind with the outward Operations and Performances proceeding from virtuous Dispositions in us; then the Goodness it self as it is in him, is likewise of the same Kind with what it is in our Souls. I Answer, that the Supposition is absolutely false; and I leave it again upon the Objectors, if they can, to instance in any one Exertion, or Operation, or Manifestation of the *Divine Goodness*, which is of the same Kind with any external Exertion or Operation of that Goodness and Virtue which is in the Soul of Man; and to shorten the Dispute I am willing to let it pass for a Decision of this Controversy. The true Nature and *Manner* of all the divine Operations of Goodness is utterly incomprehensible. And tho' we see and feel and enjoy the blessed Effects and happy Consequences of infinite Goodness: Yet the *Manner* of *Performing* them is as essentially different from the manner of any Exertions or Operations of our virtuous Qualities and Dispositions, as his Essence, his Power, or his Knowledge; and so intirely of another Kind, that they are utterly impracticable by Man. It is no matter where I begin or end in giving Instances to this Purpose. It was of his Goodness that he *Created* us out of Nothing: This surely is not an Operation of the same Kind with our performing, making, or building any thing for the Benefit and Advantage of others. It is of his Goodness that he *Preserves* us; but this

this is a Kind of Preservation as much above our Capacities, as the incomprehensible Energy of his Almighty Power: And the real manner of it is as totally different from our way of preserving any thing, as our living and moving and having our Being *In him*, differs from the manner of material Substance possessing Place. He *Redeemed* us by his infinite Goodness from the Power of Death and Hell; but not as Man redeems with Silver and Gold. He *Sanctifyeth* us; not with Prayer and Blessing or personal Exhortation, after the manner of Men; but by the secret, imperceptible, and incomprehensible Influence of his Spirit upon ours. He *Forgives* us our Sins; but not by word of Mouth, by any Sort of temporal Pardon, or only by forbearing Retaliation or Punishment; but by taking away the very Guilt and Pollution of Sin out of the Soul. He *Defends* us from the Attempts of evil Spirits and evil Men; not as Man defends by strength of Arm, or the civil Power. He *Gives Food and Raiment*; not by directly bestowing Morsels of Meat, and Changes of Garments; but by sending us Rain and Sunshine and fruitful Seasons, and by various other imperceptible methods of his Providence. By his Bounty he *Provides* all things necessary for our Souls and Bodies; But not as a Man may reckon to us a great Sum of Money, or make a Conveyance of a Parcel of Land; or fix a Settlement for the teaching Arts and Sciences, and the Instruction of Persons in the Principles of Religion. He pre-  
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scribes and publishes good *Laws* to Mankind, not after the manner of human Proclamations and Acts of Legislature : But by giving us Reason, and Senfes, and other Faculties to discern and execute them ; and by supernaturally inspiring and empowering some Men to teach and promulgate them, and to confirm their Authority. And tho' the Ten Commandments were written by the Finger of God, yet it will be grossly absurd to imagine even that Operation of the divine Goodness, to be of the same Kind and manner with a Man's writing Laws with a Pen. In short he *Rewards* Virtue even in this Life ; but in no one Instance after the same manner as Man doth. He *Punisheth* Wickedness even in this Life with Calamities of various Kinds, and sometimes with sudden Death ; but not as Man doth by Whipping or Beheading or Crucifying. In these and all the other Exertions and Operations of the divine Goodness the *Manner* is essentially different from that of any good and virtuous Operations or Performances of ours ; and utterly impracticable and inimitable to us in any Degree. But you will say the external Operations and Exertions of good Dispositions in the Soul of Man, are however like the Operations and Exertions of Goodness in God. Yes they are, and so very like that this hath been the Occasion of Men's imagining both to be of the same Kind ; Yes they have a *Likeness*, and that only ; and this is what we assert and contend for. And from thence it is that we infer an Analogy

gy and Resemblance of the inward virtuous Dispositions of our Souls also, to the moral internal Attributes and Perfections of the Divinity; at the same time that we think it the highest Presumption to assert, there is any thing in us of the same Kind with what there is in the real intrinsic Nature of God. But to be yet more particular.

JUSTICE is defined, *A perpetual Will or Disposition of Mind to give every one his due*; that is in respect of *Property, Reward, and Punishment*. As to the first of them; tho' we have *Property* in respect of one another, yet no Man can have any *Property* in respect of God and exclusive of him; and therefore Justice in this Sence of the Word cannot be of the same Kind in God that it is in us. The Justice due from one Person to another in the same State and Condition of Being, must differ infinitely from the Justice of God towards his Creatures: And as for the just Service and Worship which is due from us to God, no Man will say it can be in any one Instance of the same Kind with the Justice of God towards us. As to *Rewards* and *Punishments*, those of God are mostly dispensed in another World, and respect both Soul and Body; and therefore they cannot be of the same Kind with any Rewards and Punishments among Men. But you will say he often rewards good Men, and inflicts temporal Punishment in this Life. But how do we know when it is he does this, or in what particular Instances?

Instances? We have no other way even of guessing at it, by our own Reason, and till he pleases to reveal it; than by observing the Prosperity and Success of some good Men, and the Misfortunes of some wicked Men. After all this, how do you frame to your self a Notion or Conception of the divine Justice? No otherwise than by putting together those visible *Effects* and *Consequences* of it (the *True Cause* and *Real Manner* of which is altogether inconceivable and unaccountable to us, but) which have a great Likeness of our human Rewards and Punishments; and the *Consciousness* you have of a Disposition and Inclination in your own Mind to administer human Rewards and Punishments with Justice and Equity. This complex Notion or Conception you ascribe to God for an Attribute; that is, to represent some real and correspondent, but incomprehensible Perfection in his Nature, which gives every Person his due Reward and Punishment, after a Manner as inconceivable by us as that intrinsic Disposition of Mind which prompts him to those external Performances.

BUT you will say, it is however an inward Disposition, or Will, or Inclination both in God and Man to give every one their due; and that is Justice still. Yes it is; and what deceives Men here is, that *Justice* is necessarily a Term with us common to that virtuous Disposition in the Soul of Man, whereof we have a Self-consciousness: And that intrinsic and

correspondent Perfection in the very Nature of God, which is altogether incomprehensible. And that which makes this necessary, is our having no Conception or Idea of that Perfection as it is in its self; and therefore we are obliged to conceive and name it from one of our own Virtues, that is by Similitude only and Analogy with a correspondent Perfection of our Humanity. Not but that upon Recollection we cannot avoid concluding that these two intrinsic Dispositions, one of which is literally the Virtue of Justice in us, and the other an infinite Perfection in the divine Nature; must as necessarily be different in Kind, as the Soul of Man, and the intrinsic Essence or Substance of God.

BESIDES (which I think ought not to be omitted here) if we carry our Thoughts up to the first Production of all Intelligent Beings, the very Distinction of *Remunerative* and *Vindictive* Justice is intirely lost in respect of God; and the very Notion and Conception of it must be dropped. For originally they were all morally good; and if they had continued so, there was no room left for Punitive Justice: Nor indeed upon this Supposition, could there have been any Remunerative Justice; since there would have been then no lost Degrees of moral Goodness to be regained by them; and all the Bounty of God must in such a Case have been the Result not of Justice, but altogether of his free Grace and Goodness. Nay

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even after the Fall of Men and Angels, Misery became the *Natural* inevitable Consequence of their voluntary Corruption of themselves: And they who resolve all the Punishments and Miseries of another Life into a purely positive Infliction of God, do think with the Vulgar. Which serves to shew how far we are from having any direct and immediate Conception or Idea of that infinite Perfection in God; and how widely it differs in Kind from the moral Virtue in us which we distinguish by the Name of Justice. So little do we know what the real Perfection of Justice is in the very Mind of God it self, by help of that complex Notion we form of our own Virtue of Justice, from the inward Temper and Disposition of our Souls; together with those human Rewards and Punishments, which have a Semblance only or Similitude of those Acts or Operations consequent to the Justice of God, in the Course of his Providence and the Manifestations of it towards Mankind even in this Life: All which we conceive and express no otherwise, than by Analogy with the external Exertions, and Operations, and Effects flowing from an inward virtuous Disposition and Inclination of an human Soul.

AGAIN, *Mercy*, in the general Sence of the Word, includes all the Particulars of God's Goodness to Mankind; in this Sence therefore as it doth not differ from the divine Attribute of Goodness, I hope no Man will now say it

is of the same Kind with the Virtue of Mercy in Man. As it is considered in a duly limited Acceptaion, it consists either in forgiving Injuries, and so it is opposed to Revenge and Punishment; or in pitying the Miserable, and so it is opposed to Cruelty or Hardness of Heart.

As to the first of those two Acceptations of the word *Mercy*; surely our forgiving a frail Fellow mortal in the same Rank of Being with our selves, and the forgiving a Creature infinitely different in Essence and Properties; the remitting such temporal bodily Punishments as we are able to inflict, and God's Remission of eternal supernatural Punishments for Soul and Body; our forgiving outward Offences only committed against Man, and his forgiving the inward Guilt and Pollution of the Mind contracted by Offences committed against the most high and incomprehensible God; our Change from Resentment and Purposes of Revenge to a contrary Disposition and Temper of Mind, and God's forgiveness proceeding from the fixed and immutable Rectitude of his Nature; must undoubtedly be as totally different moral Qualities, as the *Nature* and *Condition* of God are different from ours. Nay the more violent the Commotion of Mind is in us, and the greater the Inclination to Revenge and Punishment is, the more exalted is that Virtue of Mercy in us which overcomes it all; but there is no change in God, nor are there  
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any irregular Passions in him to be overcome and rectified. Surely, I say, none of those opposite Exertions and Operations, flowing from the internal Dispositions of the divine and human Nature, can be any more of the same Kind; than the divine and human *Essence*, or the *Faculties* which exert themselves in those Operations. But you will say it is all Mercy still, whether in God or Man. Yes surely, but not the same *Kind* of Mercy. What that real Perfection is in the Nature of God which inclines and disposes him to such external, incomprehensible, inimitable Acts and Operations of Mercy and forgiveness, we know not; and for this Reason we apply that same Term to him, by which we express the inward Virtue and Grace of Mercy whereof we have a Consciousness in our selves. And because the external Operations and Exertions of that virtuous Disposition of Soul in us, have in them some Likeness, and Resemblance, or Analogy with those Instances of Forgiveness consequent to the intrinsic Goodness of God, we call them both by the same Name. When this forgiving Inclination or Temper of the Soul in Man, is strengthened and confirmed by Habit and Perseverance; and taken in the General, so as to include all the external Performances of it, we call it *Mercy*: And this very complex Notion, together with the Word which expresseth it, we ascribe to God, to represent a correspondent divine Attribute.

IF it is asked, since the very external Exertions and Operations of the divine *Goodness*, and *Justice*, and *Mercy* are so incomprehensible; how do we know that there is any Similitude, and Correspondency between them, and the virtuous Performances proceeding from our own Dispositions? I answer, the very same way we came to know we were made in the *Likeness*, and after the *Image* of God. As our Nature was originally framed to his *Likeness*, in the Powers and Faculties of the Mind; so all the commendable Exertions and Acts and Operations of those Powers and Faculties, must likewise carry in them a distant Similitude of the divine Operations: And thus it is that we are enabled to think and speak of all those Exertions and Operations of the divine Goodness in every Instance; which would have otherwise remained utterly and intirely inconceivable. This Similitude, even in the external Operations of both, is a farther Illustration and Corroboration of that glorious Revelation, that we are made after the *Image* of God and in his *Likeness*. And if any Man is still inclined to think it more than a *Likeness*; let him but lay aside all Idea and Conception of Goodness, or Justice, or Mercy, or Truth as they are in Man; and then try whether he hath any Idea or Conception left for them as they are in God. If there were not a sure Foundation of Analogy, and a solid unerring Parity of Reason in the *Likeness* both of our inward Powers

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and Faculties to the divine Perfections; and of all the external Exertions and Operations of them, to the outward Exertions and Manifestations of God's Perfections: We should not have been able to conceive them at all; much less to account for the Truth and Certainty of any of our Conceptions of God and his Attributes; or for the Truth of any of our Reasonings upon the Operations, or Manifestations, or Dispensations of his Providence.

As *Mercy* is taken for pitying the Miserable, and for the outward Acts and Methods of relieving them, which are the external Exertions of that Virtue in the Soul of Man; it cannot be of the same Kind with the infinite Perfection in the Nature of God, which inclines him to pity or relieve us; as will plainly appear from the Order and Procedure of this Virtue in the Mind or Soul of Man. There is first, a Consciousness of an uneasy Sensation or Commotion stirred up within us at the Mention or Presence of a miserable Object, and that is *Pity*; a Passion in the Soul naturally excited by a view of Pain or Affliction in any of our fellow Creatures: And this is often heightened and increased by natural Affection, or Friendship, or Intimacy; and then it gets the Name of *Compassion*. When by this inward Perturbation or Uneasiness, together with a rational Sense of Duty to God and Man, we are prompted to administer Help and Relief by visiting the afflicted in Person, actually supplying

ing them with some of our own Meat and Drink, or Cloaths, or Money, or Medicines; then it goes by the Name of *Charity*. When this grows into Practice and a settled Habit, and the inward Disposition of the Soul is strengthened and confirmed by Perseverance in such Acts and Operations, as Opportunity offers; and exerts it self on all such proper Occasions to the utmost; then we put all these things together into one complex Notion, and call it *Mercy*. When all this is done, that very same complex Notion or Conception we transfer to the Divinity to express a correspondent incomprehensible Perfection, and distinguish it by the Name of a moral Attribute: Tho' at the same Time it is evident, that not one Step of that Gradation can be ascribed to him in a literal and proper Sence.

THE only Question here then is whether Pity, with the utmost Regulation and Improvement it is capable of in the Soul of Man; can be of the same Kind with the intrinsic Perfection in the very Nature of God, which inclines him to all divine Means and Methods for relieving the Misery of his Creatures? But nothing is more evident at first Thought, than that they cannot be of the same Kind; since Pity of a fellow Creature, and a feeling of his Misery is still an human Passion, tho' in its utmost Improvement and Exaltation; and since there are, literally speaking, no Passions in God. This Passion or Affection in the Soul of Man,  
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may very aptly represent a correspondent Perfection of another Kind in the Divinity; which, for want of any direct Conception or Idea, we conceive and express after the same manner we do that virtuous Disposition we are conscious of within our selves: Nay that inconceivable Perfection is also in Scripture *Metaphorically* expressed by the Hebrew word מִתְחַנֵּן and in the Greek by σπλάγχνιζεσθαι, both which are of the same Import with *The yearning of the Bowels* in English; and so it is said Luke i. 78. Διὰ σπλάγχνα ἐλέησ θεὸς *Thro' the Bowels of the Mercy of God.*

I HAVE been thus particular in the three chief moral Attributes, because I would leave it to the Reader to go over all the rest in his own Mind; and to distinguish in each of them the outward *Exertions* and *Operations* of every Instance of Virtue, from that inward *Inclination* or *Disposition* in the Soul, whence those outward Performances proceed. When the Question is thus rightly stated, let him first consider whether those Virtues are of the same Kind in God that they are in the Soul of Man; and he will soon convince himself how unworthy that Thought is of the divine Nature: Then let him compare even the outward Operations and Performances of Virtue in us, with the outward Exertions and Operations of the correspondent Perfections in the divine Nature; and he will find that no one of them is of the same Kind with those of the  
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other. If any intrinsic Perfection of God were of the same Kind with any virtuous Disposition in our Soul, it would be an human, and not a divine Perfection; and if any of the outward Exertions and Operations were of the same Kind, they must proceed from intrinsic Powers and Faculties and Dispositions of the same Kind: Which is impossible, since the very Constitution and Frame of an human Soul includes both Matter and Spirit; but God is all Spirit, and not only such, but a Kind of Spirit more essentially different from all other created Spirits, than they are from embodied Spirits. So that there can be no Powers or Faculties, no moral Attributes or Perfections in the highest Order of Angels, of the same Kind with the correspondent Powers or Faculties, Attributes or Perfections in the Divinity; whereof it is their greatest Glory and the Highest Exaltation of their Nature, to have a more lively Similitude only and Resemblance.

I SHALL only make two Observations here. One concerning our *Knowledge* of those moral Attributes: The other concerning our *Imitation* of them.

I. FIRST then, it is evident from what hath been said, that they who renounce and explode this true divine Analogy, take away *All Knowledge* whatsoever of the moral Attributes of God. For as we have no *Direct* Idea or *Immediate* intellectual Perception, either of those  
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intrinsic Perfections in the very Nature and Essence of God; or of the external Exertions or Operations proceeding from them; or of any thing the very same in *Kind* with either; we can have no solid Knowledge at all of them, otherwise than by Analogy. The utmost extent of the Procedure of human Understanding here is thus. As we infer the necessary Existence of an eternal, infinite, intelligent *Being* or *Substance*, from the visible Works of the Creation; so from the sensible Effects of the Course of his Providence, and of his gracious Dispensations to Mankind (the true process and real manner of which we conceive by Similitude only, and Resemblance with the manner of the outward Actions and Operations proceeding from virtuous Dispositions in the Soul of Man) we infer there must be infinite *Perfections* in that Being, correspondent and similar to some of our own Virtues and Graces. As we think and speak of his incomprehensible Substance as really and actually *Existing*, by Analogy with the Existence of our own Substance; so we think and speak of his incomprehensible *Moral Perfections*, by Analogy with the inward virtuous Dispositions in the Soul of Man: Which being the greatest Perfections of human Nature, are the most apt and lively Representations of those which are divine; and we accordingly ascribe them to God for Attributes; that is, for real internal Perfections otherwise utterly incomprehensible and ineffable. They who labour to take away  
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from us this Knowledge of God and his Attributes and Operations, by Analogy ; either ignorantly or designedly strike at the Foundation of all Religion ; and are unwarily, or treacherously doing the Work of Infidels and Heretics.

THUS we not only obtain a certain determinate Knowledge of those moral Attributes of the Divinity, but all our Notions and Conceptions of them become clear and distinct ; as clear and distinct as those we have of the inward virtuous Dispositions of our own Souls : And all the blessed Exertions and Operations of those divine Perfections, which would be otherwise utterly inconceivable and inutterable, become intelligible, and even familiar to us ; thro' the like Operations and Performances to which we are prompted, by the inward virtuous Dispositions whereof we have a direct and immediate Consciousness in our own Mind. Thus our Knowledge of God increases, in the same Proportion with the Knowledge of our selves. So that let us but attain to a true and perfect Notion of what *Goodness, Justice, Mercy and Truth* are in the Soul of Man ; and how these differ from our other inward Virtues and Graces : And then we have the most clear and distinct Notions or Conceptions of the correspondent Perfections in the Nature of God, that are attainable in this Life. In proportion as our own moral Virtues and Graces are habitually improved, and at length happily confirmed in  
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the Soul of Man : So they become still more lively Emblems of the immutable moral Attributes or Perfections of the Divinity : And as far as we carefully observe and consider the outward Operations and Exertions of our own internal virtuous Dispositions ; we by this Means are enabled to comprehend all the Operations and Manifestations of the divine Goodness, represented by them, with more distinctness and Perspicuity.

Now lay aside all *Analogy*, and all *Conception* of the intrinsic moral *Perfections* of the Divinity ; as well as of the external glorious *Exertions* and *Manifestations* of them to the unspeakable Benefit and Advantage of Mankind ; by this *Semblance* and *Representation* : And then our intire Knowledge of the moral Attributes of God (which above all things it concerns us to know with greatest Distinctness and Certainty) is unhappily resolved into impossible *Abstract Ideas*, *Intellectual Vision*, *Purely spiritual Perceptions* ; or *Metaphysical Properties and Perfections*, *Imperfect Notions* and *Conceptions*, *Confused Apprehensions*, *Uncertain Glimmerings* of divine Objects. These and many other such like Terms and Forms of speaking of God and his Attributes, you will frequently meet with ; all of them denoting Uncertainty, Obscurity, and Confusion in our Conceptions of things Divine and Heavenly ; and all occasioned merely thro' Mistake of the true and real manner of conceiving them. What

Edification is there in all those dark and doubtful Phrases; or what Improvement of Divine Knowledge in the Mind of Man? And is it not a very preposterous way of managing our Defence of any Truths in Religion natural or revealed, to make a dangerous Concession at every Turn to its Adversaries; That indeed it must be confessed, the Knowledge we have of the Points in Controversy, and our Conceptions of the moral Attributes of God in particular, are at the best but very imperfect, confused, and obscure.

SUPPOSE some of the shrewd Adversaries to the orthodox Truth, should (as it is well known they do) deny that there are, *Truly speaking*, any such Attributes in the Nature of God as *Justice* or *Mercy*: And from thence make all their Inferences against the Truth and Reality of our Redemption thro' the Merits and Mediation of Christ; and turn all the Language of the Gospel concerning him, into Metaphorical Allusion only to the several particulars of the ceremonial Law; how would you go about to confute them? If you appeal to any Consciousness they must have in their own Minds of *Immediate* tho' obscure Perceptions, and some *Direct* tho' imperfect Glimmerings of any such Attributes in God, it is easy for them to reply with great Truth, that by the utmost Abstraction of their Minds they do not find the least such Glimpse of any divine Attributes. And if you tell them that Justice and Mercy are ascribed to God for Attributes thro' the



the Scripture, they readily grant you that; but reply that Justice and Mercy in Scripture are *Metaphors* only for the internal *Reëtitude* of the divine Nature, and for two different Operations only of the divine Will. Is there any way of confuting them effectually, but by freely acknowledging that we have no direct Conception or Idea, or any immediate Perception whatsoever of Justice and Mercy as they are in the real intrinsic Nature of God; any more than we have of his Essence, or of the rest of his natural and moral Attributes? But that these being the greatest moral Perfections in the Soul of Man, who is made after the Image of God; the greatest whereof we have or can have any Consciousness or Perception in this Life; we do by the Suggestion of natural Reason, and after the Example of the Holy Ghost thro' the whole style of Scripture, transfer them to the Divinity, to represent and express Perfections of another Kind otherwise utterly incomprehensible to the Mind of Man, and which we distinguish by the Name of Moral. And we call them divine Attributes upon a well grounded Presumption of such a real and true Correspondency, and Resemblance between those divine Perfections and the moral Virtues and Graces of our Souls; as renders all our Conceptions of God after that Manner, and all Judgments and Reasonings and Conclusions concerning those Perfections, as solid and true as if our Conceptions of them were more direct and immediate, and as if we were able to express them in the Language of Angels.

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IF it should be objected here, that the *Distinction* of the divine Attributes is founded only in the Mind of Man; and that we ascribe our own Virtues or moral Perfections to God according to that Distinction of them we find within our selves; but that there are no such *Really Distinct* Attributes in the Nature of God. I answer, that it is impossible for us to conceive either what the divine Perfections really are *In Themselves*, or *How* they are *Distinguished* in the very Nature of God. But that since we find our own moral Virtues truly distinguishable in our selves, we are under a necessity of continuing the same Distinction when we transfer them to God for Attributes; because all the Knowledge we have of his moral Perfections, is by Analogy with our own, and that this is the only way we have of thinking and speaking of them: And because it concerns us not to know *How* and after what *Particular Manner* they are really and actually distinguished in the intrinsic Nature of God; but only to know and believe that, however they may be there distinguished, they are certainly so far correspondent and answerable to some of our Virtues and Graces, that we are not under any invincible Mistake or Delusion, in the only Means and Methods given us for the Knowledge of God and his Attributes in this Life.

IN this way of proceeding we may urge unanswerably against the Socinians; that all the rest of the divine Attributes which we call

*Moral*

*Moral* are upon the same foot with *Justice* and *Mercy*; so that, according to them, we must resolve them all equally into the *Rectitude* of the divine Nature, and into the *Effects* of his *Will*. Nay even the divine *Anger*, or *Displeasure*, *Hatred*, *Pity*, together with *Benignity*, and *Love*, which they evasively substitute in the room of *Justice* and *Mercy*: These and every other divine Attribute likewise, must thus be only so many different Words for the *Rectitude* of God's Nature; and all the outward Operations and Manifestations of them, must be no other than so many different Effects of his *Rectitude*, or his *Will*. Thus all Distinction between the divine moral Attributes is utterly destroyed, and summed up together in the *Rectitude*, and *Will* of God; both of them equally incomprehensible, as they are in themselves, with the divine *Justice* and *Mercy*, or with any other Attribute whatsoever. So that thus we may deny all the Attributes of God one after another; thus not only that Distinction of Attributes suggested to us by the Light of Reason, but all that is spoken of God thro' the Scripture in the Language of his *Different* moral Attributes, is brought to nothing: The best Notions and most distinct Conceptions we form of them from the internal virtuous Dispositions of our own Souls, together with the outward Operations and Performances they prompt us to, are thus rendered merely Figurative; and as altogether expressive of nothing *Truly Correspondent* and *Similar* in the real Nature of

God, as if they were so many inarticulate Sounds.

WHAT is all this but by plain Implication and immediate necessary Consequence, to deny that God is *Good*, or *Just*, or *Merciful*; which in exprefs Words would be downright Blasphemy? What is this but making all the distinct Attributes of God mentioned in Scripture so many useless Figures for his *Rectitude*; an unscriptural Word, and altogether without any clear determinate Notion or Conception affixed to it in the Mind, which all the Terms expressive of his moral Attributes have? What is this but rendering them an useless Amusement of Mankind; and at once to destroy all the powerful Motives both in natural and revealed Religion, to our Love of God, our Gratitude to him, our Admiration of his Goodness, and our Worship and Thankfulness: And in short to take off all the Influence and Efficacy of those Attributes, which have a direct Tendency to regulate and exalt our Passions and Affections; and to give them a Turn to every Instance of Virtue and Holiness? This is the very Use made of that Socinian Doctrine by Free-thinkers, Unbelievers and Deists. For if there are in reality *No such* Attributes in the Nature of God as *Justice* and *Mercy*, there can be none of the rest of the moral Attributes really in him: And if they are all notional and imaginary Distinctions of our own; or only different *Metaphors* for his *Rectitude*; then our Conceptions

tions of them, together with our Reasonings, the Judgments we form upon them, and the Conclusions we draw from them, are all groundless and fallacious. Our modern clandestine Arians clinch this Argument quite on the opposite Side; by strenuously maintaining this Inference to follow inevitably, unless we allow all the moral Attributes of God to be of the *Same Kind* with what they are in human Nature.

THUS the two Extremes concur against the orthodox Truth, which is seated between them in the middle, and obliged equally to ward against both. It is false that there are *No such Attributes* in the Nature of God as Justice or Mercy; and it is as false that they are of the same *Kind* with those Virtues in the Soul of Man. For those Words, when transfered to God, express real Perfections in the divine Nature, truly correspondent and answerable to those virtuous Dispositions which they signify in us: And our Virtues and Graces can have no more than a Likeness and Resemblance of those incomprehensible Perfections; they can only represent them; and they must be as much of a different *Kind*, as finite and mortal Man is of a different Kind from the infinite and immortal God. The divine Perfections are the original Patterns and Standard of all created moral and natural Perfection, which at the utmost is but as a Picture or Image to the Substance: And the greatest Glory of all Intelligent Beings is to carry in them a Likeness on-

ly and Resemblance of the Divinity, in Proportion to the Rank and Dignity of their Nature. So that it is not only truly affirmed of God that he is *Just* and *Merciful*, and so of the rest of his moral Attributes; but that he is more *Truly* and *Really* so than Man or Angel. For all these Perfections are in the Creator after a *Manner* infinitely more *Transcendent*, than they can be in any of his Creatures; and particularly in Man, who is expressly said to be formed in the *Likeness* only, and only in the *Image* of God: And surely that which is a *Likeness* only, and no more than an Image, cannot with any Justness and Truth be imagined of the same Kind, with that *Original* whereof it is a Representation only. And yet thus, all our just Reasonings upon the moral Properties or Attributes or Perfections of the real Antitype, must proceed at least upon as sure a Foundation in the very Nature of things, as when they are applyed to the correspondent Properties and Perfections of Men; tho' these are at best but so many living Resemblances of the Divinity. For when we say God is Just and Merciful and Holy; we mean that there is no Justice, or Mercy, or Holiness, or any other moral Perfection in the Creature; but what is in the divine Nature, not in a more eminent Degree, but in a manner so transcendently different, that they are as truly of another Kind, as God himself is of another Kind from all his Creatures. And so essentially of another Kind, that it would be an impious aspiring Presumption

tion in the highest Seraph (perhaps the very Crime of Lucifer) to imagine any thing in himself of the same Kind with the Attributes and Perfections of the Creator.

2. THE second Observation I shall make is, that they who will have the moral Attributes of God of the same Kind with what they are in us; and upon this gross Mistake reject and explode our *Analogous* Conceptions of them, do utterly subvert and destroy all true *Imitation* of the divine Perfections: Which can never be too often repeated; and therefore I shall here again once more urge my Reasons for this Assertion; that they may if possible, strike the Mind of every Reader, and remove all doubt concerning this Point, which has been thought to bear so hard against the Doctrine of divine Analogy.

FOR first, nothing is more evident than that we cannot imitate the *Real* essential moral Perfections of the divine Nature; those supernatural *Intrinsic* Perfections in the divine Mind, from which all the external Operations and Manifestations of Goodness and Justice and Mercy do flow thro' the Universe, and particularly thro' this visible Creation: For these are as inimitable with Respect to their real Nature and Manner, as they are in themselves incomprehensible by us. Surely nothing ought to be more plain, more distinctly perceived, and better known and understood, than a Pattern

or Example for Imitation. But according to those Men, a Pattern is propos'd to our Imitation whereof, in reality, we have not the least Perception or Idea as it is in it self; whereof at the utmost, as they themselves do acknowledge, we have no other than obscure imperfect Notions, and confused uncertain Glimmerings: Which were it true, would only confound and distract all Imitation; and we should thus be left to wander in a Labyrinth, thro' a dark and gloomy Shade, without one certain Glance, or at best with only faint uncertain Glimpses of Light, to discover either our Track or our Leader. And suppose it possible for us to see so far into the intrinsic Nature of God, as to have a clear, and distinct, and *Direct* Perception of the divine moral Perfections as they really are in him: The Consequence of this would be, that the more we could thus see of them, the more inimitable still they would appear. And perhaps one Discovery we should thereby make is, that there is no real Foundation in the divine Nature for that Distinction of ours between his *Natural* and *Moral* Attributes; and that we might undoubtedly as well aspire to an Imitation of his Almighty Power in the Creation of all things, or his infinite Wisdom in the Mysterious Work of our Redemption, as an Imitation of his real moral Perfections.

BUT on the contrary, we have an inward and immediate Consciousness of the Dispositi-  
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ons of our own Souls, and Inclinations of our Wills to all Instances of Virtue and Goodness : And from these, together with the suitable external Acts and Operations of them, we form to our selves complex Notions and Conceptions of all our Virtues, as *Clear* and *Distinct* and *Direct* as any that are in the Mind of Man; before we transfer them to God as Representations of his incomprehensible Perfections. From whence it appears what the true Nature and Manner is of *Imitating* those incomprehensible Perfections; We can imitate them no farther than as they are thus clearly and distinctly discernible in the greatest moral Perfections or Virtues of the human Soul. Our Imitation consists in rectifying and improving those *Correspondent Representations* of the divine Perfections, by Care and Observation of what passes within our selves; refining and exalting them to the utmost of our Power by Prayer, and a constant habitual Exertion of the good Dispositions within us in their several peculiar outward Operations; and establishing and confirming them by Constancy and Perseverance : Till we do in some commendable Degrees restore the inward Powers and Dispositions of our Souls, to that blessed and more compleat Resemblance they originally bore to the moral Perfections of the divine Nature. This is the true and happy Imitation of the moral Attributes of God; a manner of Imitation very clear, and distinct, and intelligible to all Capacities; as well as very practicable by every sincere Christian.

SECONDLY, They who assert our Virtues and Graces to be of the same Kind with the moral Attributes of the Divinity, do intirely cut off all possibility of our imitating even the *External Operations* and Manifestations of those Attributes in the divine Nature ; for this plain Reason. Because it is impossible for the inward Powers and virtuous Dispositions of our Souls, to exert themselves in any one external Operation or Performance of the same *Kind* with the external Operations proceeding from the correspondent divine Perfections in the visible Creation, or in the Course of God's providential Government and Dispensations towards Mankind. The whole Exertion of the Attribute of *Justice* in God, is quite of another Manner and Kind from any external Operation or Performance of ours, and in every Particular inimitable, This must be acknowledged, unless some Instances of *Rewards* and *Punishments* are of the same Kind in both ; but, as I observed before, the divine Rewards mostly respect another Life, they are eternal, and adapted to Soul and Body ; and so far from being practicable by us in the same Kind, that we are not capable of any direct Conception or Idea of them. No nor of his Rewards and Punishments even in this Life ; either of the Soul by inward Grace and Assistance, or leaving it in a State of Hardness and Impenitence ; or of the Body, *How* he conveys Health, or Food, or Raiment ; Riches or Plenty ; or how  
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he sends Sickness, Poverty, or Death: The whole Nature and intire Manner of all these divine Operations and Performances are equally incomprehensible and impracticable. Even in this Life, I say, no one Act or Operation of his Justice is conceivable, and much less practicable by us, in *Kind*.

THE divine Attribute of *Mercy* likewise exerted in the Forgiveness of Sin, so as to take the very Evil and Pollution of it out of the Soul; together with all the true Ways and Methods of God in shewing Pity and Compassion to the Miserable, are altogether inconceivable and inimitable by us as they are in themselves. And thus it is in all the external Exertions of his Goodness; no one Instance of it can be assigned, whereof the real Manner or Kind of Execution in it, is conceivable or practicable by us in any Degree; I leave it to our Adversaries to name any one if they can, without confuting themselves. Thus then we see wherein consists the real true Manner of our imitating the external Operations of the divine Perfections; not by any vain impracticable Endeavours of doing as God actually and really doth in any one Instance: But by exerting the inward virtuous Dispositions of our Souls, in such external Acts and Performances as have a Similitude only and Resemblance of the Operations, and a correspondency to the Actions proceeding from the intrinsic Nature of God. In distributing human Rewards and Punish-

ments in our *Own Way*, and within our own Sphere of *Action*. And as God forgives, and redeems, and saves us, and in short as he distributes all his Graces and Favours and Blessings, in such a *Supernatural Manner* as we can neither know nor practise in any Degree: So do we imitate those Acts and Operations after the Kind and Manner of *Men*; in such Instances, and after such a *Different* but *Answerable* manner, as are well known and common and familiar.

BUT it must be well remarked here, that all that is practicable by us is still no more than a bare *Imitation*. It is not what some Men vainly imagine, a *Repetition* of the same Acts and Operations in *Kind*; as when one Man imitates the virtuous Actions and Performances of another; both which proceed from the same human Disposition and Faculties of Mind. When one Man imitates another, the Operations are not only the same in *Kind*, as proceeding from the same Kind of Powers and Faculties and Dispositions; but may be, and often are, the same in *Degree* likewise; and the Imitation often exceeds the Pattern: But our Imitation of those Actions and Operations and Effects proceeding from the intrinsic Perfections of the Divinity, which we call *Moral* (by a Term as indirectly applied to God as *Natural*) can never come up to any thing more than a lively Similitude or Resemblance. Herein then we may behold the wonderful

derful Wisdom and Goodness of God, in sending us a shining Pattern and glorious Example of all Virtue and Holiness, in our own human Nature: That since even the visible Manifestations of the divine Goodness, are in their own Nature and Kind of Performance inconceivable and inimitable; they might thereby be let down to the *Direct* level of human Understanding and Practice. That our Imitation of a Person who was himself a *Perfect* Transcript of the divine Perfections, might be the same as when one Man imitates another; easily apprehended, and practicable, and the very same in Kind: And that thus all the Virtues and Graces of our Souls, together with their outward Exertions and Actions, might be exalted into the most lively Similitude, and brightest Resemblance of those incomprehensible Perfections, attainable by human Nature.

I HAVE now gone thro' the different Heads of those Attributes which are ascribed to God, in a manner as plain and explicit as I possibly could. And because of the great moment and importance of the Subject, and the many grievous Mistakes generally committed in treating of it; I have ventured to incur the censure of Verboseness and Repetition in some Places, especially in treating of the moral Attributes, rather than leave the least room for a Complaint of Obscurity, or want of Explanation by variety of Instances. But before I close this Chapter I shall add some Remarks upon *Divine*

*vine Metaphor*, particularly that which is used in Scripture to describe and express figuratively some of the *Attributes* and *Operations* of God.

MANY of these divine Metaphors are taken from things merely *Material*, and particularly from the Parts and Members of an *Human Body*. Thus the Scripture speaks of the *Hands*, and *Arms*, and *Feet*, and *Eyes*, and *Ears*, and *Nostrils* and *Mouth*, and *Bowels*, and *Heart* of God. It ascribes to him our own Sensations, such as *Seeing*, and *Hearing*, and *Smelling*; Our bodily *Postures* and *Actions*, such as *Walking*, *Standing*, *Sitting*, *Dwelling*, *Yearning*, *Breathing*, *Fighting*, and *Hunting*. Again we find ascribed to him the Names and Actions of things Irrational, as that of a *Lion*, and *Roaring*, and *Flying*: Nay even the Denominations of things Inanimate, such as *Fire*, a *Rock*, a *Buckler*, a *Fortress*, a *Horn* of Salvation; and *Light*, which tho' it is the brightest and most lively Emblem we have from things material, yet exhibits to the Mind no more of the real true Nature or Glory of God, than the thickest Darkness. Here it ought to be observed,

I. THAT these and many such like *Terms* and *Forms* of speaking, are not in any Propriety of Speech to be called *Attributes*; because they are spoken of God by pure Metaphor only, without any *Correspondent Reality*  
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and *True Similitude* in the very *Nature* of the things compared: And therefore they are very well to be distinguished from all such as are properly *Attributes*; and which are applied to the divine Being in a greater or less degree of *Analogy*.

2. *THAT* divine Metaphor being no more than a mere Figure of Speech, and founded on a supposed and *Imaginary* Similitude only between the things compared; owes all the *Usefulness, Truth, and Significancy* of it, when applied to God, to something already known of him by *Analogy*. All divine Metaphor necessarily *Pre-supposes* some *Analogical* Knowledge of him, from the Powers and Faculties or Operations and Virtues of Mankind; otherwise there could be no such thing as divine Metaphor. For there could be no intelligible Conception conveyed *Thus Only*, of any thing altogether imperceptible, and inconceivable either *Directly* by any immediate Consciousness or sensitive Perception; or *Mediately* and *Indirectly* by a *True Analogy*; and thus every divine Metaphor would be a Figure for Nothing, nothing any way known. But when there is a *Prior Real* Knowledge, and well grounded useful Conceptions, obtained from that actual Similitude and Correspondency there is in the divine Attributes and Operations, to the Powers and Faculties and Operations of the human Mind: Then all divine Metaphor expresses something otherwise clearly and distinctly known (tho' not  
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by any direct Ideas or Immediate Perception; yet) by that true Similitude and Correspondency which is founded in the very *Nature* of God and Man. What lays a Foundation of *Reality* and Usefulness even in *Human* Metaphor is, that whatever we express thus, may not only be expressed in strictly proper Terms; but is always something which falls within the Compass of an immediate Consciousness, or direct sensitive Perception; and is thus known and conceived, *Previous* to any Application of Metaphor to it; for otherwise the Metaphor would be useless. But in divine Metaphor, That which is designed to be thus expressed, is ever in respect of us altogether imperceptible and inconceivable as it is in itself; and inexpressible in any literal and strictly proper Terms: And must therefore be first usefully and justly conceived and expressed by a true Analogy, before a Metaphor can be applied to it with any solid and substantial Meaning; or indeed with any Sence or Meaning at all.

To explain this by an Instance or two. When we say the *Eyes* of God behold all things, it is pure Metaphor; intended to express an incomprehensible Perfection in the divine Nature; that is, something supposed to be as yet altogether unknown otherwise than by this Metaphor; and thus it would be a Figure without any intelligible Sence or Meaning. But as that incomprehensible Perfection is the *Knowledge* of God, which we necessarily conceive



ceive and express by the help of that Knowledge which is merely human; and since the Metaphor is applyed to what is *Thus* clearly and distinctly and usefully known before by Analogy, something real and substantial is couched in the Figure: And that Metaphorical manner of expressing it helps to render that prior Knowledge of it yet more useful and beneficial; so as that it strikes the Mind, especially the Passions and Affections, with greater Life and Emphasis. But what *Useful* Notion could we ever have attained of the Knowledge of God, *Merely* by Allusion only to a bodily *Eye*; and exclusive of any Conception of it before by Analogy with our own Intellectual Knowledge? No other than we could have of the *Protection* of his *Providence* over good Men, merely from a *Buckler*, a *Fortress*, or a *Rock*.

AGAIN, when it is said God hath a *Mighty Arm*, it is plain that he hath no Arm, nor bodily Strength; nor can there be any thing in him that has a real Likeness to an Arm of Flesh, or that is truly correspondent and similar to bodily Strength. And therefore tho' we transfer the *Words* to him, yet we carefully avoid ascribing to him the *Ideas* which belong to them; and to transfer a Word only, without the Conception or Idea annexed to it, is to speak without meaning any thing at all; unless we had a previous Knowledge, after another manner, of the thing *Intended* to be thus expressed. But as the Allusion is to the *Power* of God, which

which we had conceived and expressed before by Analogy with that which is human; that is, to a Perfection in the divine Nature correspondent and answerable to human Power or Authority and Dominion: Then there is not only a real and solid meaning in that Metaphor of a *Mighty Arm* when spoken of God; but it describes with great Beauty and Energy that divine *Power*, which was otherwise usefully known before, and expressed in Terms neither strictly *Proper* nor purely *Metaphorical*, but truly *Analogical*. I leave the Reader to revolve in his Mind any other Instances of divine Metaphor; and to consider whether what is intended to be expressed by it in God and his Attributes, is not something first known by Analogy with the human Powers or Faculties and Operations: And whether it is not this which adds not only any Use, and Solidity, and substantial meaning at all, but even Beauty and Energy to the Metaphor.

FROM hence we see the great Mischief which is done by confounding things in themselves so very different as divine Metaphor, and divine Analogy; and by turning *All* the Terms relating as well to the Mysteries of the Gospel, as to the Attributes and Operations of God, equally into mere Figure only and pure Metaphor. I don't mean those which are really Figurative and Metaphorical; and which are used in Scripture more effectually to *Move* our *Passions* and *Affections*, which is the proper Use

Use of all Figure: But those which are truly and plainly Analogical, and in our present State absolutely necessary to *Inform* our *Understandings*, and to furnish us with any *Useful* and *True Knowledge* of divine and heavenly Objects. The Consequence of this is nothing less, than taking away from such Terms all solid and substantial Meaning; resolving them into empty Sound; and leaving no ground of Truth and Reality in either Natural or Revealed Religion. For if all that is spoken of God in the Language of the Faculties and Powers, Operations and Virtues of Men, does as little refer to any *Truly Similar* and *Correspondent* Perfections in the divine Nature, as what is spoken of him in the Language of our bodily Parts and Senses; and if all that is revealed of our Salvation and Redemption under the Representaion and Likeness of human Operations and Transactions, as little relates to any thing *Truly Answerable* in the divine Performances thus let down to our Capacities, as what is said of him in the Language of all other things merely material and irrational: Then there is no Foundation left for any useful divine Knowledge whatsoever in the Mind of Man; or for any sure and rational Deductions, whereon to build our Religious Duty or moral Practice. For according to this Opinion all *Correspondent Reality* and *True Similitude* is utterly taken away; and as for any *Direct* and *Immediate* Perception or Knowledge of things Divine and Immaterial as they are in them-

selves, or of any thing the same in *Kind* with them in this World, we have it not in any the least Degree. So that thus there would be nothing remaining but empty Sounds and useless Words under a false colour of Figure and Metaphor, drawn from things altogether unworthy of God, and intended to signify *Nothing*: That is, nothing in the divine Nature and Operations any way conceived or *Known*, either by *Direct* Ideas or Perceptions; or by the *Substitution* and *Mediation* of any *Like* and *Correspondent* Powers or Faculties, Operations or Virtues among Men.

3. THAT tho' mere Metaphor cannot of its self convey a Notion of any thing in the Nature of God or divine Objects, truly *Correspondent* and *Similar* to the sensitive Objects and Ideas made use of in the Allusion: Yet we may discern from what has been said, that every just Metaphor thus applyed, is intended to signify and express something *Real* and *Actual* in respect of God and divine Things. Tho' God for Instance has nothing like a *Mighty Arm*, or *Bowels*; yet these are designed to signify and express figuratively the real *Power*, and *Mercy* or *Compassion* of the Divinity. Even in *Human* Metaphor, what is designed to be expressed by that figurative manner, is as *Real* and *Actual*, tho' not *Correspondent* and *Like*, as if the Terms in which it is delivered were literal and proper; it is the same Reality set off with greater Emphasis only and Elegance. So  
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it is in divine Metaphor; which hath always as real a Meaning of something actual and true in divine Objects; as if the same thing designed, were expressed in Terms more proper, or Analogous. Which I leave to the Reader's own Observation in running over all the particular Terms mentioned above; in every one of which he may observe a positive and *Actual*, tho' not a *Correspondent* reality signified in respect of God.

4. THESE Observations lay open the fundamental Fallacy of the whole Socinian Hypothesis, which is thro'out calculated to invert the natural Order of all the divine Revelations to Mankind. The whole Patriarchal and Jewish Dispensations were contrived by the Wisdom of God, to be Prophetical only and typical of those things which were to be fulfilled in the Person of Christ. But they, instead of allowing the things typified, such as *Purchase*, *Redemption*, *Priest* and *Priesthood*, *Sacrifice*, *Atonement*, *Oblation*, *Sanctification*, and *Intercession*, to mean any thing real and solid and true in respect of God or of Christ: They, I say, turn them all into pure Metaphor (as they likewise do the Terms *Father*, *Son*, *Spirit*, *Born*, and *Begotten*) upon this false Pre-sumption; that if they are mere Metaphor they can signify nothing at all of solid *Truth* and *Reality* in respect of God, as they do in respect of Man. But tho' we should grant them all these Terms to be purely Metaphorical (as

none of them are, but truly Analogical) even thus their Consequence would not follow, *Therefore they can mean nothing real and actual in respect of God and of Christ*: For all Metaphor, both Human and Divine, is intended to mean something real and actual in those things to which it is indirectly applyed; otherwise it would be an elegant way of saying Nothing; and every Metaphorical Term would carry no more in it than the mighty Emphasis only and Eloquence of an inarticulate Sound.

THE Socinians were aware of this Rock, on which they saw they must inevitably Split; and therefore chose to run upon the Sand, and take Refuge in another no less dangerous and fatal Evasion. In their Meaning therefore, all those Scripture Terms are Metaphorical Allusions to the Rites and Ceremonies of the Jewish Oeconomy; they allow each of them a Meaning of something real, only as it refers upward to some particular Rite and Constitution or Transaction under the Patriarchal and Jewish Dispensations: And this is the fallacious and iniquitous Turn they give to all the Language of the Gospel; which they are not ashamed expressly to say, is *One grand Metaphor*. Thus, whereas the very Completions of those Types and Prophetical Representations, under the Gospel, were in the Wisdom and Goodness of God designed to have a still farther Reference forward and to another World;

so as to signify something not only real and true, but *Similar* and *Correspondent* also, with respect to divine Objects and Operations: They with human Subtilty, have made all those Completions in the Person and Office of Christ, together with the Words in which they are expressed, to recoil back again upon the Jewish Dispensation, from whence they were taken; giving to each of those Gospel Terms no other Import or Signification than that of *A Figure for a Type*, and that of *One Figure for Another*. So that all the antient *Types*, and the *Completions* of them likewise, were equally Figures only; nay Figures mutually for each other; and all the Jewish Dispensation is but one grand Type, or one grand Metaphor for it self. Thus between *Type* and *Metaphor* both the Old and New Testament fall to the Ground; and end in nothing more than one long unnecessary Series of Amusement to Mankind; the whole Course of God's Providence is turned upon himself, and runs *Backward*; all the real Virtue and Efficacy both of the Law and Gospel, are intirely taken away; and all the divine Methods of proceeding in our Favour, are ultimately resolved into a *Metaphorical* Redemption and Salvation. This came so directly in my way, that I was not willing to step over it; because it doth not only set before a Reader the whole Socinian Scheme at one View: But will enable him, by a judicious Application of what is here said, to confute that Heresy almost in every particular.

## C H A P. VIII.

*A Collection of loose and general Reflections upon the Doctrine of Divine Analogy, considered.*

**J**UST as this Treatise was finished and sent away to the Press, I was very accidentally surpris'd with a threatening Appearance of a powerful Attack upon the Doctrine of *Divine Analogy*, from an anonymous Author under the Disguise of a *Minute Philosopher*. That Title fill'd me with great expectation of nothing less than the strongest Arguments and Objections, and the closest Reasoning which could be offer'd against what has been already publish'd in defence of that Doctrine. But I found my self soon undeceived, in meeting with nothing but such a Strain of pure common place, as amounts to no more than a specious declaiming against the received and genuine Notion of Analogy; and the crying up another of his own in Opposition to it, which will appear most absurd and imaginary. The Author doth not offer at any solid Reasoning or Argument, as others have done who even glanced upon the Subject. But to make up the want of it, he hath heaped together a number of plausible and popular Phrases; invidious Turns of Expression; many Terms in a loose and indeterminate Signification, without any particular Application to  
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the Point in Controversy; odious Insinuations of pernicious Consequences from that Doctrine; not without sorrowful and boading Lamentations for the utter Ruin and Downfall of all Religion natural and revealed, if that dreadful Doctrine should ever *Prevail in the World*. For it is no less than *Denying of God, and his Being, and Attributes, and Leaving him nothing but an empty Name*. By it the very *Notion of God is taken away*, and you have nothing left instead of it but *Fate, or Chaos, or Plastic Nature*. By it the Attributes of God are taken in *No known Sence or Notion*, but in a *Sence unintelligible* and which *No one understands*; and they are *Denied in every intelligible particular Sence*. It allows no *Knowledge or Wisdom or Goodness in God*. At this Rate his *Attributes do not belong to him, They may be reconciled with any thing or nothing*. And the Method of proceeding as we do upon the Foot of our Analogy, he asserts to be no other than *Clearing up Doubts by Nonsense, and Avoiding Difficulties by running into affected Contradiction*, that upon our Principle we cannot *Frame a Syllogism to prove the Being or Attributes of God, without four Terms in it*. And in short, *That it never was a received Notion, and never will, so long as Men believe a God*.

IN a single Combat a Man would be little applauded, who should with an Air of Bravery and Defiance dextrously flourish a glittering Sword at a distance, without ven-

turing within reach of being hurt himself, or wounding another. And yet I cannot forbear observing that this is the very Image of my ingenious Antagonist, which must strike the Mind of every discerning Person, upon reading over all that relates to this Subject in the two Volumes of the aforementioned *Minute Philosopher*. Now therefore to prevent all farther Improvement of this Parallel, by any Triumph, as if, in an Attempt so extraordinary, he had obtained an easy and complete Victory; and lest he, or any others prepossessed in Favour of his Opinion, should continue that Boasting which I find is already begun, as if it were a clear and full Confutation of all that has been yet published to establish the Doctrine of Divine Analogy: I thought it seasonable to do both that, and my self Justice; by a fair and impartial Consideration of every thing to this Purpose in those Books. But since there is nothing of real Weight relating to it, to be found in them; all close and regular Answers must be deferred till I come to the Consideration of such material Objections against divine Analogy as deserve a more distinct and particular Notice. Here, where I am only to remove some groundless Prejudices and Prepossessions; there is no more to be done, but to prevent Mens being amused by a dazzling Appearance of Learning: And to take off such Impressions as are too commonly made on weak Minds by positive Assertions uttered with great Solemnity of Style, and with no small Degree

Degree of Assurance that he is on the right Side of the Question. Tho', contrary to the natural and common Sentiments of all Mankind, he expressly maintains this dangerous Position directly destructive of all Religion; *That Words may be vital, active, ruling Principles; tho' they have no clear and distinct, or determinate Idea or Conception annexed to them; Nay, Tho' in some Instances It is as impossible to affix any such Idea to them, as if they were altogether inarticulate.*

THO' I choose to perform this here, yet the judicious Reader will observe how this intire Chapter is calculated, not for an Answer to that Author in particular; but to all such loose and general Reflections as too frequently occur in other Writers, who have not sufficiently weighed and considered this Subject; accounting it not worth all that Application of Mind, which it seems to require in order to a right and full Apprehension of it. For which reason they cannot yet discern the universal Use and even Necessity of it, in an Age wherein Infidelity and Heresy are wrought up to a Crisis, by Mens confounding divine Analogy with Figure and Metaphor; by arguing from the strictly proper and literal Acceptation of *All* Terms in Religion; and by requiring such direct and immediate Ideas or Conceptions of things supernatural and divine, as we have of Things natural and human. Take then this Author's Sayings in his own Words, and in the Order  
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I met with them; all of them such as proceed intirely from a gross Mistake of Analogy, and no other than so many plain Misrepresentations of the Truth of that Doctrine we maintain. According to us, he says,

*THE Attributes of God must be understood in a different Sence from what they signify in the vulgar Acceptation. Here Vulgar Acceptation is a very dubious and equivocating Expression. If thereby he means, as he really doth, the strictly Proper and Literal and Formal Acceptation of the Terms in which the divine Attributes are expressed; it is most true that we affirm they are not to be understood in that Sence: So as to express any Faculties or Qualities or Properties in the Divinity, the very same in Nature or Kind with such as are human; this is a most absurd Sence of those Terms, which we utterly reject as unworthy of God. But if thereby he had meant what he ought to mean, that Acceptation of those Terms whereby we attribute or apply to God the well known conceivable Perfections of our own Mind, to stand for and Represent similar and correspondent Perfections in the divine Nature; which as they are in themselves all Mankind allow to be in respect of our Understanding altogether as incomprehensible and ineffable as his real intrinsic Nature it self: Then we acknowlege them to be taken in the Vulgar or commonly received Acceptation; the only true Acceptation of those Terms, when they*

are transfered from us to a Being whose *Real intrinsic* Properties and Attributes are as unknown and incomprehensible to us, as the true Substance or Essence to which they belong. Accordingly when any Man in vulgar Speech names the *Life* of God, he doth not mean a Life of the same Kind with our's which consists in the Circulation of the Blood and the Breath of our Nostrils, and in a Conjunction of Spirit and Body; or when he names the *Knowledge* or Wisdom of God, he doth not mean that which consists in *Thinking* by the Help of animal Spirits and the Labour of the Brain; or when he names the *Goodness* of God, he doth not mean that which consists in the virtuous Regulation of Manners, in the rectifying and governing of Passions, and restraining of Appetites. But he ever means incomprehensible and ineffable Perfections *Correspondent* and *Similar* to those human Perfections, which for that very Reason we only attribute or transfer to him; because it is impossible for us to have any *Direct* Conceptions or Ideas of those divine Perfections as they are *In themselves*; or any Terms in human Language to express them with the same strict and literal Propriety in which they are applyed to the things of Nature.

BUT it may be objected that the Generality of Men never attend to this Analogy; and look no farther than the strictly literal Propriety of those Terms, and in that Acceptation speak them indifferently of God and Man.

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Very true; and the Reason of it is obvious. It is necessary that one and the same *Word* should in common Speech be applyed indifferently to express a divine and an human Perfection: And because the same general Term, such as *Wisdom* or *Knowledge*, applyed to two different Men ever signifies something the very same in Kind; we are apt insensibly to run into the same Notion when that Term is applyed to God and Man. And what promotes this Mistake is, that it is as necessary also that one and the same *Conception*, affixed to that Term, should stand in our Minds to represent both human and divine Knowledge: Since we cannot possibly form two different Conceptions of these two things, one of which is utterly imperceptible as it is in it self; but must unavoidably make one Notion as well as Term serve for both indifferently, or not think or speak at all of the latter. From whence we easily slide into an Opinion, that the *Things themselves* thus expressed and conceived are the same in Kind: Tho' this procedure of our's is occasioned not by any sameness of Kind in those Objects, but by the Scantiness of our Understanding; which is often forced thus to supply the want of a direct Knowledge, by indirect and substituted and correspondent Conceptions. That this therefore should be the vulgar and ordinary way of *Expression* and *Thinking* is obvious: For Men must understand those Terms *First* in that literal Propriety, wherein they are applyed in their original

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Acceptation to things natural and human; and not in that secundary Signification wherein they are afterwards applied to things divine and supernatural. Nor was it possible for the Mind of Man to proceed in a contrary Method the very Reverse of the other: That is, first to understand those Terms as they are applied to things altogether inconceivable and inexpressible as they are in themselves; and then *Afterwards* apply them to things directly apprehended, for the expressing of which they were originally invented. And surely it is natural for the Generality of Mankind to take Words *Ordinarily* in that Acceptation which first occurs to the Mind; in that Meaning wherein they are ordinarily understood, and applied to Objects immediately perceptible; and in that Sense wherein they have not only clear and distinct, but direct Conceptions annexed to them: And not in that Analogical and Secundary Acceptation wherein they are used to express any divine correspondent Perfection, for which as it is in it self we can have no direct Idea or Conception ever so minute or obscure or inadequate. If the Words *Life*, for Instance, or *Wisdom* or *Goodness*, as also the common Conceptions annexed to them, necessarily and unavoidably stand in the Mind both for the well known natural Images, and for the divine incomprehensible Originals: Is any thing more natural, nay is it not necessary for Men to understand the Terms ordinarily as they express the former; and afterwards upon

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Recollection to transfer them to the latter, whereof the others are Likenesses and Representations? And would it not be a very groundless Inference from thence; that therefore the Image and the Original must be the same in Nature and *Kind*, because they are ever in common Speech expressed by one and the same general *Word*.

Now tho' the Case is ordinarily or vulgarly thus and cannot be otherwise; yet when Men come to observe more particularly the different Application of those Terms to the expressing both divine and human Perfections or Properties, and consider the Sense of them rightly; it is as necessary they should distinguish between that strictly proper and literal Acceptation of them wherein they are applyed to things merely natural and human; and that secundary Acceptation wherein they are from thence transfered Analogically to things divine and supernatural. And I must observe to this Author, that this way of distinguishing is now become more necessary than ever; not only because of the Arguments and Objections of modern Heretics and Infidels against Revelation and Mystery, which mostly proceed from confounding these two different Significations: But because of that dangerous, not to say fatal Mistake and Oversight too generally prevailing even among the Orthodox; which hath led them unawares into a public and zealous espousing the Principles of our Adversaries,



ries, and into labouring with all their might to secure to them the quiet Possession of their last and strongest Hold.

THE *Attributes do not belong to God in any known Notion.* Had this Author told us what he meant by a *Known* or *Unknown* Notion of the Attributes of God, or explained the Matter by any one Instance; he would have confuted himself, and might have saved me the Trouble of distinguishing for him. If then by *Any known Notion* he means, according to any *Direct* and *Immediate* Idea or Conception we have of the real Properties or Perfections themselves in the very Nature of God, signified by those Terms which we attribute or transfer to him; or of any Properties the same in *Kind*; Then it is most true that those Attributes do not belong to God in a *Known*, that is a *Directly perceptible* Notion of them: And how is it possible they should do so, when it is impossible for us to have the least direct Idea or immediate Notion or Conception of those divine Perfections they are designed to express, as they are in his real intrinsic Nature; or any otherwise than as they become known and conceivable to us by Analogy with those human Properties which we therefore necessarily attribute to him for want of any such direct Idea or Notion or Conception? But if by *Any known Notion* he means, that in our Method of Analogy we can have no real or useful Knowledge at all of those di-

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vine Perfections; and can affix no *Intelligible Meaning* to the Terms in which we express them, nothing can be more palpably false. For the very Point we contend for, is the Application of those Terms, by which the divine Attributes are expressed, in a well known Notion and very conceivable Sence: That is, as our human Perfections are clear and easy Representations of incomprehensible Properties and Perfections in the divine Nature which are correspondent and similar to them. In this Acceptation the Terms are all very determinate and distinctly intelligible; and lose nothing of their Clearness and Perspicuity by being transferred from their strictly literal and proper Acceptation, to that which is Divine and Analogical: But are as conceivable and well understood in this Sence, as when they were first applyed to the Faculties or Properties or Operations of our own Mind. Whereas the very thing we justly charge upon this Author and others of his Strain is, that according to them the Attributes belong to God in a Sence altogether absurd and unintelligible: That is as they express Perfections the very same in Kind with those that are either natural or acquired in us, only infinitely greater in Degree; which is in plain Words; as they express the same with *Infinite human Perfections*.

THAT Expression of *Belonging to God* is likewise very loose and ambiguous, and fit to be put into the Mouth only of a Minute Philosopher.

lofopher. If it muſt have a ſerious Answer then, I tell him that the divine Attributes do truly belong to God in our Sence of the Terms; as they expreſs ſo many real but incomprehenſible Perfections in him, correſpondent and ſimilar to thoſe human Faculties or Properties or Operations they were firſt invented to ſignify: They belong to God, and to him only, as they are thus taken from common Speech and appropriated to him in that Analogical Acceptation. And I muſt tell him again, that the Attributes do not belong to God in his Acceptation of them; or in that ſenceleſs contradictory Notion wherein they are ſuppoſed to expreſs an infinite Degree of ſo many human Perfections. What we ſay is, that *Human Life* for Inſtance, or *Human Knowledge* and *Wiſdom*, or human *Goodneſs* are in no Degree truly or properly or formally the ſame with the divine; and that they do not belong to God, according to this Author's grand Notion, as being of the ſame Kind when ſpoken of God and Man: But at the ſame time we affirm that they more truly belong to God than Man, as our Attributes or Properties carry in them a Similitude only and Reſemblance of the truly original archetypal Perfections. So that the Caſe in ſhort is this; The Terms by which we expreſs the divine Attributes, firſt belong to us only in their primary and ſtrictly literal and proper Acceptation; and they belong to God and to him only as they are tranſferred from us to him in an Analogical Sence.

AGAIN says he, *The Attributes are denied in every intelligible Sence.* This is a most unfair and groundless Charge upon the Doctrine of Analogy. For can any thing be more glaringly evident, than that a thing may become very *Conceivable*, and consequently very *Intelligible* by Similitude and Representation, which is otherwise to us utterly imperceptible and inconceivable? And thus it is that all the divine Attributes are very clearly and distinctly *Understood*; tho' they are, as to their own *Real Nature* and *Manner* intirely unknown and inconceivable to human Understanding. Now had we denied the divine Attributes in either of these Sences, there would have been some Colour of Truth in that Assertion of his: But it happens that we affirm and allow them in both those Sences, as they are very conceivable by *Similitude* and *Representation*; and as they are in their own *True* and *Real Nature* utterly inconceivable to us. We do not deny that the Terms by which we express the divine Attributes are with the greatest Truth and Certainty applyed to God, as that Saying insinuates: But what we deny is that, according to this Author's Notion, they can with any Truth be applyed to him in the same literal and proper and formal Acceptation of the Words in which they are applyed to Man. And pray who is it then that denies the divine Attributes in every intelligible Sence; we who affirm that our human Faculties or

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Properties or Operations cannot be truly and formally in any Degree the same with divine Perfections: Or our Author, who proceeds altogether upon this Principle; that the divine Attributes are literally and formally in some Degree the same with human Properties.

KNOWLEDGE in God hath no Sort of Resemblance or Agreement, with any Notion that Man can frame of Knowledge. This is a charge upon us as perfectly the Reverse of what we hold, as it was possible for Words to express. For what we affirm and contend for is; That there is a true and real *Resemblance* or *Agreement* between Knowledge in God and Knowledge in Man: And that there is such a Foundation of Similitude and Analogy between them, both in the divine and human Nature; that the Conception we have of our Knowledge, stands in the Mind to represent justly and usefully a correspondent and similar, but infinite and otherwise incomprehensible Perfection in the divine Nature. This Foundation we affirm to be discovered to us not by mere Reason only, but more particularly by that express Revelation wherein we are said to be formed in the *Likeness* and after the *Image* of God. From whence Mankind was very early taught from Heaven, that there is such a real Similitude and Correspondency between the Powers and Properties and Operations of the human Mind especially; and the infinite Perfections of the divine Nature, that it is

the only sure and solid Ground we have for the Truth and Certainty of all our Knowledge of things divine and supernatural. This is the only infallible and determinate Criterion of Truth in the Mind of Man, with respect to our whole Manner both of *Thinking* and *Speaking* of things purely spiritual and divine. Were it not for this, we could have had no *Conceptions* at all in any Degree of things to us so imperceptible and utterly incomprehensible as they are in themselves. And if even this were possible for us; yet no human Understanding could have found out any other Way of judging and determining how far all our *Inferences* and Deductions from those Conceptions were true or false: Otherwise than by a Parity of Reasoning, which insensibly carries on the happy Comparison and Parallel between things human and divine, thro' the whole Series of all the Powers and Operations of the Intellect and Will; as well as thro' all those Words and Forms of human Language wherein they are expressed. This is our Opinion; whereas this Author is not satisfied with any Sort of Resemblance only, or Analogy between Knowledge in God and in Man: But on the quite contrary and in direct Opposition to us, will have those Terms which express the divine Attributes to signify something *Formally* the very same in Nature or *Kind* with our own. May I not here then appeal to the Reader whether any thing could be more hardy, than for an Author in the

Face of the World so exprefly to charge upon us the very pernicious Error we are labouring to confute ; and which at the fame time is his own darling fundamental Notion?

WE both do hold that there is real Knowledge in God, but with this material Difference ; that He rejects all Refemblance only or Similitude and Correspondency between this Attribute, and that Knowledge whereof we have a Confciousnefs in our felves ; and will have them formaly the very fame in Kind, and different only in Degree. But we contend that the Term *Knowledge*, when applyed to God, exprefseth an incomprehenfible Perfection purely and intirely divine, whereof it is impoffible for us to have any direct Conception or Confciousnefs : And therefore we do neceffarily conceive it only by *Refemblance* and *Analogy* with that Property or Operation of our own Minds to which we affix the Term Knowledge. From whence we may occasionally obferve, how *Framing a Notion of Knowledge* is a very unphilofophical Way of fpeaking. For we do not voluntarily frame to our felves a Notion or Conception or Idea of human Knowledge ; but we come by the Notion of it from an immediate Confciousnefs of fuch a Power or Operation within our felves : And this is the very Notion or Conception we transfer to God on purpofe to reprefent and exprefs a real, and correspondent, but otherwife inconceivable Perfection of his intrinsic Nature.

THE Author starts an Objection here against the *Foreknowledge* of God, with design to shew how awkwardly it was to be answered upon our Notion of Analogy; and how *All the divine Attributes may, in our Way of proceeding, Be reconciled with every thing, or nothing.* The Objection is this; *Future Contingencies are inconsistent with the Foreknowledge of God, because it is repugnant that certain Knowledge should be of an uncertain thing.* It were to be wished that he who calls our Way of proceeding *Cutting of the Knot, and not untying it,* had himself performed either; and not left it in its full Strength without any Answer of his own, when he made a false Representation of our's. But the Reason of this is plain; the Objection is unanswerable upon his Principle: For the Reason assigned why God cannot foresee Contingencies is; because they are as truly Uncertainties in respect of him as they are of Man, without which Supposition the Objection falls to the Ground. Now if the Property of Knowledge in God and in Man are the very same in Nature or Kind, and differ only in Degree; then all Contingencies must necessarily be in some Degree so many Uncertainties in respect of the divine Knowledge, as well as of the human; and can be no more foreseen with *Absolute* Certainty by God, than they can be certainly foreseen by Man. Nay if you take the Attribute of *Knowledge* in the strictly proper and literal Sence of the

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Word, as he will have it, so as to signify a divine Perfection of the same Kind with that Property in Man: Then, whatever Notion you form of the divine *Foreknowledge*, Man must have that very divine Attribute in some Degree, and consequently can with *Some Measure* of Certainty foresee Contingencies likewise; tho' not with such quickness, clearness, and fulness as they are foreseen by him who is endued with that Property in an higher Degree. In short, if Knowledge in God be of the same Kind with our's, it can be only an *Indefinitely* greater Perfection, and not an *Infinite* Perfection: And if this be the Case, then God can foresee Contingencies, not with *Absolute Infalible* Certainty, but only with a much higher Degree of probability than Men can; that is, He can only make a vastly more probable Conjecture of them. He doth not only thus leave the Objection in its full Force and Insuperable, but puts this mock and senceless Answer into our Mouths; that according to any *Known Sence* of that Attribute of Knowledge, or any *Notion that we can form of it*, it may be *True that God cannot foresee Contingencies*: But as that Attribute cannot be taken by us in *Any known Sence*, but in a Sence which we know nothing of, and as we deny it in every Sence that is intelligible; there may be *No Inconsistency between the contingent Nature of Things, and divine Foreknowledge*.

IN giving our own Answer to that Objection,

tion, we must answer him first; that we do not say the divine Attribute of *Knowledge* is to be taken in a *Sence that we know nothing of*, or in any *Unknown unintelligible Sence*, that is in no Sence at all: For thus it amounts to no more than this, that Men speak Nonsense, and say nothing when they name that Attribute; and that accordingly it may indeed thus be reconciled with every thing, or nothing. No, we assert the quite Contrary; that *Knowledge* is to be taken, after the same Manner with all the rest of the divine Attributes, in a well known determinate Sence which every one of us understands; and in the only Sence wherein it can become conceivable and intelligible to the Mind of Man: That is, by Similitude or Analogy with what is natural and human; the only Knowledge whereof we have any direct Perception or immediate Consciousness. That this very human Knowledge, whereof we have a clear and distinct and immediate Perception or Consciousness, is transfered to God to represent and express an incomprehensible Perfection intrinsic to his Nature, but Correspondent and similar to that natural Property in us. And that this Conception, as well as Term of human Language to which it is annexed, retains its first Perspicuity, and remains still equally *Clear* and *Distinct* when it thus becomes the *Representative* of a divine Perfection; which is no way obscurely or partially discerned, but totally imperceptible and altogether unknown as it is in it self: Just as a

lively Image or a compleat Picture becomes never the more confus'd or obscure, for its being considered as a Representation of an *Unknown* Original. That this divine incomprehensible Perfection, so clearly conceived and distinctly understood by Analogy, is of a Kind infinitely different from that Property in us to which the Term was first appropriated, before vulgar Use rendered it general, and a Word common to *God*, and *Angels*, and *Men*, and even to *Brutes*: And they must have a very low and vulgar Way of thinking indeed, who upon some Recollection do not discern that when the Term *Knowledge* comes to be properly limited and particularly applied to any of these, it must signify some Faculty or Property of a very different Nature in each of them; and especially in God some incomprehensible Perfection infinitely different from them all, which must be of another Kind for that very Reason, because it is infinite and incomprehensible; which it could not be if we had a direct Perception or Idea of it in any Degree. That the divine Property or Perfection correspondent and similar to *Knowledge* in us, that is to *Thinking* by the Labour of the Brain and Help of animal Spirits, being utterly inconceivable and unknown as it is in itself; it is impossible for us to discern or conclude *Directly* what is, or is not consistent with it or contradictory to it as it is in the *Intrinsic Nature* of God: Thus considered it is out of the *Immediate Reach* of all our Understanding Faculties;

Faculties ; and nothing can be more groundless and presumptuous than all Reasonings and Inferences concerning this Attribute in particular taken *Only* in this much mistaken Sence of our Author ; and thus, to return him his own Expression, that *Attribute may be reconciled with every thing or nothing*. That therefore what we have to do is, to consider what is or is not consistent with this divine Attribute, as it becomes conceivable and is rendered the Object of human understanding by Similitude or Analogy with that human Knowledge whereof we have an immediate Consciousness ; which is the only clear and distinct and intelligible Way we have of thinking and speaking of that supernatural and infinite Perfection. Whatever in the whole Course of all Dissertation and Argument can be proved inconsistent with this only conceivable and intelligible Acceptation of the divine Attributes, or contradictory to them, is to be utterly rejected ; and by a Parity of Reason may be *Mediately* and *Ultimately* concluded inconsistent likewise with the real intrinsic Nature of God and contradictory to it. And lastly that the Resemblance between that Knowledge which is merely *Natural* and *Human*, and that which is purely *Divine* and *Supernatural* is not to be extended beyond the main and single Point of Analogy designed, and which is alone worthy of God : Namely to express a real infinite Perfection in his Nature, correspondent and similar to that Property in us ; and therefore that all other particular Instances of Comparison

parison between them must be precarious and groundless, and intirely unworthy the divine Nature.

Now this Author is removed out of the Way, who covered the Socinian Objection with all the Force he was Master of, it is easy to demolish it: By answering that it proceeds upon a false and groundless Presumption that the Property of *Knowlege* is exactly of the same Kind in God and in Man; which being granted, the Consequence would surely follow that he could not certainly foresee Contingencies. For the Reason assigned why things depending on the free Will of Man cannot be infallibly foreseen is, because they are *Contingent* and *Uncertain*; which they surely are to human Understanding: And if all Knowlege in God were of the same Kind with our's, they would all be in some Degree contingent and uncertain in respect of him likewise. But since Knowlege in God is a Perfection (not altogether unknown and unintelligible, but clearly and distinctly conceived and known by Analogy with that which is human, and yet) so utterly inconceivable to our Understanding *As it is in its self*, that we cannot conclude or determine what is, or is not consistent with it or contradictory to it when considered in this Sence *Alone*: And since it is infinitely different from human Knowlege not in *Degree* only, but in *Nature* and *Kind*; no Argument can be formed with any Justness and Truth, from the Topic  
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in the Objection *Only*, to prove that future Contingencies are inconsistent with a divine Perfection, of which neither we nor the Objectors have any other Conception or Notion than by Representation only or Analogy. Tho' things to come and depending upon our Freedom of Will are *Contingent* and *Uncertain*, in respect of that Knowledge which is the joint Operation of limited *Spirit and Matter* in essential Union: Yet no Inference can be made, from thence only, against the Foreknowledge of a *Pure Spirit*. Nor can we, from *Thence alone*, conclude it impossible even for an Angel, whose Knowledge is altogether different from our's, to foresee Contingencies with some Degree of certainty: And much less can any such Conclusion be made from thence with respect to a *Divine Spirit*, whose Knowledge must be infinitely different in Kind from that of all created Spirits. But tho' it were granted that all things depending on the free Will of other intelligent Agents, were in every Degree inconsistent with the certain Knowledge of all *Created* Spirits, as being contingent and uncertain to the most exalted of them: Yet those things cannot be contingent and uncertain in respect of that divine Perfection; which, *Whatever* the real Nature or *Kind* of it is in *Other respects*, must necessarily be *Infinite*; and Infinite Knowledge cannot be conceived otherwise than exclusive of all Contingency or Uncertainty. So that there can be no such thing as Contingency or Uncertainty  
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in respect of God, who must *Certainly* foresee whatever will or can *Really* happen; insomuch that *Infinite Knowledge, and Contingency or Uncertainty* is express Contradiction in Terms. Nay tho' the Knowledge of God with respect to all *Other* things, were allowed to be the same Property in Kind with our own; still his *Certain Foreknowledge of Free Actions* must be granted to be of a peculiar and different Kind. And therefore where is the Absurdity in asserting, that God is endued with a Perfection totally different from any in our Nature, which enables him to discern infallibly the future Actions of others: Any more than in the Belief of a Person born blind, that other Men have a Faculty, which he wants, of clearly perceiving and distinguishing Objects at a great Distance? God therefore certainly foreknows what we call future Contingencies and Uncertainties, as being truly such in respect of our Understanding; because there can be no such thing as Contingency or Uncertainty in respect of that infinite Perfection: And this being in Nature or Kind intirely different from our natural way of *Thinking*, is no otherwise conceivable by us than thro' Analogy with human Knowledge; which is of a Kind formed for the certain Discernment only of *Past* and *Present* Actions, and not for looking infallibly *Forward* one Moment into the Actions of our fellow Creatures.

This Author calls our Faith, *The Belief that there is an unknown Subject, of Attributes absolutely*

*absolutely unknown.* No, but our Belief is *That there is an incomprehensible Subject, of Attributes absolutely incomprehensible as they are in themselves;* and I hope this Author's Belief is the very same, notwithstanding all the Pains he hath taken to disguise and misrepresent it to the World. The Term *Unknown* in that Saying is very dubious and equivocal. As it signifyeth the same with *Imperceptible, or Inconceivable and Utterly Incomprehensible as a thing is in its own Nature,* he must believe God to be in this Sence an unknown Subject of Attributes equally unknown, as well as we: For it is utterly impossible for us to have the least Perception or Idea of them as they are in themselves; and nothing can be more vain than for Men to suppose, that they discern something of their real Nature, or of the very same Kind, in things of a quite different Nature and Kind. But as the Term *Unknown* signifyeth in his Intention here a *Total Ignorance* of God and his Attributes, and an absolute want of any Degree of Knowledge; either by direct and immediate Perception, or by Similitude and Resemblance with the greatest Perfections in an human Mind; I hope that Saying cannot with any Truth be applyed to either of us. Tho' there is still this material Difference between us; that his Belief in divine Attributes *Formally*, as he speaks, the very same in *Kind* with our human Properties, or Faculties, or Operations, is absolutely precarious and false, and altogether



unworthy of God : And that our Belief in Attributes truly and in every Degree incomprehensible as they are in themselves, and of a Nature and Kind infinitely different from any that are not only merely Human but Angelic, is founded upon Reason and Scripture ; as I hope abundantly appears from several Parts of the foregoing Treatise.

*ABSOLUTELY Unknown!* How little this Author understands the Doctrine of divine Analogy, which he is all along not confuting but reviling. No ; our Belief is in Attributes, not obscurely or confusedly, but clearly and distinctly known ; by the Intervention of that clear and distinct and determinate Perception and Knowledge we have of our own Properties and Perfections : which loses nothing of its Distinctness and Perspicuity when it is transferred to God and his divine Attributes or Perfections by Analogy. For the Design of it is not to give us any obscure or imperfect Knowledge of the divine Attributes, as it necessarily must be upon this Author's Principle ; but such a clear and distinct Knowledge of them as we should have of a Face which we beheld in a Glass or Mirrour : Which tho' it is by Similitude only and Representation, is yet a Kind of Knowledge just and clear and useful ; as being founded in the original Frame and Constitution of Man, and in that Resemblance he bears to the Divinity. So that we have just as clear and distinct (tho' not direct  
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and immediate) Conceptions of the divine Perfections, as we have of our own Faculties or Properties, which are attributed to God by Analogy only and Similitude: And beyond these we know nothing more of them, than that the Real Manner and intrinsic Nature of them is utterly inconceivable, and intirely out of the Reach of all our Faculties.

To do Justice to both Sides, each of us holds that neither God nor his Attributes are *Absolutely unknown*; that Charge upon us is not only false but ridiculous. The proper Question between us is concerning the true Kind and Manner of this Knowledge: Whether we have any direct and immediate Conception or Idea of the real Perfections or Attributes of God; by having a direct and immediate Perception or Consciousness of our own Faculties or Perfections, as being the very same in Nature or Kind with those that are truly divine? Which being all along affirmed and maintained by this Author, shews that tho' he doth not believe the divine Attributes to be absolutely unknown; yet he is fundamentally mistaken with respect to the real true Manner and Degrees of that Knowledge. Or, whether all things divine and supernatural are of a Nature or Kind so totally different from all things natural and human; that they are otherwise conceivable to the Mind of Man, than by Similitude only or Analogy? Which is what we assert in direct Opposition to the preceding

preceding Question. Tho' this Author hath taken more Pains on this Subject, than on any other thro' his two Volumes of the *Minute Philosopher*; and hath been here more pompous in his Citations, apparently in order to a grand Performance; yet he hath not dropped one Word or Sentence which is rationally applicable to this true Point in Controversy.

HE asserts with great Positiveness, that if our Doctrine of Analogy Once obtain in the World, there would be an End of all Natural or Rational Religion. Now should I say the quite contrary, That if the Doctrine of divine Analogy should not obtain in the World (which God forbid) it is more likely that there will soon be an End of all Revealed Religion among us, without assigning any Reason for it: This would be but such another dogmatical Assertion, as all those I cite from this Author; for any of which he hath not condescended to offer one Reason. But as neither of these Sayings are to be regarded upon our bare Authority, I assign this plain Reason for my Assertion; because all the modern Refinements upon Arianism and Socinianism; and upon that Infidelity which (tho' it formerly appeared only in some loose and scattered Notions, is now formed into whole Systems, and wrought up into intire delusive Schemes of Religion; for a Disguise and false Imitation both of that which is natural and Revealed) is the obvious Result of them: Together with all the main

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Arguments

Arguments by which they are supported, and the strongest Objections against the Orthodox Faith in the Mysteries of the Gospel; proceed upon Men's running either into the literal and strictly proper Acceptation of all the Terms in which they are expressed; or into the other Extreme of that which is purely Figurative and Metaphorical. By which means the whole Substance and Reality of things divine and supernatural, signified and intended by those Terms, is explained away and brought to nothing. So that it is now become more necessary than ever to shew that the Terms expressing the Attributes of God and the Mysteries of the Gospel, are to be understood neither in one Extreme nor the other; but in the Way which lies between them, that is by Analogy. And unless this comes to be allowed, there is an End of all natural Religion likewise. For if the Terms expressing those Attributes of God which are known by the Light of Nature, are not to be understood Analogically; but must be turned either into empty Figure and Metaphor: Or taken in such a literal Sense as to express something the same in Kind both in God and Man; not one of them can signify any thing truly, and really, and worthily applicable to the divine Nature.

IF such a Notion of God and his Attributes as this Author hath taken so much needless Pains to describe, should obtain in the World;  
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a Notion which doth not *Belong* to him, which denies his *Being* and *Attributes*, which is *Unintelligible*, *absolutely unknown*, and in short which is *Nonsense* and *Contradiction*: Then indeed there would be an End not only of all natural but of all revealed Religion; as well as of all the common Sense and Reason of Mankind. But whence is all this Zeal for *Natural* and *Rational* Religion, and *Revealed* Religion left out; as if this were not likewise a rational Religion, and as if it were not in more apparent Danger from the present Tendency of the Times to Heresy and Infidelity? Wherein the Name of *Natural* Religion is become the high Mode; and wherein the common Cry is for *Reason*, preposterously set up in Opposition to *Revelation* and the *Mysteries* of the Gospel: And of Course against *Divine Analogy*; as it lays open all the false Pretences of that prevailing hypocritical Concern for Religion in general; which hath no other Design at the Bottom, but the refuting and exploding all Revelation in Particular. This the Doctrine of divine Analogy performs, by shewing how natural and revealed Religion are both alike established upon the same Foundation of Knowledge by Similitude and Representation only: And that, they must therefore stand and fall together; since without this Analogy we could have no Conception or Notion at all of God; or of any of those divine Attributes which are the Ground of all natural Religion. Here it must be con-

essed, that this Author hath not only fallen in with the clamorous Crowd of Opposers of this Analogy; but hath distinguished himself with a loud Roar and open Throat: As too many others have done, in the contrary extreme, by an affected, profoundly deep, and criminal Silence; at a Juncture and in a Cause which requires them to be *Instant* on the other Side, in a zealous Defence and unreserved Profession of the Truth, whether they are inclined to think it *In Season or out of Season*.

IF this Author's Notion should obtain, That we could not believe a God, or any of his Attributes, or the Reality of any thing supernatural and divine, unless we believed them to be *Truly* and *Properly* and *Formally* the same in *Kind* with things natural and human, and to differ from them only in Degree; then there would be indeed a speedy End of natural, as well as revealed Religion. For all Ranks of Infidels, who are bigotted to Reason no farther than it is spirited up to Rebel against Revelation to which it is truly subservient, would not only soon discover the Absurdity and Contradiction of that Notion; but charge us home with the gross Impiety and Presumption of it. And when it appeared that the grand Principle upon which we founded all our Religious Knowledge of things divine and supernatural, was impossible to be maintained with any Colour of Reason; the Consequence would be a farther Confirmation

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of their disbelief in all Religion. But when the Truth is granted them; That no Properties or Faculties or Operations can be in any Degree the same as to Nature and *Kind* both in God and Man. That of the real *Intrinsic* Properties and Perfections of God we cannot have the least *Direct* and *Immediate* Conception or Idea: And can therefore have no other way of conceiving them but by Resemblance or Similitude with those that are human. That those divine Perfections are never the less real, tho' infinitely more transcendent, for being thus altogether incomprehensible *As they are in themselves*. That our Knowledge of them, tho' by Analogy alone, is however not only just and solid, but as *Clear* and *Distinct* as that Knowledge we have of their natural Representatives. And that accordingly the divine *Power*, and *Wisdom*, and *Goodness*, and *Justice*, and *Mercy* are infinite archetypal Perfections correspondent and similar to the like natural Perfections in Man whereby they are justly represented. And lastly that the Ground of this Analogy is laid in the *Nature* both of God and Man; and in that real Similitude and Resemblance of the Divinity, to which we were originally formed; From whence there is an eternal unerring Parity of Reason, running thro' all our Conceptions and Sentiments and Discourses concerning those Properties or Perfections, which from our Humanity are thus transfered or attributed to the Divinity. So that every Inference made from those Attri-

butes applyed to God, and thus taken in a divine Sence ; is so much the stronger for their being altogether incomprehensible as they are in themselves, and of a Kind infinitely different from any thing immediately perceptible by an human Mind: And every Argument drawn from them for the Performance and discharge of all moral and practical Duties; as well as against all loose and infidel Principles; concludes more irrefragably, than if the divine Properties or Attributes were the *Same* in *Kind* with our own; and that our Conceptions or Ideas of them were in some Degree direct and immediate, tho' partial and inadequate. If all these apparent Truths, I say, were granted them without Reserve; there would be no Retreat left for Infidels, out of which they could not be easily dislodged; nor any objections which would not admit of a clear and ready and satisfactory Answer.

WHAT may be objected here is, that he doth not assert any of our human Attributes to be *Truly* and *Properly* and *Formally* of the same *Kind* in God that they are in Man, *Till all Imperfection is first removed from them*; and that then they are divine Attributes when understood thus in a higher Degree, as truly as they are human Properties when taken in a much lower Degree. This is the common Evasion; to which I answer, that this is a Mistake of the true Question in Debate: For we are agreed on both Sides, that all Imperfection

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is to be removed, to the utmost of our Power, from our human Faculties or Properties before they ought to be spoken of God *Even Analogically*; and that they must be applied to him in the utmost Degree of Perfection conceivable by us. But the true Question between us still remains; Whether even then, in the most perfect and exalted *Degree* conceivable by an human Mind, they *Properly* and *Literaly* and *Formaly* express Faculties or Perfections or Operations of the *Same Kind* in the real Nature of God, that they do in the Nature of Man? This is what our Author with the other Enemies of Analogy holds in the Affirmative; and what we utterly reject, for this plain Reason. Because when we have to the utmost of our Ability removed all Imperfection from any Faculty or Property or Operation of our's; and when it is considered in the most perfect Degree conceivable by us, it is still no more than a Perfection *Natural* and *Human*, improved and carryed on to the greatest height of Refinement within the Reach of an human Mind: And must therefore be totally different in *Kind* from what is *Infinite* and altogether *Incomprehensible* as it is in it self, and intirely beyond the direct Reach of all our Perception or Imagination; and for that Reason no otherwise conceivable, than by such a Resemblance only and Similitude as is founded in the real Nature of things different not in *Degree* only, but in *Kind*. And accordingly we affirm that even then in its great-

est Exaltation, it is to be attributed to God not literally, or properly, or formaly, but by *Divine Analogy* only. The Doctrine whereof I now begin to trust is of God, and will surely obtain in his good Time; notwithstanding the open as well as clandestine Opposition it now meets with, not only from Heretics and Infidels of all Ranks and Sizes: But even from the Orthodox, who are filled with groundless Fears and Surmises of its Consequences; which proceed from Prejudice of Education, and false Principles of Knowledge with which their Minds were strongly and unhappily impregnated in their earlier Age. But it is to be hoped that all this Prepossession and panic Terror will gradually wear away with the present Generation; when our Youth grow up with some true Taste and early Seasoning of a Doctrine, so little attended to and altogether uncultivated before: Which will then plainly appear of great and universal Use, when it is thro'ly understood, and rightly applyed; but may indeed become dangerous and destructive to the Truths of Religion by being any way grossly mistaken and misapplyed.

*THE Doctrine, says this Author, of Analogical Perfections in God, or of knowing God by Analogy; seems very much misunderstood and misapplyed by those who would infer from thence that we cannot frame any direct or proper Notion, tho' never so inadequate, of Knowledge or Wisdom as they are in the Deity; or understand*

*stand any more of them, than one born blind can of Light and Colours.* But he must *Understand* very little of the Doctrine of Analogy, and *Misapply* it egregiously, who thus blends together into *One* and confounds two things, which are as different as Light and Darkness. Namely *First*, that we cannot frame any *Direct* Notion or Idea (tho' ever so inadequate or obscure) of the real intrinsic Attributes or Perfections of God, and of his Knowledge and Wisdom in particular; any more than a Man born blind can of Light and Colours; Which is a great Truth; and accordingly we positively assert and maintain that there is no Faculty or Capacity in the Mind of Man for the least *Direct* View or Notion, or immediate Discernment of the real intrinsic Perfections or Attributes of God as they are in their own Nature and Kind; any more than there is for any direct View or Notion and immediate Discernment of his real intrinsic Substance or Essence. It is impossible for us in our present State to come by such a Knowledge of God any other way than either by some *Ideas* let in upon the Imagination thro' the *Senses*: Which it is allowed we cannot have; since these proceed only from things material, and therefore are never attributed to God otherwise than by *Metaphor*; as being in no Degree real and apt Representations of any incomprehensible Perfections in a Nature purely spiritual and divine. Or else, by some internal immediate Consciousness, which we
   
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can have of nothing besides the *Faculties* or *Properties* or *Operations* of our own *Mind*: And therefore it is that these are transfered to God by *Analogy*; as being apt and just Representations of correspondent Perfections in the Divinity, otherwise altogether inconceivable. Or lastly, by *Conceptions* or *Complex Notions*, formed out of both the former considered in Conjunction: Which can reach no farther, with respect to any *Direct* Knowledge, than the sensitive *Ideas* and the *Consciousness* of the *Mind's Operations*, out of which they were formed. Not but that even these truly Analogical Representations of the divine Perfections, are likewise altogether unworthy of God, and unfit to be attributed to him in *Kind*; as being infinitely different from any thing in his real intrinsic Nature. For which Reason nothing can be more absurd and presumptuous, than Men's Imagining that by an *Immediate Discernment* of the *Faculties*, or *Properties*, or *Operations* of our own *Mind*; or by any *Conceptions* formed out of these and *Ideas* considered together; we have at the same time a *Direct* and *Immediate* Perception or Notion of so much of the real Nature or Perfections of God: Which could not then be *Infinite*, or indeed *Incomprehensible* in the true Sense of that Term. If any Man hath yet a Doubt of what is here asserted; for a fuller Conviction let him lay aside all *Ideas of Sensation*, together with all that *Immediate Consciousness* or Perception he hath of the *Faculties* and

and Properties and Operations of his own *Mind*: And then shut his Eyes and look inward; and try if he can find any *Idea*, or *Immediate Consciousness*, or *Direct Notion* of any thing divine and supernatural in the least Degree. And if upon opening them again he must confess that he could find no *Such* Perception or Idea, Consciousness, or Notion of any thing beyond what is natural and merely human: Then he will be of our Opinion, that a Man born blind can as well form a *Direct* and *Immediate* Idea or Conception of Light and Colours, as we can in our present State of Blindness of the real Attributes or Perfections of God. And consequently that we can neither think nor speak of them otherwise than by Similitude and Representation; that is by *Analogy* with such Objects and Conceptions as are merely natural and human.

As to the latter Part of that Assertion of his, which he makes the same with the former; that we profess *Not to understand any more of the divine Knowledge or Wisdom, than one born blind doth of Light and Colours*; it is, on the other Hand, a downright Falsity. For the Parallel between bodily Blindness, and that of the Mind in respect of things divine and supernatural; cannot be justly carryed on beyond their being equally void of any *Immediate* Perception, or any *Direct* Idea and Notion of those Objects. Tho' we have no immediate Perception or direct Notion of  
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*Knowledge* or *Wisdom* as they are in God, or of any other of the divine Attributes; yet we are so far from being as totally ignorant of them as a blind Man is of Light and Colours, that we have a very useful and clear and substantial Knowledge of them by Analogy with those correspondent Faculties, or similar Powers and Operations of our own Mind whereof we have an immediate Perception or Consciousness. And the great Disparity between our Case, and that of a Man born blind will evidently appear in these three following Instances; which shew that it is nothing less than a Difference between a total Ignorance on the one Hand, and of a clear and distinct Knowledge on the other.

FIRST then; as one born blind can frame no *Direct* Idea or Conception of Light and Colours; so neither can he frame any Idea or Conception of them which is *Truly Analogical*: Because there are no Objects of his Senses or his Reason so truly *Correspondent* and *Similar* to them, as to be either merely *Accidental* and *Voluntary*; or absolutely *Unavoidable* and *Necessary Images*, or *Real Representations* of those things utterly imperceptible to any of his four remaining Senses. For this Reason as he can have no Knowledge of Light and Colours by any Sensation, or by simple Apprehension of the Intellect; so neither can he form any complex Notions or Conceptions of them with any Aptitude and real Significancy, or true Appli-

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cation to those Objects; and such as are founded upon an *Actual Similitude* and *True Correspondency* between any thing which he already knows, and those things utterly inconceivable to him; much less upon any Identity of Nature between these and any Objects of his Mind, according to the Opinion of this Author. If upon hearing there was such a thing as *Light*, he should conceive it by a *Long Reach* in Feeling; or if upon being informed that there was such a Colour as *Scarlet*, he should conceive it by the *Sound of a Trumpet* or something *Wonderfully smooth*; or either of them by any other Image of his Imagination: This would proceed from mere Accident only, or from his own *Arbitrary Appointment*; and not from any *Real Similitude* and *Correspondency* in the very *Nature* of the Things, which might be a sure Foundation of a solid and universal Parity of Reason thro' all his Conceptions, and Sentiments, Expressions and Discourses concerning those things which are to him utterly imperceptible and inconceivable. He could have no sure Foundation of Knowledge laid by any direct Perception and immediate Consciousness; or in any real Similitude and Correspondency with what he already knows; or with any Idea or complex Notion whatever which he was capable of forming. Nay and if he had a Conception of any thing truly correspondent and similar to *Light* and *Colour*, this would still be no *Divine* but *Human Analogy*: Because it would be founded upon a Similitude and

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Correspondency between things of Nature; whereas the former is ever founded upon a Resemblance and Correspondency between things natural and human, and such as are divine and supernatural. Thus then the blind Man can have no *Real* and *True* Knowledge at all of any thing relating to the Nature of Light and Colours, and must ever remain in total Ignorance of them in every Degree, no otherwise to be remedied than by a Miracle; or by opening his Eyes, for a direct and immediate View or Idea of what it was utterly impossible for him before to have had any Conception, either *Direct* or *Truly Analogical*.

BUT our Case with respect to all things divine and supernatural, and the Attributes of God in particular, is quite the Reverse. For tho' we can have no immediate Perception, or direct Idea and Notion of them in the least Degree either as they are in God himself, or by a Discernment of something of the same Kind in any of his Creatures: Yet by the immediate Perception or Consciousness we have of the Properties and Perfections of our own Mind; we at the same time are able to conceive the divine Properties and Perfections, by a real and true Analogy founded in the very Nature of God and Man, we being made in his *Likeness* and formed to his *Image*. So that our Conceptions of the divine Attributes in this Manner are not merely *Arbitrary*, or any way purely *Contingent* and *Uncertain*; but originally



ginally built upon that *Natural* and *Necessary* Resemblance we bear to the Divinity in the Faculties and Properties and Operations of our Mind. That *Knowlege* and *Wisdom* and *Goodness*, which we are conscious of within our selves, are not mere Notions or Conceptions of our own, *Voluntarily* and *Precariously* appointed to stand in the Mind for things whereof we have no Knowlege either by direct Perception, or even indirectly by a true Representation and real Analogy; as it is in the Case of the blind Man when he attempts to form a Notion of Light and Colours: But they are *Natural Likenesses* and necessary *Real Representatives* of so many *Correspondent* infinite incomprehensible Perfections of the Divinity. Thus the Knowlege we have of the divine Attributes is more *Just* and *Real* and *Solid*; than if it could be in a low Degree even by immediate Perception; and it is fully as *Clear* and *Distinct*, as that we have of our own Properties and Attributes: Since all we conceive and know of those which are truly and intrinsically divine, can be extended no farther than our Conception and Knowlege of their natural Representations; and that all beyond this, is no more than a Knowlege or Belief that they are infinite, and utterly incomprehensible as they are in themselves. Thus are we from our natural Frame and Constitution enabled to think and speak of God and his Attributes, insensibly from the first Beginnings of Reason to its utmost Height and Improvement; and  
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to carry on a Parity of Reason, by a just and universal and unerring Parallel, thro' all the Operations of the Intellect upon things divine and supernatural. And thus from a right Understanding of our selves and of our own intellectual Perfections and moral Endowments, we arrive at such a clear and sufficient Knowledge of God and his Attributes, as is fully suitable to our present State and Condition in this Life, and to all the noble Ends of Religion and Morality: And all Knowledge of them by any immediate Perception, or any direct Ideas and Notions, we are to leave intirely to another World.

2. AGAIN, As one born blind is far from being able to frame to *Himself* any Idea, or Conception, or complex Notion of any thing which carries in it a real Similitude and Correspondency to Light or Colours: So neither would it be in the Power of any *Other Person* who had seen them, to give him any Idea or Conception of them *Truly Analogical*, by the most exact and perfect Description imaginable. Infomuch that tho' he might be informed of the various and wonderful *Effects* of Light in particular, yet all this would not help him to form any just Idea or Conception in his Mind, of any thing similar and correspondent to the real Nature of Light: And the whole Substance of his Knowledge of the thing *It self*, would amount to no more than that of its bare Existence only; and even this he could not infer  
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from any natural Ground or Foundation of Knowledge within himself; nor could he come by it any other way than thro' the Information of another who had the Advantage of his Eye Sight. Whereas on the quite contrary, without any actual Information from Heaven we can not only infer the bare *Existence* of things divine and supernatural, and of God in particular, from the visible Effects of the Creation; but there naturally arise up within us suitable *Conceptions* of the divine *Attributes*, from similar Faculties and correspondent Properties and Operations of our own Mind: Such Conceptions as we are necessarily led into from our very Frame and Constitution; insomuch that we cannot rightly attend to what passeth within our selves, without being enabled for useful and just Conceptions of those *Archetypal* Perfections, whereof our's are a remote but lively Transcript. From hence we naturally proceed to accumulate all the greatest Perfections conceivable in our own rational Nature, and joyn them together into one complex Notion, to stand in the Mind for an analogous Representation of that incomprehensible Being; of whom, or of any one of whose real Attributes or Properties we cannot have the least direct Knowledge: And this complex Notion of the Divinity is more or less just, and perfect, and worthy of God in every one; according to the different Disposition or Capacity of Men's Minds, and their various ways of thinking. Thus as we can infer the

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*Existence* only of a first Cause from every thing that is visible; so we discern his *Perfections* in the Mirrour only of human Nature; by the help of which we attain a sure and solid and competent Knowledge of him who is otherwise inconceivable and imperceptible, and of his Properties and Attributes which are all otherwise as incomprehensible as his intrinsic Essence. And all this from the Observation of what passeth within our selves; and by a Parity of Reason drawn from our own Nature, and Properties, and Operations, to those which are really and truly divine: So that from the original innate Tendency of our Mind, with the first dawnings of Reason we fall insensibly into the only Means and Method we have of conceiving God and his Attributes by Resemblance and Analogy; and into the only Manner we have of expressing them in Terms of human Language. Accordingly all the divine Revelations made to Mankind presuppose this Light of Nature, which qualifies us for the Knowledge of things divine and supernatural; and for the Discernment of that Celestial Light which could come to us no other way than by *Reflection*, and whereof we could not otherwise have the least Glimpse, without being supplied with some supernatural Faculty for the direct Perception of it. By this Resemblance and Analogy founded in the very Natures of God and Man, all divine Truths are revealed to those Faculties of Understanding we already have: Insomuch that the whole Tenor of Scripture relating

relating to God and his Attributes, and to all the Myſteries of the Goſpel, runs intirely in the Style of divine Analogy, enforced upon our Affections by variety of Metaphor.

3. LASTLY, A Man born blind could have had no *Terms* for *Light* and *Colours*, without hearing them from another; and even after he heard thoſe Words pronounced, they could be to him no *Terms* ſtrictly *Proper* and *Literal*, becauſe he could not affix to them any direct and immediate Ideas or Conceptions of the things they expreſſed: Nor could they be to him *Terms* truly *Analogical*; becauſe he would not be capable of forming the leaſt Idea, or Conception, or complex Notion of any things ſo correſpondent and anſwerable to them as to be natural Images and real Representatives of *Light* and *Colours*, which are to him imperceptible and inconceivable. It is plain that upon hearing thoſe *Terms* they would neceſſarily, in reſpect of him, firſt expreſs ſomething altogether imperceptible and inconceivable, as well as inexpressible by any Word of his own; and be afterwards applyed to the beſt Ideas or Conceptions he could frame of them in his Mind; but which bore no real Similitude and Correſpondency to the things they were intended to repreſent. So that thoſe *Terms* could have no real Meaning affixed to them by him, beyond the bare *Exiſtence* only of *Something* *absolutely unknown and inconceivable*; and they would otherwiſe be as

fenceless and unintelligible to him as if they were mere inarticulate Sounds. But on the quite contrary, all our Terms for things divine and supernatural are ever first applyed to things of Nature very conceivable and clearly understood ; and afterwards in a secondary Acceptation express something divine and supernatural, which is to us utterly inconceivable and inexpressible as it is in its self. So that tho' we cannot then understand them in a strictly *Literal* and *Proper* Acceptation, yet we can affix to them a Signification *Truly Analogical*, as to *Knowledge* and *Wisdom* in particular : They being Terms first applyed to the well known Properties and Perfections of an human Mind, whereof we have an immediate Perception and Consciousness ; and afterwards transfered to express similar and correspondent Perfections in the divine Nature, of which or any thing else the same in Kind we can have no such Perception or Consciousness, direct Idea or Conception ; and which are therefore no otherwise conceivable than by Similitude only and Representation. Which is however a *Solid* and *Useful* Knowledge, because it is in Truth a Light of Nature ; as being founded in the very Make and Constitution of an human Mind : and it is a Knowledge *Clear* and *Distinct*, because it reaches no farther than those natural Images and Likenesses ; whereof we have clear and distinct Conceptions.

ANOTHER of this Author's Sayings is, That *He who comes to God, must first believe that there is a God in some intelligible Sence.* This is a Charge upon us that we believe a God in *No intelligible Sence.* To which I answer, That he who comes to God must believe he is *Incomprehensible*; that is, in the true Sence of the Word, a Being so inconceivable that we cannot have the least Idea or Conception of any thing as it is in his real intrinsic Nature or Essence: Nay whose very Existence would be utterly inconceivable, had we not first an Idea of what it was to exist from our own Existence. And will he infer, that because we must on both Sides hold God to be thus *Incomprehensible*, we must therefore believe him not to be *Intelligible*? This Word *Intelligible*, which thro' this Author's Style chimes in for a Close at every Turn, is very captious and ensnaring to a Reader not thro'ly acquainted with this Subject. It may have either of these two very different and even contrary Significations. It may mean a Thing's being actually perceivable and discernible, either by *Direct Ideas* obtained from a Communication with external Objects, such as we have of things material; or by an *Immediate Consciousness* of what passeth within our selves, such as we have of the Faculties and Properties and Operations of our own Minds; from which two Repositories we are supplied with the only Materials of all our *Direct* and *immediate*

Knowledge. Upon these alone it is that Reason exerts all its Operations, which are employed in working them up with Art and Labour; and in Proportion to its natural Extent in the Minds of Men, or its providential Refinement, raising out of them a great variety of Superstructure; from that of the meanest Cottage, to the loftiest and most stately Palace; nay even to that of an intire City, which shall be a lively Representation of the heavenly Jerusalem. Now God and his Attributes are not *Intelligible* either of those two Ways; and yet it would be a very improper as well as false Way of speaking to say, that they are *Unknown* or *Unintelligible*. For tho' we can have no *Direct Idea* or *Immediate Consciousness* of them, or of any thing else the same in *Kind*; and tho' in this Sence they are utterly unknown and in no Degree intelligible; yet in another Signification of that Term they are truly Intelligible; that is, as they are well understood and clearly and distinctly known by their *Natural Representatives*: Which are in our original Make formed by the wise Creator to such a Similitude and Correspondency with things divine and supernatural, that these become very intelligible; nay just as clearly and distinctly intelligible, as the Faculties and Operations of our own Mind. He every where confounds the general word *Intelligible*, with *Perceptible* which is of a more particular Signification, and limited to what is intelligible by some direct Idea or immediate Conception of



of the Object it self, or of something the very same in Kind; as if nothing could be in any Sence intelligible, but that whereof we have some *Such* Conception or Idea; whereas those two things are widely different. We believe a God in a very intelligible Sence, nay in the only Sence wherein he is *Truly intelligible* to us; that is, as he is a Being whose *Real intrinsic Nature* and *Substance* and *Attributes* are equally imperceptible and inconceivable in every Degree as they are in themselves; and no otherwise intelligible or in any other Manner conceivable than by Analogy and Resemblance with the Properties and Perfections of our Humanity: And what we positively deny is, that God or any of his real Attributes are conceivable and intelligible, by any direct Idea and immediate Perception; either as they are in themselves, or as there is any thing of the same Kind in the Creatures.

MUST we therefore believe God and his Attributes to be in *No Sence Intelligible*, because we deny him to be so in the same Sence that the Existence, and Faculties, and Qualities, and Operations of our own Mind are intelligible? That is in other Words, because we will not close with his contradictory and even ridiculous Imagination; that we have in some Degree the very same immediate Perception of the real Properties and Perfections of the divine Nature, that we have of those which are human. Which at best is no other

in Effect, than to believe him to be the same with an human *Mind* transcendently exalted in all its Faculties and Operations to an infinite *Degree*: The Favourite Notion of this Author; who every where supposing that we can have no intelligible Notion at all of God or his Attributes, unless we have a direct Idea or immediate Conception of something the very same in Kind; doth by plain Implication hold that he is absolutely *Unintelligible*, and that we can have no Knowledge at all of him.

BUT he explains himself by saying, we ought to believe *God to be a thinking intelligent Being*; and that the true Question is, *Whether he is a Noûs a Mind, or Intelligence in the proper Sence of the Word?* To which I answer, that *Noûs* or *Mind* is a Word Properly applyed to the Mind of *Man*, a Principle composed both of Spirit and Matter operating jointly and necessarily in essential Union: which Term tho' afterwards transfered to God, could never therefore be applyed to him in the same literal Propriety of Speech wherein it was first applyed to Man. Accordingly when we say God is a *Thinking Being*, the Word cannot mean that Knowledge in him is the Result or joint Operation of material Substance and Spirit; nay or of a pure Spirit the same in Kind with that which is in the human Composition; or even with that of any other Spirit of the whole Creation. The Case is the same when we style God an *Intelligence*; we can have no other

other true and real Meaning in this, but that he is a Being endued with a divine Perfection correspondent and similar to that natural Property of Knowledge in us consisting in Thinking, which is no other than a remote Resemblance only of that original archetypal Perfection: For which because we can have no direct Conception or Idea, nor strictly proper Term; we think and speak of it with the greatest Aptitude whereof the Mind of Man is capable, and express it in the utmost Propriety in which any Terms of human Language can be applyed to things utterly incomprehensible and inexpressible as they are in themselves.

THE Text of Scripture to which the Author refers in this Saying is this, *He who cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a Rewarder of all them that diligently seek him.* Now every material Word of this Text is to be understood not in the strictly *Proper* and *Literal*, but *Analogical* Acceptation; and the whole Meaning of it becomes intelligible to us no otherwise than by a Parity of Reasoning, founded on a Similitude between things natural and human and things divine and supernatural. For Instance; every Conception which makes up the complex Notion affixed to the Term *God*, is truly Analogical; as has already appeared in all the particulars of the divine Attributes. Again; *Must believe that he is*, that is, that he *Exists*: Now of  
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the *Real Manner* of the *Divine Existence* or of any other Existence the same in Kind, we are so far from a Capacity of forming any *Direct* Idea or Conception; that whenever we attempt to frame any *Positive* Conception of it, we are forced to have Recourse to what we know of our own Existence as an *Analogical* Representation only of the other, which is inconceivable and inexpressible as it is in it self. *Must* Believe *that he is*; so that the very Existence of God is a Point of *Faith* founded on the Deduction of Reason only, and Revelation: Whereas had we any direct and immediate Idea or Conception of the divine Existence or of any one of his Attributes, this would supersede all Reasoning and Revelation and Faith upon this Point; and render them as needless and unnecessary as it would be to prove or discover to us the Existence of a Man we see standing before our Eyes. Lastly, the Term *Rewarder* and the Conception annexed to it, is taken from a just temporal Governour or Judge; who distributes due Encouragements and Recompences to those who shew themselves active and zealous in the Observance of his Laws, and in promoting the public Good. This Conception is Analogically attributed to the divine and *Incomprehensible Rewarder*; of whose spiritual Graces and eternal *Heavenly Rewards* for Virtue and Goodness, as they are in themselves, or of any thing the same in Kind, we cannot now obtain the least *Direct* Glimpse or Conception: Any more than we can attain to

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an *Immediate* Knowledge of his supernatural Method of bestowing, and Manner of distributing them. I have made these few Remarks upon the Text referred to by this Author, to shew how groundless and false his grand Notion is, that the Terms expressing the Attributes of God must be understood in the *Literal* and *Proper* and *Formal* Sence wherein they are supposed to signify something of the same Kind in Man: Since it is evident from the very Text he cites, that divine Analogy, together with the Parity of Reasoning which is built upon it, necessarily runs thro' our whole Manner of thinking and speaking of all things divine and purely spiritual. And that it cannot be otherwise, till we come to have a direct and immediate Intuition of those Objects; and to express our Conceptions and Sentiments of them after the Manner of Heaven, and in the supernatural and inconceivable Method of glorified Saints and Angels.

AGAIN he puts it into our Mouth to say, *That properly speaking there is in God no Knowledge or Wisdom; none at all, as he elsewhere speaks, but only something else which supplies the Place of Wisdom and Knowledge; which produces The visible Effects in Nature, and which Men for want of knowing better call by the Names Knowledge and Wisdom.* But *properly speaking* is a very ambiguous Expression, and calculated to deceive. For if thereby is meant that the Terms *Knowledge* and *Wisdom*

*Wisdom* cannot be applyed to God in the same literal and strict Propriety in which they express the like Faculties or Properties in Man, and so as to signify something of the very same Kind in both: Then he doth us no Injustice, for he makes us speak what we think; and what he may decry in general equivocating Words and Expressions, but will never be able to disprove whenever he attempts to come close to the Point. For it is no more than saying in other Words, that there is no Property or Operation in God which is the Result only of Thinking in a Mind composed of Matter and Spirit necessarily operating together in essential Union: It is no more than denying that there is human Knowledge or Wisdom in the divine Nature in an infinite Degree; or that there is divine Knowledge and Wisdom in Man in any Degree; or that *Finite, Created, and Comprehensible*; and *Infinite, Uncreated and Incomprehensible* Knowledge and Wisdom, can be equally expressed in the same literal and proper and formal Acceptation of those Terms. But if by *Properly Speaking* he means, that we deny there is in God Knowledge or Wisdom according to the utmost Propriety in which the Terms of human Language can possibly be applyed to any thing in his incomprehensible Nature; it is a most injurious Charge. For we do assert that there is real Knowledge and Wisdom in God; that is, infinite supernatural Perfections solely and intirely divine, correspondent and similar

to those natural and purely human Properties in us: Nay we assert that *Knowledge* and *Wisdom* are more *Truly* in him, than in Man; the Faculties and Properties of whose Mind have no more than a *Distant Resemblance* of those *Original* and incomprehensible Perfections totally divine, and as intirely different in Kind from any thing natural and human, as the real intrinsic Nature or Essence of the Divinity. This is the true Reason why no Words of human Language can express the divine Attributes with the same literal Propriety, wherein they are first applyed to our Properties or Faculties: And yet we cannot justly say there is any *Impropriety* in them when thus transfered to those incomprehensible divine Perfections; because they have then the utmost Significancy and Propriety whereby things purely divine and Spiritual can be expressed by us. Men must always speak after the same Manner they are necessitated to think: If they can *Think* no otherwise of divine Knowledge and Wisdom, than by Similitude and Resemblance only with the natural Properties whereof they have an *Immediate* Perception or Consciousness; then they can *Speak* of them no otherwise than by the same Terms of human Language wherein they express those natural Properties. Where Men necessarily think by the Help of Analogy only, they must necessarily speak Analogically; tho' what is thus conceived and expressed, may afterwards be greatly enlarged upon in an endless

less Variety of divine *Metaphor* and Allusion to our *Senses*, and *Bodily Members*, and to many other things of Nature: Which purely *Figurative* way of speaking doth more especially serve to all the Purposes of moving our *Passions*, and influencing our *Affections*; as divine Analogy serves to supply the *Understanding* with a Fund of just and solid and useful Knowledge, and to a strict and necessary Information of the Judgment.

LASTLY, The Author hath this Saying by way of Objection against our Doctrine of Analogy, *Men cannot argue from unknown Attributes, or from Attributes in an unknown Sence.* What he means by arguing from Attributes *Absolutely unknown*, as he elsewhere explains it, which is arguing from nothing, and where every Inference made must be downright Nonsense; or by arguing from Attributes in an *Unknown Sence*; or how he distinguisheth those two things with any Eye to the Subject; we must leave himself to explain in his next warm Attempt against the Doctrine of divine Analogy. Let his Meaning be what it will, this Saying hath an Air and Face of Truth, for no Man can argue either *From* or *To* any thing *Absolutely unknown*; but it is at the same time a downright Falsity at the Bottom, and fallacious, in the designed Application of it to that Doctrine: By which only we are enabled to explain the true and real and genuine Knowledge of the divine Attributes,



in the only Manner by which they become conceivable and intelligible to the Mind of Man; by Resemblance and Analogy with those natural Properties and Faculties whereof we have immediate Conceptions. To bring the whole Matter out of that affected Dark-ness wherein it is here involved, into a clear Light; the proper Question between us is, Which is most true as well as of greatest Force and Influence upon the Minds of Men; The arguing from divine Attributes supposed to become *Obscurely* and *Partially* and *Inadequately* known and intelligible, by being the *Same* in *Kind* with our own human Properties and Qualities, but different from them *Infini- tely* in *Degree*? Or arguing from infinite di- vine Perfections totally *Different* in *Kind* from our human Properties and Qualities; but so tru- ly *Correspondent* and *Similar* to some of them, that they become *Clearly* and *Distinctly* known, and very intelligible, from the clear Concep- tions and immediate Consciousness we have of their natural Similitudes and Representa- tives? Had this Author shewn in any one Instance, how we hold the Attributes of God to be *Absolutely unknown* or *Unintelligible*; or how there could be no arguing from them with any Truth or Certainty in our Manner of conceiving them by Resemblance only and Analogy; and how no Inferences could be made from them for influencing Men's Minds in the necessary Points either of Faith or Practice, otherwise than upon a Supposition that

that they are the same in Kind with those called by the same Names in Man: He had acted *Fairly* in putting the whole Matter to a short and clear Issue; and *Worthily* also, in offering at some seasonable Check to the spreading Contagion of a false and delusive Doctrine, in his Opinion of such deadly Consequence to Religion, and fatal to the Souls of all who are willing to believe a God. But since he hath all along most industriously avoided descending thus to Particulars, I shall here instance in that of the divine *Knowledge* or *Wisdom* the very Attribute to which he every where recurs.

FROM this divine Attribute then of *Knowledge*, among other things, Men argue the Perfection and Excellency of the divine Nature; our indispensable Obligation to an awful Veneration of God; to Obedience and Worship, to Sincerity of Heart, to internal Virtue and Holiness, to a constant Care and Watchfulness over all our Thoughts and inward Inclinations and Dispositions as well as outward Actions; since they are all naked and open to him, and that it is impossible any moral Irregularity or Corruption of the Soul should be concealed from him by the deepest Dissimulation and Hypocrisy. And lastly Men from thence argue the intire Dependence we ought to have upon his Providence, who knows how to regulate the whole Oeconomy of the Universe; and can make all things work together for good

to them that love him. Now what we say is, that none of these or any other Consequences drawn from that Attribute, do conclude with any Truth or Certainty upon a Supposition that Knowledge is of the same Kind in God and Man; because that very Assumption or Ground of the Argument is absolutely false and absurd: And therefore the Consequences drawn from it can have no effectual Power or lasting Influence upon the Faith or Practice of Men, since it is so easily and so commonly refuted by Atheists and Deists and Libertines. These Men may tell you with great Truth, that human Knowledge is all originally founded upon *Ideas of Sensation* lodged in the Imagination; and upon that internal Perception or *Consciousness* we have of the Faculties and Operations of our own Minds; whence follows the *Simple Apprehension* or Intuition of all these by the Intellect; this again is succeeded by the various Combinations of *Sensitive Ideas* among themselves; as well as with the *Operations* of our *Minds*, in order to form *Conceptions* and *Complex Notions*; then follows the different Observations or Judgments of the Mind upon all these; and from thence we proceed to Deduction and Inference of one thing from another. They may justly urge that all these are the Operations of *Matter and Spirit* in essential Union: And consequently that Knowledge cannot be of the same Kind in God and Man; since every one of these several Steps and Degrees of human

Knowlege, and much more all of them together, must be intirely unworthy of God. And above all that it is even Contradiction that any thing *Natural* and *Human*, *Finite* and *Created*, should be in Reality of the same Kind with what is *Divine* and *Supernatural*, *Infinite*, *Uncreated*, and *Eternal*: And from hence again they proceed to this false Conclusion, that the divine Attributes are so *Absolutely unknown* and *Unintelligible*, that none of the Consequences drawn from them in relation to Matters of Faith or Practice conclude with any Truth or Certainty. Here they are in the highest Elevation of their Knowlege, at the utmost Bounds of Nature; and for want of rightly apprehending the Doctrine of divine Analogy, never make any the least Attempt to get over them, by the last and most excellent Operation of the Intellect; that of its *Substituting* worldly and human Objects and our Conceptions of them, together with those Words we use for them, to express and *Represent* correspondent divine and supernatural Objects. And accordingly here they come to this one general Resolution; That what they are able to obtain no such *Direct* and *Immediate* Conception or Idea of as they have of the things of this Life, can be no Object either of their Knowlege or Faith: And this noted Maxim of theirs they apply to the Attributes of God in particular; and of course despise and explode all the Arguments and Inferences deduced from them in relation to Matters of Faith or Practice.

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BUT on the quite contrary, when we argue from that Attribute as an *Infinite Perfection* in the Divinity *Correspondent* and *Similar* to our natural Property of Knowledge; but equally unknown and incomprehensible, as it is in it self, with the real intrinsic Nature or Essence of the Divinity; and as being so totally different in Kind from any thing human, that it is no otherwise conceivable than by Similitude and Analogy with that Knowledge whereof we have an immediate Consciousness in our Mind: Then all our just Inferences from thence conclude with the utmost moral Certainty and Evidence; with irresistible Force and Influence upon the Consciences of Men; nay much more irresistible for that the Knowledge of God is a Perfection of a vastly transcendent and superior Kind. And thus the strongest and even fundamental Objection of Infidels is clearly and fully obviated; and a wide Door laid open to let them into the Knowledge and Faith of our Christian Mysteries. For upon this footing, our Knowledge and Conceptions of things divine and purely spiritual are satisfactorily accounted for from *Reason*; which shews us the Absurdity and Contradiction of our having any Faculty or Property in us of the same Kind with any Perfection truly and essentially divine: And from *Scripture*, which reveals to us our being made in the Likeness and after the Image of God; and consequently that it is a Likeness

only, and no Identity of Nature or Kind in any Degree. Which Similitude or Image is so truly the Ground of all our divine Knowledge, that we could not argue that God is to be loved for his Goodness, or feared for his Power, or respected and adored for his Knowledge; if we did not first infer from the well known particular Qualities of *Goodness* and *Power* and *Knowledge* in our selves, that there must be in the Divinity real Perfections correspondent and similar to them; but as infinitely different in Kind, as the divine Essence is from the human: And afterwards frame to our selves a complex Notion of him, by Accumulation of these and all the other greatest Perfections in human Nature. Thus again in this way of thinking, the divine Attributes are so far from being absolutely *Unknown* and *Unintelligible*; that our Conceptions of them are as clear and distinct and determinate, as those we have of the Faculties and Properties of our own Minds by which they are represented. Thus likewise it is obvious that a divine Perfection so transcendently exceeding all the Properties and Qualities of created Beings not in Degree only, but in its intire Nature and Kind, as to be utterly inconceivable and ineffable otherwise than by Analogy; must strike the Minds and Consciences of Men with greater Awe and Veneration, than if it were imagined a Property or Quality in God of the very same Kind with that of Knowledge in our selves: Than if we grossly  
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conceived God to have a very extensive *Imagination*, stored with infinite *Ideas* of external Objects; to have an extensive and unlimited *Simple Apprehension* and Prospect of all these; and from thence to proceed to *Infinite Observation* upon them, as our Author speaks; and from thence again to infinite *Deductions* and Consequences; and in short than if we took Knowledge in God to be no other than *Infinite Thinking* in such a Mind as our own, composed of infinite Matter as well as Spirit necessarily operating together in essential Union. And yet the true divine Perfection is never the less *Real* for being thus utterly incomprehensible and ineffable as it is in it self, or otherwise than by Analogy; it is never the less *Knowledge*, but the more truly such, because the most exalted of all created Intelligences can have no other Knowledge than what hath a lively Similitude and Resemblance only of it; and all the Operations and Effects of it are so much the more universal and certain and infallible, and it is so much the more to be admired and feared and adored, the more we conceive it to transcend all Kinds of created Perfection. Lastly, this clearly obviates that grand Objection of Libertines and Infidels, from the divine Attributes being *Unknown* and *Unintelligible*; and from their not being able to find within themselves any Idea or Conception of divine Knowledge in particular, *Different* from that which is human: For it is plainly an ignorant and senseless Expectation

tion in Men to imagine they can obtain any direct Conception or Idea of what is utterly imperceptible and incomprehensible in every Degree either as it is in it self, or by the Help of any thing else the same in Kind. No, one and the same Conception necessarily stands in the Mind for that Faculty or Property whereof we have an immediate Perception or Consciousness; and for that correspondent divine Perfection of which it is impossible for us to have either: And accordingly we are under the same Necessity of expressing the incomprehensible supernatural Perfection, and the well known human Property by one and the same Term *Knowledge*; which is the true Case of all the other Attributes of God known by the Light of Nature, as well as of all our Christian Mysteries,

As this Author is subject to an exuberant Flow of Words, so there are many other general Expressions in him to the same Purpose; which are no other than a continual giddy Round and tedious Repetition of the same Things over again, with no small Variety and Alteration of the Phrase: But since all of them may be easily obviated by the Remarks already made upon the few I have cited, I shall now pass on to *His* Notion or Description of Analogy, in designed Opposition to that which is *Truly* such and set forth and maintained by *Us*; and to the Consideration of those Authorities he produceth for the Support of it,



HE says of us that we mistake the Scholastic Use of the Terms *Analogy* and *Analogically*, when we mean by them *That we cannot frame, in any Degree, a true and proper Notion of the divine Attributes.* *Propriety* is in Words and Expressions, and *Proper Notions* is therefore an Impropriety of Speech; which I had not taken notice of, but that it occasions no small Confusion in this Subject. What *We* assert is plain and may be clearly understood; namely, that we have most *True* and *Useful* and *Distinct* Notions of the divine Attributes; and what we deny is, that we can have any *Direct* and *Immediate* Notions or Ideas of them as they are in their own Nature or Kind, in any Degree; or that we can express any of them in Terms strictly literal and proper, as we do those human Properties or Attributes which are their Images only and Representations.

HE makes *The Schoolmen* to distinguish a two-fold *Analogy*; a *Metaphorical Analogy*, and a *Proper Analogy*. Whoever may be the Author of this Distinction, it is as gross an Absurdity as if he had distinguished between *Analogical Metaphor* and *Proper Metaphor*: And every one may discern at first Sight how it changes the commonly received and allowed Distinction between *Metaphor* and *Analogy*, into a *Metaphorical* and *Proper Analogy*; which is not only full of Obscurity and Confusion, but a flat Contradiction in Terms. A thing

may be *Properly* Metaphor, or *Properly* Analogy, and it is good Sense; but to say any thing is a *Metaphorical Analogy*, or a *Proper Analogy* is neither common Sense nor Language, but the very same Absurdity as *Analogical Metaphor* and *Analogical Propriety*: And I shall entertain this Opinion in favour of all Rhetoricians and Metaphysicians, as well as of all the Schoolmen in general; that it is a Distinction never heard of in the World, before it dropped from the teeming Invention of this Author; till he produces some Instances to the Contrary. Now observe the Use and Application he makes of his new Distinction.

FIRST, *Metaphorical Analogy* is, when we attribute human Parts to God; such as a Finger, an Eye, or an Ear; then says he, every one sees that the Analogy is *Metaphorical*. But every one who sees with the Eye of common Sense must immediately discern the quite contrary, that it is mere *Metaphor* and *No Analogy*; because there can be nothing in the divine Nature which bears any real Similitude and Correspondency to our bodily Senses or Members: And therefore it is, that when we speak of God or his Attributes by Allusion to any thing merely *Sensitive* and *Material*, it is so purely a Figure of Speech that we transfer the Term only to him, without the Idea annexed to it: Whereas when we speak of God in the Language of our *Intellectual Faculties* and the Properties of the *Mind*, we transfer both the Terms  
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and the Conceptions annexed to them, which is truly and properly Analogy ; because there is a real Similitude and Correspondency between these, and the divine Perfections whereof they are true Representatives. The Reason assigned by him why our Senses and bodily Members are attributed to God by *Metaphor* only, is as false as his calling it a Metaphorical Analogy ; *Because in every Degree they necessarily and simply include Defect and Imperfection.* But if material Organs of Sensation and bodily Substance, as such, in *Every Degree Necessarily and Simply* include Defect and Imperfection, they never would have been essential Ingredients of our Composition ; nor could it be then said of us that we were created truly perfect even in our *Kind*, or that God saw *Every thing* that he had made and behold it was *Very Good*. Nay thus the very Body of Christ as he is now in a State of Glory, would *Simply and Necessarily* include Defect and Imperfection *In every Degree.* No, the true Reason is because *God is a Spirit*, a pure Spirit ; and therefore there can be nothing in material Substance or bodily Senses *Really Similar and Correspondent* to any Property in his purely spiritual Nature : Whereas it is quite otherwise with regard to the intellectual Endowments and Qualifications of our *Mind*, which is composed of Spirit as well as Matter ; and in respect of which we are said to be made in the *Likeness* and after the *Image* of God. Not but that even the human *Spirit* it self, which considered in respect  
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of *Man* is the highest Perfection and Ingredient of his Nature ; in respect of that *Divine Spirit* includes Defect and Imperfection ; as no doubt the Substance and Properties of every Rank of created Spirits must do.

HE adds here as another Instance of his *Metaphorical Analogy*, *As we attribute human Passions to God*, as if this were as truly Metaphor as the former. But in this he is grievously mistaken likewise ; for the commendable Passions or Affections of the Mind are attributed to God, as well as its intellectual Operations, not by *Metaphor* but by a good Degree of true *Analogy*. He assigns the same Reason why human *Passions* are attributed to God by his *Metaphorical Analogy* ; *Because they necessarily and simply include Imperfection in every Degree* : And I return much the same Answer ; that then we were not at first made perfect in our *Kind*, but *Necessarily* and *Simply* imperfect ; and this noble Work of God came necessarily defective out of his Hands. Nor are we upon his Principle capable of ever being rendered truly perfect in our *Kind* even by Almighty Power ; but all our Passions and Affections must, *As such*, continue for ever, even in a State of Glory, simply defective and necessarily imperfect in every Degree. Why Friend ! No Creature of God, or natural Faculty or Property of it, is *Necessarily* and *Simply* defective and imperfect in *Every Degree* : So that *This* cannot be a Reason why even the Properties and Qua-

ities of material Substance, or the very Name  
 of a Pebble may not be attributed to God;  
 for none of these *Necessarily* and *Simply* include  
 Defect and Imperfection in *Every Degree*, as  
 such. Lay aside therefore your *Simply*, and *Ne-*  
*cessarily*, and *In every Degree* which have nei-  
 ther Sence nor Application *Here*; and if you  
 consider the *Passions* or *Affections* of the Soul  
 in respect of our human Composition, when  
 they are in a just Degree, truly and properly  
 regulated under the Conduct of right Reason  
 and Religion: They are so far from being *Sim-*  
*ply* and *Necessarily* Imperfections *As such*, that  
 they are great Perfections of *Our* Nature; and  
 some of the very Qualities which in our first  
 Creation gave us a near and lively Resemblance  
 of the Divinity. But if you consider them in  
 respect of the real Nature of *God*, the very  
*Kind* of them is then indeed necessarily Defe-  
 ctive and Imperfect in every Degree; as every  
 Kind of thing in this World and in our human  
 Composition must unavoidably be. So that  
 there can be nothing in him of the same *Sort*  
 with human Passions or Affections; any more  
 than with bodily Senses or Members; or with  
 human Power, or human Knowledge and Wis-  
 dom, or human Goodness. Even these last  
 are *Necessarily* and Unavoidably Defects and  
 Imperfections in respect of the *Divine* Nature,  
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 ry *Kind*; and therefore none of them can be  
 attributed to God in the same formal or lite-  
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of our selves, before they are applyed to him. Our Passions or Affections, as well as our intellectual Properties, are all alike attributed or transfered from us to God by *Analogy only*, tho' not *Equally* or in the same Degree of it with our other Perfections: They not having the same Foundation, that is, the same Degree and Proportion of Similitude in the divine and human Natures; and consequently not being now *Equally* perfect and lively Representations of the divine Perfections. Accordingly since there is nothing in the divine Nature similar and correspondent to our bodily Senses and Members, we apply them to it by Metaphor only. The Passions or Affections being more immediately liable to moral Disorder and Corruption, we attribute them to God in a *Lower Degree* of Analogy: And the intellectual Properties and Operations of our Mind we attribute to him by a *More full and Complete* and *Lively* Analogy; they being subject to Blindness and Error and all moral Corruption, mostly from the Strength and Influence of the Passions.

Now that our Passions and Affections cannot be attributed to God in the *Same Sence* and after the *Same Manner* with our bodily Senses and Members, is plain; because they are Properties and Operations of the *Mind* which is the Image of God within us, as well as those which are styled intellectual: And since the latter are attributed by a true and  
*Real*

*Real Analogy* founded in the Nature of things, it is reasonable to think so likewise of the former. Is any thing more reasonable than to believe that there are Perfections in the divine Nature correspondent and answerable to *Love*, and *Compassion*, and to all the other commendable Affections in Man? Such real Perfections as lay no less a firm and solid Foundation of Truth, in all that is spoken of God thro' the Scriptures in the Language of the commendable Passions and Affections of the Mind; than in that of our intellectual Properties? That it may as *Truly* be said that there is *Love* and *Compassion* in God, as *Knowledge*, and *Wisdom*, and *Goodness*? And surely with more Truth (tho' our Author asserts the Contrary) than when we say he hath *Fingers* and *Eyes* and *Ears*, which can have nothing correspondent and similar to them on the Part of the divine Nature. So that our Passions or Affections are truly attributed to God, not by mere *Metaphor* but by a *Real Analogy*; tho' in a lower Degree of it, and with more Caution in separating all the Imperfection we are able from them (as I observed before) than when we attribute the intellectual Properties and Operations of the Mind.

SECONDLY, *Proper Analogy*, says he, is when we attribute such as *Wisdom* and *Knowledge* to God. Had he said this was *Truly* and *Properly* Analogy, he had spoke properly and a great deal of Truth; but as he calls it a *Pro-*

*per Analogy* in Distinction from *Metaphorical Analogy*, it is neither good Sence nor proper Language. That these and such like Attributes are attributed to God by a *Real Analogy* is most sure, but the Reason he assigns for it is most false; because *In Knowledge and Wisdom simply taken, or as such, there is no Defect or Imperfection*. These Words *Simply taken* and *As such* are so dubious and equivocating, that they would deceive any Reader who doth not discern, that they can have no other intelligible and rational Meaning here; but Knowledge and Wisdom in the *General Sence* of the Words, and as they express and include that which is *Divine, Angelic, and Human*. Knowledge is most surely a *Perfection* in them all, but vastly different not in Degree alone but in Kind. In God it denotes an infinite incomprehensible Perfection *Absolutely* consummate. In all *Created* Spirits it is a *Perfection*, not absolutely such; but only as it renders them perfect in their several *Kinds* and *Ranks*. It is the same likewise as to us; tho' our *Knowledge* contributes to render us complete and perfect in our *Kind*, and is one of the highest Perfections in our Frame: Yet it is so far from being void of all Defect and Imperfection, considered in respect of *God*; that the only real and *Positive* Perfection of *Human* Knowledge, consists merely in the distant Similitude and Analogy it actually bears to that infinite and absolutely consummate Perfection, whereof it is only a Representation. So that we attribute



to God that *Knowledge* whereof we have a direct Conception, for a quite different Reason to that assigned by this Author; not because *Simply taken* and *As such* it has *No Defect and Imperfection* in it; for even our bodily Parts and Senses, *Thus* considered, include no Defect; and might, notwithstanding any thing in this Principle, be attributed to God. But because, tho' our Kind of Knowledge is manifestly an Imperfection, in its utmost Degree, in respect of the *Divinity*; and therefore we cannot apply or transfer it to him as an *Essential* and *Intrinsic* Perfection of his *Real Nature* whereof we have any direct Idea or Conception, or for which we have a proper Term and literal Denomination: Yet it is a Perfection of the human Mind, which manifestly contains a lively *Image* and true *Analogical Representation* of a *Correspondent*, infinite, and absolutely complete Perfection in the *Divinity*; which cannot be truly asserted of our bodily Parts in any Degree. In short nothing in the Nature or Properties of created Beings, no not even in *Mere Matter*, *Simply* and *Necessarily* includes Defect and Imperfection in *Every Degree*, as such; for otherwise every created Being would be necessarily defective in its Kind: Nor on the other Hand can there be any thing in the *Created Universe* so perfect, as to exclude all Defect and Imperfection in *Every Degree* and in *Every Respect*, considered *As such*; so that all the Consequences deduced from the contrary Topics are alike groundless and false.

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As it is thus with Knowledge, so it is likewise with all the other Faculties and Properties and Operations of our Mind. Tho' they are truly Perfections, considered as they are in *Us* the just Complement and finishing *Our* Nature, and such as raise us up to the utmost Dimension and Size of Humanity, and which render us truly perfect in our Rank of Being: Yet when they are considered in respect of the real intrinsic Nature of God; they are all so many Defects and Imperfections, altogether unworthy of him (as to their very Kind) who is in himself simply and absolutely perfect, not by possessing the most *Exalted Degrees* of any *Created* Sort of Perfection, much less of that which is *Human*; but by such real Perfections as are infinitely different in *Kind*, not only from all Human but even Angelic Properties. And therefore it is that no Faculty or Operation of an human Mind, can be applyed or attributed to his absolutely perfect Nature literally, or *Properly* and *Formally* as our Author terms it; and so as, according to him, to preserve any Proportion of *Degree only* between the infinite Nature of God, and the finite and limited and imperfect Nature of Man, which is gross Absurdity: But by *Analogy* only with the most perfect and correspondent Faculties and Properties and Operations of an human *Mind*, in respect of which we are formed after the Likeness or Image of God. Which lays a sure and solid Foundation for  
universal

universal Truth and Certainty in all our Conceptions of things purely spiritual and divine, and in all our exact Reasonings upon them; tho' at the same time nothing is more manifest, than that they must be altogether different in *Kind* from every thing natural and human.

FROM hence then the true Difference between Metaphor and Analogy is apparent. Metaphor is merely *Imaginary* and *Arbitrary*, without any *Real* Similitude and Correspondency in the very *Nature* of the things between which the Comparison is made: And it is therefore in Truth no more than a pure Allusion, or Figure of Speech, without any transferring of the *Ideas* or *Conceptions*; as when in human Metaphor we express the *Verdure* of a Field by *Smiling*, or the *Consideration* of the Mind by its *Running over* a Subject. And thus when we attribute *Fingers* and *Eyes* and *Ears* to God, the Terms are purely *Metaphorical*; since it is manifest from Reason and Scripture, that there can be nothing in the Nature of a pure Spirit similar and answerable to our Senses and bodily Members. But the Resemblance and Correspondency which is the Ground of Analogy, is not *Imaginary* and *Arbitrary*; but founded in the very *Nature* of the things compared; as when in human Analogy we say, what *Reason* is to Man, that natural *Instinct* is to Brutes. And accordingly when we attribute Know-

lege and Wisdom and Goodness to God, we do it by Divine *Analogy*; because it can be undoubtedly proved that there are Perfections in him *Correspondent* and *Similar* to those Properties or Qualities of an human Mind: Which we are under a *Necessity* of applying or transferring to God Analogically, for want of any *Direct* or *Immediate* or (in this Author's Language) *Formal* Ideas or Conceptions of those divine Perfections; which are totally imperceptible and incomprehensible to us, as to their *Real Nature* and *Kind*. This is what *Cajetan* very aptly says is *Analogia proprie facta*, *Analogy properly formed*, or *Justly instituted*; that is, what we truly and properly call *Analogy* in Distinction from *Metaphor*: And not, according to this Author's gross Mistake in rendering the Words, a *Proper Analogy*; as if it had been *Analogia Propria* in Opposition to *Analogia Metaphorica*, which I am persuaded neither *Cajetan* nor any other of the Schoolmen ever dreamed of. For surely a *Metaphorical Analogy*, and a *Proper Analogy*, which is as palpable an Absurdity as *Analogical Metaphor* and *Analogical Propriety*; are two such unnatural ungainly Monsters of human Imagination, as were never before drawn out at full Length, and set off with so much Daub and Colouring, for a public Shew to the World with no small Pomp and Solemnity. He attempts to father these chimerical Births upon the Schoolmen; who as far as I can yet see, are intirely innocent of the Charge. But what if some among them had been guilty; should

should he not have left their spurious Issue exposed in that solitary forsaken Desert where he found them, to perish in their Infancy; since no human Creature besides himself would ever have owned them: And not have taken up such gross Absurdities in order to be cherished, and maintained, and openly abetted under a Disguise of the genuine Offspring of good Sense and solid Learning.

IN Defence of this unheard of Distinction of his, and of his fundamental Principle of *Analogy in respect of Degree only*; or *Attributing Knowledge and Wisdom to God proportionably*; or *preserving a Proportion to the infinite Nature of God*: That is, in his Meaning, a Proportion purely in *Degree* between things the very same in *Kind*; and not a Proportion of *Similitude only* and *Correspondency* between natural or human Knowledge, and that which is divine and supernatural; as if *Proportion of Degrees* between any thing *Finite* and *Infinite* were not downright Contradiction. In Defence of these Notions, I say, one Writer whom he happens to cite is *Thomas Aquinas*; whose Opinion with respect to *Analogical Perfections in God*, or our *knowing God by Analogy* is fully and clearly shewn already in the preceding Part of this Volume, nothing of which need be here repeated. But the two particular Places or Sentences in him referred to here, by this Author, must not be omitted. The first is this; *Oportet quod; quandocunque nomen sumptum a quacun-*

*que Perfectione Creaturæ, Deo attribuitur; secludatur ab ejus Significatione omne illud, quod pertinet ad imperfectum Modum qui competit Creaturæ.* Here Aquinas most expressly asserts two things; one is, *That Words expressing the Perfections of the Creature are from thence attributed or applied to God for expressing the divine Perfections;* which all Men must allow to be, with respect to their own *Real Nature*, utterly incomprehensible and inexpressible by us. This our Author very well expresseth by saying, *We borrow the Name of the Perfection from the Creature, and attribute it to God.* Yes, and we borrow the natural and worldly *Conception* likewise annexed to that Word of human Language, to help us to conceive something altogether divine and supernatural; which could never be conceived and expressed otherwise than by such borrowed Terms and substituted Conceptions. Again says he, *The Intellect gets its Notions of all Sorts of Perfections from the Creatures.* But say I, it gets no Notion of any eternal, uncreated, and essentially divine Perfection from the Creature, either in *Kind* or *Degree*; the very thing which lyes upon him to prove. This and the preceding Question cited by this Author are full of such Sayings as these to the same Purpose. *Non possumus nominare Deum nisi ex Creaturis. Nomina de Deo et Creaturis Dicta* are not, says he, to be taken *Univocæ*, as if they signified something the same in *Kind* with any thing human; nor *Æquivocæ* as if it expressed nothing *Really Similar* and *Answerable*

*swerable* to any thing in human Nature; but *Analogice*, as it expresseth a Being endued with Perfections really *Correspondent* and *Similar* to the greatest Perfections of an human Mind; therefore he adds, that the Words are spoken of God and the Creatures *Secundum Analogiam Creaturarum ad ipsum*.

THE other thing expressly asserted by *Aquinas* in that Saying is, That when the Name of any Perfection borrowed from the Creature is attributed to God; *We must exclude from its Signification all that belongs to the imperfect Manner in which it agrees to the Creature*. What our Author builds upon here is the word *Modus* or *Manner*; as if *Aquinas* meant that Words expressive of Perfections in God and Man signified something the same in *Kind*, and differing in the *Manner* only: As if the word *Knowledge* in particular, borrowed from Man and attributed to God, signified no more than a *Different Manner* of knowing in each of them; and consequently that Knowledge in both must be the same in *Kind*. That the *Manner* of Knowledge in God and Man is different, infinitely different is most true; but nothing can be more false than his Consequence, which should have been the very Reverse: For the *Different Manner* of Knowing in each of them is the very thing that alters the *Nature* of their Knowledge, and which makes it really different in *Kind*. Now our human Frame being composed of Spirit and

Matter ; the Manner of our Knowledge is by original *Ideas* of *Sensation*, and the *Consciousness* we have of the several Operations of our own Mind ; the only Materials of all our Knowledge human and divine : The Manner of the Intellect's operating upon these is, first by a simple Apprehension and View, or a bare Prospect of those Ideas and Operations ; then by its various Combinations of them, among themselves and with each other ; to which succeed the Observations upon them, or the Judgments it makes of them ; subsequent to which is its whole Manner of Deduction and Consequence. The chief and most concerning of all its Consequences, as being the Foundation of all Religion, is the *Existence* of an eternal, infinite, and purely spiritual Being : Whose intire Nature or Essence, and Attributes are utterly imperceptible and inconceivable in any Degree as they are *In themselves* ; and consequently not to be conceived or expressed, otherwise than by Analogy with the highest correspondent Properties and Qualities of an human Mind. This whole Procedure and *Intire Manner* of human Knowledge is, in every step of it, altogether unworthy of God ; and renders it of a quite different *Kind* from that correspondent Perfection in him, which we express by the Term Knowledge borrowed from Man.

ACCORDINGLY Aquinas in the very Article cited argues, that *Secundum Modum Immaterialitatis*,



*materialitatis, est Modus Cognitionis.* So that the *Manner* of Knowledge in Brutes must be of a quite different Nature and Kind from that of our's; the whole *Manner* of Knowledge in a Mind composed of Matter and Spirit operating jointly in essential Union, must be of quite another Kind from that of Angels or created Beings who are all Spirit; and the *Manner* of Knowledge in a divine and infinite Spirit must differ vastly more from the *Manner* of knowing in Angels, than their *Manner* of knowing doth from that which is merely human. Now if the *Manner* of Knowledge in God is *Infinitely different* from our *Manner*; the divine Knowledge it self must be of a *Kind* infinitely different from that which is human: Nay so different in Mind, that he observes the *Divine Knowledge is neither a Quality nor an Habit*, as it is in Man, *But it is his very Substance*; and consequently must differ as truly in Kind from human Knowledge, as his Essence or Substance differs in Kind from that which is human. And therefore he says it is a *Pure Act*; to exclude not only all Habit and Improvement, but the whole intire *Nature* and *Manner* and *Kind* of human Knowledge. For otherwise where is that *Simplex Intelligentia*, which is very aptly opposed by him to the *Compound-ed* Knowledge which is the Result of *Matter* and *Spirit*; of *Sensation* as well as *Reason*, and of such a gradual Process and so many distinct Operations of the Intellect?

THIS is Aquinas's Meaning in those Expressions of his where he says, *The Perfections of the Creature are in God Altiori Modo*, that is, in a *Manner* very different from what they are in the Creature; not *Altiori Gradu*, as this Author would have it, but in a *Higher Sence*; and in a *Manner* so infinitely different from what is in the Creature, that the whole intire *Nature* or *Kind* of those Perfections is thereby altered. In this Sence it is that he says, *Whatever Perfection is in the Creature, Præexistit et continetur in Deo secundum Modum excellentem*, not *Secundum Gradum excellentem*. This he explains by saying, that it is contained in God as its *Cause* or *Principle*; *Quicquid dicitur de Deo et Creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis Ordo Creaturæ ad Deum ut ad Principium et Causam; in qua præexistunt excellenter omnium Rerum Perfectiones*. There is nothing he is more full and express in, than that no Perfections attributed to God and the Creature can be of the same Kind; *Nullum Nomen convenit Deo secundum illam Rationem, secundum quam dicitur de Creatura*: And to convince you that by *Rationem* he means *According to the same Manner, or Nature and Kind*, take the Words immediately following, *Genus autem variatum mutat Rationem*; Change the Kind, and you change the whole Meaning and Signification of the Word when you apply it to God and the Creature. Nay he asserts the same with respect to Knowledge in particular;

ticular; *Non secundum eandem Rationem hoc Nomen Sapiens de Deo et de Homine dicitur; et eadem Ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum Nomen univoce de Deo et Creaturis prædicatur.* Words taken *Secundum eandem Rationem* and *Univoce*, in the constant Style of all the Schoolmen, signify Terms used to express things *The same in Nature or Kind and Manner.* He is so clear and express in this Point, that his *Conclusion* in answer to that Question, *Utrum aliqua Creatura possit esse similis Deo*, is this; *Since God is the universal Principle, and not contained in any Species or Genus, Creaturæ ei similes sunt non secundum eandem specificam aut genericam Rationem; sed secundum aliqualem Analogiam.* And accordingly he asserts that God is *Extra omne Genus*, so that nothing else can be of the same Kind with any thing in him; his intire Nature being different from any thing in the Creature. And again, *It is not said that there is any Likeness of the Creature to God, Secundum eandem Rationem Generis et Speciei; sed secundum Analogiam tantum.* Upon which he makes this excellent Remark, of which I would have a particular Notice taken once for all: *That tho' the Creature may be said to be like God, as we say a Picture or Image is like the Person it represents; yet it cannot be said with the Same strict Propriety of Speech, That God is like the Creature.* For as it is not with exact Fitness and Propriety said that *A Man hath a Likeness of his Image or Picture*; that is, a Likeness of his Own Likeness or of his  
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own Image: So neither can it be said with the *Same* exact Propriety and distinct Significancy of Language, that the *Original archetypal* Perfections of God have a Likeness of any *Created* Perfections; as when it is affirmed that the *Creatures* possess Perfections similar to *His*; and which carry in them a more or less lively Resemblance of his, in Proportion to the Rank and Dignity of their Nature. Nay and he proceeds farther to assert on another Occasion, that this very Likeness of our's to the Divinity is *Imperfect* for this Reason; *Quia etiam nec idem, SECUNDUM GENUS, repræsentat.*

THE other Place cited by our Author from Aquinas is this, *Intellectus autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas [Perfectiones quæ in Deo sunt] secundum quod sunt in Creaturis; et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per Nomina. In Nominibus igitur quæ Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare; Scilicet Perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut Bonitatem, Vitam, et hujusmodi; et Modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod significant, hujusmodi Nomina proprie competunt Deo; et magis proprie quam ipsis Creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo: Quantum vero ad Modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo; habent enim Modum significandi qui Creaturis competit.* Here he asserts That our Intellect apprehends the divine Perfections no otherwise than according to what they are in the Creatures; then this Author takes him up short, as if he meant that

the very same Perfections with those of God are in the Creature; and that in apprehending the Perfections of the Creature, we apprehend the same *Kind* of Perfections which are in God, tho' in a lower Degree. But if Aquinas had any such Meaning it was short and easy for him to have said, what he no where says, that the Perfections in God and the Creature, and in Man in particular, do not differ in *Kind*; or that they differ *Only in Degree*: Whereas a thing so contrary to common Sense, could never drop from the Pen of that great Author; and so fraught with Contradiction as that God should *Create* any Substance, or any Faculty or Property or Quality of that Substance, the same in *Kind* with his own which are uncreated, infinite and eternal; that is, that he should *Create* an *Human* Substance with Faculties or Properties in some degree *Divine*. Aquinas's Notion is quite the contrary thro' the whole thirteenth and fourteenth Questions cited by this Author; That we do not apprehend or conceive the divine Perfections in any Degree as they are in themselves, or as they are in their own Nature or Kind; that we conceive or apprehend them no otherwise than by apprehending the Perfections of the Creature, derived from him as from their first *Cause* and *Principle*; in whom therefore all their Perfections must be *Eminenter*. And lest this should be understood of a more eminent *Degree* only; he uses the word *Supereminenter*, which signifieth their being of a different and transcendent *Kind*.

ANOTHER

ANOTHER thing contained in that Citation out of Aquinas is, That as we apprehend the divine Perfections only in the Perfections of the Creature; *So we express them in the same Terms of human Language*; in such Terms as are made common both to our well known natural Faculties, Properties, and Qualities; and to the divine Perfections, which are incomprehensible to us in every Degree as they are in themselves. When these Terms taken or borrowed from the Creature are attributed to God; there are, says he, two things to be considered in them. First the *Divine Perfections themselves* ultimately signified and intended by those Terms; and Secondly *How* or after what *Manner the Terms signify* or express those Perfections. In respect of the divine Perfections *Themselves*, or the *Real Things* in God signified by them (things inconceivable otherwise than by the Ideas or Conceptions we have of such Faculties and Properties as are purely natural and human; and ineffable otherwise than by Terms borrowed from them) these *Properly* agree or belong to God; and *Per prius*, as he expresseth it, *Chiefly* and *Primarily*. Nay these agree to God more truly and properly than to the Creature or to Man in particular, from whom the Terms with the Conceptions annexed to them were first borrowed. Nay farther yet, these are so peculiar and proper to God, and to him only; that they are not in the least Degree attributable

ble to Man. For the Terms *Thus* signify infinite, incomprehensible Properties of the divine Nature; and so incommunicable, that the same in Kind cannot be created, or communicated to the Creature in any Degree. But in respect of the *Manner of the Terms signifying* or expressing those divine Perfections, he positively asserts they cannot be spoken of God with any literal Propriety of Speech, for the following Reason in this very Article; *Quia Nomina Deo attributa Modum significandi Creaturarum retinent, Deo proprie ex Modo ipso significandi minime competunt.* And he elsewhere assigns this Reason, *Quantum ad Impositionem Nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur Creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus.* The Terms still *Retain the Manner of their Signification*; and therefore cannot be applied to God with the strict Propriety of human Language; but (which is his constant Doctrine) can be spoken of Him no otherwise than by *Analogy*. His Instances here are *Goodness* and *Life*, Terms taken or borrowed from Man, whose *Goodness* consists in governing and regulating his Passions and Appetites according to Reason, and restraining them from any evil Influence upon his Understanding and Will; and whose *Life* is partly in his Blood and Breath, and lasts no longer than the Union of Spirit and Body. When *Life* and *Goodness* are applied to God, they signify incomprehensible Perfections *Peculiar* and *Proper* to Him alone as an infinite Cause or eternal Principle;

and which are not attributable to Man in any Degree. But with respect to the *Manner* of *signifying* those divine Perfections; the Terms are applied to the divine Nature by Analogy only. An excellent Distinction; and which ought to be universally observed in all those Attributes and Terms that are borrowed from Man, and transferred to God for the conceiving and expressing his incomprehensible Perfections. In respect of the *Truth* and *Reality* of the *Divine Perfections Themselves*, the Terms in which these are expressed are *Chiefly* and *Primarily* spoken of God; for thus they denote Perfections *Proper* to the first Cause alone, and which do not belong to Man in any Degree: They then express the *Original*, *Archetypal*, *Incomprehensible* Realities; whereof all created Perfections, particularly those of an human Mind, are no more than bare Transcripts or Representations. But in respect of the *Manner of their signifying* those incomprehensible Perfections, which must unavoidably be the same with *Our Manner of Conceiving* them, by the Help and Substitution of Properties peculiar to Man; the Terms are first applied to us in an immediate and strictly literal Propriety of Speech; and afterwards borrowed from thence, and transferred to God for expressing his divine Attributes, in an *Analogical* Sense only.

THE Conclusion quoted by this Author from *Picus* of *Mirandula*, and by him mis-translated, is this. *Magis improprie dicitur de Deo,*



Deo, quod sit Intelligens vel Intellectus ; quam de Angelo, quod sit Anima rationalis. It is more improperly said of God, that he is Intelligent or an Intellect ; than it is said of an Angel, that he is a rational Soul. This Doctrine he says Picus defended, by explaining it away into a mere verbal Difference from what is meant by other Men. No ; he explained the Doctrine by a just Distinction, and defended it to the very last. As Knowlege says Picus, Is taken Communiter et generaliter pro omni Cognitione, in General for all Kinds of Knowlege belonging to God and Angels and Men ; I do not only allow but contend that there is Knowlege in God ; nay the most perfect Knowlege of all things : But if you take the term Knowlege as it is particularly applyed to a Property in Man, which he calls *Notitia discursiva hominibus propria* ; he utterly denyeth that there is any *Such* Knowlege in God, who doth not Know after the Manner of Men. Accordingly he asserts over and over, that the word *Reason* is not in its proper Acceptation applicable to God, as being expressive of a Faculty peculiar to Man. This very Distinction he again puts into a shorter and clearer Light thus. *Secundum propriam Acceptationem hujus Dictionis* Intelligere, God cannot be called Intelligent or an Intellect ; but he may be so styled, *Secundum communem viam minus propriam*. From thence he concludes that *Cognitio omnium est in Deo ; sed ista magis distat ab Intellectione proprie captâ, quam homo ab Angelo* :  
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And again most expressly, *Notitia angelica magis distat ab infinita Notitia Dei; quam distat a Notitiâ rationativâ, Animæ rationali vel homini appropriatâ.* Is this any thing like explaining his Doctrine away? Or must he be said to recant, because he allows and contends for a real infinite Perfection or Knowledge in God; but vastly different in Kind from Reason and Knowledge in Man? And which we are obliged to call by the same *General* name *Knowledge*; because we have no direct Conception or Idea or strictly proper Word for it, and because it is to us utterly inconceivable and ineffable as it is in it self.

H O W E V E R that Conclusion might have been relished when proposed and defended by Picus, it was a great Truth. For tho' to say of an Angel that he is a *Rational Soul*, by way of Analogy with that which is human, may be no unapt or insignificant way of speaking concerning an imperceptible Being of whose Faculties, or Manner and Kind of Knowledge, we have not the least direct Conception or Idea; because we justly infer there must be in him a real Faculty or Perfection correspondent and answerable to Reason in Man: Yet nothing is more evident, than that *Rational Soul* cannot be spoken of an Angel with any strict Propriety of Speech, as it is spoken of Man; whose Mind or Soul is composed of Body and Spirit; who thinks by a joint Operation of both together; and whose whole  
Manner

Manner and Kind of Knowledge must therefore be essentially different from that of a Creature who we suppose is all Spirit. Tho' at the same time, whenever we think or speak of such Beings, we are under an inevitable Necessity of expressing that imperceptible correspondent Perfection, by the same Word which in a literal Propriety of Speech is applicable only to that Kind of Faculty or Manner of Knowledge whereof we have an internal and immediate Consciousness. Now therefore to say even of an Angel that he is *Intelligent* or that he is an *Intellect*, is the very same thing, and carries in it as little strict and literal Propriety, as saying that he is a *Rational Soul*: Because the only direct Conception we can form of a Creature's being *Intelligent* or an *Intellect*, is from that Faculty called the Intellect in our own Soul or Mind. And consequently those Terms cannot be applyed to an Angel with any literal Truth or strict Propriety. Surely then it is much more certain and manifest with respect to God, that tho' *Intelligent* and *Intellect* may and must be applyed to him as some of the aptest Words in human Language, to express a Perfection essentially divine and infinite, and therefore not to be directly apprehended in any Degree; but correspondent however and answerable to our natural Faculty of Reason and Thinking: Yet there can be no strict and literal Propriety at all in those Terms when thus borrowed from Man, and applyed to an infinite Perfection of the divine

Substance; which cannot be of the same Kind with that of any created Spirit.

THIS Author falls foul upon the *Pseudo-Dionysius*, on account of Picus's defending the foregoing Conclusion by his Authority; as being a spurious Apocryphal Writer, of a much later Date than the Age of Dionysius; as writing in a singular Style; with great harshness of Language and Expressions; and as personating a Saint and Martyr of the Apostolical Age. But what is all this profuseness and waste of Learning for? It is to no Manner of Purpose here; for the Doctrine of divine Analogy doth not stand in need of our justifying him in any of those Particulars; nor is it of any Consequence to the Matter in Hand whether he lived in the first, or the fourth, or the sixth, or even in the sixteenth Century. The Doctrine of divine Analogy depends only upon common Reason, and express Scripture; which hath laid a firm Foundation for it in the first Creation of Man, and in the constant Style and Language of Revelation which is full of it, and unintelligible without it. Let him therefore be as severe as he pleases upon the *Supposed Dionysius*; we adopt none of his *Harsh Language*, nor swelling hyperbolical Terms, nor his Enthusiastical Manner of Reasoning in Defence of them; but adhere to the *Received Notions taken from Holy Scripture and the Light of Nature*: Nay more, we religiously retain the very *Words*

and Expressions of *Revelation*; as well as all those Terms which are borrowed from *Common Speech* or human Literature, and applyed to things divine and supernatural. None of the Terms or Expressions cited by me in this Treatise from the Pseudo-Dionysius, or from any of the genuine Fathers, are brought for any farther Purpose than to shew that they had a general Notion of divine Analogy, tho' very confused and imperfect; that they naturally fell into the *Thing*, tho' they did not use the *Name*: And that none of them set themselves to pursue and cultivate that Doctrine; to explain it fully, and confirm it from Reason and Scripture; to answer all the Objections of Men against it, and remove their Prejudices; and to make a particular Application of it to the several erroneous Principles and false Hypotheses of Infidels and Heretics.

HAD the supposed Dionysius or the genuine Fathers rightly understood the Doctrine of divine Analogy; it would have prevented all that affected singularity of Style, and all their lofty swelling Terms, and Enthusiastical Reasonings upon them. Had the Fathers clearly apprehended how all those Terms when applyed to things supernatural and divine, together with the Ideas or Conceptions annexed to them, are then truly Analogical; had they distinguished with some Exactness between divine Analogy, and divine Metaphor: Had they observed that our being made in the

*Likeness* and after the *Image* of God, is the Foundation of all the Knowledge we have of things divine and purely spiritual; how this is the only Criterion of Truth and Certainty with respect to all our Conceptions and Sentiments and Discourses concerning them; and had they been sufficiently apprised how the whole Sum and Substance of all our Knowledge of them in this Life is to be resolved into this Analogy. Had all this I say been known and thro'ly digested by the primitive Fathers, it would (as this Author speaks by way of Contempt and Irony) *Have furnished them with admirable Weapons against the Heretics of their Times, and would have saved a World of Pains*: As I now trust it will furnish the Orthodox with admirable Weapons against the Infidels and Heretics of our Days, who have not only revived the Antient Heterodox and Infidel Principles; but have refined upon them with much Learning and Artifice, and published them to the World under a more modern and exquisite Disguise. And tho' this Author's supercilious contemptuous Manner of exposing this Doctrine, to return him his own Expression, *May proceed from a well-meant Zeal*, yet I hope it now abundantly *Appears not to be according to Knowledge*: And that instead of reconciling Atheists to the Truth, it hath a direct Tendency to confirm them in their own Persuasion.

LET the Failings of the supposed Dionysius

fius be what they will, he ought to have Justice done him; and it should have been owned that in the Treatises quoted by this Author, he was ever accounted Orthodox from their first Appearance in the World. Which he never would have been, if those uncommon Terms and Expressions of his were understood by others, in that very singular and harsh Manner wherein he hath translated them; or if there had been any Heresy or Profaness in the main Scope and Design of them. Which was to shew, in direct Opposition to this Author, that all the real Attributes or Perfections of the Divinity are utterly inconceivable in every Degree as they are in themselves: And of a Kind so infinitely different from any Attributes natural and human, that they are altogether inexpressible with any strict and literal Propriety of human Language. His *Negative* and *Hyperbolical* Manner of expressing this well grounded Notion, he illustrates by *Giving the Name of Darknes to Light inaccessible*. Because if the Light is inaccessible and imperceptible *As it is in it self*; if it be that *Which no Man hath seen or can see*; and a Light whereof we cannot have the least direct Glimpse; then it is in this Respect as Darknes to us, and we can obtain no Conception of it otherwise than by Analogy with the Light we do see. Thus when he says God is ὑπὲρ πάντων οὐσίαν καὶ ζῶν his Meaning is not as this Author represents it, that he hath *No Essence or Life* at all; or that he has not as *Real an Essence* as

that which is human; and as *True* and *Actual* a *Life* as that which results from the Union of Spirit and Body, and depends on the Circulation of Blood: But that he is above all *Kind* of Essence and Life *Directly* conceivable by us. So again when he affirms God to be ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν σοφίαν καὶ σύνεσιν, he doth not mean as this Author would interpret him, that there is no such thing as Understanding and Knowledge in God: But that he doth not know or understand after the Manner of Men, by *Thinking* which is performed thro' the necessary Concurrence of the finest of our bodily Parts and animal Spirits; and that therefore the Terms *Knowledge* and *Understanding* cannot have any literal and formal Propriety in them when they are applyed to those correspondent divine Perfections.

AGAIN, the *Wisdom* of God he describes to be τὴν ἀλογον, καὶ ἄνευ, καὶ μωρὰν σοφίαν, all which this Author hath falsely rendered into Nonsense and flat Contradiction thus; *An unreasonable, unintelligent, and foolish Wisdom*. No, the rendring is truly thus; *A Wisdom without Reason*, that is, without the rational discursive Faculty proper only to human Nature; *Without a Mind*, which is essentially compounded of Spirit and Matter: And in the words μωρὰ σοφία he certainly alludes to that Expression of the Apostle, *The Foolishness of God*, which *Is wiser than Men*. He is again cited and condemned by this Author as saying that



that God is *ὑπέρστροφος* and *ὑπέρζως*; and the unfair Remark made upon it is, *As if Wisdom and Life were Words not worthy to express the divine Perfections.* No; this was far from the Intention of that towering Genius, who knew them to be the best Words we have in human Language to express those divine and incomprehensible Perfections which are otherwise inexpressible; and therefore Words most *Worthy* of God. What Dionysius means that the terms *Wisdom* and *Life*, together with the Conceptions annexed to them, are altogether unworthy of him in the Sence of this Author; who imagines they must *Literally* and *Formally* and *Properly* signify Perfections or Attributes the very same in *Kind* both in God and Man: This is what he abhorred; and what will be the Abhorrence of all good Men, when the Doctrine so grievously misrepresented by this Author comes to be rightly understood and thro'ly digested.

To ward against all such gross Mistakes and Misrepresentations of his Principles; and in Justification of those lofty Expressions of his, and of his many negative and hyperbolic Terms; he lays down this just and clear Distinction. That they are not to be ascribed to the Divinity *κατ' ἁλλειψιν* *By way of Defect*; as if there were in God a Want of any of those Perfections denoted by the Words commonly applied to Him for Attributes. Not by way of denying the *Reality* of those *Essential* At-  
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tributes

tributes of the Divinity which we conceive by Analogy with the Faculties and Properties and Qualities of our own Mind, and express in Terms literally and properly applyed only to these last. But κατ' ὑπεροχὴν *By way of Excellency*, and of removing from the intrinsic Nature of God all *Kinds* as well as *Degrees* of *Created* Perfection; and to shew that the Terms by which the divine Attributes are commonly expressed, do signify real Perfections *Correspondent* and *Similar* only to those that are natural; but utterly inconceivable in every Degree as they are in themselves, and inexpressible likewise with any literal Propriety of human Language. And he accordingly applyeth the common Attributes to God in that Acceptation, with the same Freedom that other Men do; *And affirms over and over*, as this Author acknowlegeth, *that God knows all things*. Whereas the short Turn given to this Distinction and the Application of it by him is, that it was in order to shew how *The Attributes UNINTELLIGENT and UNPERCEIVING are ascribed to God*; when there are no such Attributes of God mentioned in Dionysius, without a wrested and perverse Translation of his Words; and when no such Attributes were ever heard of in the World before this Author. From hence he takes Occasion to say that *The Schoolmen rejected or softened his harsh Expressions, and explained away his Doctrine*. But the Reader is now an Eye-witness that the very Schoolmen quoted by himself

self have explained the Doctrine of Dionysius fully; and defended it strenuously, in direct Opposition to this Author's erroneous Notion of Analogy; That we conceive God and his Attributes by having in our selves Properties or Qualities the same in *Kind* with the divine Perfections, but in a low Degree. Whereas had they mistaken him as grossly as this Author hath done; and had they apprehended his Meaning to be according to this Author's harsh Translations of him; they had esteemed him not merely *Heterodox* and *Heretical*; but an open *Infidel*, *Atheist*, and *Blasphemer*.

ANOTHER of the Schoolmen cited by this Author is *Suares*, whose own Words are these. *Hæc tria, Scientia, Voluntas, et Potentia, peculiari modo concipiuntur a nobis; tanquam Facultates vel Operationes ipsius Dei; per Analogiam ad res creatas. We conceive the divine Knowledge, and Will, and Power after a peculiar Manner; as if they were so many Faculties in God, or so many Operations of those Faculties; by Analogy only with the Faculties and Operations of the Creature. For, says he, by Knowledge in particular when attributed to God, We do not understand a Quality, or Habit, or even an Act subsequent to a Power of acting, or any discursive Knowledge; no nor any thing like these which include Imperfection: As indeed the most exalted human Perfection doth in respect of God; it being as he terms it Material, or the natural Result of Matter*

as well as Spirit. That is, he doth not understand any such Knowledge as is in Man, in any Degree; but a Perfection infinitely different in *Kind*. In this Sence, says he, they understand the Attribute *Knowledge* who affirm it *Non esse proprie in Deo*; and it is for these Reasons Men *Formaliter et proprie Scientiam in Deo esse negarunt*. And from hence he proceeds to observe with just Indignation the unreasonableness of those who, in the Strain of this Author, charge such Men with imagining God to be *Prorsus stolidum et Inscium*, that is *Unintelligent and Unperceiving*; the very blasphemous Attributes this Author would have fixed upon Dionysius. In *Sensu exposito*, says Suares, *According to the foregoing explanation*, it is evident even to the Light of Nature *That there is Knowledge in God*; not such as is in Man, but an incomprehensible Perfection Analogous to it: Which he supposeth to be infinitely different in Kind from that which is human; and imagines it to be the very divine *Substance* it self, or *Intellectual Life* of God. This is Suares his true and real Opinion, and why did not this Author set himself to refute it; who calls it *A denying of God, and his Being, and Attributes; which leaves him nothing but an empty Name; and which undermines all Religion natural and revealed?*

SUARES indeed runs into this mistaken Notion with many others; that those Imperfections

ons of the Creature and of the Mind of Man in particular, which are to be removed from the divine *Knowlege*, do not belong *Ad Rationem formalem Scientiæ*; and therefore that in ascribing that Term to God he takes it *Abstractissime, et præscindendo a creata et increata scientia*. But *Knowlege* is an unintelligible Thing, or rather Nothing at all, when it is abstracted from every particular *Kind* of *Knowlege* belonging to each distinct Rank and Sort of Beings; from the *Knowlege* of God, and Angels, and Men. The *Ratio formalis* of *Knowlege* *Abstracted* from *All these*, can have no other real or intelligible Meaning except (in plain Language) the taking the word *Knowlege* *In the General*: That is, the suiting our selves to the Weakness of our Understanding, in conceiving and expressing different but correspondent Objects and Attributes by the Help of the same Conceptions and Terms. But when you have first taken *Knowlege* thus in the General, and afterwards come to make a particular Application of it to each Sort of Beings; it will then import a different *Ratio formalis* as you apply it to God, or to Angels, or Men; that is, it will necessarily signify a peculiar Perfection or Property in God especially, of a *Kind* infinitely different from any created Faculty or human Perfection.

THIS Author takes occasion from hence to say, *That it was indeed a current Opinion in the Schools, that even Being or Existence it self,*

*self, should be attributed Analogically to God and the Creatures.* But surely not according to *His* singular Notion of Analogy between things the very same in Kind, and differing only in Degree; so that a lower Degree of *Existence* should be Analogous to a higher Degree. No; but as he himself is obliged to own, *That they supposed not God to exist in the SAME SENCE with created Beings; not that he exists less really and truly than they; and he adds less properly and formally than they.* But to *Exist properly and formally* is a Phrase of his own here, and not of the *Schoolmen*; who hold that tho' God doth exist *Really and Truly*, yet the term *Existence* is not to be applyed to him in the same *Proper* and *Formal* Sence in which it is applyed to *Man*. The *Ratio formalis* of any thing in the Sence of the Schools is, what is so peculiarly essential to it, as such, that thereby only it becomes *What it is*, and different from all other Kinds of things whatsoever: And accordingly when a *Word* is applyed to any thing so as to include and signify that intrinsic, peculiar, distinguishing Essence or Property of it; it is said to be applyed in a *Formal Sence*, and in its strict and *Literal* Propriety. Thus it is they say *Existence* is applyed to God in a Sence actually *True* and *Real*, but not *Formally* and *Properly* and *Literally* as it is applyed to *Man*; of whose *Existence* and the Manner of it we have a direct and immediate Conception. This is what our Author should have confuted; and not have blended

blended his absurd Notion together with it in one Sentence, by slipping into it two Words of his own utterly destructive of the Schoolmen's real Meaning. Till he does confute it, it must be a current Opinion among all Men. For surely we are as far from any direct Idea or Conception of the *True divine Existence*, as we are of the divine *Substance*; or at least as we are of those *Real intrinsic* divine *Attributes* which exist: And consequently we can have no other way of conceiving the *Manner* of God's Existence, than by Analogy with our own and that of other Men whereof we have an immediate Perception and Consciousness; nor any other way of expressing it than by a Word borrowed from thence. And tho' nothing is more true than that God doth not *Exist* in the *Same Sence* with created Beings; or that he hath not the same *Kind* or *Manner* of Existence, but a Kind and Manner infinitely different from them all; yet we can affirm that *God is* or *Exists*, with as much Truth and Reality as that we our selves exist.

THE last of his Schoolmen is *Cajetan*, from whom the only material thing observed is this. *Knowlege*, says our Author, *may be attributed to God in the proper and formal Meaning of the Word: For as we say that God is infinitely above Man, so is the Knowlege of God infinitely above the Knowlege of Man; this, says he, is what Cajetan calls Analogia proprie facta, A proper Analogy* as he wrongly translates it.

But

But word the Sentence right, and you will do Justice both to Truth, and to Cajetan. We say, that as the *Nature* of God is infinitely above the *Nature* of Man; so is the *Nature* or *Kind* of his *Knowledge* infinitely above the *Nature* or *Kind* of *Knowledge* in Man; and consequently no Proportion of *Degrees only* can be signified by that Term when attributed to God: So that it cannot be attributed to him in the *Proper*, or *Formal*, or *Literal* Sence of the Word; but by that *Analogy* only which is founded on such a real Correspondency and Similitude as may be between two things different in *Nature* or *Kind*. This is *Analogia proprie facta*, *Analogy properly formed*, or *What is properly Analogy*; and not *Analogia propria*; the short and mistaken Turn given to the Words of Cajetan in this Author's Translation of them.

I H E R E appeal to the Reader whether, as our Author confesseth this to have been *His first Fault* in meddling with the *Schoolmen*; he is not bound in Conscience to keep *His Promise*, that it shall be the last of the Kind. To induce him to be as good as his Word, I shall observe to him; that Men of Sence in the present Age are already surfeited of Treatises full of *Curtailed*, *Perverted*, *Mistranslated*, *Misapplied*, and *Impertinent Quotations*: And begin to nauseate them, as temperate sober Men do the Dishes that are served up with a very little substantial Food; but stuffed with Force-meats,



meats, and brimful of unwholesom and pernicious Sauces. Nothing is more void of real Improvement and Instruction to the Mind, and more fulsom, than Heaps of Quotations, and tedious Disquisitions what Opinions such and such Men were of, in relation to Matters properly determinable only by right Reason and Scripture; and Inquiries how far they at first maintained those Opinions, or how far they receded from them afterwards. Whereas the stating any of those Opinions of Importance distinctly and fairly; explaining them clearly and fully; and producing the best Reasons and Arguments for or against them either from our selves or others, with that Brevity and Perspicuity which may save Men the irksom Trouble of frequently raking over a large Dunghill before they find one Gem; would be of real Service to Mankind in general, as well as to the more *Polite* Part of them in particular.

T H O' all his Authorities from the Schoolmen have proved so expressly against him, I lay no stress upon them beyond the clearness of their Distinctions and their Explanations of the Ground of them; and the Strength of the Reasons they offer for them; of all which other Men have a Right to Judge as well as they. But, says he, however positive they are in their Assertions and Conclusions, *They explain them away till there is but a mere verbal Difference*, between *Them*, and *His* directly

ly opposite Notion of Analogy. Suppose this were true; it requires no other Answer than that it ill became those great Names to assert one thing first, and then be at much Trouble to shew that they mean the quite contrary: To be so Contradictory to themselves as to affirm, That the Terms when applied to express things divine and supernatural and the Attributes of God in particular, are to be understood *Analogically*; and yet that they are however to be then understood in their *Proper* and *Formal* and *Literal* Acceptation. After their first plain and open Declaration of so great and fundamental a Truth; what if they had been scared out of it again, by such a confused Clamour as is now raised against it in the World; by a Rote of hard Words and invidious Expressions, officiously bellowed out against it from among the Crowd of its Opposers? Must we adhere to that Opinion of their's which was owing to the innate Energy and irresistible Force of Truth: Or to such of their Explanations as are but so many Disguises, and Palliations, and Concealments of it; and which amount to nothing more than the resolving it into the quite opposite Falsity? But after all, they were so far from being inconsistent with themselves, by explaining it away, that all their Explanations and Distinctions are so many Illustrations and Confirmations of it, in direct Opposition to the Opinion of this Author. And to those who objected in his dogmatical Style, That this  
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was *Denying the Existence of God and his Attributes; leaving him Nothing but a Name; that no Man of their Opinion could Believe a God; or have any Religion natural or revealed; the Substance of all their Answers is, That the Being of God and his Attributes are never the less Real and True in themselves, or Useful to us, for their being no otherwise conceivable than by Analogy: And therefore that they did not thereby deprive God of his Existence or Knowledge or any of his other Attributes, by holding them to be Real Perfections inconceivable by us as they Are in themselves.* And that those Men by plain Implication deny the Attributes of God, who positively assert that they cannot be either true and real, or usefully conceived, unless they are of the same Kind with the like Faculties and Properties and Qualities in us; and unless the Words which are common to both of them are understood equally in the very same Proper and Formal and Literal Acceptation.

I SHALL here leave the Reader to his Astonishment at what this Author could mean by his Quotations from the Schoolmen who are so clearly and distinctly, so fully and positively against him: And shall pass on to his last and grand Objection, That according to our Notion of divine Analogy, *Every Syllogism brought to prove the Being or Attributes of God, will be found to consist of four Terms, and consequently can conclude Nothing.* Now

this is no more than a bold and groundless Assertion; and to have rendered it an Argument he should have framed some Syllogism relating to the *Being* or *Attributes* of God, and have shewn how upon our Notion of Analogy it must necessarily have four Terms in it. This he was cautious enough to avoid; and there was more Reason for this Omission than a cursory Reader can be aware of: For any one Instance whatever upon that Foot would have overturned his whole Scheme, and all that he hath wrote upon this Subject would have gone for nothing. But I will supply this grievous and in Appearance wilful Omission, and perform it for him. Take then this Argument for the Existence of God or an eternal Being, in the Syllogistic Form.

IF no Being could make it self; then there must have been an eternal Being.

BUT no Being could make it self. Therefore

THE Objection here is, that upon my Scheme of Analogy there must be four Terms in this Syllogism. But how can this ever appear? For the term *Being* is taken in the same precise *General* Acceptation both in the Antecedent of the Major, and the Minor; as including all Kinds of Beings whatever, and however different among themselves. The Term *Make it self* thro'out the Syllogism is taken  
*Generally,*

Generally, for making it self after *Any Manner*. But here perhaps he will still urge, that according to my Doctrine the term *Being* in the Antecedent means Beings different in Kind, from that mentioned in the Consequence. No; *Being* in the Antecedent is taken as *Inclusive* of *All* Beings, and consequently of that *Particular* Being mentioned in the Consequence; and not in *Contradistinction* from it: So that if no *Kind* of *Being* whatever could *Make it self* after *Any Manner*; then *Some* Being must have been *Eternal*. Whether that eternal Being is the same or different in *Kind* from all others, is another Question depending on other Premises; and the Point here is only, Whether there must have been an *Eternal* Being? *However* different *This* Being is from others, whether in *Degree only* or in *Kind*, it does not in the least affect the Argument as to *Matter* or *Form*. For tho' it be certain that He differs intirely in Kind, and that we have no Notion of his *Being* and *Existence*, or *Nature*, or *Attributes*, or particularly of his *Eternity* and *Power* of *Causing*, but what is Analogical: Yet *Whatever* Conceptions we form of any of these, and after *Whatever Manner* we obtain those Conceptions; this is quite foreign to the Argument, which has no Dependence on it. So that turn it which way you please, there is no ground for asserting there are four Terms in the Syllogism; tho' it be allowed that an *Eternal Being* or *Cause* differs totally in *Kind* from all *Created* Beings and Causes.

BUT to come cloſer to the ſtreſs of his Objection, let us take a Syllogiſm proving *A Poſteriori* that there is *Knowlege in God*. Now this cannot be done at all without firſt allowing Knowlege to be a *Directly conceivable* Perfection in an human Mind; for otherwiſe we ſhould have *No Manner* of Conception or Idea of it at all, or even have known that there was ſuch a Perfection. Which by the Way is the Caſe of all the other natural and moral Perfections which we attribute to God, for the ſame Reaſon we do our Knowlege; becauſe all his Attributes are equally inconceivable, as they are in themſelves, with his intrinsic Eſſence or Subſtance; and the Order and Manner of our proceeding to a Proof of them is likewiſe the ſame: From a directly conceivable Perfection in our own Mind, we infer (not that there is a Perfection of the *Same Kind* in God; but only) that there muſt be ſome Perfection in him *Correſpondent* and *Similar* to that which we have in our ſelves. Now ſince *Knowlege* is our Author's Inſtance, take the Proof of its being an Attribute in God, thus.

IF *Knowlege* is a Perfection in an *Human Mind*; then there muſt be Knowlege in *God*.

BUT Knowlege is a Perfection in an human Mind. Therefore

UPON our Notion of Analogy, this Author objects

objects that there are four Terms in this Syllogism; because the term *Knowledge* in the Consequence of the Major, must thus express something of a quite different Kind from what it signifies in the Antecedent and Minor: Or, which is the same thing, it signifies one Kind of Knowledge in the Minor, and another Kind of Knowledge in the Conclusion; whereas it ought to mean strictly and properly and formally something of the very same Kind in both: otherwise there are four Terms and nothing is concluded. To which I answer, by granting that the term *Knowledge* in the *Consequence* of the Major and in the *Conclusion* doth signify something of a different, nay infinitely different Kind from what it signifies in the *Antecedent* and in the *Minor*; and that however there are not four Terms: Because there are not two *Different Ideas* or *Conceptions* annexed to that Term in those different Places; but one and the *Same Idea* or *Conception* necessarily stands in the Mind for both the *Divine* and *Human Knowledge*; so that the Idea or Conception affixed to that Term is exactly and *Precisely* the very *Same* thro' the whole Syllogism. There is this Difference in the *Use* of it only (which is unavoidable in all Syllogisms relating to things divine and supernatural) that the Idea or Conception annexed to that Term in the Antecedent and Minor, stands *Immediately* for a well known and *Directly* perceptible Property in Man: But in the Consequence of the Major and in the Conclusion, that very

same Conception is substituted as a *Mediate* and *Analogical Representative* of a *Correspondent* Perfection in the Divinity, otherwise utterly inconceivable to us.

WERE it possible for the Mind of Man to obtain two *Different Ideas* or *Conceptions* directly from the two *Different Kinds* of Knowledge in God and Man; or, in other Words, to affix two different Conceptions to the term *Knowledge* in the different Parts of that Syllogism, there would be four Terms in it, and it would conclude Equivocally: But since we can obtain no other Conception for that Sort of Knowledge which is in God than what we have for our own, both the Term and the Conception remain unalterably the same; and they differ from themselves no otherwise than as in one Part of the Syllogism they are *Literally* and *Directly* applied to a Property in Man, and in another Part *Analogically* to an Attribute in God. And this is done not out of Choice, but Necessity; in order to express and conceive a divine and otherwise incomprehensible Perfection answerable to our Knowledge, but infinitely transcending it; not in *Degree* only according to this Author's Notion, which would leave no room for what is truly and properly Analogy: But in *Kind*, which is the real Foundation of that Analogy, and what renders it absolutely necessary to *Any Manner* of Conception or Apprehension of things infinite and divine. Thus then as the  
word



word *Knowlege*, and the Conception annexed to it, are the very same in all Parts of the Syllogism; and stand for real Perfections both in Man and God, *One of which is necessarily an Analogous Representative of the other*, there are still but three Terms: All Equivocation and Fallacy is removed, and the Argument is clear and determinate; If there is *Human Knowlege* in us, there must be *Divine Knowlege* in God; or, If there be such a Perfection as *Knowlege* in the *Creature*, there must be *Some Kind of Perfection Correspondent and Similar* to that *Knowlege* in the *Creator*; which is all that is possible to be proved justly, and consistently with other plain Truths, by this or any other Argument to the same Purpose: Because, whether this Perfection in God be of the same Kind with our's called by the same Name, is an independent Question; and because by other Arguments we can prove irrefragably, that every *Intrinsic Faculty* and *Attribute* must be of a different Kind in God and Man. And thus it is in all Arguments *A Posteriori*, infering any Attribute in God from an Attribute in human Nature. The Term expressive of such an Attribute must, in different Parts of the Syllogism, unavoidably signify two things different in Kind, and yet this does not make four Terms in it, because we cannot possibly form two different Conceptions of those two things. Which does not proceed from their being of the *Same Kind*; but on the quite Contrary from hence, That *One* of them

is totally *Different in Kind* from the other; and consequently inconceivable to us as it is in it self, or after any Manner but by substituting the *Other* (or rather our *Direct Conception* of the other, obtained immediately from its proper Object) as an *Analogical Representative* of it.

BUT in this Author's absurd Meaning, and agreeably to his inconsistent Notion of an Analogy founded only on different Degrees of Attributes altogether the same in Kind, which is no Analogy at all, the Syllogism must mean thus; If Knowledge is a Perfection in an human Mind, then there must be the *Same Kind* of Knowledge in God in a higher Degree: Which is more than can possibly be infered by any Argument whatever; because it has been proved that the Conclusion is an absolute Falsity, and the whole Syllogism would thus amount to no more than this Absurdity, *If there is human Knowledge in us; there must be the same Kind of human Knowledge in God, in an infinitely greater Degree.* Whereas in our true Notion of Analogy this Consequence is good, and intirely consistent with all *Other Truths*; If there is human Knowledge in Man, there must be divine Knowledge in God; that is, there must be a different Kind of Perfection in his Nature, correspondent and similar to human Knowledge in us.

To explain this fully and glaringly, take a  
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parallel Instance. We have an immediate and direct Idea or Conception of that *Life* which is in our selves; and if one were to prove that there is *Life* in *God*, he would do it thus: If *Life* is a Perfection in human Nature; then there must be *Life* in the divine Nature, and so on. Now in his absurd way of proceeding the Consequence must mean, Then there must be the *Same Kind* of *Life* in the divine Nature in an infinite Degree. But because we can evidently prove that there is no such Kind of *Life* in *God* as consists in an *Union* of *Spirit* and *Body*, or in *Breathing* and the *Circulation* of the *Blood* and *Animal Spirits*; and that infinite and finite Degrees of the same Kind of Perfection, is Nonsense: Our Meaning in the Consequence, and which renders it agreeable to other plain Truths, is That then there must be a Perfection in the divine Nature *Analogous* to human *Life*, but of a *Different Kind*. And yet no Man can say there are four Terms in the Syllogism thus understood; because we cannot affix one Idea or Conception to the *Life of Man*, and another different Conception to the *Life of God*; but we must unavoidably and necessarily make the very same Idea or Conception stand for both: *Immediately* for that Kind of *Life* which is in Man, whereof it is a *Direct* Conception; and *Mediately* or by way of *Analogical Representation* for that Kind of *Life* which is in *God*, whereof we can have *No direct* Conception at all in any Degree, nor any Notion as it is *In its self* or *In its own Kind*.

IF Men proceed upon what is truly and properly *Analogy*, namely that which is founded on a real Similitude and Correspondency between two things differing not in Degree only, but in Kind: The foregoing Syllogism concludes regularly in due Form; and with the utmost Certainty, for a real Perfection in the divine Nature correspondent to that Knowledge in us which consists in *Thinking*; tho' of a Kind as different from it, as an eternal infinite Creator and pure Spirit, can possibly differ from a created finite Nature compounded of Body and Spirit. But according to this Author, and to all those who proceed upon a mistaken Analogy founded on a Likeness between things of the same Kind and differing only in Degree; such as may be conceived between the Light of the Sun and that of a Star; or between Knowledge in one Man and Knowledge in another; or to speak the Absurdity plainer, on a *Similitude* only between two things which are *Not alike only*, but the very *Same in Kind*: According to these I say, no Syllogism can be formed for the Proof of God's *Knowledge* or any of his other Attributes, but what will infer more in the Conclusion than was either expressed or could be *Truly* implied and intended in the Premises; namely, that in every Instance they must be of the same *Kind* in the divine and human Natures. Whereas this is a distinct and very different Point, requiring a distinct and

different Proof, which we must expect from this Author: And when he hath answered what I have elsewhere offered against that wild presumptuous Notion, it will be time enough to believe as he doth; That the divine Knowledge is truly and properly and formally the same with the Human; and that our human Knowledge is truly and properly and formally the same with the Divine.

BUT say they, we found our Analogy on that Similitude and Correspondency there is, not between different *Finite* Degrees of two Perfections the same in Kind; but between *Finite* and *Infinite* Degrees of the same Kind of Perfections in God and Man. Then say I, to avoid one false Notion of Analogy, they run into another which is gross Absurdity and manifest Contradiction: For tho' there may be a Difference of *Indefinite Degrees* between two *Finite* things of the same Kind; yet there is express Contradiction in the words *Infinite Degrees*, or *Infinite in Degree*. According to the only Conception we have of Infinity, it is in its very *Notion* and *Nature* utterly exclusive of all Degrees, of *More* or *Less*; so that if any Attribute of God be really *Infinite*, it can never be a transcendent Degree of any *Kind* of thing whatever that is *Finite*, because nothing *Finite* ever so often added or repeated would ever make up an *Infinite*. Infinity added to the Conceptions of our own Perfections, when transferred or attributed to God, necessarily alters  
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the very Nature of them even in our way of Thinking; and renders them totaly different in Kind from any thing finite and created: Much more then from what is purely human; and consequently doth as necessarily exclude all Analogy between them, founded on Degrees only of the same Kind. Tho' there may be a Similitude and Correspondency between things Finite and Infinite, for which we have the Word of God himself in the History of our Creation; yet that *Knowledge* for Instance in God should be the highest Degree only of that Kind which is finite and purely human; and that there should be an Analogy between them not built on a *Similitude only*, but on an *Identity* of Nature or *Kind*; is an Opinion without the least Foundation either in Revelation or in common Sense and Reason.

I SHALL give a third Instance of a Syllogism relating to the Mysteries of Christianity; and to the divine pre-existent Nature of Christ in particular.

IF Christ is truly the only-begotten Son of God; then he must be of the same intire Essence or Substance with his Father.

But Christ is truly the only-begotten Son of God. Therefore.

HERE as the term *Only-begotten* cannot be understood in the literal and proper, but in the  
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Analogical Sence only; and the Signification of it is thus limited to something supernatural, and altogether incomprehensible otherwise than by Analogy with an only-begotten human Son; it is still but one Term with the *Same Analogical Conception* and determinate Signification affixed to it thro'out the whole Syllogism: And can admit of no Equivocation any farther than the divine Generation is purposely confounded, and supposed the same in Kind with that which is natural; which cannot convey to us a Conception of any thing real and true on the Part of the Divinity, otherwise than by Analogy only. Thus it is likewise with the term *Essence* or *Substance*. As the Word is particularly transfered from Earth to Heaven, from Man to God, and from our own Essence or Substance to that which is divine; and as it *Includes* that which is *Natural* and *Human*, no otherwise than as an *Analogical Representation* only of what is supernatural and incomprehensible; it is still but one Term, with the same precise Analogical Idea or Conception in every Part of the Syllogism. So that the Logical Form of Syllogism is here duly preserved; and there are not more than three Terms in it, even by any forced or obscure Implication.

As the foregoing Syllogism is, upon the true Principle of Analogy, strictly regular in *Form*; so it concludes irrefragably as to the *Matter* of it, against our modern clandestine Arians.

For if a Son in the way of Nature is intirely of the same Effence or Substance with his Father; when the terms *Only-begotten* and *Essence* or *Substance* are transfered from things natural and human to things divine and supernatural: Then from the Veracity of God in his Revelations we may conclude by an infallible unerring *Parity* of Reason, that the Consequence must have as much Truth in it; and that Christ must be the Son of God of the same Substance with his Father, in as much actual Reality as if those Terms were to be here understood in the strictly proper and formal and literal Acceptation. Then nothing is more evident than that something *Correspondent* is signified and expressed by those Terms, as solidly *True* and *Real* on the Part of the divine Nature, as on the Part of the human; and as distinct from Creation, as natural Generation is from human Efficiency: For otherwise the Words could have no intelligible useful Meaning; and would serve not to inform and enlighten, but to baffle and confound the Reason of Mankind. Thus according to this only Manner we have of Thinking and Speaking of that supernatural Derivation, the main Point of Analogy designed in this Instance of Revelation is; That Christ is as *Fully* and *Truly* the Son of God, as if we were to conceive him such by a natural Generation: Which would be a false and erroneous way of Thinking and Speaking, unless the Terms *Son* and *Only-begotten* signified a *Real* tho' incomprehensible



henfible Derivation *Correspondent* and answerable to human Generation; and unless Christ is as really and intirely of the same divine Essence or Substance with God the Father (*Whatever* that Substance or Essence may be in it self) as Abel was of the same intire human Essence or Substance with Adam.

THE professed and open Arians have no way of answering this Syllogism but by asserting, that the term *Begotten* in the Minor is a mere Figure; and no more than a purely Metaphorical Word for *Created*, or *Derived by an Efficiency*. But our modern clandestine Arians being well aware of the gross Absurdity of making *Begotten* a mere Figure of Speech and a Metaphor for *Created*, which is quite opposite to it; nay so directly opposite that it is the last thing in all human Language for which it could be a Metaphor: And foreseeing this palpable Absurdity, that if *Begotten* is only a Metaphor for *Created*, then *Only-begotten* must be a Figure or Metaphor for *The only one Created*; and consequently that Christ alone of all intelligent Beings must have been made or Created, and all the Rest of them must have been *Begotten* or produced by some other divine Operation than that of an *Efficiency*. They I say being aware of this, tho' they are express and positive that *Only-begotten* is but mere Figure and Metaphor, yet they deny it to be a Metaphor for *Creation*: And at the same time have ever craftily declin-

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ed affigning any particular determinate thing which is so Metaphorically expressed by that Term, and which might be an Object of our *Knowledge* or *Faith*. But by way of a delusive Evasion they say it is a Figure for *Some singular inconceivable Manner of Derivation*, so as thereby to be distinguished from all other Beings. But if the Manner of that divine Derivation can be no way conceived or apprehended either by any Conception obtained directly and immediately from the thing it self; or by a true Analogy with something whereof we have a direct and immediate Conception; then Only-begotten must express nothing *Any way* usefully conceivable or intelligible to the Mind of Man; nothing that we can either *Conceive* or *Believe*. Whereas Christ is said to be an *Only-begotten Son*, on purpose to enable us to distinguish him from all other Beings; and unless this signifies something as real, and yet as different from Creation, as human Generation is from human Efficiency; all Distinction between them, conceivable or any way intelligible to the Mind of Man, is lost; and the Revelation resolved into nothing more than an empty Word without a Meaning: And instead of that Distinction these Arians argue Christ to be in this Respect produced after the very same Manner with all other intelligent Agents of the Creation.

T H U S unanswerable is the Matter of that Syllogism upon the true and genuine Notion  
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of Analogy ; but upon our Author's Notion of it between things the same in *Kind* and differing only in *Degree*, all the Force of it is lost and amounts to no more than this: The divine *Generation* and divine *Essence* or *Substance* are the very same in *Kind* with human *Generation* and human *Substance*, and they differ only in an infinite *Degree*; therefore the term Only-begotten is to be attributed to Christ in the same proper and formal and literal Sence in which it is applied to Man; and therefore the Consequence is good, that he is of the same intire *Essence* and *Substance* with the Father. But nothing is more obvious to all Unbelievers than the glaring Falsity of the Assumption the Syllogism thus proceeds upon; it betrays it self at first Sight. For it is evident that neither the *Divine Generation*, or *Essence* and *Substance* can be of the same *Kind* with what is natural and human: Nor hath this Author, with all that concur with him in his Notion of Analogy, any other way of evading this absurd way of arguing here; but by running in with the Arians, and asserting the Terms of the Syllogism to be purely Figurative and Metaphorical.

I SHALL give this Author one Syllogism more proving *A Priori*; because it is directly in Answer to that Part of the Objection he puts into the Mouth of his *Minute Philosopher*, designedly against our Doctrine of divine Analogy; but which in Truth lies e-

qually against all Doctrines of Mysteries in Religion whether natural or revealed: *That we cannot argue from unknown Attributes—that God is to be loved for his Goodness, or feared for his Justice, or respected for his Knowledge; that is from Attributes in an Unknown Sense, in no Particular Sense, or in a Sense which None of us understand; as he most ignorantly or wilfully explains our Notion of Analogy. He himself is notoriously guilty of the very Absurdity and Folly which he so confidently chargeth upon us; for tho' he makes his Unbeliever falsely object that we argue from Attributes in an unknown Sense, yet He pretends to argue from the divine Attributes As they are in themselves; whereas they are utterly unknown and altogether inconceivable by us after that Manner: He argues as if they were as directly conceivable by us as our own; and as if we had an immediate Conception of their Real Nature, by having the same Kind of Properties in our own Mind. Which the Enemies of revealed Religion and Mystery urging home upon us at every Turn as absurd and false and unworthy of God, have made all their Advantages of it; by first pinning us down to the strictly Proper and Literal Acceptation of such Terms in Religion, for which some of us thus imprudently and zealously contend: And then treating us with Disdain and Insolence, whilst we are not without great Toil and Struggle labouring to disengage our selves; by reconciling them in that Acceptation to the*

purely spiritual, infinite, and incomprehensible Nature of the Divinity. But *We* on the quite contrary are for arguing from the divine Attributes as we conceive and express them by Analogy with those Properties in human Nature which are correspondent and similar, tho' different in Kind; that is in a *Well known* Sence, in a very *Particular, Determinate and Intelligible* Sence, and in a Sence which *Every one of us understands*; nay in the *Only* Sence wherein those Attributes are at all in any Degree *Conceivable, or Intelligible, or Expressible*. Now since the *Grace* of God is one extraordinary Instance of his Goodness towards us, let the Syllogism be this.

IF the *Grace* of God is necessary to the Attainment of Evangelical Holiness; then we ought to *Pray* to him for it.

BUT the *Grace* of God is necessary to the Attainment of Evangelical Holiness. Therefore.

I TAKE *Grace* here in that particular Sence, wherein it is limited to the imperceptible assisting Influence or Operation of the Holy Spirit of God upon the Mind of Man. Now this Author's Objection against the Syllogism upon our Principle of divine Analogy would be; That there are four Terms in it, because the term *Grace* here must express two things different even in Kind: The two different things

are a *Supernatural Influence* or *Operation* of the divine Spirit, and some *Natural Influence* or *Operation* whereby we affirm it to be conceived and represented *Analogically*; and therefore that the Syllogism is Equivocal and Fallacious, and concludes nothing. But surely the *Term* Grace as well as the *Conception* annexed to it in the Mind, is precisely one and the same thro' that Syllogism: We can have no Conception or Idea at all of the *True Nature* or *Real Kind* and *Manner* of that divine Influence, or in other Words, of that supernatural Operation *As it is in it self*; and therefore we have no other way of conceiving it, but by Analogy with a directly conceivable Influence or Operation in natural Causes and in human Nature particularly. And tho' the Idea or Conception of it is thus borrowed from things common and human, and the Term from vulgar Speech; yet the Application of both together, thro'out that Syllogism, is altogether to a supernatural and divine Operation, necessarily so conceived and expressed by *Analogy* only. Consequently then either there are not four Terms in this Syllogism; or it will be impossible to frame any Syllogism relating to things divine and supernatural, which shall not have four Terms in it at least. The Difference here between us and such as hold this Author's Doctrine of Analogy, is this; *We* assert the divine Influence and Operation in the Work of Grace to be, as to the *Real Nature* and *True Manner* of it, utterly imperceptible and inconceivable;

ceivable ; and that we have no other way of Thinking and Speaking of it, but by the Intervention of some similar and correspondent Influence or Operation of one thing in Nature upon another. *They* must hold that we have as *Direct* and *Immediate*, tho' not so complete and adequate a Conception of it, as we have of any Influence or Operation merely natural : Nay that this divine Grace or Operation, is the very same in *Kind* with that which is natural and human ; that the Power and Goodness of God and Man in this, as well as in all other Instances differ in Degree of Perfection only ; and that this Difference in Degree is the only Foundation of what they call a true Analogy. Now, as I observed above, every Syllogism they form upon this Foot relating to any one of God's Attributes, will conclude falsely ; by ever *Implying* and *Supposing* what is absolutely false, or at least what ought to be first proved in the General, That the divine and human Perfections are the very same in Kind : Whereas it cannot be even charged upon us, that we barely *Suppose* the contrary, namely that they are different in Kind ; since it is already abundantly proved that they are so. And if this had not been already performed so as to admit of no reasonable Reply ; yet we should have had nothing more to do here, but to appeal to common Sense and Reason, Whether if the Substance or Essence of two distinct things differ in Kind, their respective inherent Attributes or Properties must not do

so likewise? And whether things created and uncreated, infinite and finite, eternal and originated can be the very same in Kind?

THUS then you see how the foregoing Syllogism evidently concludes against all Sorts of this Author's unbelieving Minute Philosophers; and how it is a full Answer to that Objection he puts into their Mouths against our Notion of Analogy; *That we cannot argue from Attributes* (and consequently from divine Operations) *in an unknown Sense; from inconceivable unintelligible Attributes* (and Operations) *and which none of us understand.* For tho' we have no *Direct* or *Immediate* Conception of *Divine Grace*, or of any thing the same in Kind; yet as we conceive the Grace of God by Analogy, we can most truly and usefully argue from it thus: That if such a supernatural Operation of the divine Spirit upon our Minds, no otherwise comprehensible by us but thro' Analogy with a directly conceivable and correspondent Operation of one thing in Nature upon another, is revealed to us by God; we are bound to believe the *Truth* and *Reality* of it; and we ought to *Pray* daily for that Grace, and offer up our constant Tribute of Praise and Thanksgiving for it to the *Throne of Grace*.

BUT as this is in Truth an Objection of Infidels not only against our Notion of Analogy, according to this Author's apparent Design;



sign; but against all our Doctrines concerning Mysteries: How would he go about to answer it, and to confute Men who are fixed to this Principle, *That they can have neither Knowledge nor Faith of any thing whereof they have no Ideas?* He hath no other way, upon *His* Notion of Analogy, but to tell them, that by having a direct and immediate Conception of human Grace and Favour, or of the Operation and Influence of one thing in Nature upon another; they have at the *Same Time* a *Direct* and *Immediate* Idea of the Grace of God, and of the Operation of his Spirit, tho' they are not aware of it; for they are both the very *Same in Kind* and differ in *Degree* only. But if they should reply, as they really do, that by looking into their own Mind they find Ideas or Conceptions of *Human* Grace or Favour indeed, and of the Influence or Operation of *Natural Causes*; but that with the most intense Observation and Search they can find no Idea or Conception within them of *Divine Grace*, or of any *Divine Influence* or Operation, *Distinct* from the Conceptions of those that are natural and human; which is what they require and demand from us. That they will never be persuaded, contrary to the common Sense and Reason of all Mankind, that things *Divine* and *Human*, *Natural* and *Supernatural*, *Finite* and *Infinite*, *Created* and *Uncreated* should be the very same in Nature and Kind: So that one and the same Idea shall equally give the Mind a direct

and immediate Knowledge of both; and one and the same Term expresses them both with the same strict and formal and literal Propriety. And yet that this very Term with the very same Idea annexed to it should be in respect of a thing natural and human, most clear and distinct; but in respect of what is divine and supernatural, obscure and partial and confused: And therefore that they can never recede from their Demand of *As clear and Distinct* Ideas of things divine and supernatural, as they have of things natural and human. I say if Men should make this Reply, our Author must be at a full stand, having gone the utmost Length of his Chain of Reasoning; with his *Metaphorical Analogy* and *Proper Analogy* between things the very same in Kind, that is no Analogy at all at the End of it.

H E R E then we must leave him behind, to the Contemplation of his Analogy of *Degrees*; and proceed to tell those Objectors they are so far in the right, That things divine and supernatural cannot be the same in Nature or Kind with things natural and human; that one and the same Idea or Conception cannot exhibit to the Mind a Knowledge of each of them *Equally Direct and Immediate*; that they cannot be expressed by one and the same Term in the same literal and strict Propriety; that we can have no Ideas or Conceptions of things divine and supernatural, totally distinct and  
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different from those we have of things natural and human: And lastly that Analogy of Degrees, such as is supposed between *More* White and *Less* White, *More* Wise and *Less* Wise, *More* Good and *Less* Good, is a modern Invention; and the spurious Issue of some wanton Imagination, designed to supplant the genuine Analogy founded on a real Resemblance and Correspondency between things different in Kind. But that the Truth of the Matter in short is this: They must not expect to find within themselves any Ideas *Clear* or *Obscure*, *Distinct* or *Confused*, *Adequate* or *Inadequate* of things divine and supernatural, and of divine Grace in particular, *As they are in themselves*; because they are utterly imperceptible after that Manner, and so infinitely out of the Reach of all our understanding Faculties that it is impossible for us to have a *Direct* Idea or Conception of them in any Degree. That therefore those things can be conceived no otherwise than Mediate-ly, that is by Analogy with things natural and human; nor expressed otherwise than by Terms of common Speech, which in their original Meaning and literal Propriety were applied to things of Nature, the only direct and immediate Objects of human Understanding. That accordingly in every Instance of that Knowledge which respects things divine, *One* and the *Same* Idea or Conception necessarily stands in the Mind both for what is natural and human, and for what is divine and supernatural;

pernatural; and that both of them are ever expressed by one and the same Term to which that Conception is annexed: Only with this Difference, that the Term with the Conception annexed to it is at one time applyed directly and immediately and in a literal Acceptation to what is natural and human; at another time to what is divine and supernatural; in an Analogical Sence only. That those Terms and Conceptions are never the less *Clear* and *Distinct* when applyed to things divine and spiritual, than when applyed to their proper Objects; because they are applyed to the former, not as they are apprehended directly, or in their own *Real intrinsic Nature*; for in this respect we are involved in a total Ignorance of them, exclusive of all Obscurity and Confusion: But as they are conceived thro' the Help of *Correspondent Resemblances*; by which Means the Conceptions receive no other Alteration than in being used as Analogical Representations of things otherwise utterly unknown and inconceivable to us; and must therefore in that new Application retain the very same distinct Perspicuity which they had before. Accordingly that in this very Instance of the *Grace* of God, we have no other way of apprehending it but by Analogy with the clear and direct Idea or Conception of some natural Operation; nor of expressing it but by a Word of common Speech, well understood by being first applyed in general to Grace or Favour and Assistance. Vouchsafed  
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by one Man to another, as by a Prince to his Subjects; and afterwards more particularly to a worldly Cause and Effect; so that the Term *Grace* or *Favour* is equally clear and distinct and intelligible whether you apply it to God or Man. Lastly, we are to tell them that the Foundation of this Analogy is laid, not in any *Sameness* of *Nature* or *Kind* between things divine and human (a Notion without which the Unbelieving and Heretical Genius of our Age could not subsist) but in our being formed in the *Likeness* only, and after the *Image* of God. As this Analogy is the only Ground of all our Knowledge of things purely spiritual and supernatural; so it is to this we owe the greatest Fulness and Enlargement of it: It is the highest Degree of spiritual and divine Knowledge we are capable of in this Life; and they who are not contented with it, must reject not only all *Revelation* and *Gospel Mystery*, but all *Natural Religion* likewise; since we have no other way but this of conceiving even God and his Attributes.

Now as upon this Writer's Notion of divine Analogy in respect of *Degrees* only, the foregoing Syllogism, as well as every other Syllogism relating to things purely spiritual and divine, must conclude falsely; and as that great fundamental Principle of Infidelity could never receive any satisfactory Answer, in his way of proceeding: So upon another quite different Notion of this Author in the latter

Part of his second Treatise, where he states the same Objection at full length, there can be no more than two Terms in the preceding Syllogism; and instead of any distinct and solid Answer to it, he intirely falls in with that Infidel Principle in the General; and in the particular Instance of divine Grace, he in effect gives up the whole Cause of Revelation and Mystery. The Objection put into the Mouth of his *Minute Philosopher*, and enlarged upon thro' many Pages is in short this. *Knowledge is the Perception of the Connexion or Disagreement between Ideas; so that where there are no Ideas, there can be no Knowledge: All Degrees of Assent terminate in Ideas, as their proper Object; and without them there can be no such thing as KNOWLEDGE, FAITH, or OPINION. Consequently then, Words which suggest no Ideas are insignificant; and where clear Ideas are wanting to them, the Speaker utters Nonsense. So that the only way to know whether a Man's Speech be senceless and insignificant, is to lay aside the Words, and consider the Ideas suggested by them: Strip any Doctrine or Tenet of the Words, and examine what Ideas are underneath, or whether any Ideas at all; and you will find this the shortest way to expose such of those Doctrines or Tenets as are false, and to end all Disputes about them. This is the Foundation of the grand Objection as it is stated by him in general; and the Inference made from thence by Unbelievers is, That because they are so far from having clear and*  
*distinct*

*distinct Ideas of Things purely spiritual and divine; that they can find no Ideas at all affixed to the Terms which express the Attributes of God or the Mysteries of Christianity, different from such as are affixed to them when applied to Things natural and human in common Speech: They therefore reject them all, as things absolutely unknown; together with all the Deductions and Consequences drawn from them, as utterly precarious and groundless; And by the same Method of Reasoning, the Objector observes, Men may confute all other the most essential Articles of the Christian Faith.*

THE true way of answering this Objection of Unbelievers is thus. By granting them, first that we have no such *Ideas*, either in the Abstract or in the Concrete, of things purely spiritual and supernatural, as we have of things natural and worldly; and consequently that no such Ideas can be annexed to the Words by which we express divine Objects. According to the duly limited and proper Acceptation of the term *Idea*, it signifyeth the Knowledge we obtain from a *Direct* Perception of an external Object it self, or of something the same in Kind with it. But we can have no direct Perception of any Objects purely spiritual and divine, nor of any thing the same in Kind with them; and the Objection proceeds upon this false Presumption, that without such a direct Perception or Idea we can have no Knowledge at all of them. It is a gross

gross fundamental Error in Logic, that Words can have no Signification unless *Ideas*, even *Direct* Ideas can be annexed to them; whereas none but those Words which express things material and sensitive can have such Ideas annexed to them by *Us*. But Words may be very significant which have the *Operations*, *Conceptions*, and *Complex Notions* of the Mind annexed to them; and these make up the greatest Part of significant Words in human Language. Nothing therefore can occasion so much Equivocation and Fallacy thro' the whole Course of Men's reasoning upon any Subject, especially in Religion, as the loose indiscriminate Use of the Term Ideas; and the confounding them not only with the *Immediate Consciousness* we have of the *Operations* of our own *Mind*, without the Intervention of any Ideas of them: But with all our *Conceptions*, and those *Complex Notions* which arise from combining the various Operations of the Intellect with Ideas of Sensation.

SECONDLY, By granting them what is a plain undeniable Truth, that where we can have no *Ideas*, nor *Conceptions*, nor *Complex Notions*, we can have no *Knowledge*, *Faith*, or *Opinion*: And that where Words have none of these annexed to them, they are altogether insignificant; as much without a Meaning as if they were inarticulate; and the Speaker utters Nonsense. So that if you add the terms *Conceptions* and *Complex Notions* to the term *Ideas* thro'



thro' the former Part of that Objection; then from being one grand fundamental Falsity, you turn it into a great Truth. For without some of these affixed to the Words we make use of, we can never form a *Mental* Proposition answering to the *Verbal*: Nor can a Word without some of these annexed to it, be one of the Terms in a Syllogism; it is not any Number of Syllables that renders it such, but either the Idea or Conception or Notion it stands for. Words are *Signs*, and where a Word is not a *Sign* of something any way conceivable and intelligible, it is to us a Sign of nothing; and accordingly nothing can be concluded from it. When the Idea or Conception or complex Notion is distinct and clear, so likewise is the Signification of the Word to which it is annexed: And where these are not to be had in the Abstract, the Word must express some of them in the Concrete. Where the Word is not *General*, it may be made such by standing for an indefinite Number of Particulars of the same Kind. And lastly, where no *Direct* and *Immediate* Ideas or Conceptions or complex Notions can possibly be affixed to the Terms we use (which is the Case of all the Terms whereby we express things divine and purely Spiritual) we transfer some of those Terms to which our *Ideas* are annexed, to express things divine and spiritual by mere *Figure* and *Metaphor*; and some of them which are applied to the Operations, Conceptions, and complex Notions of our Mind,

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we transfer for expressing things divine and spiritual by *Analogy*.

THIRDLY, And that which is the most material Concession of all is this. We grant them that, as we have no direct *Ideas*, or immediate *Consciousness* of things purely spiritual and divine, or of any thing the same in Kind; so consequently neither can we have any direct and immediate *Conceptions* or *Complex Notions* of them: And therefore no *Such* Conception or complex Notion can be affixed to any Word whereby we express the Attributes of God or the Mysteries of Christianity. For all the most *Abstracted* and most *Spiritual* Conceptions and complex Notions of the Mind, take their original Rise from *Ideas of Sensation*; and are no other than so many *Compositions* formed out of *These* and the *Conscious Operations* of the Intellect. It must therefore be a *Vain Expectation* in Men, and a *Senceless Demand*, to call upon us at every Turn even for direct and immediate *Conceptions* or *Notions* of things *Supernatural*; that is, of things above the direct Reach of all our natural Powers and Faculties. But it is downright *Frenzy* to insist upon *Ideas* of them, nay *Direct* and *Immediate* Ideas in the Sence of this Objection; when they may as well require us to *Shew* them the Deity; or to place an Angel before their *Eyes*; or at least to give them such a complete and perfect Description of the *Substance* of a pure Spirit, that they shall have just such another

another respective *Idea* of it as they have of the Members of an human Body : Or to explain to them the *Intrinsic essential Properties* of the divine Nature in such lively Words, that they shall conceive them after the very same *Immediate* Manner they do our mental Powers and Faculties and Operations.

AFTER all these Concessions freely made to Unbelievers, which open to us the true Matter in Controversy, and by which we are brought on gradually to the utmost Point of its Decision ; there is but one Concession that we insist upon and require from them : Which if not freely made from the Conviction of their own Judgment, will be extorted from them by the irresistible Force of Truth. That tho' we have no direct and immediate *Conception* or *Complex Notion*, and much less any such *Ideas* of things divine and supernatural, of God and his Attributes, or of any of the Mysteries of Christianity ; yet we have clear and useful Conceptions of them by *Analogy* with the Properties and Qualities and Operations of human Nature : As we conceive them Analogically, so do we likewise *Express* them ; and from thence we are carryed on insensibly to *Enlarge* upon them, by a purely Figurative and Metaphorical Allusion even to our Senses and bodily Members, and to many other sensible Objects of this World. All the Terms which we use for them have accordingly some of these determinate and clear

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Conceptions or Notions annexed to them; and without them they would be insignificant empty Sounds: But thus they have all a Meaning as distinct and intelligible, as when they are in their formal and literal Propriety applied to things natural and human.

I HOPE it now appears undeniable and past any reasonable Opposition, that as this Analogy is our only Method of conceiving God and his Attributes and the Myſteries of Chriſtianity; ſo it is ſure and ſolid, and will remain unſhaken to the End of the World: Since all thoſe things are not the leſs *Real* and ſubſtantially *True* in themſelves; nor the leſs *Usefully conceivable* to all the Intents of Morality and revealed Religion in this Life; nor of leſs *Influence* and *Concernment* to Mankind, becauſe we cannot apprehend them by Ideas, or after the ſame direct and immediate Manner we do things natural and human. It is this which will render all Kinds and Degrees of Infidelity unreaſonable here, and inexcusable hereafter; and not any falſe Imagination that Men are as little able to frame *Abstract* Ideas of Things natural and human, as they are of Things divine and ſupernatural: Or a fantaſtic Opinion that our Words may be ſignificant and uſeful without diſtinct Ideas; nay without any Ideas or Conceptions or complex Notions affixed to them. And yet theſe are the two Ways our Author takes to obviate that main Objection of Infidels, which he hath  
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been at much Trouble and Pains to render too strong for him to encounter.

THE particular Instance put into the Mouths of Unbelievers by this Author to illustrate and fortify the general Objection, is that of divine *Grace*; concerning which say they *Many things are spoken in Scripture*, and which hath occasioned *Many Disputes and Controversies in the Church*. And yet after all they ask, *What is the clear and distinct Idea marked by the word Grace?* For without such an Idea it can be neither the Subject of a rational Dispute, nor the Object of Knowledge, Faith, or Opinion. That for their Part, when they lay aside the word *Grace*, and look into their own Mind for a clear and distinct Idea to affix to it, they find a perfect Vacuity or Privation of all Ideas; and from thence they infer it to be no more than an empty Name without any real useful Meaning or intelligible Signification. The shortest and clearest Way of giving an Answer to their Question, is by asking them another. What is the clear and distinct Idea marked out by the word *Favour*? To which they make this ready Answer, That they have a clear and distinct Idea annexed to that Word when applyed to any Favour conferred by one Man upon another, as by a Prince upon his Subjects. Then say I, that and no other is the very Conception or Idea which is annexed to it, when it is applyed to God in order to express and represent any divine Favour; and there is

not then any other *New* Idea or Conception to be annexed to it. But say they, what we expect is a *New* and *Distinct* Idea *Purely Spiritual*, and of a *Divine* Object, and intirely *Different* from that Idea or Conception of *Human* Favour which we clearly perceive and apprehend ; because those two Things themselves are totally different from each other : And therefore since this cannot be had, we will not allow that Term *Favour* to have any real Signification or intelligible Meaning beyond what is merely human : 'Tho' nothing is more obvious than that upon this Principle they must not believe or acknowlege *Any* Favour received from God, and consequently there is an End of all Religion natural and revealed. That those Men cannot find within themselves any such *Spiritual Ideas*, intirely *Different* from all Ideas or Conceptions of correspondent *Natural* and *Human* Objects ; and that when they look into their own Mind for any such Idea to annex to the word *Favour* in particular when applyed to the Divinity, they find a perfect Vacuity or Privation of all *Such* Ideas, is most true : But their Consequence is most false ; that *Therefore that Term can have then no real useful Meaning or intelligible Signification*. For the Word together with that Conception of human Favour, is transfered to God Analogically ; to express and conceive such correspondent divine Favour, as is in every Instance and Degree otherwise inconceivable and ineffable. One and the same Idea or Conception and the Term

Term to which it is annexed, necessarily stand both for human and divine Favour; according to the different Application of it either to God, or to Man: When it is applyed to Man it literally expresseth something directly conceivable; when applyed to the Divinity, it expresseth something to us utterly inconceivable directly, or in Kind, or as it is in it self; but clearly and distinctly conceived by a correspondent Resemblance. We have no direct and immediate Idea or Conception of what Grace or Favour is *In* God, or of that internal *Disposition* in the divine Nature to shew us Favour; and tho' all the *Sensible* and *Visible* Blessings of this World are from him; yet we are so far from any Conception of the true and real Manner of his Operation in *Bestowing* them, that we know not even that they *Come* from him: Otherwise than as we have the utmost moral Evidence and Certainty, by Deduction and Consequence, that they could come originally from none but one necessary and eternal Being; who alone can be endued with infinite Power and Wisdom and Goodness; which is farther confirmed to us by Revelation. And then as for all the Favours of God which are *Insensible* and *Purely spiritual* Operations, they are intirely inconceivable; otherwise than by Analogy with some worldly and natural Operation. Let us therefore here drop the word *Favour*, and use the Synonymous word *Grace* instead of it.

THE term *Grace* then thus applied to God by Analogy only, is taken in a *General* Sence by making some one Instance of his Favour and Goodness to us, to stand for an indefinite Number of many Instances of his gracious Bounty and Favours: For no universal Idea of it can be formed by any imaginary and groundless Abstraction from all the Particulars. In a more limited Sence the word *Grace* is applied to the Light of the Gospel, the greatest of the divine Graces or Favours vouchsafed to Mankind; and in a Sence yet more particular, it is used to express the greatest Instance of God's Grace and Favour under the Gospel Dispensation; That of the actual Influence or immediate Operation of the divine Spirit upon the Mind of Man: Which being equally imperceptible and inconceivable, as it is in it self, with the intrinsic Nature and Powers of that Spirit which operates; we conceive it only by Analogy with the Influence or Operation of a well known natural Cause. Thus as the Objector expresseth it, tho' by way of upbraiding us with Folly, *We speak of this Holy Principle as of something that really Acts, Moves, and Determines; and we take our Idea or Conception of it from things natural:—Which being very obvious and immediately perceptible, we substitute in the Place of a thing spiritual and incomprehensible.* This is what he says *Imposeth upon Mankind*, and he calls it *A manifest Delusion.* But they are under a manifest De-  
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lusion who either reject and explode that holy Principle as something feigned and imaginary, because it is not natural and sensible; or who conclude it can be nothing true and real, or useful to us, because they cannot affix a direct Idea or Conception to the Term by which it is expressed: Whereas the very supposition of our being able to conceive it *Thus*, destroys the Nature of it; nor could there be any such thing as a divine supernatural Operation, if it could be thus naturally sensible or directly conceivable by us. If Men will allow what they will never be able to disprove, That the divine Spirit can actually assist the Mind by any immediate Influence or Operation at all; they must at the same time allow this to be inconceivable and inexpressible, otherwise than by Analogy with a directly conceivable Cause and Effect. Surely this blessed Operation or divine Influence is never the less real and true because it is supernatural, and cannot therefore be naturally and directly discerned; never the less the proper Subject of our Prayers, because it could not be so aptly and usefully revealed to us any other Way as by Analogy; and never the less an Object of our Assent, because we have not such a direct and immediate Idea or Conception of it as would leave no room for a Religious *Faith*. This then is the only Idea or Conception which can be affixed to the word *Grace*, when it is used to express that particular Instance of the divine Favour; And those Unbelievers who reject the Truth and

Reality and Usefulness of such an insensible and incomprehensible Operation of the divine Spirit; and assert the Word by which we express it to be utterly insignificant and without any intelligible Sence or Meaning, because they cannot find within themselves any clear Idea or Conception of something divine to affix to it, *Different* from that of something answerable in natural and worldly Objects; must for the same Reason reject the very Being of God, and all his Attributes; and may in particular as well deny that Almighty Energy and incomprehensible Influence whereby he preserves the created Universe. Those pretended Patrons of Liberty and Freedom in *Thinking* will fail in the End for want of using *A little common Sence where it is most concerned*, in a Matter of the last and highest Importance; they are like finally to perish by not following the Dictates of the plainest Reason, and by a wrong Byass upon their Judgment from a manifest Blunder in common Logic.

THIS is an Answer to that fundamental Objection, which will admit of no Reply but one; namely the proving that we have some other way of *Conceiving* things divine and spiritual (when the *Existence* of such things is granted) than by Analogy with things natural and human; and That the Properties or Attributes and Operations of an eternal, infinite and purely spiritual Substance, are of the same Nature or Kind with the Properties or Qualities

ties and Operations of such as are human and compounded. I have already just mentioned the two Ways our Author hath taken to Answer that Objection, which are these.

I. THE Substance of his first Answer is, That whereas the Objection supposeth every *General* Term in an intelligible Discourse, to stand for a distinct *Abstract* general Idea; He proceeds to shew, very justly indeed, how groundless and false that Notion is, of Men's forming any *Universal* Ideas by *Abstracting* intirely from all the *Particulars* of any Kind of things whatsoever. The Application he makes of it is this. That Men are as little capable of forming *Abstract* Ideas or Conceptions even of things *Natural* and *Sensible*, as they are of things *Divine* and *Supernatural*; that they can form no such general abstract Idea of *Number* and *Force*, any more than they can of *Grace*: And his Consequence is, that both being upon the same level with respect to our forming any abstract Conception or Idea of them; it is unreasonable that Men should insist upon having such an Idea of *Grace*, when they cannot have the like Idea of *Number* or *Force*. But to what Purpose is all this? For the Objection, as it is stated by Infidels supposeth no such thing; nor doth he himself mention *Any* Sort of *Abstract* Ideas in any Part of it, to give even a Colour to his being so prolix in discanting upon them in his Answer. No, the whole Strength of their  
Objection

Objection is resolved into this; that they can obtain no Ideas, either General or Particular, either in the Abstract or in the Concrete, either Clear or Obscure, Distinct or Indeterminate, of Things divine and spiritual contained in the Gospel Mysteries; *Different* from the Ideas of common worldly Objects: Nor of Grace in particular, different from that of human Grace or Favour; and therefore they reject it as an insignificant Term, without any real and useful Meaning when taken in a Divine and Religious Sence. They do not insist upon Ideas of Things divine and spiritual, rendered general by *Abstraction* from all the *Particulars*; nor upon such as become general by *One* of the Particulars being made to *Stand for* an *Indefinite Number* of Things of the same Kind, which is the true Abstraction: No nor upon an Idea of divine Grace abstracted from the *Cause* operating, from the *Subject* operated upon, and from the *Effects* produced; as he groundlessly supposes in his Answer. But what they demand is, *Any* Ideas of them as different from all the Ideas and Conceptions of things sensible and human, as these are from things imperceptible and divine; And accordingly they tell you that when they look inward for such Ideas to annex to the Terms, their Mind is an empty Void; and therefore they look no farther than the strictly proper and formal and literal Acceptation of those Words.

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BUT should we grant that the Objection did really proceed upon a Supposition that Men cannot have as clear and distinct an *Abstract* Idea of Grace, as they imagine they have of Number and Force: Yet the tacit Supposition upon which his whole Answer manifestly proceeds, and which is an unavoidable Consequence of his supposing the divine and human Attributes to be the same in Kind, is absolutely false. Namely, that we have as *Direct* and *Immediate* Ideas or Conceptions of Things divine and spiritual, as we have of Things sensible and human, tho' we have no abstract Ideas of either; and that we have as *Direct* an Idea of Grace in particular, as we have of Number or Force: For tho', says he, we cannot form any Idea of Number in the *Abstract*, or exclusive of all Things numbred; nor of Force *Prescinded*, as he speaks, from Body, Motion, Time and Place; yet we can form a clear and distinct *Direct* Idea of each of them in the *Concrete*. But surely we can form no *Direct Immediate* Idea or Conception of divine Grace, either *Abstracted* from God the Author, from Man the Subject, and from Virtue and Piety its Effects; or *Even in the Concrete and In Conjunction with them*: Because as the *Operation it self* is inconceivable directly, so neither can we have any direct and immediate Conception or Idea of the divine *Spirit* which operates, or of any Thing the same in Kind with it. What are we to do then here? The very same that we are obliged to

to do in respect of all other things divine and spiritual, even the very Attributes of God; that is to substitute the clear and distinct and *Direct* Conception of a natural and human Operation in the *Concrete*, as an Analogical Representation of (what is otherwise inconceivable) the divine Grace or Influence in the *Concrete* also; or inclusive of the holy Spirit, the human Mind, and the happy Effects. So that the true Ground of Men's Delusion in rejecting the Conceptions and Faith of Things divine and spiritual contained in the Gospel Mysteries; and all real and useful Signification of the Terms by which we express them, and of *Grace* in particular; is not the intire want of such an *Abstract* Idea of it as they falsely imagine they have of Number and Force, which is this Author's wrong Solution of the Matter: But their not discerning that tho' the Thing it self were granted to be ever so true and real; yet it is absurd to expect that the Mind of Man can obtain *Direct* and *Immediate* Ideas or Conceptions of such Kinds of Objects as are out of the direct Reach of all their Faculties; or that it can have *Natural* Ideas of Things *Supernatural*. And therefore that if there *Is* any such thing as Grace, or an immediate assisting Influence of the divine Spirit upon the Mind of Man (which is plainly revealed, and impossible for them to disprove) there can be no other way of conceiving it but by the Influence of an human and natural Cause: Because such divine Operation must unavoidably  
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be as inconceivable with respect to its *Real Nature*, as the Spirit it self which operates. And their fatal Error is, that upon their Principle they must necessarily reject the *Truth* and *Reality* of every Thing that is thus *Inconceivable to us as it is in it self*; and of whatever is no otherwise conceivable than by Analogy with Things natural and human; even the Attributes of God included.

2. THE Substance of this Author's Second Answer to the foregoing grand Objection of Unbelievers, you have in these following Particulars.

THERE *may be*, says he, *another Use of Words besides that of marking and suggesting distinct Ideas; which is, the raising certain Passions Dispositions and Emotions in our Minds, tho' the Words should not bring each a DISTINCT Idea to the Mind.* In the Term *Idea*, according to the modern loose and illogical Acceptation of it, this Writer without Distinction includes all our Conceptions and complex Notions. Before in the former Answer it was, That there may be another Use of Words besides marking or suggesting *Abstract* Ideas. Here it is, without *Distinct* Ideas: And anon you will find, that there may be another Use of Words besides that of marking or suggesting *Any* Ideas at all. Nay at last he ends in this, That Words may be very useful *Tho' there should be no POSSIBILITY of their offering or exhibiting any*

*any Ideas to the Mind.* But surely *Things* whereof we have no *Distinct* Ideas or Conceptions or Notions, must be very indistinctly known; and the *Words* to which we cannot affix such distinct Ideas or Conceptions, must be very confused and obscure in their Signification: And if we cannot affix clear and distinct *Ideas* or *Conceptions* to the Terms whereby we express the Attributes of God, and all the Mysteries of Christianity; our *Faith* which is consequent upon these, must be proportionably blind, confused, implicit and indeterminate. Men disposed to Infidelity are here furnished with an invincible Argument for rejecting not only revealed, but natural Religion likewise; both which must upon his Principle be full of Confusion and Obscurity in the most material and fundamental Points: Nor can either of them thus admit of a firm and undoubting Assent of the Understanding; or of a well grounded religious Faith, which must ever be as wavering and instable as the Foundation it is built upon. Without some clear and distinct Idea or Conception annexed to the word *Knowledge*, how could we ascribe it with any Certainty to God for an Attribute? We have no Idea or Conception directly from that divine Faculty or Perfection, as it is in it self; and some clear and distinct Idea or Conception we must have of it, or we could never reason clearly and distinctly upon it: Nor could we ever infer with any Truth that there must be such a Perfection in God, otherwise



wife than by this Consequence; That since human Knowledge, whereof we have a clear and distinct Conception, is a Perfection of a created Mind composed of Matter and Spirit; there must be a Perfection in the Creator, to which this is correspondent and similar. If it is objected, that we have a clear and distinct Idea of human Knowledge to annex to that Term, when we apply it to God; which being of the *Same Kind* with the divine Knowledge, is a good Foundation of all our Reasoning upon that Attribute: I answer, That its being of the same Kind with the divine Knowledge, is a false and groundless Presumption; and what will never admit of any Proof, till it is first proved that an infinite and eternal Nature is of the same Kind with that of Man; then indeed, but not till then, it will follow that the inherent Faculties and Attributes are of the same Kind in both. Without a *Clear* and *Distinct* Idea or Conception marked out and suggested to the Mind by the word *Existence*, even antecedently to any Knowledge of a first and eternal Cause; how could we come to any clear and certain and determinate Knowledge of the *Existence* of such a Cause? How could we otherwise attempt to offer any solid and convincing Proof of the very *Being* of God, either from Reason or Revelation; when all our Arguments and Deductions must be as confused and obscure, as the Idea or Conception we have of that *Existence* which is the Subject of our Reasoning?

AGAIN, Without *Clear* and *Distinct* Ideas or Conceptions annexed to the Terms *Son* and *Begotten* before any Revelation was made; how could it have been clearly revealed to Mankind that Christ is the Only-begotten Son of God? And now that it is so expressly revealed, how are we able to affix any other new Ideas or Conceptions to those Words, different from those clear and distinct Ideas or Conceptions before affixed to them? Have we then any other sure Ground for a real and useful Knowledge of that fundamental Mystery of the Gospel, but by transferring the Words together with these clear and distinct Ideas or Conceptions annexed to them, to the divine Nature by Analogy. Whereas had we only obscure and indistinct Ideas or Conceptions annexed to those Terms when we apply them to the Divinity; or were we absurdly to understand them as signifying something of the same Kind with human Filiation or Generation, but infinitely above them in Degree of Perfection; all our Knowledge and Faith of that Doctrine would be proportionably confused obscure and absurd. Without a *Clear* and *Distinct* Idea or Conception previously annexed to the Term *Intercession*, namely the Idea or Conception we have of human Intercession; how should we be capable of receiving such a clear, distinct and determinate Revelation of Christ's incomprehensible Intercession for us in Heaven; as may be a sure Foundation for Faith and

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Dependence upon a Transaction whereof we can have no direct Idea or Conception, for our everlasting Peace and Reconciliation with God? Nay how should we otherwise have any Notion at all of a Thing to us so utterly incomprehensible and ineffable as it is in it self, that we cannot obtain the least Idea or Conception of the *Real Nature* of it to annex to that Term: And are therefore under a necessity of annexing to it the Idea or Conception of human Intercession as a Representation of the other; and of applying them jointly to the Divinity by Analogy, with the same Clearness and Distinctness we apply them to Man? And can any Thing be more wild and extravagant, than the Notion we must have of Christ's heavenly Intercession upon this Author's Principle; that it is the very same in Nature or Kind with that which is human, but in a superexcellent Degree: And that the Term *Intercession* must be applyed to what is divine and what is human, in the same proper and formal and literal Acceptation? Lastly, without a *Clear* and *Distinct* Idea or Conception in the Mind to annex to the Term *Grace*; first in the General, that of human Favour shewn from one Man to another; and then in particular, that of the Influence of a natural Cause: How could we ever arrive at any distinct and useful Notion of a supernatural imperceptible Influence of the Spirit of God upon the Mind of Man? Directly from this divine Operation it self, we can obtain no Idea or Conception to

annex to that Term; without some Idea or Conception annexed, it would signify nothing; and unless this Conception be clear and distinct, our Information concerning the Thing, and our Faith of it would be but uncertain obscure and indeterminate. What have we then to do? Nothing more but to substitute a plain Word, with a most clear and distinct Conception of what is natural and human annexed, to express and represent Analogically what is otherwise inconceivable and ineffable: And then a divine Favour and a supernatural Influence of the Spirit upon our Mind, becomes as *Clearly* and *Distinctly* and *Usefully* conceivable, as any human Favour or the Influence of a natural Cause.

ONCE more, that I may not omit this Author's main Instance. Without *Clear* and *Distinct* Ideas or Conceptions previously annexed to the words *Father*, *Son*, and *Spirit*, we could have received no clear and distinct Information of the three divine Persons: Nor could we plainly tell what we meant by the word *Trinity*, without a clear and distinct Idea or Conception as well of human *Personal Distinction*, as of an *Equality* or *Identity* of *Nature* among Men, to be annexed to it. We can have no Conception or Idea (tho' ever so minute or obscure) to annex to those Terms, directly from the divine Nature it self, or from any thing the same in Kind with it: And if we could obtain any such dark and confused

Conception

Conception of the real Nature of that divine Distinction and Unity; this would not be sufficient for a Doctrine which is the Foundation of Christianity, and ought therefore *Some way or other* to be *Clearly* and *Distinctly* understood, in order to a firm unshaken *Faith* both of that and all other Christian Doctrines which are built upon it. The clear and distinct Ideas or Conceptions annexed to those Terms when applied to the divine Persons, are the very same which were annexed to them before that Doctrine was revealed; and it could not have been revealed to us either Orally or by Writing without them: And they are still applied to the Divinity with the very same clear and distinct Ideas or Conceptions annexed to them, but Analogically used; and thus they usefully express and exhibit to the Mind correspondent Things as true and real on the Part of the divine Nature, as they do when literally and directly applied to our Humanity. So likewise without a clear and distinct Conception before annexed to the Term *Three*, we could never have received any clear and plain Revelation of a real Distinction between the divine Persons: Whom we cannot distinguish as they are in themselves, and to whom we cannot apply the Term *Three* any other way than by Analogy with that clear and distinct Conception, which was previously obtained from human Personages whom we can readily and directly distinguish. These worldly Ideas or Conceptions which are clear and

distinct, are made use of in Revelation to inform us of that Doctrine in the only way it could be conveyed to our present Capacities: And consequently the Doctrine it self is clear and distinct and easily intelligible; and ought never to be rejected on Account of any Confusion or Obscurity in the Manner of apprehending it; because we are neither obliged nor concerned to apprehend or believe any more of it, than what is thus clearly and distinctly conceivable by *Analogy*. So that what will render Men's disbelief of this and other such Christian Doctrines inexcusable is, their not assenting to it upon sufficient Testimony *As far* as it is *Clearly* and *Distinctly* to be conceived and apprehended: And their unreasonably demanding or expecting Ideas and Conceptions of the *Real Nature* and *Manner* of that supernatural Unity and Distinction as it is in it self, to annex to those Terms by which it is expressed. In short their rejecting what is clear and obvious and usefully intelligible in it; and insisting upon *Direct* and *Immediate* Ideas or Conceptions, of what is infinitely out of the direct Reach of all our intellectual Powers and Faculties; tho' upon the same footing they must necessarily reject even all natural Religion.

It is by Means of those clear and distinct Ideas or Conceptions annexed to the Terms in the several foregoing Instances, as well as to all other Words which are used to express things

things divine and supernatural, that they are rendered in any Degree usefully conceivable and intelligible to an human Mind; that they are made the Objects of our Knowledge, Faith, or Opinion; that we can discourse and reason upon them, so as to come to Resolutions and form Conclusions concerning them with undoubted and determinate Certainty; and that Words thus applyed to things supernatural with those clear Ideas and Conceptions, become *Active vital and ruling Principles* for regulating and influencing the Faith and Practice of Mankind. So that let Men but suppose the actual *Existence* of a Deity, as well as the *Reality* of those divine Attributes and Operations which are deduceable by the Light of Nature: And they must grant that the Mind of Man is capable of conceiving them no other way, than by Analogy with those clear and distinct Ideas or Conceptions we have of our own Existence, and of the Faculties and Properties and Operations of our own Mind. All those therefore who set up for *Natural Religion* in Opposition to *Revelation*, under pretence of our Doctrines of Christian Mysteries being utterly inconceivable and unintelligible, are intirely without Excuse for this plain Reason: Because every one of them is conceived and exprest after the very same Manner, by which *Alone* we are enabled to think and speak of those Attributes of God which they allow to be the true Ground of all natural Religion.

THE next Step taken by our Author to obviate the grand Objection of Infidels is, by laying it down for a sure Maxim *That Words may be significant altho' they do not stand for [any] Ideas*; and he is so positive in this, that he says *Men's Presuming the Contrary, seems to have produced the Doctrine of Abstract Ideas*. Now is it not very hard for any Man to keep his Countenance and argue seriously, in making a Reply to one who so frankly acknowledgeth before hand, that the main Terms of his Discourse may have neither Sence nor Meaning in them? A Word, such as *Grace* for Instance, significant tho' it hath *No Idea*, nor (in his Sence of the Term) *Conception*, nor *Complex Notion* annexed to it; and consequently not to be understood either in a *Proper*, or purely *Figurative*, or *Analogical* Acceptation! This is another chimerical unnatural Offspring (as our Age is fertil of Monsters) lately brought forth, and as yet without a proper Name given to it: And therefore you may call it a *Literal* or *Metaphorical Noise*, or *Analogical Sound*; or a *Figure* whereby a Man may *Whistle* his Thoughts with as much Advantage and Eloquence as he can speak them. This he hath laid at the Door of some modern Writer whom he is ashamed to name: But let who will be the Parent, it is of this Author's nurturing; with Design to manifest to the World that Words may be *Significant*, tho' they signify *Nothing*. He grants however

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that



that Words are *Signs*; and if so, then they must be Signs of something besides themselves: They are external, sensible, instituted Signs of Ideas Conceptions or complex Notions in our Mind; which not being *Immediately* communicable, cannot be made known to others without some such Indications. One of the most useful and ready Sorts of Signs for exciting the same Ideas Conceptions and Notions in the Minds of others, are *Words*; and because of the vast variety of such Ideas and Conceptions, they could not be *Clearly* and *Distinctly* communicated if those Words were not *Various* and *Articulate*. Accordingly unless some Idea or Conception or Notion in the Mind is annexed to each of these Signs, it hath lost its Use and can have no *Signification*. Take away these from the Words and they are no longer *Signs*; the whole Intent and Purpose of human Language is intirely subverted and destroyed; we should converse after the Manner of Brutes: And upon this Author's Principle, if we *Brayed* to one another, or *Bellowed*, or *Chattered*; it might as well have answered all the Ends and Exigences of human Life and Religion.

ONE Reason he gives why Words may be *Significant* without *Ideas* or Conceptions or Notions annexed to them is, *Because the Idea is inactive*: What then? Therefore the *Word* without any Idea or Conception annexed, may be an *Active, vital, ruling Principle*. How preposterous and the very Reverse of Truth is

this? Surely if there be any common Sense remaining it will inform us, that it is some Idea or Conception or Notion in the Mind, affixed to the Word or excited by it, which gives it all its *Significancy Life and Activity*; and which renders it a *Ruling Principle*, as he calls it, for the Conduct of Men's Faith and Practice; Without this the bare Word it self would be altogether *Inactive*; that is, utterly without Effect and Influence upon us as a *Sign*, and nothing more than a dead Letter and a mere Sound. Accordingly it is impossible to raise any Passions Dispositions or Emotions in *Rational Minds*, by Words only without *Any* Ideas or Conceptions annexed to them or excited by them, in him who Hears or Reads them. Men may be affected indeed by affixing to the Words or Signs very *General* and *Indeterminate* and *Obscure*; or very *Mistaken* and *False* Ideas and Conceptions; or such as are very *Different* from those affixed to them by him who uttered or wrote them: But where they have *None* annexed to them or excited by them, they are downright Nonsense; and of no real Influence, Use, or Signification. But if it were true, as this Author asserts, that Words without any Ideas or Conceptions belonging to them could really affect and move us; such Emotions would be merely *Mechanical*: At best Men must be affected as mere *Animals* only; they would be moved when there was nothing but Wind or Sound to move them; they must be wrought upon and disposed without

out any Concurrence of Thinking or Reason; and they would be intirely under the Guidance and Direction of Tones and Accents of the Voice, without any *Rational, Moral, or Religious* Influence and Meaning.

THE last and most extraordinary Step taken by our Author for solving the preceding grand Objection of Infidels is, by telling them *That the true End of Speech, Reason, Science, Faith, Assent; is not always the imparting or acquiring of Ideas: But something of an operative Nature, tending to a conceived Good; which may be obtained — Altho' there should be no Possibility of offering or exhibiting any such Idea to the Mind.* Surely more Confusion and Absurdity could not possibly have been crowded into the Compass of one short Period. *The End of Speech is not always the imparting or acquiring Ideas, Conceptions, or Notions; tho' without some of these affixed to the Words or excited by them as Signs, it is no Speech, but insignificant empty Noise.* Tho' it be evidently plain that Speech could serve no rational End; if it did not suggest and impart some of these: Tho' this is the very Point, wherein human Language differs from the irrational instinctive Sounds of Birds and Beasts, and even of Insects. And tho' if you exclude this Use, no Man living can assign any other for Words or Speech: In which it would be impossible there should be either Propriety or Figure; or any thing tending to excite us  
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to a rational *Operation*. Infomuch that our conversing like Mutes, and denoting the Ideas and Conceptions of the Mind by Signs upon the Fingers; would, according to his Notion, be of more real Advantage to Mankind, and upon all Accounts vastly preferable to any Sounds variously articulated by the different Organs of Voice. *The true End of Reason.* But surely one true End and Use of Reason, is to acquire and impart a Perception of the Agreements and Disagreements of our Ideas Conceptions and Notions; which it could never perform, unless the *Ideas* Conceptions and Notions themselves are acquired, or exhibited to the Mind: Without this it could never Influence us to *Act* or *Operate* like Men; nor to obtain our ultimate End, which is true rational Happiness. *The true End of Science.* But surely each rational Science must be conversant about some *Ideas* Conceptions or Notions of things; and these must be acquired or exhibited to the Mind, and imparted by the Terms and Signs used in it: Or it would be impossible to understand or teach any of the Sciences; or to render them useful to any rational *End* or *Operation*. Otherwise the true End of all Science would be to talk much, but to learn and know and practise nothing: There would be in Reality but one Science in the World; that is a very learned Method of multiplying such Marks and Words only, as were most agreeable to the Eye and harmonious to the Ear. Upon this Author's Principle,  
there

there might be some Use of *Singing* indeed ; but it would be to no purpose for any Man to speak who could not perform it melodiously. *The true End of Faith.* Religion then is placed upon the same absurd Foot with Science ; Faith (according to him) may answer a true and excellent and operative End, without our always acquiring any Idea or Conception or Notion of *What* we believe, or having it any way exhibited to the Mind ; and *We may believe* (as this Author himself words it) *Where we do not understand.* The bare Words in which we express our Faith, may be vital ruling Principles to rational Creatures ; tho' they are not always animated by any Ideas or Conceptions affixed to them, and exhibited to the Mind : And tho' Faith in Words only for its Object, is no other than believing in certain Sounds and Syllables. You may profess indeed to believe in *Father, Son, and Spirit* ; in the *Grace* of God ; and in the *Mediation* and *Intercession* of Christ ; but yet it is not always *Necessary* or *Possible* for you to acquire, or exhibit to your Mind, any *Ideas* Conceptions or Notions of the things marked out by those Words : Tho' by this Rule you may as well be said to have Faith in the Noise of sounding Brass or a tinkling Cymbal. Nay your believing a God would be very useful ; tho' upon his Scheme it may be no more than Faith in a Monosyllable. You may commendably believe in what you *Hear*, tho' you do not *Understand* any thing of it. Thus all Faith would terminate in the Ear ; and no Point

Point of it could ever reach the Head or the Heart, or Influence us to any rational Action. *The true End of Assent.* The *End* of Assent indeed is not the imparting or acquiring Ideas Conceptions or Notions: But surely some of these must necessarily be acquired or exhibited to the Mind for the *Object* of our Assent; otherwise it would be just such another useful Assent as one *Parrot* may yield to another.

WELL then; Words do not always impart or exhibit Ideas or Conceptions to the Mind: But they may be very useful, says he, to another End; in producing or imparting something else without a particular Name, *Something of an Operative Nature.* Then surely the Words must impart something more than the bare Sounds of Syllables: And it cannot be they themselves which thus *Operate* alone upon us, but that *Something* which they impart to the Mind. Now since he will not have any Ideas Conceptions or Notions always imparted by them; it must be *Something*, says he, *that tends to a conceived Good, which may be obtained tho' the Ideas or Conceptions Marked by the Terms, in order to our obtaining it, Cannot be offered or exhibited to the Mind:* Something tending to a *Conceived Good, tho' there should be no Possibility of exhibiting such an Idea or Conception To the Mind.* Change the Syntax of this unaccountable Sentence into all the Forms and Varieties it can bear; and yet it will not produce any intelligible Truth.

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NOT *always the imparting Ideas.* But surely if Words, in Religious Doctrines especially, do sometimes impart Ideas, and sometimes none; it was highly proper for him to have distinguished those Words, and to have informed the World which of them can have Ideas and Conceptions affixed to them and imparted by them, and which not: For now he hath left his Readers in an endless Uncertainty in relation to the *Grace* of God in particular; and upon the same Foot of Reasoning, in relation to all the Attributes of God and Mysteries of Christianity in general. *No Possibility of offering or exhibiting any Idea to the Mind.* Had he taken the word *Idea* in the true logical Sence, as limited to the *Direct* and *Immediate Perception* of external and sensible Objects only; and affirmed that there was no Possibility of our having any *Such* Perception or Ideas of things divine and purely spiritual: And that it was as ridiculous for Men to insist upon such Ideas of them, as to demand a full View and Prospect of them with their Eyes. Had he affirmed moreover, not only that such *Ideas* are impossible to us; but that it is equally impossible for the Mind of Man to obtain an *Immediate Consciousness* of them, or of any thing the same in Kind with them; and consequently to frame even any *Direct Conceptions* or *Complex Notions* of them: And that we are therefore under a Necessity of conceiving them by *Analogy* with things natural and human, or else of denying the Truth and Reality even

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of the divine Attributes as well as the Mysteries of Christianity ; or at least of disclaiming any Capacity in Mankind of obtaining an *Useful* Knowledge of either. Had he done this, I say, he had asserted an evident and important Truth ; and thereby have inevitably reduced the Adversaries of Revelation to the palpable Absurdity of disbelieving the *Reality*, or denying the *Useful Knowledge* of every thing in the Universe, whereof they have not a direct Sensation or immediate Consciousness, either from the thing it self or from something the same in Kind : Nay of rejecting all things divine and supernatural for no other Reason ; but because they have no such Conceptions of them, as would be directly inconsistent with their very Nature and Existence. He should have granted them that *Some* Idea Conception or Notion must necessarily be affixed to every Word expressive of each Doctrine in Christianity, and of every one of God's Attributes : Or else that it could have no Use and Signification ; nor could otherwise impart or suggest any thing to the Mind for an Object either of our *Knowledge* or *Faith* ; and consequently for a Principle of rational *Action* or *Operation*. But what involved him in all this complicated Absurdity, was his having a strong Suspicion that we can obtain no *Direct* and *Immediate* Ideas or Conceptions, to annex to Words expressive of things divine and purely spiritual ; together with his Reluctance at the same time to acknowledge



knowledge that we may and must have *Analogical* Conceptions to annex to them, or else that they would be utterly useless: To avoid which he ran blindfold and headlong into the other Extreme, of maintaining a most pernicious Tenet; That Words and Doctrines may be significant and useful, and productive of Action, *Tho' there should be no Idea affixed to them or imparted by them; nay no Possibility of offering or exhibiting any such Idea* [Conception or Notion] *to the Mind.*

THE main Scope and Design of that obscure Dissertation, was to shew how impossible it is to affix any *Distinct* Idea or Conception to the word *Grace*: But that however the Term it self, without any such Idea or Conception annexed to it or imparted by it, may have a useful Tendency and excite us to Action. Whereas without the Conception of human *Favour* annexed to it or imparted by it, when taken in the General; and without the Idea or Conception of the Influence of a natural and human Cause, when it is taken in particular; and so applyed with those *Clear* and *Distinct* Conceptions to God and the divine Spirit, by *Analogy*: It would have been a Word altogether senseless insignificant and useless in Religion; it would have imparted nothing to the Mind for an Object either of Knowledge or Faith; nor could it have been any rational Principle, or have afforded any Motive or spring of Action. Now to prove that the word

Grace

Grace is not *Insignificant* tho' no *Determinate* Idea or Conception is annexed to it or imparted by it; he instances in the word *Number*, as being in this Point exactly parallel. *You can form no Idea of Number*, says he, *Abstracted from all things numbred*. No surely, but it is for this Reason: Because there is no such *Thing* as Number abstracted from all things numbred: Exclude these from Number, and it can have no Existence or Reality. It is equally true that we can form no Idea or Conception of Grace; exclusive of the Mind of Man, the divine Spirit, and the Effects. But why is this impossible? For no other Reason, but because Grace is then resolved into *Nothing*; insomuch that the very mention of such a Conception or Idea of it, is trifling and ridiculous. And much more such a tedious Dissertation about what is then but a mere *Sound*, and no *Sign* of any thing *True* and *Real* in respect either of God or Man. The Truth of the Matter is this; As we can form a clear and distinct Idea or Conception of Number in the *Concrete*, which is as *Direct* and *Immediate* as the Ideas or Conceptions we have of the *Objects* numbred by us: So we can form a clear and distinct Idea or Conception of Grace, in the *Concrete* likewise; but which is as necessarily and as truly *Analogical*, as that Conception we form of the divine *Spirit*, and its supernatural *Power*. And here I shall once more observe to this Author, what he seems to be wholly ignorant of; That we cannot form any *Direct* and *Immediate* Conception

ception or Idea of Number, either in the *Abstract* or in the *Concrete*, in respect of things divine and supernatural: Because we can obtain no direct Conception or Idea of such *Objects* in any Degree; and consequently the Mind of Man cannot *Distinguish* them from one another as they are *In themselves*, or *In their own Kind*. And therefore it is, that the *Distinction* between the divine Persons is revealed to us by *Analogy* with that which is *Personal* among Men; who are easily numbered, and directly distinguishable from one another.

THE other parallel Instance from which he argues, is that of *Force*; exclude, says he, Body the Subject of it, and Motion, and the sensible Effects of it, and then it is impossible to frame any Idea or Conception of it. Yes surely; it is the same senseless Ridicule as if you bid a Man try to form a Conception of *Thinking* or *Willing*, exclusive of any *Object* of Thought or Desire, and of a Mind operating. So say I of *Grace*; exclude the divine Spirit, the Mind of Man, and the Effects of it; And then there is nothing left whereof to form even any Analogical Idea or Conception. About that same chimerical abstract Idea of *Force* or *Impetus*, he observes learned Men have had mighty Contests; and great variety of Opinions there are about what is in Truth but an airy empty Nothing: And therefore it is no Wonder that they are so much at a loss for such an Idea; and that the Searches of the Ingenious among them should amount to this at last, That it was but a *Subtil*  
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*Abstract,*

*Abstract*, or *Spiritual Quintessence*; and that they knew not what to make of it.

WELL, but notwithstanding all this waste of Learning is nothing to the Stress of the Objection; yet as our Author hath been very profuse in reciting the particular Disputes and curious Dissertations concerning *Force* or *Impetus*: So hath he blazoned out a large Field of Mechanics, to display the many Uses which have been made of it, to the great Benefit and Conveniency of Mankind; altho' Men could never fix upon any precise *Distinct* Idea to be annexed to that Term. Even so then, his Inference is, Infidels need not wonder that the word *Grace* hath occasioned so many different Opinions and Controversies; and that it is of so great Use in Religion; tho' it be impossible to frame any precise distinct Idea of it. But certainly Men could have had no Disputes or Dissertations about *Force*; or have deduced any convincing Consequences in relation to it for the Benefit and Advantage of Mankind, and their Improvement in the Knowledge of Mechanics; if they had not first formed *Some* clear and *Distinct* Idea of it in the *Concrete*. This clear and distinct Idea annexed to that Word, was the true Ground and Foundation of all those Dissertations; and without it they could not have made one Step towards any solid and useful Knowledge concerning it. And thus it is with *Grace*; without a *Distinct* Idea or Conception in the *Concrete* of some obvious natural Operation or Influence, affixed to that Term; and transfered together with it to *Represent*

*sent* the supernatural Influence of the divine Spirit: It would be no distinct Object of our Knowledge Faith or Opinion; there would be no intelligible Dissertations or Contests about it; there could be no useful Conclusions drawn from it, or satisfactory Propositions formed with relation to it. And without *Any* Idea or Conception affixed, it could have no more real Signification than if you spelled the Word backward.

By this Author's thus placing *Physical Force* and *Divine Grace* upon the same Level, as to an Impossibility of forming any *Determinate* or *Distinct* Idea or Conception of either of them; he puts it intirely out of his Power and the Power of any Man living, to make a clear and effectual Reply to the strongest Part of the Infidels Objection, as he himself hath stated it; and that by which they clinch their main Argument against all Revelation. For says his Minute Philosopher, *You take your Idea of Grace from things Corporeal, from Motion and the Force of Bodies which are obvious and sensible; and this you substitute in the Place of the other, which is spiritual and incomprehensible; but this is manifest Delusion. For tho' the Idea of corporeal Force be ever so clear and intelligible; it will not therefore follow that the Idea of Grace, a thing perfectly incorporeal, must be so too: And tho' we may reason distinctly, perceive, assent, and form Opinions about Force; it will by no Means follow that we can do so about Grace. Tho' he hath prudently declined making any Reply to this Pinch of the Argument; it will not however be*

amiss to shew the only way of performing it upon his Principle. We must first positively deny that we take our Idea or Conception of Grace from the Force or Influence of any thing material, or human: Which is a manifest Falsity; for if we did not take it from some of these (by Analogy) we could have no Idea or Conception at all of Grace, which is altogether spiritual and incomprehensible as it is in it self; and thus the Word would be completely insignificant and useless. Then we must go about to persuade Unbelievers out of their *Senses*, and convince them that they can form no *Determinate* and *Distinct* Idea or Conception of natural Force or human Influence; than which nothing is more obvious and sensible, and which they see and feel and clearly perceive every Day of their Lives: And out of their *Reason* likewise; so as to make them believe they can as easily form a *Direct* Idea of Grace, or the Influence of the divine Spirit on the Mind of Man, in the *Concrete*; as they can of any natural Force or human Influence: Whereas it is impossible to form any such *Direct* Idea of it; either general or particular, determinate or indeterminate, distinct or indistinct, in the Abstract or in the Concrete. And from these Premises we must at last draw this wild Conclusion, That tho' it may be as impossible to affix a *Distinct*, or even *Any* Idea or Conception to Grace, as to Force: Yet that Term may be *Significant* and *Useful*, and excite us to Operation; and we can assent to it, and reason and form Opinions about it, as we can about Physical *Force* or Influence.

Now

Now therefore may I not appeal to the Reader; in this Author's own Words, *Whether this is taking his Notions of Faith Opinion and Assent from common Sense and common Use; and from maturely weighing the Nature of Signs and Language?* And whether he had any wrong done him when I asserted, that upon his Principle there could be but two Terms in the preceding Syllogism of *Grace*; or in any other Syllogism relating to the Attributes of God or the Mysteries of Christianity? Since nothing is more evident than that no Word can be a *Syllogistic Term* without *Some Idea* Conception or Complex Notion annexed to it; either direct and immediate, or Analogical: And that unless this is *Clear* and *Distinct*, nothing can be concluded with any *Determinate Truth* and *Satisfactory Certainty*. Was he any way injured or misrepresented, when I said he intirely gave up the whole Cause of Christian Mysteries? And may I not now justly add, that his notional Method of proceeding thro' that tedious obscure and perplexed Dissertation upon Number and Force and Grace, unwarily tends to sap the very Foundation of Religion natural and revealed? And to resolve it all at last into nothing more than a blind implicit Faith, and an empty Senceless Sound of Syllables without any real Meaning Use or Signification: By granting to Unbelievers the very Principle upon which their grand Objection proceeds, and by making them the only Concession they wanted; namely that it is not always *Necessary* or *Possible* to annex *Distinct*, nay *Any Ideas* Conceptions

tions or Notions, to the main Terms by which we express our Faith in the Doctrines of the Gospel ; and to the words *Grace* and *Trinity* in particular. For then all the vile Consequences which he hath put into the Mouth of his *Minute Philosopher* inevitably follow. *That those Terms are altogether insignificant ; that there can be no Assent and consequently Faith, where there are no Ideas Conceptions or Notions ; that then we pronounce hard Words without a Meaning ; that thus there can be no Argument or Belief ; nor anything in Faith farther than a mere verbal Trifling. That those Terms are merely Forms of Speech, and express empty Sounds which mean nothing and are of no Use to Mankind ; that they are Names only instead of Ideas and Things, and thought intelligible only because they are familiar. In short, That Doctrines and Propositions composed of them cannot regulate our Wills Passions and Conduct ; or be lively Principles influencing the Mind and operating upon it : And that their Method of Reasoning concerning GRACE may be applyed, by any Man of Sense, to the confuting all other the most essential Articles of the Christian Faith.*

THE true Answer to the Stress of that Objection of Unbelievers in this latter Form is ; by granting them *That we do really take our Idea or Conception of divine Grace from things natural and human and obvious (tho' not from things Merely material, as they unaccurately word it) and these we substitute in the Place of the other : And that for the very Reason mentioned in the Objection ; because Grace is Spiritual and Incomprehensible as it is in it self,*



self, and therefore it is impossible for us to do otherwise. And this is so far from being *A manifest Delusion*, that it is a highly rational Method of proceeding; and effectually answers all the present Ends of Morality and Religion. For our Case in short is this; As natural and human Force or Influence is a thing obviously and directly perceptible, we can frame a *Direct* and *Immediate* Idea or Conception of it: And as Grace is a thing of quite a different Kind, purely spiritual and imperceptible; we can form no direct and immediate Idea or Conception of it in any Degree. And therefore we substitute the clear, and distinct, and direct Idea or Conception of natural and human Force or Influence in the Concrete; as a clear *Analogical Conception* and distinct *Representation* of a *Correspondent* Operation of the divine Spirit upon the Mind of Man. So that the Idea or Conception is one and the same, as well as the Word: Nor are either of them to be otherwise distinguished, than by the different *Use* and *Application* of them to human, or divine Grace and Favour; and to natural, or supernatural Influence. Thus the *Perspicuity*, *Distinctness*, and *Usefulness* both of the Term and of the Idea or Conception annexed to it, are still the same; whether you apply those Terms to one or the other of those Things. If the Idea or Conception of natural and human Influence or Operation annexed to the Term is *Clear* and *Distinct*, as the Objection supposeth; it is not the less clear or *Useful* when the Word is used Analogically, to express that which is *Correspondent* and *Similar* in super-

natural and spiritual Objects; for these two plain Reasons. Because no new and different Idea or Conception, obtained directly from the *Thing it self* (or from any thing *Of the same Kind*) can then be affixed to it; this being utterly imperceptible and incomprehensible after that Manner, and no otherwise conceivable than by some Analogical Representation: And because we are *Obliged* to *Understand* and *Believe* nothing more beyond what we thus conceive by that distinct and intelligible *Correspondent Resemblance*; except that the supernatural Original is *Real* and *True*, but in no Degree conceivable or intelligible by us *As it is in its own Nature*.

Now then; If supernatural and divine Objects be totally *Different in Kind* from any thing directly and immediately conceivable by us: And consequently there can be no other *Possible* way of *Thinking* or *Speaking* of them, but by the same Conceptions and Terms we use for *Correspondent* and *Similar* worldly Objects. Accordingly if we are not *Concerned* and *Obliged* to *Apprehend* or *Believe* the former, as they are in their own *Real Nature*; but only as they are *Represented* by such clear and distinct and intelligible Analogical Resemblances. If the *Word* and the *Idea* or *Conception* annexed to it are the very *Same*, for Instance, in respect of a natural and human; and a supernatural and divine Operation or Influence: And that it is impossible to affix any new and different Idea or Conception, when the *Term* is transfered to the latter. If the *Idea* or *Conception* is *Equally Clear*  
and

and *Distinct*; and the *Word* equally plain and *Intelligible* when they are applied to either. If the *Things* for which that one and the same Idea or Conception stands in the Mind; and which are expressed by one and the same Word, are or may be equally *True* and *Real*. If we conceive and express the divine *Grace*, and all *Gospel Doctrines* of *Mystery*, after no other Manner than we *Necessarily* do the *Attributes of God* known even by the *Light of Nature*. And lastly, If this only Method we have of conceiving them be perfectly *Useful*; effectually answering all the *Ends of Religion*, and most strongly *Influencing* our *Moral Practice*.

IF these things, I say, are firm substantial Truths; established upon a solid Foundation, never to be shaken by the utmost Efforts of mistaken Believers, or obstinate Unbelievers. Then, since I am in a Station which obligeth me to fence on both Sides, and ward against Friends as well as Enemies; here I fix my Foot, with open and resolute Defiance to any Man living to assign a good or even plausible Reason; why we may not *Understand* the divine *Grace* as clearly and distinctly; and believe the *Truth* and *Reality* of it as surely, firmly, and usefully, as we can conceive and believe any thing in this World, for which we have the utmost moral Evidence and Certainty? And why we may not *Reason as distinctly, assent, and form Opinions about* the supernatural Influence of the divine Spirit upon the Mind of Man; as we do about the Force or Influence of natural Causes? To which I shall add in the Style of this  
 Author's

Author's Minute Philosopher, *That the same Method of Reasoning may be applyed by any Man of Sence to establish all the Attributes of God known by the Light of Nature or Revelation, as well as all the Mysteries of the Gospel; against the strongest Objections of Infidels and Heretics: And he may thereby make it plainly appear to be Manifest Delusion, and a shameful Want not only of common Logic, but of common Sence and Reason in Men; either to explode the Truth and Reality, or to deny the Useful Knowledge of things divine and supernatural; only for want of such Direct Ideas or Conceptions of them, as they have of things natural and human. Which is no other than by plain Implication destroying the very Nature of the things themselves, and then requiring some Ideas or Conceptions of them. The Absurdity is no less than demanding a Direct Apprehension in some Degree, of things in every Degree Incomprehensible to us As they are in themselves; an Immediate Perception of things, totally Different in Kind from all Objects Immediately perceptible by us; and Purely spiritual Ideas, in a Mind composed of Matter and Spirit: Which is a Knowledge of them utterly impossible to human Understanding; as well as intirely inconsistent with their very Nature, Properties, and Existence.*

F I N I S.













